ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, 



TOGETHER WITH AN 



INTRODUCTORY VIEW 

OP 

PHILOSC^^W, (JENERAL, 

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE REASON. 
BY HENRY P. TAPPAN. 



NEW-YORK & LONDON: 
WILEY AND PUTNAM. 

1844. 



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[TBBUftftAftY 

[Of COHGlEtf 
WASWNGTO* 



Entered accordingty'Acl or Uoh*gress7inlhe year 1844, by 

THE AUTHOR, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. 



J. P. Wright, Printer, 
122FaltonBt.,N.Y. 



PREFACE 



The work here undertaken differs somewhat in its 
scope and design from systems of Logic which have 
hitherto been given to the world. The Aristotelian 
Logic is simply the method of deduction; and. as 
such, it is complete. Subsequent works, in so far as 
they have been strictly logical, have closely copied the 
great master, and have confined themselves to an exhi- 
bition of the deductive principles and processes. Now, 
the deductive method comprehends merely the laws 
which govern inferences or conclusions from premises 
previously established. These premises may, in their 
turn, be inferences from other premises, and so on, to 
a certain extent ; and just so far this method ,4s all 
sufficient. But it is evident that the evolution of pre- 
mises and conclusions, and conclusions and premises, 
must have a limit. There must be premises which are 
not conclusions from other premises, but which arise 
in some other way. Now, a complete and adequate 
Logic ought to exhibit this other way likewise : it ought 
to inform us how the most original premises arise, and 
upon what basis they rest. 



IV PREFACE. 

Other methods indeed have been abroad in the world, 
but without being systematically propounded as parts of 
Logic. Thus the Platonic philosophy really contains 
a Logical dev^lopement of the most original forms of 
human thought, springing out of the intuitive faculty* 
And the Novum Organum of Bacon contains a logical 
exposition of the method of establishing first princi- 
ples through the observation of phenomena. 

Both Plato and Bacon have had many able disciples 
and expounders ; and both are daily coming out into 
a broader and clearer light, not as opponents, but — » 
to adopt the thought of Coleridge — as the opposite 
poles of one great and harmonious system. 

The present attempt, therefore, is to make out the 
system of Logic under its several departments ; and to 
present it not merely as a method of obtaining infer- 
ences from truths, but also as a method of establishing 
those first truths and general principles which must 
precede all deduction. 

With all humility, I acknowledge my indebtedness 
to the great thinkers who have preceded me. I have 
of course read as well as thought ; and my thinking and 
reading are naturally blended together. With this ac- 
knowledgment, may I be permitted to go on with my 
work, without stopping to note narrowly in my own 
mind, or to remark to my reader, when I am drawing 
from original, and when from other sources ? I ought 
perhaps, in justice to myself, to remark that the entire 



PREFACE. V 

plan of this work was struck out several years since, 
and different portions of it written before Professor 
Whewell's and Mr. Mills' elaborate and suggestive 
works had fallen under my eye. 

That Logic really embraces all the parts which I 
hare assigned to it, I think will fully appear in the se- 
quel. It is that branch of philosophy which expounds 
the laws of the Reason as the faculty of truth and 
reality. 

The view which I have taken of Logic, will justify 
the prolegomena. I give the Introduction to Philoso- 
phy in General, in order to point out the relative posi- 
tion and importance of Logic in a philosophical sys- 
tem. And I give the Preliminary View of the Reason, 
because, since this is the faculty which reasons or 
logicizes, I deemed that such a view, if given both 
clearly and briefly, would be satisfactory in this place. 



1* 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 

PAGE 

Section I. Definition of Philosophy ..... 3 

II. Distinction between the Phenomenal and the Me- 

taphenomenal ........ 12 

• III. Of the Reality of the Metaphenomenal . . 16 

IV. The Objective and the Subjective ... 21 

V. Reason and Sense 28 

VI. Sensualism and Transcendentalism ... 31 

VII. Ideas and Laws ....... 39 

VIII. Primary and Secondary Phenomena ... 47 

IX. Antecedence in Time and in Necessary Existence. 49 
X. Ideas the Last Authority *of all Judgments or 

Knowledges . 53 

XI. Divisions of Philosophy : 

I. Metaphysics 59 

Comprehending 

Psychology 60 

Dynamics 62 

Anthropology 63 

Ontology 64 

II. Nomology; comprehending 

The Morale 69 

Esthetics ib. 

Somatology 71 

Logic 72 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Sec. XII. Of the Relations between Philosophy and the Sci- 
ences and Arts] 75 

Geometry 78 

Sciences of Discrete Quantity . . 80 

Natural Science 81 

Conditional and Unconditional Science . 84 

Art 88 

XIII. Reason, the Organ of Philosophy ... 92 

XIV. Criteria of a True Philosophy .... 97 



PART II. 

PRELIMINARY VIEW OP THE REASON. 

Section I. General Introductory Considerations respecting 

the Reason 

II. Outline of the Ideas and Functions of the Reason. 

III. Explication of Ideas ■ 

IV. Explication of the Functions of the Reason . . 



PART III. 



LOGIC PROPER. 



113 

119 
128 
133 



BOOK I. 

PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Section I. Geperal Laws of the Evolution of Ideas . . 141 ] 
II. Metaphysical Ideas ; comprehending 

I. Subject and Objective Exteriority . . 145 

II. Time and Space 146 J 

III. The Infinite and the Finite . . . 149 ! 

IV. Ctuantity ib. 

V. duality 155 

VI. Relation 157 

VII. Modality 163 i 



CONTENTS. IX 

PAGE 

f. III. Nomological Ideas ; comprehending 

I. Law 167 

II. Matter and Spirit 168 

III. Perfection * 170 

IV. Right and Wrong ib. 

V. Freedom and Responsibility ... 173 

VI. Personal Identity ..... ib. 

VII. Immortality 174 

Vf II. The Beautiful, comprehending 

Symmetry 177 

Grace 178 

Regularity, Uniformity, Variety . . ib. 

Determinate Form 179 

The Sublime 180 

Melody 181 

Harmony " ib. 

IX. The Useful 187 

X. Centralization and Diffusion . . . 188 
XL Affinity and Repulsion .... 189 

XII. Life. 190 

XIII. Polarity 191 

XIV- Instinct . ib. 

XV. Regularity, Uniformity, Variety, Sym- 
metry, and Determinate Form . . . 192 

XVI. Identity, Difference, Resemblance . . 193 
. • XVII. Design, Final Cause, Means, and End. 196 

XVIII. Truth 197 

XIX. The Philosophical Idea. ... 199 

XX. Intuition . . . a . . . . 201 
XXL Involution and Evolution ... ib. 
XXII. Analysis and Synthesis . . . 204 

IV. Primary Sensuous Cognitions, or Cognitions of 

the Exterior Consciousness .... 210 
V. Primary Subjective Cognitions, or Cognitions of 

the Interior Consciousness .... 213 

VI. Axioms 215 

Metaphysical Axioms ...... 217 

Nomological Axioms 219 

VII. Of the Characteristics of Axioms in general . 226 

VIII. General Relations of Axioms .... 231 

IX. Definition 235 



CONTENTS. 



BOOK II. 



Section I. 

II. 

III. 

IV. 
V. 

VI. 

VII. 



VIII. 



IX. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

PAGE 

Introduction 241 

Causes and Laws. . . . . . . 244 

The Human Reason, as related to the Objective 

World 252 

General View of Classification .... 255 
Principles determining the Induction of Pheno- 
mena in Classification . . . . . 258 
Distinction between a General Fact and an Abso- 
lute and Fixed Law 269 

The Logic of General Fact 276 

Principles of Elimination : 

I. General Difference with Uniform Agree- 

ment in One Point . . . . 281 

II. General Agreement with Uniform Differ- 

ence in One Point . . . . . 283 

III. Elimination by Corresponding Quantities 

and Intensities 285 

IV. Elimination of the Terms of a Sequence, 
in order to determine which is the Antece- 
dent and which the Consequent . . 287 

Inductive Logic of Universal and Necessary 

Laws 29G 

The Logic of Art 308 



BOOK III. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



Section I. Introduction . 

I II. Analysis of Propositions 

III. Of Propositions, as opposed to each other 

IV. Of the Conversion of Propositions. 
V. Propositions constructed into Syllogisms 

VI. Of Moods and Figures 

VII. Of the Reduction of Syllogisms . 

VIII. Of Modal, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive Propo 

sitions 



311 
313 
318 
321 
325 
340 
344 

347 



CONTENTS. XI 

[ PAGE 

Sect. IX. Hypothetical Reasoning ..... 350 

X. Of the Dilemma 355 

XI. Of the Sorites 358 

XII. Application of the Deductive Formula. . . 361 

XIII. Of Fallacies. 

Fallacies of Deduction 370 

Comprehending 

I. Fallacies in the Formula .... 371 

II. Fallacies in the Matter .... 373 

1. Ambiguous Middle ib. 

2. Fallacies relating to the Connection be- 

tween the Matter of the Premises and 

that of the Conclusion .... 376 
Fallacies of Induction ; comprehending 

I. Fallacies of Observation .... 387 

II. Fallacies of determining General Facts . 390 

III. Fallacies in Inducting Laws . . . 392 
Fallacies in respect to Intuition .... 393 



BOOK IV. 

DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

Section I. Nature of Proof 397 

II. The different kinds of a priori and d posteriori 

Proof ........ 402 

III. Of the Nature of the Relation between Antecedents 

and Consequents 407 

IV. Of Degrees of Evidence 410 

V. Of Testimony 424 

VI. Circumstantial Evidence 430 

VII. Argument from Progressive Approach . . 437 

t YlH. Proving by Example 440 

IX. Reasoning from Experience 445 

X. Reasoning from Resemblance and Analogy . 448 

XL Demonstrative Proof 457 

[XII. Calculation of Probabilities and Chances . . 458 



ERRATA. 

N. B.— The Author regrets the following Errata, which have crept into these 
sheets while passing through the press ; and as a few of them are important, he 
begs the reader at once to make the necessary corrections with his pen. 
Page 17, line 15 from the top, after perception, substitute a comma for the period. 

" 18, line 8 from the top,/or entered, read enter. 

u 20, line 2 from the top, after materialism, substitute an interrogation point 
for the period. 

" 31, line 2 from the top, for the, read their. 

" 35, line 3 from the bottom,/or conveying, read conceiving. 

" 45, line 10 from the bottom, dele of, after possible. 

" 57, line 11 from the top, for phenomena, read phenomenon. 

" 65, line 13 from the bottom, /or omnipotence, read omnipresence. 

" 79, line 1 at the top,/or positivity, read positively. 

" 79, line 6 from the top, for comes, read come. 

" 80, line 11 from the bottom,/or formula, read formulae. 

" 81, line ,,15 from the top, dele of, after ideas. 

" 82, line 1 at the bottom,/or formula read formulae. 

" 96, line 5 from the top, after temple, substitute a semicolon for the period. 

" 103, line 5 from the top, after errors, dele to, and insert before. 

" 186, line 6 from the bottom, for laid, read lain. 

" 200, line 12 from the top, for quick, read quiet. 

" 258, line 8 from the top, after unity, substitute a period for the mark of ex- 
clamation. 

" 329, line 10 from the bottom,/or universal premises, read universal positive 
premises. 

" 371, line 15 from the top, for there can be ground, read there can be not 
ground. 

" 373. In the formula on .this page in the minor premiss, substitute X for Z ; 
and in the conclusion, substitute Z for X. 



mvt *. 



INTRODUCTORY VIEW 



OP 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 



PART I. 

INTRODUCTORY VIEW 

OP 

PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 



SECTION I. 

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 



The term Philosophy in common usage has obtained an 
indefinite and often an improper application. When em- 
ployed alone, and without relation to any specific subject, 
it is generally supposed to refer to natural science : and 
thus a Treatise, or Essay, or Lecture, on Philosophy, would 
be expected to embrace something relating to Mechanics, 
Astronomy, Chemistry, Electricity, or Magnetism. 

Some undoubtedly would go beyond this ; and regard the 
term in its higher applications, as expressing something in 
relation to the doctrines of the intellectual and moral pow- 
ers : or they would simply identify it with Metaphysics, a 
term no less vague and obscure to common apprehension. 

It is to be expected that the affirmation will at first ap- 
pear to many, paradoxical, that Mechanics, Astronomy, 
Chemistry, &c. are not branches of Philosophy : but in the 



4 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

end it will appear perfectly just. Philosophy indeed holds 
a close and most important relation to these sciences : they 
are grand results of philosophy ; but they are not phi- 
losophy itself. And even Metaphysics, general and com- 
prehensive as it is, does not comprehend all philosophy — it 
only forms one of its important divisions. 

In defining philosophy, we may go on to say, that it is 
the Scientia Scientiarum — " the Science of Sciences ; as its 
object is to explain the principles and causes of all things 
existing; and to supply the defects of inferior sciences, 
which do not demonstrate, or sufficiently explain their prin- 
ciples."* Or we may call it the " Science of the Universal 
and the Absolute." But this is not enough. It would be 
like defining Astronomy as the " Science of the Heavens." 
A definition may be just, and yet by reason of its dry, gene- 
ral, technical, and elaborate form of expression, may fall 
short of the true end of all definition, viz., to lead the intel- 
ligence to a clearer insight and a more perfect comprehen- 
sion. 

Philosophy is a word formed from the Greek *«Xocro(pia. 
It primarily expresses a mental affection — a love of know- 
ledge or of wisdom. 

It cannot be questioned that such an affection is inherent 
in the human mind. It appears in feeble infancy — it 
stimulates the activities of the busy prattling child — it forms 
the wakeful earnestness and joy of youth — it stirs nobly in 
manhood — it decays not with the decay of age. It is a 
moving spirit even in savage life, and shows man, when i 
lowest, as still above the brute. This impulse to know,- f\ 

* Ed. Ency. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. O 

this restless curiosity, is connected with the whole develop- 
ment of humanity in Science, Arts, Government, and Reli- 
gion. Co-existent with this love of knowledge is the love 
of external action. Hence, the development of humanity 
appears not only in the cultivation of the intelligence and 
the consequent unfolding of the sciences ; but also in the 
construction of implements and machinery, and in the changes 
and improvements wrought upon the face of Nature. The 
eager love of knowledge, and the no less eager love of ac- 
tion — the impulse to know, and the impulse to no — these 
are elements spontaneously at work in human nature, and 
may be appropriately termed philosophical elements. 

Let us conceive of that period when the Heavens and the 
Earth were finished, and man was created and placed in 
the Earth its inhabitant and lord. Then he had the same 
faculties which he now possesses ; and the Earth was un- 
der the government of the same physical laws which govern 
it now ; but his faculties were undeveloped, and science and 
art had not yet appeared ; and the Earth, whatever modifi- 
cations it might be capable of, stood as it came from the 
hand of the Creator, in uncultivated beauty. But man, as 
he walks abroad upon the Earth, with all the endowments 
of intelligence and feeling, observes the Heavens and the 
Earth, exercises thought, generalises, and forms conclu- 
sions. What is working within him, impresses its form 
upon all outward things : — the forest is levelled, and culti- 
vated fields appear ; the mountain and the valley feel the 
touch of his hand, and put on new appearances ; he opens 
a way across rivers, and covers the ocean with fleets; 
where rivers are wanting, he creates them ; he digs into the 
crust of the Earth, and brings up minerals and appropriates 



6 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

them ; he calls into being a thousand useful arts ; he scat- 
ters over the face of the Earth convenient habitations, and 
crowds them together into cities. But not only does he 
change the face of the Earth, and put to his uses its vari- 
ous materials — he also establishes government, administers 
law, and awards justice : he speaks eloquence into being ; 
poetry born in his heart, is expressed in flowing numbers ; 
he perfects sound into music ; he takes the chisel, and from 
the marble quarry spring up forms whose beauty is divine ; 
and majestic temples, which seem born with them as their k 
fit habitation : he takes the pencil, and dipping it in the 
colours of heaven, imitates every form of life, and advances 
beyond Nature herself : he affirms, reasons, and believes ; 
draws out pure abstractions from his thought ; advances in- 
to Nature, and searches out laws for her phenomena ; and 
thus builds up systems of science : he invents a method of 
analysis, and, in the laboratory, compels Nature to reveal 
her more secret processes ; and, not content with this world, 
the light of heaven, which has lighted him to his labors here, 
he seizes upon as his minister, and makes it reveal to him 
the worlds from whence it has travelled. Still more — 
from these finite forms, he ascends up to the Infinite : 
he is a worshipper of God, and an expectant of immor- 
tality. 

" Imagine a being who had been present at the earliest 
days of the universe, and of human life ; who had seen the 
external surface of the Earth, as it came forth from the 
hands of Nature, and looked upon all the beauty of those 
ancient times ; who had seen the beautiful forms which 
Nature presented, and heard the melodious sounds which 
she then uttered ; in a word, a being who had been a spec- J 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 7 

tator of the first exhibition of the primitive world, and who 
should return at the present day amidst the prodigies of our 
industry, our institutions, and our arts ; would it not seem 
to him in his astonishment as if he no longer recognised 
the ancient dwelling-place of man; as if beings of a supe- 
rior order had transferred their abode to the Earth and had 
metamorphosed it ?"* Or contemplate an epitome of the 
whole mighty development of mind in a single individual, 
appearing first on the shore of this world a feeble infant, 
and in less than a century assuming the character of a 
Newton, a Leibnitz, a Milton : and as an illustration of the 
changes made in the condition of the world by human in- 
vention and skill, take the history of Mechanics, of the 
Needle and the Telescope. 

In contemplating these developments and changes, what 
enquiry springs up, yea, irresistibly springs up, in the mind ? 
Do we not ask, how all this came to pass, and why the de- 
velopments and changes came up under these particular 
forms ? Do we not ask, why did man change the face of 
the Earth? Why did he create government? Why did 
he give birth to science and art ? Where and how did the 
development of his mind begin ; and how did it proceed ? 
What are the laws of his thought, the grounds of his know- 
ledges and beliefs, the forms of his reasonings, and the 
methods of his investigations ? What are the laws of his 
emotions and passions ? What are the capacity and force, 
and what the laws of his will ? 

Enquiries like these evince the workings of the philosophic 

* Introduction Generate al'Histoire de la Philosophic, par M. Cousin. 
Lee. I. — Linberg's Translation. 



8 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

spirit : they are found under some form, in some degree in 
every human mind. Few indeed take in that whole field 
of enquiry, which embraces the complete development of 
humanity : but whether in the child, or in the adult, in the 
savage, or in cultivated man, you perceive questionings 
after the origin and reason of things — after efficient and 
final causes — an earnest prying of the mind into something 
beyond mere visible and tangible forms, you there perceive 
the workings of the philosophic impulse — the ^jXotfopia. 
This is the dawn of philosophy. The impulse to 
know and to do, the elements of philosophy spontaneous- 
ly at work in the mind, lead forth the developments and 
changes above mentioned. The enquiry after the causes 
and reasons of these developments and changes, after they 
have in any degree taken place, is the higher form of the 
'pjXoo'opja, and leads forth the mind to the construction of 
philosophy as a system. Under the first form, the mind ap- 
pears intent upon its objects, thinking, feeling, doing, and 
making its inherent energies to appear in external effects. 
Under the second form, it turns back upon itself, that is, 
makes itself its own object by an act of reflection, and finds 
out its own reach and limits, its own aims and laws. 

*jXotfo<pia, from expressing the impulse to know and the 
consequent causal activity of man, and from expressing, 
after the development of humanity has taken place, the im- 
pulse to seek after the laws and principles which have 
governed this development, comes to express these laws and 
principles themselves. These laws and principles, like the 
simple desire of knowledge, act spontaneously in the deve- 
lopment of humanity. They are in the highest sense philoso- 
phical elements of our being, inseparable from it, and ener- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 9 

gizing as a plastic power within, and as such distinguish- 
able from philosophy as an expressed system without, laid 
down in books, or in the lectures of the schools. The first of 
course gives birth to the second, as thought gives birth to 
language. 

In that early period of humanity to which we have ad- 
verted, it could not exist as a developed system : it was then 
in man as a light and a power, under which he thought and 
acted, but upon which he did not reflect : Thus the idea 
of the useful, led him to change the face of nature and to 
originate the ordinary arts: The idea of justice, led him 
to constitute government and law : The idea of the beauti- 
ful, led him to the creations of painting, sculpture, music, 
and poetry : The inherent laws of his intelligence, guided 
him in his reasonings ; he believed, because he could not 
disbelieve, and faith appeared in him like a sublime and di- 
vine instinct : When he looked out upon the phenomena 
of the world, he assigned them causes, because he could 
not think of them without this relation : And from finite 
being, his mind necessarily rose up to the conception of the 
Infinite Being — he became a worshipper under the energy 
of a spontaneous and irresistible idea. 

At length reflection began — when it began we know not, 
but its beginning was the birth of philosophy as a system de- 
veloped and recognised. By the act of reflection or self- 
conciousness, the mind turns back upon itself, and makes 
itself the object of its own contemplations. All the phe- 
nomena of the mind, are presented in the field of its con- 
sciousness ; — the sensations which are caused by the external 
world — the affirmations of the reason — the volitions — must all 
alike appear there, in order to be known. There is an ordi- 



10 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

nary consciousness which belongs necessarily to every man ; 
but reflection is a special and voluntary consciousness, and 
thence called a philosophic consciousness, which appears ! 
only when the mind becomes the object of its own observa- 
tion by an act of Self-determination. 

Now in the exercise of this philosophic consciousness, the 
mind questions itself respecting the grounds of its know- 
ledge and its faith — respecting the forms of its thinking, and 
the modes of its investigation — respecting the grounds of 
its decisions in arts, morals, government, and religion : it 
makes those very enquiries which we recognize in ourselves, 
when, reviewing the progressive development of humanity, 
we are struck with wonder and admiration at what man has 
accomplished, and at what man has himself become. The 
results of these enquiries form systematic philosophy. 



Let us sum up here the preceding observations, so as to 
present a succinct definition. 

1. Philosophy, from ^iXofrtxpfa, expresses the inherent de- ! 
sire of knowledge in the human mind ; and as closely con- 
nected with this, the desire of action. Under the impulse 
of these desires man begins to acquire knowledge ; and to 
exert his causality in appropriating the materials supplied 
him from the earth — in working in various arts, and in 
modifying the face of nature. 

2. After a time he begins to reflect* upon the develop- 
ment of his mind, the facts he has observed, and the 
works of his own power and skill : and now the $i\o<focpia 
or love of knowing, takes a new direction and impels him 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 11 

to search out the causes, laws, and forms of the various de- 
velopment of his own being. 

3. These causes, laws and forms really existed subjec- 
tively, inseparable from himself, before he began to mako 
them the object of his thought and curious enquiry : and 
they, as the first principles of his being, and as governing 
its manifestations, are the substantial elements of philosophy. 

4. These first principles of his being are known through 
reflection or self-consciousness ; and when stated methodi- 
cally, under proper divisions, and with clear definitions and 
expositions, form Didactic Philosophy. 

The term $t\o<fo$ia, which at first expressed only the 
desire of knowledge, or love of truth spontaneously work- 
ing in the human mind, is thus employed to express all the 
grand results of this high and glorious impulse. 



12 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 



SECTION II. 

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHENOMENAL AND THE 
METAPHENOMENAL. 

Consciousness is the common field of all our mental 
activity. All our sensations, our perceptions, thinking, and 
reasoning, our imaginations and fancies, our emotions, pas- 
sions, determinations, and volitions, alike appear and are re- 
cognised here. These affections of our being are not the 
movements of an insensate mechanism : we know them in 
their going on, and we know ourselves as the subjects of 
them. 

Now there is an important distinction to be drawn here. 
The distinction between the immediate objects of conscious- 
ness, and those objects which, although known, or at least 
supposed to be known, yet lie without the sphere of con- 
sciousness. The immediate objects of our consciousness 
are phenomena, and these only are phenomena ; while those 
objects which, by supposition, lie beyond immediate con- 
sciousness, are metaphenomenal. 

What are the immediate objects of consciousness, or of 
what are we immediately conscious ? This is the first en- 
quiry. 

Let us begin with our sensations. The sensations are af- 
fections of our inner being, and unquestionably are the imme- 
diate objects of consciousness. But there are many percep- 
tions and judgments which come up to view in connection 
with the sensations, which, together with their objects, are 
entirely distinct from the sensations. The bare sensations 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 13 

are those of color, of sound, of fragrance, of taste, of 
touch, of heat and cold, of titillation, and of pain and plea- 
sure. In these are contained what are commonly called the 
secondary qualities of matter : but this designation cannot 
be made from the bare sensations. We have in the sensa- 
tions mere internal experiences, or movements of our own 
inner being. We are not conscious of matter, distance, 
space, substance, or cause ; — we are conscious of sensa- 
tions oniy. We may be conscious of the action of other 
faculties of our being, affirming or perceiving the existence 
of body, distance, space, substance, and cause ; but the 
bare sensations are no such affirmation or perception. I 
think it must be plain to every mind that will reflect a lit- 
tle, that if we had only the sensations above mentioned, we 
should have no knowledge of an external world whatever. 
The same conclusion must be drawn with respect to the 
primary qualities of matter. These are extension and re- 
sistance. But resistance, to immediate consciousness is 
only an internal experience, and extension only a repetition 
of this experience. There is nothing in this experience to 
give us a knowledge of any thing external: time, space, 
substance, and cause, are not contained in a mere inward 
experience, a mere modification of our own being. In 
the primary qualities, therefore, we have no immediate 
consciousness of an external world. It thus appears, in 
general, that we have an immediate consciousness only of 
certain affections or modifications of our own being. What 
immediately appears to us, what we immediately know, are 
these affections. These are truly the pJieno?nenaL If there 
be an external world, — if there be substance, space, time, 
and cause, — they are not phenomenal or immediately recog- 



14 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

nised in the consciousness, nor do they come directly from 
the sensations. 

Let us suppose, then, that we have faculties by which we 
can know an external world, and by which we can know 
substance, time, space, body, and cause, either through the 
sensations or independently of them ; then, with respect to 
these faculties, the enquiry arises also, what are the imme- 
diate objects of consciousness ? 

The faculties themselves are not the immediate objects ; 
nor are the objects perceived, and the truths affirmed the 
immediate objects : simply the acts of these faculties are 
the immediate objects of consciousness. Thus in perceiv- 
ing any external object, as a house or a tree, I am not im- 
mediately conscious of the house or the tree, but of sensa- 
tions of color, and of the act of perceiving. The external 
object does not come into my consciousness, but only the 
sensations and perceptions, and these are simply movements 
of my own being. Indeed, my own being, as a substance 
endowed with faculties of feeling, knowing and willing, is 
not immediately presented to my consciousness : I am con- 
scious only of certain phenomena, and of acts of judgment 
connecting the phenomena with external objects and inter- 
nal faculties. 

In processes of deep thinking and reasoning, the same 
holds true. In studying out some mathematical theorem, 
for example, the recondite mathematical relations, — the ne- 
cessary and absolute truths are not immediate objects of 
consciousness ; — but the acts of attention, the acts of think- 
ing and reasoning — the modifications of my own being in 
order to know and comprehend, and in knowing and com- 
prehending. The mathematical relations, the necessary and 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 15 

/ 

absolute truths, do not come into consciousness as phe- 
nomena, — the acts and modifications of my own being are 
the phenomena, while the relations and truths are metaphe. 
nomenal. 

Again, God is invisible : He is neither as a substance ad- 
dressed to the senses ; nor is he manifested to the conscious- 
ness as a modification of our interior being ; but still, if 
known at all, he must be known by these modifications : 
He is not the phenomena of consciousness, but known 
through them. 

Here, then, we have the broad and clear distinction between 
the phenomenal and the mefaphenomenal. Sensations, emo- 
tions and passions, acts of perceiving, judging, reasoning and 
imagining, acts of choice and volition — these, as the imme- 
diate objects of consciousness, are phenomenal ; but the 
causes of sensation, emotion, and passion, the objects and 
truths perceived, affirmed, or deduced, the objects of the 
imagination, of choice and volition — these, not being the 
immediate objects of consciousness, are metaphenomenal. 



16 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

SECTION III. 

OF THE REALITY OF THE METAPHENOMENAL. 

The reality of the phenomenal is not questioned. That 
I have certain sensations, perceptions, emotions, passions, 
and volitions, this is immediate knowledge and conscious- 
ness : but whether the objects of these acts and experiences 
of my being, have a real, positive, and independent ex- 
istence, this may be and has been questioned, and even de- 
nied : The reality of the metaphenomenal has been ques- 
tioned and denied. 

It will be readily granted by all, that by the imagination 
we can create objects which are unreal ; and that in our 
actual perceptions we are often mistaken, and seem to per- 
ceive what we afterwards discover to have no reality, or to 
be a very different object from what we thought it to be. 
But, beyond all this, it has been contended that there is no 
objective reality whatever ; — that the tree and the house 
which I now see, and which everybody sees, has no ex- 
istence out of, and independently of, the perception of which 
I and everybody are immediately conscious ; and the same 
of all objects, whether external things, or internal truths. 

It is undeniable that men generally believe in the reality 
of the metaphenomenal ; nay, that only a few speculative 
philosophers, have ever denied it. 

Now, the aim of philosophy is to explain the actual devel- 
opment of our being, of all that man has thought and done. 
Hence even the errors of man must be explained. If, there- 
fore, men have erred in their belief in the reality of the 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 17 

metaphenomenal, it must be shown both that it cannot 
exist, and how men have come to entertain this universal 
but erroneous belief. 

Those who believe in the reality of the metaphenomenal 
are indeed required, as philosophers, to show, how it is legiti- 
mately attained : but, on the other hand, those who deny 
this reality, in opposition to a common sentiment, are justly 
required to explain this common sentiment. 

The denial of the metaphenomenal had its origin in a 
mode of explaining the attainment of it. Its reality was at 
first assumed as unquestionable ; but the explanation given, 
finally developed the denial as a legitimate consequence. 

The cardinal principle of this mode, was the assumption 
that the mind could perceive only by coming in contact 
with the object of perception, ^fh accordance with a sup- 
posed axiom, nihil agit, nisi cum, et ubi est, nothing can act 
except when and where it is. This principle was suggested by 
an apparent law in physics, viz : that one body can act 
upon another only by actual contact. The truth of this 
law is now disputed, and even the impossibility of an actual 
contact between the particles of bodies firmly believed. But 
if the law were unquestionable in respect to physics, on 
what legitimate grounds can it be taken as a law of equal 
appropriateness and validity in explaining the perceptions 
of the mind ? That the mind can perceive only by coming 
in contact with the objects of perception, must be a mere 
assumption. Besides, by the physical analogy, the mind 
perceiving as well as the object perceived must be material. 

Having assumed the law, however, the great aim now 
naturally became to explain how the contact between mind 
and its objects takes place. 

B 



18 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

In the first place, it was plain that mind and the external 
material objects do not immediately come in contact. 
The fnind perceives therefore, not the material objects 
themselves, but certain representations of these objects, 
which were variously called species, forms, images, and ideas. 
But what are these representative forms 7 Various were 
the explications. The old Aristotelians held that they are 
made up of fine material particles which entered the differ- 
ent organs of sense, and form themselves into the required 
image in the brain, and that there the mind comes in con- 
tact with them. 

After the age of Des Cartes, this theory was abandoned; 
and the image or idea was spoken of as an impression made 
upon the brain like that made upon wax by a seal. Here 
no material particles were received into the brain through 
the organs of sense ; but, impressions being made upon the 
organs from without, images were shaped upon the brain 
corresponding to the external objects. 

It is evident that the representative image once admitted, 
must become a fruitful subject of speculation. These specu- 
lations, however, all tended to one result — a result proclaimed 
in part by Berkley, and fully by Hume — namely, that above 
mentioned, the denial of the metaphenomenal. 

If we know only the representative images affirmed to 
be in the mind, then we can have no legitimate knowledge 
of any thing out of the mind ; for, as in all our attempts 
to approach exteriority, we are met merely by these im- 
ages, they are all that we can possibly attain to. 
Hence, Berkley, on this principle, cannot be confuted, when 
he affirms, " The existence of a body out of a mind per- 
ceiving it, is not only impossible, and a contradiction in 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 19 

terms, but, were it possible, and even real, it were impossi- 
ble that the mind should ever know it." — Hume is equally 
consistent in his sweeping affirmation : " Now, since nothing 
is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all 
ideas are derived from something antecedently present to 
the mind, it follows that 'tis impossible for us so much as 
to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different 
from ideas and impressious. Let us fix our attention out 
of ourselves as much as possible ; let us chase our imagi- 
nations to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the uni- 
verse ; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, 
nor can we conceive any kind of existence but those per- 
ceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. 
This is the universe of the imagination ; nor have we any 
idea but what is there produced.' ' 

The denial of the metaphenomenal appeared under two 
forms : — First, that of Idealism. Here the facts of immedi- 
ate consciousness were taken as the only universe, " the 
universe of the imagination." Secondly, that of Material- 
ism. Here the representative images were merely con- 
sidered as arising from material objects, and impinging upon 
material organs, and thence affecting the brain, or senso- 
rium. What now is the soul which receives the next im- 
pression but a finer form of matter, and what are its sensa- 
tions and ideas but a movement of the internal organism ? 

There is a class of philosophers, and Reid may be placed at 
their head, who endeavor to dissipate the dogmas of both 
Idealism and Materialism by the stern voice of Common 
Sense. Every man believes in the metaphenomenal — in 
objective reality and truth ; therefore, it exists for every man. 
Here common sense pauses : but the philosophical impulse 



20 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

still urges to the enquiry, Is there not reality in opposition 
to Idealism and Materialism,, Is there not reality indepen- 
dently of a mere subjective persuasion ? The first are forms 
of a philosophy which, on its received principles, demon- 
strates conclusions in opposition to general belief. And 
is the general belief incapable of explaining itself by demon- 
strating the reality of its objects ? Must it merely doggedly 
affirm itself in opposition to the philosophical diagrams parad- 
ed before it ? And shall the united efforts of the human mind 
end in the birth of two great parties, both occupying absurd 
positions — the one affirming, " I prove, although I do not 
believe"; and the other, "I believe, although I cannot 
prove" ? May we not prove and believe, and believe and 
prove 1 

It is now evident, I think, that the cardinal aim of 
philosophy must be to reach the metaphenomenal. If 
the existence of the metaphenomenal can be demonstrated, 
then the facts of consciousness, the phenomenal, are ac« 
counted for. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 21 

SECTION IV. 

THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE. 

In determining the actual development of our being, in 
its various relations, we find ourselves at once introduced to 
two forms of being : the subjective, and the objective. 
The subjective, under its simplest and most unique form, 
is myself; and the objective, under its most general form, 
comprehends whatever is not expressed in the term me, or 
myself. Again, the simple subjective, myself, becomes ob- 
jective, when, in an act of self-consciousness, I make it the 
object of my thought. And again, the objective general, 
or whatever is not myself, must be subdivided into the purely 
objective and the subjective general. The purely objective 
is that which is not only not myself, but totally unlike my- 
self — different in kind — having no properties in common. 
The subjective general is that which, embracing myself, is 
like myself — the same in kind — having properties in com- 
mon : a distinction of personalities, of laws, causalities, and 
sympathies — but yet agreeing in being connected with per- 
sonalities, in implying the presence of mind, and in being 
capable of being referred in kind to the finite and the infi- 
nite mind. 

I will explain : I have developed to my own conscious- 
ness a thinking principle, a will or free causality, and va- 
rious emotions and passions ; and these, either as constitut- 
ing or as being inseparable from my own personality, con- 
stitute the simple subjective. Now, I conceive of other 
personalities like my own, each being to itself the simple 



22 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

subjective ; — and of these distinct personalities I conceive 
of one as the Eternal and the Infinite, while all the others 
are finite of various degrees. 

Now, all these personalities come under the denomination 
of the subjective general. They are all of one kind, and 
each one is capable, by an act of self-consciousness, of mak- 
ing itself the simple subjective, and of considering all else 
in relation to itself as objective ; and capable of even mak- 
ing itself an object to itself. 

Besides these distinct personalities, which are directly 
like myself, and palpably of the same kind, there are 
other forms of the subjective, which, however, are ulti- 
mately resolvable into the former. The vegetable and 
animal life — the forces and laws of the material creation, 
chemical affinities — the informing power of animal and 
vegetable physiology, that power by which every ani- 
mal and every plant is produced invariably after its own 
kind, from the vitalized seed ; — these forces, laws, affinities, 
and informing powers — these busy workers and co-workers 
— these wise and exact regulators of the whole natural 
world — what are they 1 There is design and causality here 
which cannot be conceived of without mind : Whether the 
mind be in the material masses, formative and governing 
by direct influence and immediate presence ; or whether it 
have invisible, unconscious, and incomprehensible agents, 
makes not ; mind is here as the seat of power, and the 
fountain of law. If all that is personal belong to the sub- 
jective general, then also must these laws and forces belong 
to the subjective general likewise ; for, although they do 
not directly appear as personalities, because giving us no 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 23 

manifestation of self-conscious determination, still they can- 
not but be involved in some way in such personalities, since 
their explication and conception is impossible in any other 
way. 

But what is then the pure objective, or that which can 
in no sense be subjective ? Whatever is directly known by 
the senses, or by the muscular organism, is purely objective. 
I see and smell a flower — that is, I have certain sensations, 
which arise from the correlation between my senses and a 
certain substance lying in space and exterior to myself. 
Now, I say not that I could form the judgment here ex- 
pressed, without subjective principles ; but the exterior sub- 
stance which I name a flower in expressing this judgment, 
I conceive of not as life, but as a product of life, and up- 
held by life ; not as a formative power, a. forma for mans, but 
as a substance informed, a forma formata. Again, a ball 
is tossed towards me, and I catch it in my hands. In doing 
this, I have the sensation of hardness, or, in other words, 
I experience a muscular resistance. Now, here again, I do 
not say that I could have formed this judgment without sub- 
jective principles ; but the ball, or body, I conceive of not 
as itself a resisting cause, or as a gravitating power, but as 
that in which such a cause and power are habitant ; and 
while cause and power belong to the subjective, I cannot but 
assign the gross material phenomena to the purely objective. 
They are not me, nor like me : they are not life, or forma- 
tive power : they are not a force or a law. " In the mate- 
rial sense of the word Nature, we mean by it the sum total 
of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and 
consequently of possible experience — the aggregate of 



24 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

phenomena."* All that is exterior to me, and phenomenal to 
the outer senses, and which does not account for and explain 
itself — as, for example, effects require causes to explain 
them, — is purely objective. 

But not only are all material phenomena purely objec- 
tive ; all phenomena of consciousness which are known 
merely as acts or movements of the thinking, willing, and 
sensitive faculties — that is, all which comes into the consci- 
ousness through the outer senses, and thence called sensa- 
tions ; and all which is presented in the activities of the 
internal faculties, the perceptions, reasonings and imagina- 
tions, the acts of memory and fancy, and the volitions, 
emotions, and passions, are objective likewise. 

The distinction between the subjective general, therefore, 
and the pure objective, is co-extensive with the metapheno- 
menal and the phenomenal. — But in this point of view, it is 
a distinction in the kind or nature of the particulars compared. 
The metaphenomenal is subjective, because it is that upon 
which the development of our being ultimately rests: the 
phenomenal is objective, because it is that in which the de- 
velopment of our being appears actually taking place. 

The development of the Intelligence must ultimately rest 
upon ideas, principles, or first truths. In the process of this 
development, appear its perceptions, reasonings, imagina- 
tions, and so on. 

The development of the Will must ultimately rest upon 
the laws of the Reason. In the process of this develop- 
ment appear choices and volitions. 

The development of the Sensitivity must ultimately rest 



Coleridge. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 25 

upon the laws of the Reason, likewise. In the process of 
this development appear the various sensations, emotions, 
and passions. When the subjective is fully attained, — 
that is, when all principles are known, all laws obeyed, all 
fitting sensations, emotions, and passions brought out and 
regulated by reason, then the development of our being is 
complete. While this development is going on, the pheno- 
menal, or the purely objective, is thrown out. 

But, although the phenomenal is always and only objec- 
tive, we have seen that the subjective can also become 
objective ; but this last distinction does not, like the 
former, arise from a difference in kind, but merely from a 
change of position or relation. Every intelligent personal 
subject can make all else objective to itself — nay, can make 
itself objective to itself, by an act or reflection. 

To sum up the preceding distinctions, we have all pos- 
sible forms of being embraced under the subjective and the 
objective, as follows : 

1. The subjective simple, or myself '; 

2. The subjective simple, taken as objective to myself; 

3. The objective general, or whatever is not myself ; 

4. The objective general, divided into the subjective gene- 
ral and the pure objective ; — the first comprising what- 
ever is metaphenomenal — the second whatever is phe- 
nomenal. 

The distinctions made and explained above, give us the 
leading philosophical conception, and enable us clearly and 
succinctly to state the leading problems. The leading 
philosophical conception is that of explaining the develop- 
ment of my being. Now this development presents me, 

First, the phenomenal, or what appears to my immediate 



26 INTRODUCTORY VIEWS OF 

consciousness. This conciousness I can divide into the 
exterior, or that which contains mere sensations ; and the 
interior, or that which contains the movements of my own 
faculties. Now, all these phenomena, whether of the exte- 
rior or interior consciousness, constitute the pure objective,* 
because they lie before the reflective power. 

Secondly, I have the metaphenomenal, or that which lies 
beyond the phenomena : and this admits likewise of a two- 
fold division. The metaphenomenal in the world without, 
which is to account for the sensations ; and the metapheno- 
menal within, which is to account for the acts which take 
place upon the sensations. Now, the metaphenomenal with- 
out and within, constitutes the subjectivef general, because 
it lies under and sustains the phenomenal as the ground of 
its possibility. 

Hence we announce a main problem in philosophy, name- 
ly : To determine the validity and the forms of the subjec- 
tive, and to shew its relations to the objective. 

Again, in the development of my being, the earliest con- 
viction at which I arrive is ..the Ego sum, I am. Now, start- 
ing with this conviction, I find that all which I know, 1 know 
not only in the field of my consciousness, but also in the 
determination and activity of my personality. I find thus, 
that I am a simple, unique subject, lying in some sort under 
all being whatever, determining the mode and extent of its 
cognizance, and even its reality. 

Hence we announce another problem in philosophy, no 
less important than the preceding, namely : To determine 

* Ob and jaceo. t Sub and jaceo. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 27 

objective reality ; or the reality of the objective general,— 
of that which is not myself. 

The first problem is disputed by the sensualists, or those 
who derive the materials of all cognition from experience. 
The second is disputed by the idealists, or those who, like 
Berkley and Hume, deny the possibility of knowing an ex- 
ternal world. 

Once more : The subjective simple which attempts to reach 
the objective general, attempts also to reach itself. This 
it can do only by making itself an object to itself. Hence 
arises a new and unique form of knowledge through the 
power of reflection or self-consciousness ; and thus we have 
the problem : To determine the faculties and laws of the sim- 
ple subjective. 

These three problems cover the whole field of Philosophy, 
as will be apparent when we come to consider its cardinal 
divisions. 



28 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 



SECTION V. 

REASON AND SENSE. 

In the present developed state of my faculties, I know my- 
self as Body and Spirit. Spirit is the subjectivity within, 
which thinks, feels, and wills. The body, the material ta- 
bernacle of the spirit, is a part of the great system of ex- 
ternal nature : it is the same, mechanically and chemically ; 
and it lives and decays like all other living things. What 
is its relation to the spirit ? It is the curious and wonderful 
mediator between matter and spirit. Through the nerves, 
distributed into five external senses, and through the muscu- 
lar organism sometimes called the " sixth sense" and the 
sense of resistance, nature reaches the spirit. What is the 
product of this union ? Sensations, and nothing more. No 
thought, no knowledge— simply an experience of sound, 
color, sapidness, fragrance, touch, and resistance. But the 
cognitive faculty within, is not unfurnished. It is prepared 
to know the world, from whence the sensations arise ; and 
it is prepared to know itself. Sensation conditionates the 
reason in two ways : — 

First — In sensation, in common with all the subjective 
faculties, it wakes to self-conscious activity. It here begins 
to live its knowing and thoughtful life. 

Secondly — Sensation furnishes materials of cognition ; 
or signs which the reason appropriates readily and familiar- 
ly, in reading the external world. 

The lower faculty, as it were, sings a joyful matin song 
under the window of the reason ; then this glorious power 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 29 

awakes, and looking out, recognizes the reality, beauty, and 
laws of God's works, and the Great Maker himself; and 
then, turning back upon itself, sees there the image of the 
Divine wisdom and love. In knowing the world, the mind 
is developed, and all its faculties brought into exercise ; and 
as consciousness necessarily accompanies every internal 
movement, the mind is likewise revealed to itself. 

The first knowledge of both spirit and nature is sponta- 
neous. Afterwards, comes the period for philosophical re- 
flection upon the one, and philosophical observation upon 
the other ; and then, psychology and natural science are 
born. 

As our faculties become unfolded in their relations with 
nature, important changes take place. The sensations and 
muscular resistance, which originally could directly of them- 
selves give us no knowledge, are now transformed into apt 
and familiar signs of all external bodies, forms and qualities. 
The different shades of light and color, now associated 
with bodies, forms and qualities, readily represent them, and 
we seem to know every thing by the eye. It is now an al- 
most universal sense. So also the different sounds received 
by the ear, enable us to distinguish persons, things, places, 
and distances. The same principle applies to all the senses. 
The reason has appropriated them all, and made them such 
quick and familiar servitors of knowledge, that we now seem 
to have an immediate perception of the outer world. On 
the other hand, Reason, having from the first activity of the 
sense which opened the play of the mental powers, entered 
upon its career and unfolded itself to itself, is now no longer 
dependent upon sensuous experience as occasions of intellec- 
tion. It can now retire within itself, and think with closed 
c* 



30 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

senses. Memory and Imagination now wait upon it, to sup- 
ply it with facts and images ; and within its own depths it 
has opened fountains of pure, absolute, and necessary truth. 

As the body is thus the mediator through which the outer 
world reaches the spirit, so also it is the mediator and in- 
strumentality through which the spirit reaches the external 
world, and impresses itself upon it. One set of nerves obey 
nature, and give sensations to the spirit. Another set of 
nerves obey the spirit, and move the muscular organism. 
The tongue and the hand are the two great instruments by 
which the mind does its work without. The arts of indus- 
try and beauty — all the changes — all the improvements 
which the spirit hath made in the great field of nature, it 
hath made by the tongue and the hand. 

What, then, is humanity, but spirit conditionated on the 
one hand in its incipient activity, and in its knowledge of 
an external world, by sensuous impressions? And condi- 
tionated on the other hand, in the exertion of its causality 
and plastic power, by an apt material instrumentality 1 



PHILOSOPHY IX GENERAL. 31 



SECTION VI. 

• SENSUALISM AND TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

We now arrive at the point of departure of two great 
systems of philosophy. Taken under the modern develop- 
ments, Locke may be said to represent the one, and Kant 
the other. 

Sensualism, concentrating its thought in the sensuous con- 
ditions of knowledge, loses sight of the truth that they are 
merely conditions ; and goes on to expound them as the 
primary and radical elements of knowledge itself. Hence 
the utmost development of the human intelligence presents 
us only the combination and expansion of these elements. 
The reason is absolutely incapable of arriving at any truth 
whose generating or constitutive elements have not first en- 
tered the senses. The senses thus become the sources and 
measure of all knowledge. 

Transcendentalism begins with sensation no less than sen- 
sualism. Kant opens his great work with the affirmation, 
"That all our knowledge begins with experience, does not 
admit of a doubt." But then transcendentalism does not 
make the sensations, the radical, generating and constitutive 
elements of knowledge ; but conditions, under which the 
cognitive faculty begins to act, and suggestions, upon 
which, by its own force, and according to its own ideas and 
.laws, it forms cognitions. 

The views which the two systems entertain respecting 
the primordial state of the mind, differ widely. Locke re- 
presents the state of mind before sensation takes place by a 



32 INTRODUCTORY VIEWS OF 

sheet of white paper, and Hobbes by a slate, in which there 
is no idea or element of knowledge, but merely a suscepti- 
bility of being written upon. To this view all the adhe- 
rents of this system conform. 

Transcendentalism represents the mind as having the 
possibility, the scope, the law and the form of all knowledge 
within itself. Whatever the mind be, whatever its facul- 
ty of knowing, and with whatever elements it be primordi- 
ally furnished, it is easily conceivable that in the act of 
knowing it brings this faculty and these elements to bear. 
Now, in order to determine the reach of the cognitive fa- 
culty, and whether the mind really have primordial elements 
of knowledge, we need only examine our actual knowledges. 
The sensations can easily he analyzed : and if they be 
the primary elements of knowledge, they will appear every 
where in the composition and deduction of thought : for 
every mere composition must preserve the original elements, 
and can shew nothing absolutely new; and every deduction 
must keep within the measure and kind of the starting 
points. 

But if in our actual knowledges, there be found elements 
which, so far from belonging to the sense, appear in their 
nature and characteristics to transcend the utmost capacity 
of the sense, then these elements unquestionably lay claim 
to a higher origin. And if these elements, when disinte- 
grated from our complex knowledges and held up before the 
reason, are readily recognised and reaffirmed by this faculty 
as necessary, universal and absolute, then may they legiti- 
mately be claimed as the product of this faculty alone. 

Now the sensations are those of the eye, consisting of light 
and color ; of the ear, consisting of the various sounds ; of 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 33 

smelling and tasting, consisting of odor and sapidness in 
their endless varieties ; of touch, consisting of simple and 
uniform impressions upon the nerves wherever they are dis- 
tributed ; of muscular resistance, consisting of hardness and 
softness, smoothness and roughness ; and, in the last place, 
the sensations of pleasure and pain, and of titillation. 

But our actual knowledges bring to view substance, cause, 
time, space, truth, justice, and many other ideas of similar 
characteristics — ideas which no analysis of the mere sen- 
sations can ever unfold. And while these ideas can be 
brought under the observation of the senses, even now that 
they are known, no more than they could at the first be 
evolved out of them, to the reason itself they are intui- 
tively true, universal, and necessary. 

When we speak, therefore, of transcendental truth in the 
just philosophical sense, we speak of nothing doubtful, but 
of that which both in itself is most certainly known, and in 
its relations makes all other knowledge possible. 

The application of the term transcendental is convenient 
and appropriate, because it is descriptive. It tells the simple 
fact, that the human mind, while it is susceptible of impres- 
sions from without by means of the organs of sense — im- 
pressions which conditionate its first development, and af- 
ford materials for an important department of its know- 
ledge, — nevertheless contains within itself those elements 
of truth, those forms of knowledge, those first principles of 
all thought and reasoning, which transcend the reach of 
the senses. The lower faculty is connected with that cor- 
poreal organism, through which spirit communes with nature. 
It occupies the sphere appropriated to it. and does its work 
well. The higher faculty of the pure Reason has its sphere. 



34 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

also; and is just as capable in its sphere of announcing 
primordial truths, the forms of perception, and the laws of j 
reasoning, as the sense in its sphere is of giving forth sensa- 
tions. 

From this it is evident that the metaphenomenal and sub- I 
jective, identify themselves with the transcendental. 

Locke is a great and venerable name ; and no one may i 
speak lightly of him. But an excessive veneration has led j 
some who disclaim sensualism, to claim for his doctrines j 
certain saving clauses in those passages where he speaks of 
Reflection, as one of the sources of ideas. 

There is no school of philosophy that might not be ambi- I 
tious of retaining as an authority, such a man as Locke : and 
one cannot well conceive how any thing less than a supreme 
and honest love of truth, could influence any one to dis- 
pense with his authority. 

For my part, I can say from my heart that I admire and 
love Locke. His clear and penetrating intellect, his good i 
sense and manly candour ; his strong English heart, his pure j 
English style ; and his decided moral and religious princi- 
ples, always quietly about him like the coat he wears, like j 
the air he breathes, like the familiar tones of his common ! 
discourse, and the prevailing expression of his honest face, — 
altogether I admire and love him. And notwithstanding i 
the errors of his system, I shall continue to read and admire j 
and love him. 

Locke refers all our knowledge to two sources, Sensation j 
and Reflection. The latter, as he defines it,* is undoubted- ! 
ly the interior consciousness, — it embraces the operations of 

* Book II., ch. 1, § 4. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 35 

the mental faculties : and the former is equivalent to the 
exterior consciousness. All that appears to us, therefore, 
appears in the consciousness ; and all which there appears, 
consists of the simple sensations, and the operations of the 
mind, and whatever is revealed in or by the operations of the 
mind. Now so far the Transcendentalist will go with Locke ; 
so far there is no difference whatever. But when we come 
to consider the mental operations themselves, we find the 
great point of departure of the two systems. According to 
Locke, the mental faculties, when they go into action, not 
only begin conditionally and in poir t of time with sensa- 
tion, but they also derive all the materials and elements upon 
which their activity is expended, from sensation, and the 
conscious experiences of the mental activity itself. The 
sensations, together with the acts of " perception, thinking, 
doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the 
different actings of our own minds," are the first radical 
elements from which all possible knowledges are formed. 

Now, the introduction here of the ideas of reflection or 
the interior consciousness, by no means changes the charac- 
ter of the system ; for these, no less than the sensations, are 
merely phenomenal. The operations of the mind, as well 
as the sensations, are conditions of knowing the transcen- 
dental truths. Thus the succession of thought, as well as 
the succession of sensations, is a condition of knowing time. 
Indeed, the most important truths are revealed upon condi- 
tion of the experiences of the interior consciousness. But 
recollect that the contents of sensation and reflection, while 
to the transcendentalist they are mere conditions of convey* 
ing time, space, substance, power, and so on ; to Locke and 
his school they are the simple ideas or elements out of which 



V 



36 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

these, and all the most abstruse truths are compounded, or 
drawn.* 

The transcendentalist can say that sensation and re- 
flection, or the exterior and interior consciousness, are the only 
sources of our knowledge ; understanding by this that all 
that we know we know either upon the experience of sen- 
sations, or in the acts of knowing, of which we are con- 
scious ; but this is a very different thing from making the 
sensations and the acts of knowing the materials or elements 
out of which all that we know is compounded. I have al- 
ready distinguished between the mere act of knowing and 
that which is known, calling the first the phenomenal, and 
the second the metaphenomenal ; and just as broadly as that 
distinction are the two systems to be distinguished. Sen- 
sualism merges every thing into the phenomenal : Transcen- 
dentalism transcends or passes beyond the phenomenal, and 
reaches the universal and necessary truth, the substantial 
and real being ; — that which is the rational ground of all 
phenomena, without which they could have had no exis- 
tence, and without which, now that they exist, they cannot 
be explained and accounted for. 

Men generally, and even most philosophers, in daily 
thought and occupation, are more with the phenomenal than 
the metaphenomenal, and thus from the familiarity of use, 
the phenomenal comes to be regarded as more unquestionable 
and certain than truths of pure reason. I think, however, 
that a little quiet thinking must dissipate this illusion from 
every mind. How do we reach the phenomenal, that is, our 
sensations and the operations of our mental faculties ? Is it 

* Book II., ch. 12, § 1 and § 8. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 37 

not simply by a form of knowing, — namely, consciousness 1 
Now, if there be a form of knowing adapted to the metaphe- 
nomenal, why do we not know this as well as the phenome- 
nal ? But there is such a form of knowing, namely, Intui- 
tion, or the direct perception and insight of Reason ; and 
we are conscious of the exercise of the function implied in 
this form — we are conscious of knowing by intuition. Is 
not the act of intuition, of which we are conscious, as valid 
as the sensation of which we are conscious ? Nay, more, 
is not the truth, which we are conscious of knowing in the 
exercise of the intuitive function, as valid as the conscious 
act by which it is known ? To immediate consciousness, as 
a form of knowing, we refer sensation and the operations of 
the mental faculties. To the intuition of reason, as anoth- 
er form of knowing, we refer the transcendental truths. 
This is the whole account of the matter. The sensualistic 
school will insist upon it that the objects of immediate con- 
sciousness alone are the elements of knowledge — while the 
transcendental school affirm that the fundamental elements 
are found beyond immediate consciousness. 

But the principle on which transcendental truths are de- 
nied, involve the denial of all objective reality whatever, be- 
yond immediate consciousness. It is not merely the ideas 
of pure reason, which lie beyond immediate consciousness ; 
all the pure mathematics transcend it likewise. Nay, the 
entire outer world transcends it ; for all must allow, that not 
the received objects of the external world are immediate 
objects of consciousness, but only the sensations supposed to 
arise from these objects. Indeed, in this very way were 
Berkley and Hume led to deny all objective reality, out of 



38 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

consciousness. It is plain that they deduced their doctrines 
legitimately from the system of Locke. 

I conclude here by remarking, that the denial of the meta- 
phenomenal as that which transcends immediate conscious- 
ness must involve the destruction of all philosophy. If we 
are shut up to mere phenomena, we can account for nothing. 
We have only to observe, classify, and name; to mark a 
ceaseless involution and evolution, where nothing absolutely 
begins, and nothing can be truly finished. Thus the whole 
field of human thought becomes a panorama of shadows. 



FHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 39 



SECTION VII. 

IDEAS AND LAWS. 



The word " idea," according to the usage of Locke, ex- 
presses whatever we are immediately conscious of. The 
word " idea," according to the usage of Plato, expresses 
what we cannot be immediately conscious of. In the usage 
of Plato, however, " idea" does not express any thing trans- 
cendental of consciousness in the external world, but only 
the metaphenomenal, lying in the mind itself. And here 
we see at once the fallacy of all that Locke has said respect- 
ing innate ideas. Taking the word in his usage, that ideas 
cannot be innate, is a truism ; for nothing is more evident, 
than that mere sensations and acts of the mind, that is, mere 
phenomena, cannot be innate — they exist only as they ap- 
pear in the consciousness. His reasoning, therefore, does 
not reach the point in debate. On the other hand, " ideas," 
in the Platonic usage, cannot but be innate, since the word 
expresses those primordial laws of knowing, thinking and 
reasoning, and those necessary and absolute elementary 
truths which are inseparable from the mind itself. 

In order to form a clear conception of ideas in the Pla- 
tonic, or transcendental sense, let us recur to the distinction 
of the subjective and the objective. The subjective simple, 
or mind, is directly opposed to all supposed forms of being, 
lying out of mind, and comprised in the phenomena of sen- 
sation, and whatever in the exterior world is connected with 
their production. It is the opposition of the spiritual sub' 
jectivs, myself, and the unspiritual objective, exterior to my- 



40 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

self. Now, the true PJatonist or transcendentalist views 
every thing existing beside mind, as made by mind, after the 
laws of mind, and primarily for mind. 

It is a kindly doctrine, and to be heartily received, that 
one design of the great Creator, in forming the countless 
tribes of animals, was to multiply the forms of enjoyment. 
Every sensitive creature hath its sphere of life, its bountiful 
provisions, and its term of happiness. But irrational crea- 
tures comprehend neither the world in which they subsist, 
nor the curious workmanship of their own organism. The 
world, in its wise designs, its exact order, and its beautiful 
forms, is not made for them. It is made for them only in 
respect to the gratification of their mere animal wants. 
But under all these higher points of view, it is obviously 
made for rational beings. Our physical constitution, indeed, 
finds its fitting provisions and accommodations in the world ; 
but we are not confined to these. To us, the world is a vast 
and sublime exhibition of design, skill, causative and regu- 
lative force, harmonious relations, and beautiful forms. 

We can conceive of a period when there was as yet no 
creation, and the Creator dwelt alone in the immensity of 
his being. Now we cannot but believe there was arrayed 
before his mind, every possible form of being, every possible 
constitution of a universe, every possible variety of life ; 
and there, also, lay the map of the worlds which were or- 
dained actually to be. In his mind was all the science and 
art, according to which, the Universe was to be bodied forth ; 
and there, too, was that creative energy, which had but to 
exert itself, and Creation would stand forth in all its glory 
and magnificence. Now the preconceived laws, forms and 
relations of the universe, as they lay in the Divine mind, 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 41 

are a part of the Divine ideas. Viewed in relation to the 
Eternal Reason, as giving the original thought and law, they 
are ideas simply. Viewed in relation to the Divine imagin- 
ation, as giving forth definite forms and relations, they be- 
come ideals, models, or archetypes. Divine ideas, as the 
originating thoughts and archetypes of worlds, cannot be 
exhausted in the actual creation, for God is infinite. Again, 
there must be in the Divine mind thoughts and conceptions 
which do not take their embodiment in material forms. 
Such are those which relate to pure science and moral gov- 
ernment. Whatever thus lies in the Divine mind, consti- 
tutes the Divine ideas. 

Suppose the infinite mind to constitute another mind 
like itself. This mind, of course, must be finite ; but inas- 
much as it is mind, it must have the same ideas, according 
to its measure, which are found in the Divine original. 
These ideas, perhaps, could not be given in a fully developed 
state, that is, drawn out into all their consequences and ap- 
plications, for this would appear to border upon the infinite ; 
but given in their elementary state, to be unfolded by the 
active and free thought of the being thus gloriously consti- 
tuted. Such a being may be conceived of, as existing with- 
out a body and organs of sense — a pure spirit ; and although 
thus without sensation, and supposed even to have no know- 
ledge of a real world, in its pure thoughts and imaginations 
it might have, not only mental activity, but emotions of 
beauty and grandeur exquisitely delightful. For such emo- 
tions even now are awakened in our minds, without calling 
in the aid of immediate sensation, when in dreams, and es- 
thetical efforts of the imagination, we are entertained with 
forms of greatness and beauty beyond the power of mere 



42 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

sense to reveal. But now, suppose this being to be intro- 
duced to the actual creation, — would not the possibility of its 
knowing and comprehending it, arise from the correspon- 
dence between the outward reality and the ideas within ? 
Would it not understand the real world, just so far as it had 
the preconceived law and archetype within ? At least, to a 
being destitute of sensation, no other possible way could ex- 
ist. Let us, then, make another supposition, namely : — That 
a being be constituted like the Divine mind ; but instead of 
existing as a pure spirit, that it be connected with a materi- 
al body, with organs of sense — this body itself forming a 
part of the system of things without ; and that its relations 
to this body are such that it cannot become conscious of 
existence, nor begin the play of its powers, until sensations 
are produced within, by corporeal impressions without. 
Shall the law of perception and the forms of knowledge now 
be changed, because sensuous conditions are demanded for 
their development ? It is impossible and inconceivable. 
The originating power and law of thought must still remain 
in the spirit, to which they of necessity belong. This last 
new form of being, is new only in respect to the conditions 
of its beginning to act, and the mode and conditions of its 
communication with the external world ; while the possibility, 
and the determinate form of its knowing, still lie in its in- 
herent spiritual faculties, and its necessary and constitutive 
ideas. The universe represents the Divine thought ; and now 
it cannot but represent the thought given likewise to this 
highly endowed creature, whom we recognize as man himself. 
When man, therefore, was placed upon the smiling out- 
spread earth, and beneath the bright starry heavens, he did 
not find himself a stranger and out of place. His mind and 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 43 

heart responded to the works of his Creator. His spirit 
drank in the living beauty of all things, because he was 
formed to know the beautiful. He saw the wise design of 
Creation, because he himself was endowed with a designing 
mind. He searched and found out the order of the heavens 
and the earth, and the great and all-regulating laws, because 
the principles of science, the foundations of law, were laid 
in his own intelligence. We have a striking illustration of 
this mutual adaptation and harmony in the science of mathe- 
matics. This science is drawn directly from the reason of 
man. By this science he is enabled to measure the planets. 
The Great and Divine Mathematician made the universe 
according to these lofty and exact principles. He then gave 
his creature the capacity to construct this pure and unerring 
science ; and thus man has a ladder by which he can 
mount from earth to heaven. 

If ideas of the reason are embodied in the external 
world, determining its forms, relations, and movements, 
what do they become when thus embodied ? The an- 
swer is given in one word — Laws. Force or power has its 
origin in the Divine causality ; but that which appropriates, 
compounds, directs, and governs force, is Law, answering to 
the Divine idea. All ideas do not become laws, regulating 
Force in the exterior sphere of their manifestations. Some 
ideas give the law to perception, and determine our know- 
ledges : — others give the law to the fine arts, and determine 
the forms of the beautiful : others, again, give the law to 
the free causality or the responsible will, and determine mo- 
ral rectitude. But these all go out into some form of law. 
Law and idea are thus the same. Viewed in respect to the 
reason, originating, conceiving, and projecting, we speak 



44 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

of the idea : viewed in respect to the sphere of determi- 
nate movement and action, we speak of the law. 

Now, if the object of science be to ascertain the laws of 
the universe, we see how it depends upon, and must grow 
out of, philosophy. 

There is a period in the development of mind in relation 
to external nature, when observation and thought first awake. 
It is a period of spontaneous communication between the 
soul and nature, springing up from the relation between the 
ideas within and their embodiment without. A voice from 
without calls to the soul within, and the soul joyfully answers 
back. In the very impressions made upon the sensitivity 
by nature, the occasion appears when the ideas are required, 
in order to know and comprehend. The reason is noticing 
carefully, and struggling to comprehend : in the very effort 
of earnest thought it perceives ideas, vaguely, perhaps, at 
first, and immediately carries them out to nature as a tenta» 
tive law. The first efforts to assign laws to nature, and to 
expound her great system, may be crude and imperfect, wild 
and imaginative, because observation is limited, and reason 
only partially developed ; but the process is the same in kind, 
at the dawn of science, and at its glorious noontide. It is 
the union of ideas and observation. This first period may 
be called the Time of A. wakening. 

The second period is the Time of Prophecy. The mind 
now realises in clear and decided reflection, what it wants. 
It proceeds, therefore, to make out the system of nature by 
mapping out the related bodies, their forms, magnitudes, and 
relations, and assigning them forces and laws. In this work 
the mind is prone to become intoxicated by its first glimpses 
of the grand mechanism of the world, and to imagine that 



FHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 45 

the great discovery is completed : here, then, it pauses, and 
gives itself up to dogmatizing. In reality it has only ar- 
rived at a theory, or a tentative system of nature : it has 
made prophecies more or less clear, but nothing yet is es- 
tablished. 

The third period is The Time of Elaborate Observa- 
tion, Experiment, and Calculation. Dissatisfied with 
preceding results, and yet taking advantage of them, the 
mind now sets itself at work afresh. It endeavors to think 
more profoundly, to reason more logically, and thus to es- 
cape from empty conjectures and fallacies. Now it aims 
to observe more extensively and accurately, at the same time 
reducing its observations to an exact and convenient classi- 
fication ; and not content with the facts of nature as they 
present themselves of their own accord, by ingeniously con- 
trived experiments it forces out new and more curious facts 
from the hitherto silent and veiled bosom of nature. Now, 
too, it diligently cultivates pure science, that it may con- 
struct formulae for the solution of the problems which come 
thronging in. 

The fourth period is the Time of Determinate Sci- 
ence. Now imaginary conceptions, and the ideas of mere- 
ly possible $L systems, are set aside, and the true idea 
finds its corresponding law. 

Thales belongs to the first period ; Pythagoras and Pto- 
lemy to the second ; Copernicus, Kepler, and Tycho Brahe 
to the third ; Newton and La Place to the fourth. 

In the amazing advance which has been made in deter- 
minate science, and in perfecting methods of investiga- 
tion, the four periods in respect to any new subject may be 
said to be passed through in one generation and in the life- 
time of one philosopher. 



46 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

Natural science will then only be completed when all the 
phenomena of nature shall be reduced under a universal 
causality, and assigned to fitting laws known in their con- 
formity to ideas. Then the ideas and the laws will, as it 
were, stand face to face, and the phenomena be the intelli- 
gible words which pass between them. 

The Mathematical, Moral, and ^Esthetical Sciences are 
formed in the same way. The ideas of the reason pro- 
ject the forms and relations, and give the laws. The per- 
fection of these sciences lies in their conformity to the ab- 
solute ideas. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 47 



SECTION VIII. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PHENOMENA. 

We shall begin with the exterior consciousness. The pri- 
mary phenomena are the simple sensations. These are in 
themselves incapable of projecting themselves beyond the 
sphere of consciousness. But when the ideas are added to 
them, moulding and appropriating them by the laws of per- 
ception, then they become merged into positive judgments 
respecting bodies in space with forms, qualities, distances, 
magnitudes, and movements. The sensations now habitu- 
ally are not thought of as simple affections of the sen- 
sitivity ; but whenever they arise, the mind is busy in 
noticing the goings on of the world in space. Hence, 
when we speak of phenomena in this developed state of 
perception, we mean not the mere sensations, but the actual 
appearances and changes of bodies, of which the sensations 
have now become such apt and familiar signs that we lose 
sight of their original simplicity and bareness. Just as in 
language, when we hear the familiar and appropriated 
sounds, or see the familiar symbols, we seem at once to be 
present to the world of thought and imagination. 

Now the phenomena transferred from the sensitivity, and 
characterized and classified as the phenomena of an out- 
ward world, constitute the secondary phenomena of the ex- 
terior consciousness. 

A similar transformation takes place in the interior con- 
sciousness. Here the primary phenomena are simple acta 
or movements. But the ideas here also add themselves to 



48 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

the phenomena, and we come to know a subject — a person- 
ality, endowed with power, intelligence and freedom. The 
mere phenomena could not carry themselves back into spir- 
itual reality, but of themselves would remain a bare flow of 
appearances through the field of the consciousness, without 
telling the fountain from whence they came, or whither they 
were tending. But in the very giving forth of the phe- 
nomena in the consciousness, the ideas make their appear- 
ance under the form of an intuitive perception and affir- 
mation ; and then the mind knows itself as spirit endowed 
with reason, power and freedom, and perceives design and 
law in every movement. Thencefoward there are no more 
bare phenomena ; but it is the reason, knowing, designing, 
and commanding ; the will exerting causality ; the sensi- 
tivity alive with emotion and passion j the glorious mind 
exerting itself in its proper sphere. The acts and affections 
of definite powers are the secondary phenomena of the in- 
terior consciousness. 

The above distinction is an important one ; for men 
generally think of phenomena under their secondary 
form in the developed state of the mind : many, therefore, 
might fall into some confusion when the phenomenal is 
represented as lying wholly in the field of consciousness, 
under its primary presentation. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 49 

SECTION IX. 

ANTECEDENCE IN TIME, AND IN NECESSARY EXISTENCE. 

This is what Cousin styles Chronological, and Logical 
Antecedence. 

The first is the antecedence of the primary phenomena ; 
the second, the antecedence of ideas. 

To a mind not placed under sensuous conditions, the 
phenomena of the interior consciousness would alone claim 
antecedence in time. To man, who is mind under these 
conditions, the phenomena of the exterior, as well as of the 
interior consciousness, claim this antecedence. Bid the 
phenomena alone exist, no question respecting necessary 
existence could arise ; but in the actual manifestation of 
ideas within the sphere of thought, this question cannot be 
avoided. > 

The distinction here held up to view is very important, 
and really not difficult to comprehend. In the actual de- 
velopment of our being, the primary phenomena obvi- 
ously must first appear in the order of time ; for sensation 
is the first awakening of conscious existence, phenomena 
are the immediate objects of consciousness, and conscious- 
ness is the first form of knowledge. The knowledges to which 
we attain through the consciousness of phenomena, are pre- 
sented under the form of judgments or affirmations made by 
the Reason. But these judgments, as acts of the Reason, are 
phenomena of the interior consciousness ; as phenomena they 
must rest upon something antecedent ; but this something an- 



50 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

tecedent is not sensation, for sensation stands only in the rela- 
tion of a condition, and does not contain the elements of 
the judgments. Upon analysis, these elements are found 
to be ideas. Ideas, then, must have the antecedence of 
necessary existence. Mere sensation, in a particular form 
of being, may exist without involving antecedent ideas in 
the sphere of that being; but judgments or knowledges 
formed upon the basis of ideas, necessarily involve their 
prior existence ; and as ideas can be traced to nothing higher, 
their antecedence must be that of necessary existence. 

Sensations demand a previous necessary existence, only 
as all phenomena demand antecedent causality. But the 
phenomena of the interior consciousness, in addition to this, 
demand a constructive reason. 

Sensations are known before cause is known ; and yet as 
without an antecedent cause they could not have existed, 
so neither could they have been known under the causal re- 
lation, without the antecedent idea of cause. Affirmations of 
the reason appear, before the reason and its ideas come 
into the field of reflection ; and yet, had not these had a ne- 
cessary prior existence, the affirmations would not have been 
possible. 

Experience is the conditionating starting point in the or- 
der of time. Ideas are the determining starting point in 
the order of rational judgments. 

Experience marks the time when the knowledges begin. 
Ideas alone make the knowledges possible. Experience is 
the dial-hand which tells the hour of the mind's morning 
when it awakes to thought. Ideas necessitate the movement 
of the dial -hand itself. 

Again : As the sensuous experiences of the exterior con- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 51 

sciousness conditionate the reason in the order of time in 
the development of those ideas by which it knows the ex- 
ternal world ; and as the experiences of the interior con- 
sciousness conditionate it in the order of time in the devel- 
opment of those ideas by which it knows the intellectual 
world ; while, on the other hand, in the order of necessary 
prior existence, ideas determine all the knowledges arrived 
at : so, likewise, the particular judgments formed respect- 
ing objects in either world, conditionate the universal truths 
in the order of time ; while these truths, in the order of ne- 
cessary prior existence, determine the particular judgments. 
For example : in the external world the particular judgment 
that a given body is in space, precedes in time the univer- 
sal judgment that every body must be in space ; while the 
universal judgment comprehended in the ideas of space and 
substance, must have had a prior necessary existence in or- 
der to make the other possible. And in the interior and in- 
tellectual sphere, although the affirmation that all phenome- 
na must be assigned to causality, would not have been 
formed until a particular instance of causality had appeared ; 
still, in the order of necessary prior existence, the universal 
truth must have been embraced in the inherent idea of cau- 
sality, or the particular judgment assigning a particular phe- 
nomenon to an appropriate cause, would have been impossi- 
ble, as haying no basis on which to make its appearance. 

To sum up the whole in brief : In the development of our 
being, the phenomenal as to time precedes the metaphe- 
nomenal ; in necessary existence, the latter precedes the for- 
mer. The phenomenal is first known, but it could not be 
known at all in its actual state, unless the metaphenomenal 
had had a prior existence : and as the universal belongs 



62 1NTB0DUCT0RY VIEW OF 

only to the metaphenomenal, the universal and particular 
come into the same conditionating relations. The particu- 
lar is first known, and yet it could not be known at all un- 
less there had been a necessary prior existence of the uni- 
versal. The phenomenal, are first appearances in time : the 
metaphenomenal, cause them by a necessary spontaneous 
power. The metaphenomenal existed out of the relation of 
time, and independently of it ; when the phenomena were 
given in this relation, then the condition was supplied, under 
which, the metaphenomenal could be apprehended by an act 
of knowing standing in this relation also. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 53 



SECTION X. 

IDEAS THE LAST AUTHORITY OF ALL JUDGMENTS OR KNOWLEDGES. 

A judgment or knowledge is an affirmation of the rea- 
son. When expressed in language, it becomes a proposi- 
tion ; because, it then passes beyond the sphere of the indi- 
vidual consciousness, and is propounded to general thought. 

Every proposition consists of a subject and predicate. 
The subject is that of which the affirmation is made. The 
predicate is that which is affirmed of the subject. The af- 
firmation is either positive or negative ; that is, an affirma. 
tion of agreement or disagreement. 

Fixing the mind upon the question of agreement, or dis- 
agreement, it is evident that there are only two ways in 
which it can be determined, — namely, by deduction or by in- 
tuition. If by deduction, then the subject and predicate 
are compared by means of a third or middle term, with 
which they both agree ; or with which one disagrees, and 
the other agrees. This forms the syllogism, which will be 
analysed hereafter. But a question arises, respecting the 
agreement of the two terms with the third, respectively : — 
Is this known by deduction or by intuition ? If by deduc- 
tion, then we have had a previous comparison subsidiary to 
the one in hand. But again, how was the agreement seen 
in this previous comparison, — by deduction, or by intuition ? 
If by deduction, then there must have been a comparison 
still more remote. Thus, A agrees with B, because they re- 
spectively agree with C. But A agrees with C, because A 

E* 



54 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

and C respectively agree with X. And B agrees with C, 
because they respectively agree with Y. Again, B agrees 
with Y, because they respectively agree with Z ; and so on. 

It is manifest that this series of retrogressive deductions 
cannot be continued ad infinitum. We must at last arrive 
at a point where the agreement is seen, without a middle 
term, by direct insight or intuition. We thus arrive at what 
is generally called a first truth, — a truth which neither 
admits of nor requires a demonstration. Such are the axi- 
oms of geometry. Here, then, is a resting-place of thought 
— here is an absolute authority. The axiom is authorita- 
tive, because it is drawn out of the pure reason, and per- 
meated with its ideas. For, plainly, the axiom could not be 
formed, if the reason were not furnished with the ideas of 
relation, equality, and identity. The reason, out of its own 
thought, and by its own authority, forms the axiom. A 
succession of comparisons thus conducts us upward to the 
idea as the last authority. 

Let us next view the subject and predicate separately. 
The subject can be thought of without the predicate ; and 
the predicate without the subject ; — each being a distinct 
cognition. Now the question may be started, How do we 
come by each distinct cognition introduced into the com- 
parison 1 And here it may appear upon analysis, that each 
is the result of a previous comparison ; and still further, 
the terms which enter into this previous comparison, may 
themselves be drawn from a comparison lying still farther 
back. But, as in the former case, the series of comparisons 
must at length come to an end, and we must arrive at cog- 
nitions which are obtained without a comparison of forego- 
ing cognitions. Take, for example, the proposition, Every 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 55 

body is in space. We have here the cognition of body, and 
that of space : Now, if it were granted that body is derived 
from a preceding comparison, it is plainly impossible that 
space could be thus derived. In space, then, we have a 
simple original cognition. The same must appear in 
tracing back every cognition. These first elements of 
thought, whatever they be, must be the foundations of all 
the subsequent cognitions. If, according to Locke, these 
first elements were merely the phenomena which form the 
immediate objects of consciousness, they undoubtedly would 
be the foundations of all the subsequent knowledges, as he 
has represented them. 

According to the transcendental system, however, the 
original elements are ideas or simple intuitions of the pure 
reason, given upon sensuous conditions, but not formed out 
of them. The truth of the latter system appears upon the 
last analysis of our knowledges, since this analysis does not 
give us bare phenomena of the interior and exterior con- 
sciousness, but ideas, as the constitutive elements. 

We may next view the subject and the predicate in their 
particular relation to each other. Here propositions take a 
two-fold designation. They are either Analytical or Syn- 
thetical, 

First, the Analytical.* Here the subject contains the 
predicate ; and, in the form of the proposition, the predicate 
is wound out of it. Nothing more is really said in the pre- 
dicate than what is implied in the enunciation of the sub- 
ject ; but for the purpose of definition or explanation, that 
which is implied in the subject, is stated fully and clearly. 

* AvdXvoi. to unwind or unravel. 



5<5 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

For example : when we say, Body is extended, the predicate 
extended affirms nothing more than what is implied in Body, 
for body is inconceivable without extension. The immediate 
basis of every analytical proposition must, therefore, be the 
cognition expression in the subject. Then the question 
comes up next, What is the basis of the cognition itself? 
And here, as before, we are carried back to some origi- 
nal element lying in the reason, or in the sense, or in both. 
But as the sense cannot supply the constitutive elements of 
the cognition, but only its condition, we are inevitably led 
to assign the idea of reason as the last authority and basis 
of all propositions of this class. 

Secondly, the Synthetical.* Here the subject does not 
contain the predicate, but the latter contains a distinct cog- 
nition, which is added to the former for the enlargement of 
the thought. For example : when we say, every bodygravi* 
tales, or has weight, the predicate is not contained or ne- 
cessarily implied in the subject, for body, as. a resisting and 
extended substance, is a possible cognition before the know- 
ledge of gravity is attained ; and this gravity is a new cog- 
nition, attained and joined to the former, in some other 
way. Now, there are but two ways by which the new cog- 
nition can be attained, viz : by observation, or by intuition. 
Hence arises the distinction of synthetical propositions into 
a posteriori and a priori. 

That every body gravitates is a synthetical proposition d 
posteriori, because we gain the cognition contained in the 
predicate by observation, or sensuous experience projected 
into the outer world, and revealing the secondary phenomena. 

i • I t ■ ! ' ' ' » — — » 

* Zwridnitt, to put together. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 57 

But even this predicate does not find its ultimate authority 
in the observation itself, since the observation could not have 
been moulded without the d priori cognitions of space, 
cause, and substance. The d posteriori only gives us the 
sensuous fact which appears first in a succession in the re- 
lation of time ; while the d priori gives us the constitutive 
idea. 

Synthetical propositions d priori are those whose predi- 
cates are attained by direct intuitions, and without the in- 
tervention of any sensuous experience. For example: 
Every phenomend must have a cause. Here, not only is the 
predicate not unwound from the subject, but no observation 
of phenomena in any succession whatever can afford any 
suggestion or type of it. The phenomena reveal only phe- 
nomena to observation : but these being given, the reason 
supervenes and reveals the idea of cause by its own insight 
and authority. Hume, indeed, very consistently affirms 
that there is no cause demanded or really existent, because 
he admits no elements of thought beyond the phenomena 
themselves. But unless we adopt this bare statement — for 
philosophy it cannot be called — we must make the synthe- 
sis of cause in the above axiom, by intuition of reason alone 
—that is, either the predicate is nothing, and the proposition 
absurd, or the basis is an d priori principle. 

It appears, then, from the preceding analysis of proposi- 
tions, that whether we consider them in the comparison of 
the subject and predicate, of which they are composed, or in 
the deduction of the terms taken separately, or in the par- 
ticular and interdependent relations of the two terms, we 
are inevitably in the last result led to the ideas of the rea- 
son as the last authority on which they rest. But inas- 



58 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

much as every form of knowledge and belief, when express- 
ed in language, takes the form of a proposition, it must fol- 
low that the ultimate basis of all knowledge and belief must 
be the ideas of the reason. 

In making our last appeal to Reason, we are not wanting 
in reverence to the Great God our Maker. On the contra- 
ry, we are bowing before him with the profoundest homage : 
for the ideas revealed in our reason, are there implanted by 
Him — are his own voice within us. And when by holy 
prophets he sends us a special revelation beyond and above 
that which is given naturally in the constitution of our 
reason, we receive it, both because it claims to come from 
the Infinite Reason by attending signs and wonders address- 
ed to the sense, and because it contains everywhere, in its 
great truths provisions and duties, the resplendent marks by 
which we cannot but recognize its source. It is as if, see- 
ing with a clear vision the whole pathway up to the vesti- 
bule of Heaven, when the gate of Heaven itself is opened 
upon us we know that we are witnessing no illusion, for al- 
though new visions burst upon us, we feel assured they are 
those to which such a pathway must lead us. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 59 

SECTION XI. 

DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The pure objective depends upon the subjective — thephe* 
nomenal upon the metaphenomenal. Hence the latter, as 
sustaining and accounting for the former, becomes the ma- 
terial of philosophy. 

Now, in the most general conceptions which we form of 
the subjective and metaphenomenal, we have, 

First : Substance, endowed with faculties or functions, 
and causes or forces. 

Secondly : Laws, or that which determines and regulates 
the manifestations and movements of the first. 

Philosophy in relation to the first, in accordance with old 
usage, we shall call Metaphysics.* 

The second, — if we may venture to frame a term — we 
shall call NoMOLOGY.f 

I. — Metaphysics. 
Metaphysics treats of that which, as actually existent and 
productive or creative, lies beyond the physical, or the mere- 
ly phenomenal. I think, feel, and will : What is that 
which thinks, feels, and wills ? What is that which lies be- 
yond the mere phenomena of the thoughts, feelings, and vo- 
litions ? Again : through my senses, and my muscular or- 
ganism, I attain to an exterior world, whose forms £ call 
material. What lies under or beyond these primary and 

* Mera Qvaiicri, i. e. beyond the physical, 
t Hopos \oyos, i. e. the doctrine of law. 



60 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

secondary qualities, and these various forces ? What ac- 
counts for these changes — these perpetual modifications ? 
In the development of my being, I am presented with the 
physical or phenomenal ; — and the enquiry is, What is the 
metaphysical or the metaphenomenal, which is to account for 
my development in this direction? 

The answer to these enquiries is given by Psychology, 
Dynamics, Anthroiology, and Ontology. These may 
be considered as the divisions of metaphysics, and subdivi- 
sions of philosophy. 

Psychology. 

Psychology* is that part of metaphysics which accounts 
for all the phenomena of consciousness, in so far as they are 
modifications or manifestations of the subjective simple. 

In Psychology, we have the whole being of man given in 
its inherent powers and faculties, and in its relations to God 
and the world. In Psychology, we effect the analysis of the 
reason, and arrive at its eternal and absolute ideas. In 
Psychology, therefore, we find the basis of Logic, Esthetics, 
Morals, Politics, and Religion, and of Science generally. 
That the above is strictly true, any one may realise to him- 
self by reflecting upon the operations of his mind, when en- 
deavoring to attain to any knowledge whatever, or when 
endeavoring to execute any thing, or when disciplining him- 
self to any state or condition of the passions. All his think- 
ing, purposing, and willing, and all his discipline of the pas- 
sions, lie within his consciousness, and are inseparable from 
himself. Whatever he may attain to as really exterior to 

* *vw Ao^oj, the doctrine of the soul. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 61 

himself, 'becomes his, only by some modification of him- 
self in relation to it. 

What is the psychological method ? It is to examine the 
facts of consciousness, and by these to arrive at the facul- 
ties and compass of our being, It is by facts of conscious- 
ness that we arrive at every thing ; and yet there can be no 
facts of consciousness without bringing to view the simple 
subjective. My aim may be to arrive at something belong- 
ing to the subjective general, or at something belonging to 
the purely objective, but still, I, the simple subjective, am 
there permeating the whole — I am there thinking, imagin- 
ing, remembering, comparing, generalizing, reasoning, de- 
termining, exerting causality, or putting forth emotions and 
desires : and whatever else I may arrive at, I do not arrive 
at it without a further development of my own faculties, 
without knowing something more about myself. Indeed, I 
do not only in this way perpetually see myself, however I 
may be engaged, but my own faculties assume to me the 
importance of measuring to me the universe : I can know 
only upon condition that I have the faculty of know- 
ledge ; and however abundant may be the objects of know- 
ledge, the number and perfection of the cognitions must de- 
pend upon the capacity and vigor of the cognitive faculty. 

But although Psychology, as embracing the science of our 
mental constitution and its faculties, embraces in some sort 
all science, since whatever is known, is known by these fac- 
ulties, and since in every act of knowing, feeling, or doing, 
these faculties are brought to light, — still it is clearly dis- 
tinguishable, as a particular branch of Philosophy. It is 
strictly the doctrine of the mind as a distinct entity — the 



62 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

doctrine of the simple subjective : — in fine, it is self-know- 
ledge. 

When through the phenomena of the mind we have ar- 
rived at a knowledge of the faculties of the mind, together 
with their characteristics, their distinctions, their relations, 
and their unity, we have arrived at Psychology. 

Dynamics. 

Dynamic* Philosophy treats of the life and working pow- 
ers of nature. On every side we see the forms of a uni- 
versal life— in the myriads of the animal and the vegetable 
tribes. Everywhere, also, powers and energies are at work, 
in large masses and in small, as presented in the vast forms 
of astronomy, in the winds and tides, in magnetism and 
electricity ; and in the minute forms of chemical affinities. 
It is impossible for us to reflect upon the productive life of 
nature, and the forces at work in nature, without enquiring 
after their origin, their dependency, their centre. In this 
enquiry the mind is irresistibly led upward to the infinite 
and absolute life, and the infinite and absolute power. Dy- 
namic philosophy ends its enquiry in God, who filleth all 
in all. 

We have before us the distinction between the phenome- 
nal or purely objective, and the metaphenomenal or subjective. 
We have also the subjective as embracing the energies of 
thought, will, and feeling, as found in myself, and in other 
beings like myself, both of the finite and infinite degree ; — 
and the energies, life, and forces at work in material masses, 
those masses which are extraneous to me, and known to me 

* Avvanig,, energy or force. ;1 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 63 

by their correlations with the sensitivity as given through 
the five senses, and by muscular resistance. 

Now it is plain from this, that Dynamics expresses in re- 
lation to this life and energy working in extraneous materi- 
al masses, what psychology expresses in relation to the fac- 
ulties working within the substance of the mind. Assum- 
ing here the distinction between material and immaterial 
substance, we may say of Psychology that it treats of the 
faculties or powers which produce or develope the phenom- 
ena given in connexion with immaterial substance ; and of 
Dynamics, that it treats oY the faculties or powers which 
produce or develope the phenomena given in connexion with 
material substance. In both we begin with the phenome- 
nal, and arrive at the subjective as accounting for the phe- 
nomenal. We may sum up the whole by saying, that Psy- 
chology respects the subjective faculties of the mind ; Dy- 
namics respects the subjective powers of matter. 

Anthropology. 

Anthropology* takes up man in the union of his spiritual 
and simple subjective being, with a physical and animal life 
and organism. 

View man in his mere animal nature and functions, and 
he appears different from all other animals. The spirit with- 
in, modifies, enlarges and ennobles the animal without — he 
is the most glorious and interesting of all animals. 

This animal nature is also affected variously by the exter- 
nal world with which it is linked, and, indeed, of which it 
forms a part : climate, natural scenery, food, and employ. 

* AvdpwTtos and Ao^-oj, the doctrine of humanity. 



64 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

ment, all act upon it. It is thus modified at the same time 
by the spirit within, and by influences from without. 

On the other hand, the animal thus closely communing 
with spirit, reacts upon the spiritual sphere. The most sus- 
ceptible point of this reaction is the sensitivity, through 
which the emotions and passions become strikingly modi- 
fied. In every theatre, therefore, of human passion — in so- 
cial life, in government, in war, in commerce, in the arts of 
beauty, you may see the influences of the external nature. 
But inasmuch as man is a unity, this modifying action can- 
not be exerted upon his sensitivity, without reaching in some 
form and degree his entire being ; so that his thinking and 
reasoning, his free activity, and even his moral character, 
gain a tone from the objects which surround him, and shew 
the complexion of the sun which shines, and the atmos- 
phere which breathes upon him. 

Anthropology is thus a union of Psychology and that 
part of Dynamics which informs the science of physiology. 
Indeed, as actually cultivated, it is hardly a pure philosophy, 
but rather a mixture of philosophy, physiology and natural 
history. In its determining elements, however, it is strictly 
philosophical. 

Ontology. 

After having considered the life and forces belonging to 
the pure subjectivity of being, as distinguished from the phe- 
nomenal or the pure objective, — we come next to consider 
the substance of being. The idea of substance, like the 
ideas of time and space, of cause, and of right and wrong, 
is intuitively given in the reason. 

Upon the observation of phenomena, we not only assign 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENEBAL. 65 

them causes and laws, we also assign them substance. Sub- 
stance is therefore metaphenomenal, and belongs to subjec- 
tivity in general ; and hence the consideration of substance 
forms a part of philosophical speculation. 

Metaphysics, as relating to substance, is Ontology.* 
To Ontology belong such questions as the following : — 
What is substance? Is substance distinguishable from its 
properties ? Do substance and properties necessarily imply 
each other ? Is the relation between substance and proper- 
ties to be distinguished from the relation between cause and 
effect? What are the distinctions and relations of spiritual 
and material substance ? Is the soul material ? Is God in 
his substance identified with the world, or is he extra-mun- 
dane ? What are the relations between infinite and finite 
substance ? Is space substance or attribute ? Is it to be 
referred to matter or spirit, or is it independent of both 1 
Does the om nipotonoor of God suppose his essence or sub- 
stance to be diffused through all space ? 

Questions of Ontology do, undoubtedly, exist in the hu- 
man mind ; and because they exist, they require an answer. 
No question of the mind is to be arbitrarily set aside. If 
its aim be an impossibility, it must be proved to be so, but as 
long as a hope of its solution remains, it must remain as a 
question. Now, a great many vain and idle questions have 
come up in Ontology, but it was philosophy itself that ex- 
posed them, and set them aside. On the other hand, many 
questions of the very last importance are presented here. 
Whether the soul be material or immaterial ; whether God 
be identified with the world, or be extra-mundane, are not 

* Ovtos and Aoyos, the doctrine of essential being. 



?* 



OJn 



66 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

trifling questions, as the history of philosophy abundantly 
shews. If Ontology could arrive at nothing positive, its 
negative decisions would forever give it an important place 
in philosophy. 



We have distinguished the subjective and the objective ; 
the latter the phenomenal, the secondary and dependent — 
that which consciousness directly recognizes, and which re- 
quires to be accounted for, by referring it to something ante- 
cedent : The former, the metaphenomenal, primary, inde- 
pendent,* not directly recognized by the consciousness, and 
which does not in like manner require to be accounted 
for. 

The subjective general is that which accounts for the pure 
objective. This is their relation. Thus the will accounts 
for all choices and volitions ; and is subjective in relation to 
them taken as the objective. Thus the sensitivity, in con- 
nexion with its external correlates, accounts for all the sen- 
sations ; and is subjective to them taken as the objective. 
Thus the reason accounts for all acts of perception, knowing, 
and reasoning ; and is subjective to them taken as objective. 
Thus the extraneous physical powers account for all the phe- 
nomena of matter ; and are subjective to them taken as the 
objective. 

In considering the relation of the subjective to the ob- 
jective, we say generally as above, the former accounts for 

* I do not mean here to exclude the fact, that both the powers of our 
own minds, and the extraneous physical powers, require and are depen- 
dent upon the First and the Infinite : I mean only the inherent and con- 
stituted sufficiency of these in relation to their proper phenomena. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 67 

the latter. But the enquiry may still come up, How, or un- 
der what forms, does the former account for the latter ? Is 
it sufficient to say it accounts for the latter simply as the 
subjective ? May not the subjective itself be presented un- 
der different relations to the objective ? Unquestionably, 
there are two different relations which may be named and 
distinguished, viz. the relation of substance and proper- 
ties, and the relation of cause and effect. The sub- 
jective may be taken as either substance or cause ; the ob- 
jective may be taken as either property or effect. Cause is 
self-determined, creative, and contingent activity. Sub- 
stance is fixed, and, relatively at least, necessary existence. 
Cause can be thought of as having potentiality to a variety 
of effects, without being connected with any particular ef- 
fects as its necessary manifestations. Substance cannot be 
thought of without implying certain properties as its neces- 
sary and fixed manifestations. Effect begins to be after 
cause exists. Property is co-existent with substance from 
its beginning. Effect is related to cause contingently. 
Property is related to substance necessarily. 

Again : Substance cannot be given without involving in 
some way the idea of cause. If it be finite substance, it 
is caused. If it be infinite substance, causality is con- 
ceived of as inseparable from its unity. Universally, im- 
material substance or mind involves causality.* Material 
substance, besides being itself caused, is the vehicle or me- 
dium of the manifestations of causality, either directly or 
indirectly : directly, if physical powers be taken as proper 
causality ; indirectly, if they be taken as the properties of 
substance. On the former hypothesis, the Divine causality 
absorbs the supposed physical, and is all-pervading and om- 



68 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

nipresent. On the latter hypothesis, the Divine causality 
is taken as having produced a certain form of substance, 
that is, material, different from the Divine substance, and 
constituted with these physical forces, as fixed and in- 
separable properties. On the former hypothesis, matter is 
represented as inert until permeated by activities ; on the 
latter, it is inseparable from activities. For example : on 
the former, gravity is distinct from matter as a cause, and 
interfused by special constitution ; on the latter, matter can- 
not be conceived of without gravity, nor gravity without 
matter. But not only does substance involve the idea of 
cause ; cause also involves the idea of substance. Cause 
cannot be separated from mind, and mind cannot be con* 
ceived of without substance. This is true both of Will, di- 
rectly recognised as such, and of physical powers, when ta- 
ken as causes proper. 

Taking the Subjective, then, as divided into Cause and 
Substance ; and the Objective, as divided into Effects and 
Properties, the latter springing from the former, and being 
accounted for as existent, by being referred to the former, the 
enquiry arises, How do the latter spring from the former, 
or what regulates the action of cause, and the development 
of substance ? 

II. — Nomology. 

This at once introduces us to the Doctrine of Law, or 
Nomology, which is the second grand division of philoso- 
phy. Nomology treats of the laws, according to which the 
subjective ought to cause effects and develope properties. It 
also explains the possible violations of these laws* 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 69 

Nomology is divided into the Morale ; Esthetics ; 
Somatology ; and Logic. 

The Morale. 

This comprises the laws which ought to govern the Will — 
the laws of duty, the laws which command what is due — 
what ought to be done in moral relations. If all causality- 
is resolvable into Will,* then the Morale is related to all 
creations, whether by the infinite cause, or by finite causes. 

The law of duty, however, must be distinguished from 
the rules of art. The first enjoin upon us what ought to 
be done in our moral relations, or in our relations to mind, 
embracing what is due to ourselves, to others, and to God. 
The second, point out how any rational, ingenious, useful, 
or esthetical design is to be effected. 

Esthetics. 

Estheticsf may be briefly defined the * Philosophy of the 
Beautiful.' As the Morale relates to the will, so this re- 
lates to the sensitivity. As the Morale determines what 
ought to be done in the moral relations ; so this determines 
what ought to please, or what is really agreeable to the sen- 
sitivity in its unperverted and rightly developed condition. 

There is in some sort an interchange between the Morale 
and Esthetics. Esthetics lays down the rules of the fine 
arts to the executive will. The Morale enjoins upon the 
sensitivity the proper moral emotions and desires. 

Esthetics comprises the principles and laws of the beau- 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. 294. 

t kujQnoi j, perception or sensibility. 



70 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

tiful, or of the agreeable, or of taste, (for all this variety of 
designation has obtained,) not only in relation to the actual, 
but also in relation to the possible. That which may be is 
known, and the influence of its beauty felt, as well as that 
which is. 

When man awakes to existence, his eye beholds the beau- 
tiful, the sublime, the graceful, the proportionate, the con- 
gruous ; and his ear perceives melody and harmony, with 
the joy, the ecstasy of one recognising the thoughts of his 
own spirit, the reflected forms of his own being. The 
splendors of the heavens above him — -the scenery of the 
earth around him, are not strange to him ; he knows them 
in himself, and he knows himself in them. But he cannot 
rest in these delightful contemplations. The fountains of 
his thought open and enlarge beyond the world which his 
senses have recognised. It would seem as if this world 
were presented him to call out the activities of a being, of 
which it cannot be the measure. 

Hence, man creates : he creates in statuary, painting, 
music, architecture, gardening, poetry, and romance. He 
does not confine himself to imitations — he creates. His 
creations are not only of that which is possible in this world, 
but of that also which it requires a more perfect constitu- 
tion, both physical and moral, to realise ; and thus in his 
thought he knows other worlds. Sal va tor Rosa gives us na- 
ture as she is, with only finishing touches of the ideal ; but 
Milton, in his " delicious Paradise," introduces us to a crea- 
tion not indeed opposed to nature, but requiring nature 
under a more genial clime, in more glorious worlds.* 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 130 and 131. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 71 

In poetry, and in the fine arts, generally, the ideal of the 
mind is indeed never perfectly expressed. The poet and 
the artist labor to make visible the thought upon which they 
dwell in rapture ; but they never satisfy their own earnest 
aspirations, — they have a vision which they cannot reveal to 
others ; and they find that the world, as presented them, 
not only is not the measure of their being, but also that all 
the efforts of art cannot make its forms and materials even 
truly representative of that being ; and the perfectly beau- 
tiful remains with them as a pure idea, of which they have 
only been enabled to give a dim reflection. 

In Esthetics the human mind seeks to solve the mystery 
of the arts ; it enquires after their origin, their laws, and 
their method; and seeks to comprehend their reach, and 
the grounds of their limitations. 

This is that beautiful philosophy which leads us far back 
into the spirit of man, there to find the true Castalian 
spring, and there to converse with the " Sacred Nine" as liv- 
ing and real inspirations. 

Somatology. 

Somatology* holds a relation to Dynamics similar to that' 
which the Morale, Esthetics, and Logic hold to Psychology ;, 
it comprises the necessary laws which govern the changes 
and motions of bodies, as the former do the necessary laws 
which govern the mental activities. 

It is difficult, however, in its present development, to repre- 
sent Somatology as a branch of pure philosophy, and to dis* 
tinguish it clearly from the Science of Nature. In the Mo- 

* Sahara and Aoyoj, the doctrine or law of bodies; 



72 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

rale, there are necessary and absolute laws of the good ; in 
Esthetics, of the beautiful ; in Logic, of intuition and rati- 
ocination : but can we say with the same positiveness, that 
there are necessary and absolute laws for determining the 
relations and changes of bodies 1 The application of the 
pure mathematics in solving the problems which arise res- 
pecting bodies ; the limitations which are fixed to the pos- 
sible laws of forces now existing — for example, the neces- 
sity that the centripetal force should vary inversely as the 
square, and not inversely as the cube or any higher power 
of the distance ; the fact that great minds, like Newton's, 
preconceived before they calculated — indeed, that all minds 
must preconceive before they calculate ; and the necessary 
conception that ? amid indefinite variety there still must exist 
fixed laws, go to shew that absolute and necessary laws must 
somewhere exist in respect to bodies, and that of course 
Somatology must be a possible and real philosophy. 

The difficulty in the way of determining with exactness 
this branch of philosophy, arises from the vast compass of 
nature, and the indefinite diversity admissible. It cannot | 
be doubted, however, that Somatological ideas in the form j 
of prophetic suggestions, direct the investigations of science, j 
These ideas unite with phenomena in the inductive process ! 
through which science is determined. These were the pre- j 
conceptions of Newton in determining the law of gravita 
tion ; and of Davy in inventing the safety-lamp. 



Logic. 

In the Greek, Ao/oj expresses the faculty of reason or 
intelligence. Aoy»£o/xaj and 2uXXoyi£ojua» are the verbs ex- 
pressing the action of this faculty ; the latter being particu- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 73 

larly appropriated to express this action in drawing conclu- 
sions from premises, that is, syllogizing or proceeding ac- 
cording to the law and formula of the HuXXoyitfjutos, the Syl- 
logism. Aoyoo} ("rs-xyq or 6tei(f1ri^r} 9 understood), expresses 
the science and art of Reasoning, or Logic. 

Aoyixi?, or Logic, has, indeed, been represented as a mere 
art, or at least limited to such forms of representation as to 
convey the impression of a mere art. It is plain, however, 
that under its highest acceptation, it must refer to philoso- 
phical principles ; for if in relation to any part of our being 
we are stimulated by the ^iXotfopia to enquire after the laws 
and the method of its action and development, we are thus 
stimulated in relation to the Xoyog, or reason. 

The Reason is the faculty of knowledge in general. 
Logic expresses in relation to the Reason, what the Morale 
expresses in relation to the Will, and what Esthetics express- 
es in relation to the Sensitivity, Reason perceives and 
knows ; seeks and arrives at truth. But what are the laws 
which regulate its perceptions? What are the methods 
which it pursues in seeking after truth 1 What are the ul- 
timate grounds of its knowledges and beliefs ? When we 
have answered these questions, we have Logic completed as 
a branch of philosophy. 

Logic takes precedence of all the other branches of No- 
mology. The others are all dependent upon it. Laws, 
whether belonging to the morale, esthetics, or somatology, 
are all based upon ideas of the reason. But Logic deter- 
mines the legitimate processes and characteristics of ideas 
themselves. Again, wherever the reason acts, there must be 
laws to determine and regulate its action. Logic, therefore, is 
co-extensive with these laws, for the province of logic is the 

G 



74 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

laws of the reason. But as reason acts wherever there is 
intellection, it acts in every department of philosophy ; and 
hence logic permeates the whole. 

Logic permeates, but does not absorb the whole. Logic 
is present to givelaws to thought, investigation, and ratioci- 
nation ; but these laws are universal and irrespective of the 
particular subjects. Each subject, therefore, still retains its 
distinctive position, characteristics and aims. Psychology 
still aims to determine the faculties of the mind ; Dyna- 
mics, the forces of nature ; Anthropology, the union of man 
and nature ; Ontology, the reality and distinctions of sub- 
stance ; the Morale, the laws of duty ; Esthetics, the laws 
of the beautiful ; Somatology, the laws of bodies. These 
do not sink into Logic ; but as Reason is the universal organ 
of philosophical construction, Logic is everywhere present as 
the light and atmosphere of thought. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 75 



SECTION XII. 

OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY, AND THE SCIENCES 
AND ARTS. 

Philosophy and Science are often employed as identical 
terms. Philosophy, indeed, is science ; and science, if not 
pure philosophy, is closely connected with it. The word 
science is strictly used in the sense of systematic knowledge 
in relation to a given and defined subject ; and as in every 
such system, particular phenomena are accounted for and 
explained, the science puts on very much of the air of phi- 
losophy. But what, then, marks the distinction ? 

One obvious distinction is this, that philosophy is conver- 
sant simply with principles ; while in a science, principles are 
applied to a particular subject. In the science of nature, 
for example, the philosophical ideas of cause and effect, of 
substance and properties, and general somatological laws, are 
applied to a particular class of phenomena. 

The science begins with the phenomena, as the conditions 
of its development : and when the phenomena are reduced 
under common causes and laws, then the science is deter- 
mined and fixed. But philosophy is taken, to account for 
the phenomena in the general. First: by affirming that 
there must be causes and laws : Secondly, by laying down 
in logic the principles of induction, investigation, and de- 
duction : Thirdly, by conceiving somatological causes and 
laws, and applying them tentatively to the phenomena. 

The subjective and the objective make up the sum of all 



76 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

knowledge, actual or possible. Philosophy finds its ele- 
ments in the subjective, so that the determination of the sub- 
jective is the determination of philosophy. Science is con- 
versant directly with the objective ; but it proceeds by the 
aid of the subjective. Its aim is to distinguish and general- 
ize the objective into particular spheres, under particular 
causes and laws. 

We will suppose the subjective to have been deter- 
mined — we will suppose the mind to know its own faculties, 
substance, and laws — and to know the external world in its 
substance, forces, and laws. In making this supposition, we 
do not mean to imply that the subjective is thus antecedent- 
ly and primarily completed before science begins. On the 
contrary, the developments of philosophy, the constructions 
of science, and the inventions and workings of art, all go 
on together. But for distinctness of conception, and in or- 
der to shew forth clearly the relations as well as the differ- 
ences of the two, we may make this supposition. In mak- 
ing this supposition, I bring myself into possession of Psy- 
chology, Dynamics, Anthropology, Ontology, Esthetics, the 
Morale, Somatology, and Logic. I have named my rea- 
son, will, and affections — I have distinguished material and 
immaterial substance — I have conceived of the universal life 
in nature — of powers and forces — and of laws regulating 
their action. I have in the Morale distinguished the just, 
the benevolent, and the true ; in Esthetics, I have con- 
ceived of the absolute laws of beauty, proportion, and sub- 
limity ; in Somatology, I have determined the necessary laws 
of bodies ; and in relation to the Reason, I have laid down 
the formulas of a rigid logic. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 77 

Now, what is the procedure from the purely subjective to 
the objective ? We shall endeavor to give the answer. 

Science is divided into the pure, exact, universal, and 
absolute, and the mixed, contingent, limited, and varia- 
ble. 

The first embraces the pure mathematics. The mathe- 
matical sciences are pure, because incapable of being formed 
out of sensible representations. They are exact, be- 
cause never falling short of, and never transcending the 
principles and axioms on which they are based. They are 
universal, because never admitting of exceptions. They are 
absolute, because it is inconceivable that, in any relation, or 
by any power, they are capable of being changed. 

^Natural science, on the contrary, is mixed, because, al- 
though admitting, nay, demanding, the application of the 
principles of exact and pure science, still it has such mate- 
rial properties, and properties so foreign to the pure science, 
as to prevent the strict application of these principles. 
Body is in space, and assumes forms in its conformations, 
and moves through lines in performing its revolutions, which, 
in the way of analogy, may be called geometrical ; and 
these forms and lines may be taken as grounds of many im- 
portant conclusions deduced by means of geometrical prin- 
ciples ; but the mathematical astronomer knows full well, 
and takes care not to neglect the difference, between the 
pure and absolute geometry of his mind, and the rough 
sphericity of the planets, and the jagged lines of their or* 
bits. If geometry were a philosophy, then its difference 
from, and its relations to, natural science, would form an in- 
telligible illustration of the distinctions and relations of phi- 
losophy and science. 



78 introductory view op 

Geometry. 

Geometry, however, is a science, and our first aim is to 
distinguish it from philosophy, as well as to shew its rela- 
tions to philosophy. The philosophy upon which geometry 
is constructed, comprises ontology and logic. But ontology 
enters into it only so far as space is concerned. That space 
is not body, that it is infinite and necessary ; the defini- 
tions of the point, of lines, surfaces, and solids, all belong 
to ontology in the determination of their absolute separation 
from substance, and their independent and unchangeable 
verity. 

The point is a conception of absolute and indivisible uni. 
ty. But although a unity, perfect and absolute, it cannot 
be called a quantity"; it is, on the contrary, the absolute ne- 
gation of all quantity ; it is not length — it is not breadth — 
it is not thickness ; but it is where quantity begins. We 
assume this point in space, by our thought, and then quanti- 
ty is supposed to be formed in one direction ; and the least 
departure from the point, in one direction, forms the line or 
simple extension. This line must of necessity be curved 
or straight. Then quantity is supposed to be formed in two 
directions ; and the least departure from the point in two 
directions forms length and breadth, or surface. Surface, 
likewise, must of necessity be either plane or curved. Then, 
again, quantity is supposed to be formed in three directions ; 
and the least departure from the point, in three directions, 
forms length, breadth, and thickness, or the solid. Solid, 
again, must of necessity be composed of plane or curved 
surfaces. Quantity, as thus conceived of, is exact quanti- 
ty, because it has absolute limitations. 

This conception of quantity is a pure ontological concep- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 79 

tion of the reason — not ontological positivity as denning a 
particular substance, but negatively as defining a quantity 
absolutely independent of substance. 

Having the pure quantity thus given, we may now begin 
to use it for the purpose of scientific construction. And 
now comes in the other philosophical elements, viz. : — 
those belonging to Logic. There are, 1. The axioms — the 
conceptions of agreement and difference-— of equality and 
inequality — of a whole and its parts — of measure and pro- 
portion. 2. The deductive formula. 

As far as the conception of space, of the point, of the pure 
quantity, and of the logical elements goes, we have simply 
philosophy. But when we proceed to construct out of this 
pure quantity a variety of definite figures, and to consider 
their particular relations, and to apply to them the logical 
axioms and formula, for the purpose of eliciting particular 
conclusions in the form of regular propositions or theorems, 
we give birth to determinate science. It is true, indeed, 
that the conclusions of geometry are universal and abso- 
lute, and therefore it cannot be questioned that geometry 
is a most philosophical science ; but, nevertheless, it is just- 
ly considered a science, inasmuch as antecedent principles 
are applied to a particular material or subject, which princi- 
ples are true, wholly independently of the subject to which 
they are applied. All the axioms and the logical formula, 
are manifestly of this character ; »nd the conceptions of a 
point, and of pure quantity beginning there, although more 
immediately connected with the geometrical constructions, 
are, nevertheless, independent and general : — A point — a 
line — a surface— a solid, may be thought of independently 
of all particular forms, relations, and propositions. 



80 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

While thus the philosophy and the science are distinct, 
the relation between the two is most intimate and important. 
The philosophy may exist without the development of the sci- 
ence ; but the science cannot be formed without the philoso- 
phy. The philosophy does not require the science, either to 
account for it, or to make it more plain ; but the science 
refers directly back to the philosophy as its only basis, and 
affording the only means of its explication. 

Sciences of Discrete Quantity. 

Arithmetic and algebra, in like manner, have their philo- 
sophical basis. They do not begin with absolute unity in 
forming their quantities ; the idea of unity as a philo- 
sophical idea, is antecedent to, and independent of, these 
quantities : but although their unit, always assumed and 
ever variable, cannot represent the absolute and invariable 
unit, still it has its origin as a conception of unity in the ab- 
solute and pure idea. Here, also, we have universal axioms, 
conceptions of abstract quantity, of equality, difference, 
measure and proportion, and logical formula. When we 
come to apply these antecedent and independent elements 
of thought, and primary conceptions, to the relations of a 
particular class of quantity — to discrete quantity, for the 
purpose of arriving at particular solutions and theorems, we 
construct a science ; and, indeed, we may be almost said to 
invent an art — an art of representing quantities and rela- 
tions, of giving deductions in detail, and of solving problems. 

Here, again, the distinction between the philosophy and 
the science is clear, as well as the intimate and important 
relations between the two. It must be evident, also, that 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 81 

the same philosophical ideas and principles, give birth to dis- 
tinct sciences, as in the case of geometry and arithmetic. 
The distinction of these sciences is grounded upon the dis- 
tinction of their subject matter. The subject matter in 
both is quantity ; but in one it is continued quantity ; and 
in the other, discrete quantity ; or the one is quantity, be- 
ginning at an absolute limit, and increasing itself by exten- 
sion in space ; the other is quantity beginning with any as- 
sumed unit, and increasing or diminishing itself indefinitely, 
by addition and division. In the one, we consider the rela- 
tions of figures formed of lines and surfaces ; in the other, 
the relations of numbers, as abstract and universal quanti- 
ties, capable of representing any real quantities whatever, 
on condition that these quantities be divisible into units. In 
respect of both, we have the same general ideas of axioms 
and logic. 

Natural Science. 

I shall take this as a general designation, embracing Me- 
chanics, Astronomy, Magnetism, Hydrostatics, Physical Dy- 
namics in general, Chemistry, and so on. 

I do not intend to convey the idea, that every thing thus 
embraced under this designation, is strictly scientific ; there 
is much that is still theoretic. I comprise them all under 
this designation, because they refer to phenomena, which in 
their psychological relations are of one kind. All these phe- 
nomena, are phenomena of sensation, or of muscular resis- 
tance, which is closely connected with sensation. The 
quantities of geometry and arithmetic, and of the pure 
mathematics generally, have an existence wholly indepen- 
dently of the senses ; but all the forms, movements, and phe- 



82 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

nomena generally, of natural science, are made known in the 
consciousness by the correlations of external substance with 
the senses, or by a resistance to the muscular organism. 
By careful and repeated observations, that is, by addressing 
our senses to their correlative objects without, — by investi- 
gations and experiments, — we acquaint ourselves with the 
various sensuous phenomena, and their characteristics. 
These phenomena are next classified by resemblances and 
differences, and by common relations ; and are attempted to 
be explained by the assignment of causes and laws. In 
making this assignment we may at first merely hypothesise 
the causes and laws : the system built up in this way is 
merely a theory, and not demonstrated science. A theory 
is taken up for the time being, with the understanding that 
it is subject either to be confirmed, or to be wholly set aside, 
accordingly as more extended experiments and observations 
shall enable us to decide. A science has for its basis, not 
mere hypothetical causes and laws, but causes and laws 
demonstrated and fixed. 

Now, in constructing a natural science, we have recourse 
both to philosophy and to pure science. 

1. We have recourse to philosophy. Ideas of time and 
space ; — of substance and attributes ; — of cause and ef- 
fect ; — of law ; — of quantity, relation, measure, and pro- 
portion ; ideas of distributed life and distributed causality ; 
of central, and diffusive movement ; distinctions of the 
subjective and the objective, and of personal and imper- 
sonal manifestations; the conception of generic wholes? 
and specific differences ; ideas of unity, multiplicity, and 
totality ; the relations and distinctions of the finite and 
the infinite ; a knowledge of logical formula ; a know- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 83 

ledge of mind, as the seat of all power, wisdom, de- 
sign, and government — all work together in the scientific 
construction. It is impossible to step forth into this wide 
field of natural phenomena, without having metaphysical and 
nomological questions crowded into the mind ; and every 
attempt, whether to build up a theory or a science, is made 
upon the basis, and in the light of philosophy. These first 
ideas, principles, and distinctions, are presumed by every 
one ; — the mind elaborates science under their spontaneous 
influence, even where they are not defined and comprehend- 
ed in known, philosophical systems. 

2. We have recourse to pure science, or the mathema- 
tics. The mathematics are the science of pure quantity — 
of simple extension from the absolute point ; and of abstract 
number. But physical bodies take upon themselves forms 
analogous to geometrical forms ; and move in lines analo- 
gous to geometrical lines : their distances, magnitudes, den- 
sities, temperatures, attractions, velocities, times, &c, are ca- 
pable, also, of being represented comparatively by numbers. 
It is evident, therefore, that mathematical principles may be 
employed in the determination of physical relations and 
laws. But still, should conclusions drawn on mathematical 
principles respecting bodies, assume the perfect geometrical 
form of bodies, or regard them as pure and exact quantities, 
there would, of necessity, be error in the conclusions. The 
mathematics are conversant with pure space and abstract 
number ; but body has properties entirely foreign and pe- 
culiar. Hence, in the determination of physical science, 
there is not an absolute, but a conditional application of 
mathematical principles. It is thus that the mixed mathe- 
matics are produced. 



84 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

It thus appears, in natural science, that the material of the 
construction is that part of the objective, embracing the 
sensuous phenomena ; that the ultimate grounds of the con- 
struction lie in pure subjectivity or philosophy ; that the 
preparations for the construction are experiment, observa- 
tion, and classification ; and that the immediate organon 
of the construction is the mathematics. Deductive and in- 
ductive logic are, indeed, employed in the construction, but 
not as an immediate organon ; they are a part of the all- 
penetrating and governing philosophy — the deductive logic 
pervading the mathematics throughout, and the inductive 
appearing in the determination of every general principle 
from particular observations. 

Let us now sum up the preceding observations. Phi- 
losophy is the knowledge of the subjective, the absolute, 
the primary, and the universal ; — Science is the knowledge 
of the objective within particular spheres, under philosophi- 
cal conceptions, and with laws determined in relation to 
particular phenomena. Philosophy is complete without phe- 
nomena : Science must be constructed out of phenomena. 
Philosophy comprehends : Science is comprehended. 

Conditional and Unconditional Science. 

Geometry can have no relation to phenomena of the ex- 
terior consciousness — it cannot be constructed out of these 
phenomena. But to the phenomena of the interior con- 
sciousness it is related — it is constructed out of these phe- 
nomena. We have seen that after the formulae of logic, 
the idea of space, and the conceptions of a point, and of 
quantity, in one, two, and three directions are given, as the 
necessary and the absolute ; — the mind proceeds to con- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 85 

struct certain definite figures in space, and to consider their 
relations in the light of the principles already developed ; 
and so, also, with respect to discrete quantities, it proceeds 
to th%formation of signs and symbols as representatives of 
these quantities and their general relations ; and proposes 
to itself various problems for solution. This particular and 
definite action of the intelligence presents us the phenom- 
enal of the interior consciousness. 

The principles and conceptions above referred to, are in- 
dependent, primary, and necessary ; and the action of the 
intelligence in comprehending them as knowledges, is ac- 
counted for only in the fact that they are essential and in- 
separable elements of thought. The intelligence cannot 
think without logic ; it cannot form cognitions upon sensa- 
tion, without space — and the very idea of space involves the 
point absolute, and extension in three directions ; number — 
as the one — the many — the total — is no less a necessary 
element. The intelligence within its actual relations and 
conditions cannot go into action without them. But it is 
not necessary that it should go on to form the triangle, the 
circle, the sphere, the polyhedron, and problems in discrete 
quantity ; when it does so, it presents phenomena to the in- 
terior consciousness which demand to be accounted for by 
something antecedent ; and when the antecedent principles 
are appealed to, these phenomena become a material out of 
which exact and pure sciences are constructed. 

Reflection will shew the analogy between this case and 
that of natural science, in its relation to the exterior con- 
sciousness. Cause and effect, substance and attributes, 
space, law, designing and governing mind — we cannot sup- 
press the ideas of these amid the phenomena of nature, the 

H 



86 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

intelligence cannot form its simplest cognitions independent- 
ly of them. Neither could the objects of our cognitions 
ba supposed to exist without these. But these primary ideas 
and principles can be supposed to exist without our particu- 
lar cognitions and their objects. Now, our cognitions of the 
external world, by our sensations, are the phenomena* which, 
by philosophical principles, and the organon of the mathe- 
matics, we form into natural science. In the same way, 
by philosophical principles, and by logic in particular, do we 
form pure and exact science from our cognitions of these 
forms of space, and numerical problems. The science in 
both cases lies in the determination of particular laws gov- 
erning particular relations. 

In the case of the pure and exact science, the law is ab- 
solute and unalterable : but this arises from the nature of 
the object of the cognition : — forms in space, generated from 
the absolute point, and abstract numbers, are objects given 
in the pure reason, and are, therefore, as absolute and un- 
changeable as the reason itself ; but bodies in space are ob- 
jects given in sensation, and because contingent, are capable of 
indefinite changes. While, however, the present constitu- 
tion of bodies remains, the laws demonstrated of their par- 
ticular relations must remain. In the one case, the law de- 
termined is universal in the particular relations of the quan- 
tities, unconditionally, because the quantities themselves are 
absolute : in the other case, the law determined, in the par- 
ticular relations of the quantities, is universal, conditionally, 
because the quantities themselves are contingent. 

* The secondary phenomena : vide Sec. VIII. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 87 

This, obviously, lays a ground for a distinction of the 
sciences. 

I. — Unconditional and Absolute Science. 

This embraces, as we have seen, the pure mathematics. 

To this may be added the science of ethics, or the deter- 
mination of particular laws for the particular relations which 
moral and responsible beings stand in to God, to each other, 
and to inferior beings. As these relations are immutable, 
so the science formed by the application of general philo- 
sophical principles to the phenomena appearing in them, 
must be immutable likewise. 

The science of the civil law, or jurisprudence, is also to 
be ranked among unconditional sciences, because, based up- 
on immutable moral relations. The distinction between 
ethics and jurisprudence is simply this : Ethics is the sci- 
ence of right and wrong, in its application to the relations 
of moral beings universally ; jurisprudence, in its applica- 
tion to these relations as they appear under a particular gov- 
ernment, in a particular state. The laws of ethics belong 
to man as man; the laws of jurisprudence belong to man 
as the citizen of an organized commonwealth. In the con- 
stitution of government, man cannot lose his inherent na- 
ture, and, consequently, cannot be lawfully compelled to vio- 
late any principle of necessary rectitude : but, still, in the 
constitution of government, |je, as a moral being, comes into 
peculiar and marked relations. It is, indeed, true, that in 
the utmost scope of ethics, jurisprudence would be compre- 
hended within its definition. The usage which has distin- 
guished the two sciences, has not separated or opposed the 
cardinal principles. 



88 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

II. — Conditional Science. 
This exists on condition that the relations of the phe- 
nomena remain unchanged. All the natural or physical 
sciences are of this description. The great laws of As- 
tronomy, for example, accurately determined as they are, 
and forming a stupendous and glorious body of science, are, 
nevertheless, science, only while the constitution of the uni- 
verse remains as it is. Let the relations of the phenomena 
be changed, and the present science is destroyed. Now, it 
is plainly conceivable that changes might take place, to an 
indefinite extent. We can set no bounds to Omnipotence in 
modifying the forms of physical being and the constitution 
of planetary systems. The distinctions of right and wrong, 
the nature of truth, justice, and benevolence, can be changed 
no more than God himself can be changed ; but our thought 
does not attach the same immutability and necessity to nat- 
ural forces and laws. 

Art. 

We have denned Philosophy — we have defined Science — 
and shewn the relation of the former to the latter ; but it 
remains to define Art, and to shew the relation which the 
first two hold to it. 

Art, in common usage, is confined to express the exertion 
of human causality for the modification of bodies according 
to principles and rules. « 

The most enlarged idea of art is given in the work of crea- 
tion itself, by the Almighty and Allwise Creator. The crea- 
tion everywhere exhibits design, law, and skill. We may, 
therefore, without any figure of speech, call God the first 
and Great Artist and Mechanician. He created, arranged, 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 89 

and finished, according to principles and rules which his own 
exhaustless intelligence supplied. The variety, the num- 
ber, the nice and elaborate perfection, the beauty, be- 
nignity, and glory of his works, exceed not only our actual 
knowledge, but the utmost flight of our imagination. From 
the glimpses which astronomy furnishes of the extent and 
the continual advance of creation, we are irresistibly led to 
the conviction, that the mind will find new objects to ob- 
serve and admire, throughout its immortality. 

Human art is comparatively a feeble, yet a beautiful copy 
of the Divine. God formed the substances together with 
their properties, upon which human skill is exercised. He 
fixed the laws under which this skill must accomplish its 
ends. We imitate the beauty of nature, or improve upon 
it, only by observing these properties and laws. If we at- 
tempt to do violence to them, we are not long waiting for a 
rebuke of our folly, and a demonstration of our weakness. 
But if we fall in with the suggestions of nature, and work 
according to the principles and rules on which she has been 
constituted, then the arts of utility and beauty will appear, 
rich and manifold, and the human will become both a co- 
worker with the Divine, and an instrument of completing its 
projections. 

Now, in analyzing human art, we are led to perceive its 
connexion with both philosophy and science. 

1. With philosophy. This appears in the ideas under 
which it works. There is, in the mechanical or useful arts, 
generally, the idea of utility itself — the idea of improving 
upon the actual forms and arrangements of nature, and of 
adapting them more perfectly to our wants, actual or fanci- 
H* 



90 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

ful. This idea is the forecasting thought, and the propel- 
ling energy of the reason itself, and hence is an element of 
pure philosophy. 

In the fine arts appear the ideas of proportion, grace, sym- 
metry, congruity, and harmony — forming the complex idea 
of beauty. This idea leading to all improvements upon the 
beauty of the existing forms of nature, as in landscape gar- 
dening, for example ; and to the creation of new forms of 
beauty, as in statuary, architecture, painting, music, and 
poetry, has its origin also in the pure reason, and is, there- 
fore, a philosophic element. 

2. With science. Science being the determination of the 
laws governing the relations of phenomena, as they spring 
forth in succession from causality, the artist, when he un- 
dertakes a work, either of imitation or creation, is bound, in 
the use of materials, and in the arrangement of parts, to 
observe these laws. He not only works under the inspira- 
tion of pure ideas, or, in other words, the conception of the 
ideal, but working in the field of nature, he works in obedi- 
ence to her material constitution — her fixed properties and 
laws. In architecture, he works under ideas of proportion, 
congruity, grace, and dignity ; but, at the same time, he must 
regard the properties of his materials, and pay the utmost 
respect to mechanical laws. In musical composition, he is, 
indeed, led on by the ideas of melody and harmony ; but in 
producing and arranging the sounds which form the material 
of the art, he cannot dispense with physical laws. Similar 
illustrations may be given in relation to the other fine arts. 
That the mechanician, and the inventor of arts of utili- 
ty, base their operations upon scientific laws, requires no 
illustrations. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 91 

Rules of Art are explicit specifications, expressed clear- 
ly in language, and by diagrams, and numbers, with respect 
to form, measure, proportion, combination, and adjustment. 
They lay down in simple terms how the causality must ex- 
ecute a given work. They direct the application of physi- 
cal skill. 

An individual may be a crude philosopher, and raw and 
uninstructed in science ; but still, he may, by long practice, 
acquire the skill of obeying rules of art. The philosophy 
and the science implied in the rules, and from which the 
rules were deduced, he is incompetent to explain, and does 
not even comprehend; but skilfully and readily adjusting 
his physical instrumentality under the simple directions of 
the rules, he rears the stately temple, or fashions and ar- 
ranges the curious machinery of the watch. Such men are 
mere copyists or mechanics. 



92 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 



SECTION XIII. 

REASON, THE ORGAN OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Philosophy is the knowledge of mind and nature in their 
faculties, forces, substance, and laws ; and the knowledge 
of truth conceived of as independent of all being. 

Science is the knowledge of phenomena, as accounted 
for, reduced under, and regulated by, these faculties, forces, 
substances, and laws. Art is reproduction, imitation, and 
creation, by human causality and skill, under the light and 
authority of philosophy and science. 

Phenomena, or the purely objective, are the immediate 
experiences or objects of consciousness ; and are either ex- 
periences of the action of pure reason, and simple choice 
and volition, or of sensations depending upon correlative ob- 
jects without. 

The metaphenomenal, or the subjective general, are the 
realities of being and truth, which do not form the immedi- 
ate experiences of consciousness, but are known mediately 
through these experiences. 

Philosophy relates to our whole being : but in construct- 
ing philosophy as a system, our whole being does not form 
the organ of this construction. Philosophy is not a crea- 
tion of the will : nor is it an outflow of the emotions and 
passions. There is but one faculty which can claim to be 
the organ of philosophy, and that is the Reason. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 93 

The Reason is the faculty of all perception, whether by 
immediate intuition, or by mediate representation or de- 
duction ; whether of the interior or the exterior conscious- 
ness ; whether of the past, the present, or the future ; wheth- 
er of the actual or the possible, or of the probable or the 
impossible ; whether of phenomena, or of being and truth ; 
whether of cause or law. All perception and all knowledge 
belong to this one faculty. 

Now that the Reason should perceive the movements or 
phenomena of the other faculties, and assign them their 
laws in the Esthetics and the Morale ; and that it should 
perceive all forms of being and truth taken as objective to 
itself, seems to present no difficult s. But how does the 
reason, while perceiving all else, perceive likewise its own 
acts or phenomena ; and while giving out the laws of the 
other faculties, give out, likewise, its own laws, thereby con- 
structing Logic 1 

The difficulty here presented, it will be perceived, consists 
in the fact that the reason must perceive its own phenome- 
na, while, in order to develope phenomena itself, it is en- 
gaged in perceiving something objective to itself; it must 
give out the laws which regulate its own movements, while, 
in order to develope these laws, it is engaged in determining 
laws for some other faculty, or in some similar exercise upon 
that which lies without its own immediate subjectivity. 
How can I observe my own perceptions and thoughts, and 
the laws which regulate my perception and thinking, when 
the acts of perceiving and thinking imply that the reason 
is intent upon objects ? And if the reason be supposed to 
withdraw itself from objects for the purpose of examining 
itself, then, again, how can the reason examine itself with- 



94 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

out calling itself into action by fixing itself upon objects — 
which is a recurrence of the same difficulty ? 

The difficulty is to be answered by simply appealing to 
the fact — the fact of consciousness. In the very act of 
thinking or perceiving, and when I am drawing conclusions, 
or forming cognitions, I am conscious of these acts. The 
reason has this twofold capacity of knowing phenomena, 
and being, and truth, external to its own subjectivity ; and 
of knowing, at the same time, its own acts and its own sub- 
jectivity in these acts. This is spontaneous and necessary 
self-knowledge. 

The deduction of the laws of its own operations, and the 
construction of logic, can be effected only by reflection or 
philosophical consciousness. 

The reason, when it perceives, thinks, or ratiocinates, 
does so under the consciousness of its own acts, and under 
convictions of the reality and truth of its operations. Its 
development begins and goes on to an indefinite extent spon- 
taneously, before it pauses to look back upon its course, in 
order to trace out the laws of its own movement. In this 
way, not only had cognitions of an outward world been 
formed, and many admirable principles in morals, law, and 
government, been determined, but even geometry itself had 
been carried to a high degree of perfection, before logical 
investigation had become ripe. It is, therefore, not merely 
by attending to our thinking and reasoning in their going 
on, that we arrive at the laws of logic. In the actual develop- 
ments of the reason appearing in works of science and art, 
and in all the institutions of society, there are, as it were, 
diagrams and charts which the reason can inspect for the 
purpose of ascertaining its own laws. But, then, even in 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 95 

inspecting these, it renews in the consciousness the original 
processes ; and does not really intermit the exercise of its 
remarkable function, of knowing the laws of its own move- 
ments, while these movements are actually going on in re- 
ference to that which is objective to itself. These diagrams 
and charts are of the utmost importance, because they ren- 
der reflection more easy, by presenting the work of investiga- 
tion and deduction as already completed. Under these cir- 
cumstances, the renewal in the consciousness of the original 
processes is effected with no great effort, and thus the rea- 
son is enabled to bend its strength to acts of reflection and 
philosophical insight. The difference may easily be con- 
ceived of, by supposing Euclid to have engaged in deter- 
mining the abstract and universal laws of deduction during 
his first efforts at geometrical construction ; or to have com- 
pleted his geometrical construction under the spontaneity of 
the reason, and then to have reflected upon the operations 
of his reason in this construction, for the purpose of eli- 
citing universal laws of deduction. 

Taking the reason, then, as the organ of philosophy, how 
are we to decide when we have attained a genuine philoso- 
phy ? This question, undoubtedly, is of the highest impor- 
tance, for a great many spurious philosophies have appeared. 
In these prolegomena to my main purpose, I have no oppor- 
tunity to enter into minute elucidations ; I am only indica- 
ting thoughts. It would be no ordinary undertaking, by it- 
self, to determine the criteria of a true philosophy : — What, 
then, can be accomplished in a few pages ! — But as an ar- 
tist, where he is not in a condition to give a finished work, 
can still, by a few lines and touches, give an intelligible and 
striking outline, so at least as to attract contemplation, to 



96 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

stir up thought, and to make the beholder desire a perfect 
picture, or rather to go and examine the original, — be it a 
quiet scene of hills and plains and flowing rivers, or of wild 
rocks and woods and cataracts, or the noble ruins of an old 
and mysterious temple. So here, a few hints and rough- 
hewn thoughts thrown out may serve a good end, by lead- 
ing ingenious readers to put forth their thoughts afresh, and 
perhaps to correct their past conclusions. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 97 



SECTION XIV. 

THE CRITERIA OF A TRUE PHILOSOPHY, 

All that is secondary to philosophy, and dependent upon 
it, of course requires no other ground. Philosophy accounts 
for and explains every thing beside itself — it is the final au- 
thority. 

Hence, there is an empirical way of testing a philosophy. 
There are a multitude of knowledges abroad among men, 
generally received and believed — nay, received and believed 
so confidently, that he who should question their reality, 
would be regarded as destitute of common sense, and unfit 
for the duties and responsibilities of society. A philosophy 
which appears to uphold these favourite convictions — to be' 
the ultimate and unquestionable ground of them, is taken as 
a well-attested philosophy. 

Now, I would not utterly rejeet these empirical criteria. 
They have their use, an eminently practical use, and one 
adapted to the people at large. There are, for example, 
certain convictions of, a moral and religious nature, which 
widely pervade the human mind, and are the very life of 
the common social system. Men are tenacious of these, 
and that for the best of reasons, viz., the close connexion in 
which they stand to all that is most dear and valuable. It 
is just and worthy in human nature to cling to any philoso- 
phy which clearly appears to sustain high and invaluable 
beliefs. 



98 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

But, while making these admissions, we must still insist 
upon other criteria, lying farther back, and which, indeed, 
are implied in those which we have above adverted to ; and 
that for two plain reasons : First, The empirical criteria 
can have no legitimate authority in themselves. This is 
evident, since the secondary knowledges are assumed to es- 
tablish that, without which they could have no reality. The 
secondary knowledges by hypothesis require an ultimate 
basis — they are not self-evident, they are not necessarily 
true ; but their ultimate basis consists of philosophical prin- 
ciples, and the very principles which they* are employed to 
establish. Now, we may not prove an antecedent by a con- 
sequent, and that, too, when it is granted that this consequent 
requires for its own basis the very antecedent which it is 
taken to prove. 

And if it be admitted that those irrepressible and firm 
spontaneous convictions to which we have alluded, are an 
authority and basis in themselves, it will be found upon an 
accurate analysis that the spontaneous convictions do not 
arise from the phenomenal and secondary, but from the ab- 
solute and primary, which penetrates and sustains the phe- 
nomenal and the secondary. For example : One man is 
observed giving another man a purse of money, and the ob- 
server has an irrepressible and firm conviction that the act is 
right. But why has he this conviction ? Because, by suppo- 
sition, he knows that it is given in benevolence, or in payment 
of a just debt. Now, the payment of a debt cannot be taken 
to prove the principle of justice, nor the giving of money to 
prove the principle of benevolence ; but the principle of jus- 
tice commands the payment of the debt, and the principle 
of benevolence, the relief of the needy. From observing 
the benign influences of certain acts, I may commend that 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 99 

philosophy which elevates them into immutable moral prin- 
ciples ; but then these benign effects require the existence 
of such principles in order to account for their manifesta- 
tion. By inducting phenomena we may arrive at a principle, 
but ths principle arrived at must have had a pre-existence in 
order to render the phenomena possible. It must not be for- 
gotten that philosophy is incorporated with our proper be- 
ing ; and enlightens, guides, and determines us even when 
we do not recognize it by reflection, and are too unlearned 
to name it as formally laid down in systems. 

To one untaught in systematic philosophy, a very natural 
prejudice would spring up in favour of some philosophy 
named to him, if he were informed that it lay at the 
bottom of his warmest and noblest feelings and beliefs ; 
but it is perfectly plain that this philosophy, if, in re- 
ality, lying at the bottom of these mental phenomena of the 
individual in question, would really be that which gave rise 
to these phenomena. This individual may be satisfied with 
it, from its supposed connexion with his beliefs and sen- 
timents ; but it could never be legitimately determined 
by such criteria. We must determine independently of 
the individual, whether his beliefs have a true basis ; that 
is, whether they are philosophical or unphilosophical : hence 
the proper criteria must be independent of the phenomenal 
of the individual mind. 

Secondly, The empirical criteria cannot be legitimate in 
determining the truth of a philosophy, because, in them- 
selves they do not, in the first place, sufficiently provide 
against the introduction of error ; and in the second place, 
it is a matter of history that errors have actually been in- 
troduced in this way. 

In the first place, they do not in themselves sufficiently pro- 



100 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

vide against the introduction of error. Opinions and beliefs 
may be connected in the human mind with many other par- 
ticulars besides an innate philosophy. They may be con- 
nected with prejudices of nation, family, and sect ; with 
I ride, ambition, favourite pursuits and pleasures. If an in- 
nate philosophy always governed our opinions and beliefs, 
then they would always rise above, and be independent of, 
these other connexions. But so far from this being the 
case, these other connexions do often exclusively determine 
them, and in spite of the innate philosophy. It is plain, 
therefore, that if actual opinions and beliefs are to set- 
tle our philosophy, it will not only have an ultimate ba- 
sis beyond itself, which is absurd in the very enunciation, 
but this ultimate basis also, will be just as various, muta- 
ble, conflicting, and impure, as human passions them- 
selves. It is impossible, then, in this way, to settle what is 
a true philosophy. 

But, in the second place, it is a matter of history, that er- 
rors have been introduced in this way. The instances of 
Gallileo and Abelard, may be taken as types of a mul- 
titude that might be sought out and adduced. Both were 
severely persecuted for resisting philosophies which had their 
origin in the prejudices of a learned unthinkingness ; and 
in the pride and ambition of a corrupt hierarchy. The 
current opinions demanded different philosophies from those 
broached and expounded by these great apostles of freedom 
of investigation and thought. 

Every man holds certain opinions in common with his na- 
tion, his family, his political party, or his religious sect. Are 
these opinions all based upon sound philosophy ? No one 
would contend for such an absurdity. These opinions con- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 101 

flict with each other ; they cannot, therefore, all be true. 
But if the mere strength of an opinion, and the zeal in advan- 
cing it, are to be taken as among the sure criteria of phi- 
losophy, then we shall establish a multitude of philosophies 
at war with each other, and all upon an equally secure basis. 
Philosophy is a word of such awful and momentous import 
and authority, that both he who advocates old opinions, and 
he who attempts to introduce new ones ; both the venerator 
of unchanging institutions, and the reformer and revolution- 
ist ; both orthodoxy and heresy ; both bigotry and liberal- 
ism, will be ambitious of its titles, and of marching under 
its banners. 

From this Babel-like confusion of tongues — from this light 
rendered murky by the dust and steam of furious conflicts, 
we must retire to a calm and elevated region, where quiet 
thought has its home ; and where the "light" is " dry" and 
pure.* 

In introducing the criteria of a -true philosophy, I will 
name one thing — not, perhaps, really ranking among the 
criteria strictly defined, but yet, the invariable attend- 
ant of such a philosophy : — It is the quality which charac- 
terizes the spirit of the philosophy. Philosophy is truth, 
nothing but truth, and truth immutable, arrayed in the glory 
and majesty of her own eternity. Now, that philosophy, 
which has developed itself in a mind which loves, fears, and 
adores truth, with a filial spirit ; which takes up its cross 
and follows truth with an entire devotion ; which counts all 
things else, whether they be the prejudices of family, sect, 
or nation — or old titles of honour won in the service of pow- 

* "Lumen siccum." — Bacon. 
T * 



102 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

erful and honoured creeds and dogmas of the church or of 
the schools, — but loss, for the excellency of the knowledge of 
truth — counting truth all gain, and confiding in her with 
heartiness, fearing no evils — willing to endure ail trials, and 
joyfully and certainly expecting a satisfactory and peaceful 
end, — that philosophy recommends itself at once to respect- 
ful and earnest attention, and gives promises which cannot 
well deceive us. For as God hath made the mind for the 
apprehension of truth, and hath set forth before it a world 
of glorious truths for it to apprehend, so we cannot but 
hope, nay, feel a strong confidence, that an ingenuous spirit, 
looking out after the marks of truth, humbly, purely, and 
freely, as the eye, tired of the darkness, looks out for the 
morning light, will, according to the harmonious constitu- 
tion given it, find her resplendent presence, and be accept- 
ed as her oracle, to make known her laws. 

It is worthy of remark, also, that a preparation of mind is 
necessary, as well for the study of philosophical principles 
announced, as for undertaking an announcement of them. 
A genuine philosophical spirit is the pre-requisite of good 
learners, as well as of good teachers. The want of this, 
indeed, has been the- great obstacle to the inculcation of 
truth in all ages of the world. 

There always have been men of ingenuous and honest 
minds, and designed by Heaven to be the lights of their age, 
whose teachings, if the multitude had listened to, there 
would have been a wide diffusion of wholesome knowledge 
and pure morality. Thus would the philosophy and ethics 
of Socrates, as an example among the heathen, and the 
sublime revelations of prophets and apostles among the cho- 
sen people, have revolutionized society, by destroying old, 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 103 

stagnant errors, and bringing in rational and heavenly truths. 
But it hath ever been the folly of men, that although hav- 
ing eyes to see, and ears to hear, and understandings to 
perceive, they have chosen old traditions, and familiar 
errors, to new instructions, simply because these instruc- 
tions demand at the first an honest confession of igno- 
rance, or impose new labours, or are opposed to dearly cher- 
ished prejudices and passions. Bacon, in his great work, 
has exposed these enemies of new investigations, and revo- 
lutionizing truths, where they lie in the human heart. The 
" Idols of the Tribe," or those prejudices which belong to in- 
firm human nature generally ; the "Idols of the Den," or 
individual prejudices — the idiosyncracies of the man ; the 
" Idols of the Market-place," or the prejudices connected 
with set forms of speech in the announcement of opinions 
and dogmas — where venerable phrases are mistaken for 
grave truths ; the " Idols of the Theatre," or prejudices con- 
nected with wild and startling, but idle theories. When 
these " Idols" are worshipped by the philosopher, he can 
make no new discoveries, unless by accident, and then he 
will be prone to distort them. When they prevail among 
the people, — that is, the reading people, those who are seek- 
ing for information in different ways, and with different de- 
grees of interest, — solid and rational truths can gain friends 
but slowly, and are liable to be silenced by the authority of 
public opinion, the rebukes of the church, or even by the 
force of civil law. 

It holds true in philosophy, as well as in religion, that the 
sower may go forth to sow, and sow none but good seed, 
and yet if the hearers be impracticable, the labour will be in 
vain, and the precious seed will be lost ; and it is only in 



104 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

the good and honest heart that truth finds a proper soil, in 
whose rich depth she sends forth her roots, and springs up 
an immortal fruit. 

In proceeding to the direct enquiries respecting the crite- 
ria of a true philosophy, we cannot well avoid adopting as 
a leading thought, the subject of the preceding section, 
" Reason the Organ of Philosophy." If reason construct 
philosophy, she must be immediately conversant with these 
criteria ; and as she is the faculty of all knowledges, she 
must be the last authority in determining them. 

But where shall these criteria be sought for ? We have 
shown that they cannot be empirical. Experience may be 
the condition of their development — may suggest them ; but 
they, in themselves, must be subjective. Philosophy is sub- 
jective and metaphenomenal. The criteria of a true phi- 
losophy must be subjective and metaphenomenal likewise. 
It is evident, therefore, the criteria must be sought for in the 
pure Reason itself. 

I will begin with Logic as an illustration. Logic gives 
the laws of all ratiocination. But how do I know when I 
have, in this respect, attained a true philosophy ? I do not 
go to the common, concrete reasonings of men on various 
subjects. They may confidently believe their current con- 
clusions — they may deem them of the utmost importance : 
but the aim of Logic being to test the legitimacy of these 
conclusions, it cannot go to them as criteria. What, then, 
is my only remaining resource ? Why, to go to the Rea- 
son itself, and ask it whether these principles can be other- 
wise than true — whether their falsity is conceivable, or pos- 
sible 1 The Reason gives the answer, from its perfect in- 
sight or intuition ; and beyond this, there can be no appeal. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 105 

Is there any other way of determining the truth of the 
" dictum cle omni et nullo 1" Whatever be the philosophical 
conception — whether substance, cause, proportion, harmony, 
space, or time ; — whatever be the philosophical law — whe- 
ther of Esthetics or the Morale, or belonging to Logic, — its 
reality and truth can evidently be settled only by an appeal 
to the Reason. What the Reason intuitively perceives, and 
undoubtingly affirms, must be reality and truth. The only 
legitimate way of arriving at philosophy, is to question the 
Reason : and so, likewise, the only true method of testing 
any system claiming to be philosophy, is to bring it in its 
parts, its relations, and in its constituted wholeness, under 
the review of the Reason, as the faculty of intuition — of 
original insight. 

I may remark here, that we are claiming in the deter- 
mination of philosophy, no more than what the mathemati- 
cian claims in the determination of his science. How shall 
we test the definitions and axioms of Geometry — except by 
a direct appeal to the intuition of Reason ? Nay, in every 
step of the long chains of reasoning drawn out from these 
definitions and axioms, the exact relations and dependen- 
cies defy the possibility of error, by submitting themselves 
to the intuition of Reason. 

There is such a thing, then, as appealing directly to Rea- 
son, and receiving a reply of more authority than the hear- 
ing of our ears, or the seeing of our eyes ; since what is 
generally received as the most exact and unquestionable of 
all the sciences, continually holds it up to our view. If it 
bslong to the mathematics, much more must it belong to 
philosophy, which furnishes the ultimate grounds even of 
this science. 



106 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OP 

Philosophy, when taken up according to a true method, 
becomes rigid, exact, authoritative. It is only when wan- 
dering from this method, that vague and mutable theories 
and fancies, which belong neither to heaven nor earth, but 
which seem grotesquely to partake of both, become phi- 
losophies, falsely so called. Indeed, so rife has this tribe 
of vain and fanciful theorists ever been, that we might ad. 
duce in illustration of the emptiness which may belong to a 
current opinion, the very general opinion, that philosophy is 
but an ever-changing mysticism, which every new adept 
may mould to his peculiar fancies. 

There have been two classes of men, called philosophers, 
in all ages. The one, very numerous, and composed of these 
vain theorists. The other, generally embracing the few, 
and plainly distinguishable from the former, first, by elevating 
philosophy from a mere deduction from experience, or a 
mere expedient created to answer an end, to the dignity and 
permanency of a system formed out of the primary and in- 
tuitive perceptions of pure Reason ; and, secondly, by the 
identity of the system itself, exhibiting clearly that the same 
conception of philosophy, and the same method, was trans- 
mitted from age to age, if not in books, yet in the elemen- 
tal working of the human mind itself; and shewing the 
true philosopher to be a most natural and genuine, although 
a rare manifestation of humanity. 

The criteria are all embraced in the fact of the Reason's 
authoritative affirmation. They are capable, however, of 
receiving a specific enunciation. 

I. A philosophical truth, in its very nature, is incapable 
of being defined and demonstrated by any thing going be- 
fore. The aim of philosophy is, as the ultimate ground of 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 107 

knowledge, to define, demonstrate, and account for that 
which in its nature is incapable of standing alone, and re- 
quires something antecedent to define, demonstrate, and ac- 
count for it. There must be such primary truths, for if 
there were not, there would be an infinite relrogressus of 
thought in the labour of defining and proving ; there would 
be no ultimate ground for the repose of enquiry. 

II. A philosophical truth must be perfectly clear, and at- 
tended with no doubtfulness. It is incapable of being de- 
fined and demonstrated, both because it is primitive, and be- 
cause there really is nothing clearer than itself by which to 
define and demonstrate it. For example, the idea of space 
is incapable of being defined and demonstrated, not only be- 
cause there is nothing before it, which comprehends it, and 
therefore adequate to defining it, but also because it is in it- 
self eminently clear and certain. That space exists, I af- 
firm with the utmost confidence. If I attempt to represent 
space by body, or to attain to its utmost stretch by the mul- 
tiplication or enlargement of bodies, my mind soon becomes 
confused ; but this confusion arises, not from any obscurity 
inherent in the idea of space, but from the absurd attempt 
to represent that under the phenomena of the senses, which 
is not attained by sensation, and is indeed antecedent to, 
and independent of, all phenomena. 

III. A philosophical truth is a pure intuition of the Rea- 
son. It must be seen without doubtfulness — it must be af- 
firmed with a positiveness which admits of no rational ques- 
tioning in the mind in which it developes itself. But these 
characteristics belong only to intuitive truth. 

IV. Philosophical truths being in a high and peculiar 
sense, elements of thought, cannot remain unproductive 



108 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

/ 

where thought is going on. Hence, a philosophical truth 
must make its appearance somewhere in the develop- 
ment of humanity. If we seek for it, we shall find it. 
This cannot well be confounded with the empirical 
criteria, against which objections have already been 
urged. These criteria suppose us to begin with phenom- 
ena as the basis of the philosophical construction. Here, 
on the contrary, we begin with the truth as an affir- 
mation of the Reason, and seek for its manifestations. This 
criterion is especially useful to those who seize a truth be- 
cause it fills the mind with a sort of inexpressible delight, 
and kindles it into a lofty enthusiasm, without calmly bring- 
ing it under the eye of the Reason. It will serve to dissi- 
pate this enthusiasm and delight, and to bring about a so- 
ber-mindedness, to call upon such, to search for the manifes- 
tations of the supposed truth in the actual phenomena of 
consciousness. 

V. Philosophy cannot legitimately present itself under 
the form of isolated truths. Reason is one ; and hence it 
developes its truths woven into a system, and constituting 
Unity. That construction, therefore, cannot be received 
as legitimate, which does not exhibit the most perfect agree- 
ment with itself. It will be faulty if its parts appear con- 
fused, so that there is manifest difficulty in determining whe- 
ther any system is aimed to be constituted ; or if the parts 
being clearly brought out and arranged, they fail to work 
together, and are incoherent. 

VI. Philosophy accounts for all phenomena ; it accounts 
even for error. Not that the error is the birth of the Rea- 
son, for this is manifestly absurd ; but that, Philosophy is 
adequate to giving an explanation of the grounds, the pos- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 109 

sibilities, the causes, and the modes of error. A true phi- 
losophy, therefore, as a system, will account for the universe 
as a system. Of course, the reason alone can judge wheth- 
er the one accounts for the other. We are thus brought 
back to its simple authority. 

The criteria above given must speak for themselves. I 
believe a careful reflection will lead to their approval in the 
mind of every genuine and candid philosopher. If all who 
have engaged in the work of philosophical construction, had 
governed themselves by these criteria, there would have 
been little difference among them ; and the world, long ere 
this, would have witnessed philosophy taking her stand as 
the Scientia Scientiarum f and possessing at least all the 
clearness and exactness which are claimed by many sci- 
ences dependent upon her. But when men are determined 
to preserve their " Idols" at all events ; they are prepared 
either to discard philosophy altogether, or to make her the 
mere tire-woman of their prejudices and accidental and float- 
ing opinions. A theory in physics, a dogma in speculation, a 
creed in religion, a name or a degree in a mutable world, 
are permitted to give the leading thought ; and hence they 
seek not for philosophy herself, but only to philosophise in- 
geniously and speciously, in order to satisfy the forms of 
truth while they preserve the body of error. They are will- 
ing to impose upon themselves, — why, then, should they scru- 
ple to impose upon others ? 



mvt k*. 



PRELIMINARY VIEW 



OF 



THE REASON. 



PART II. 

PRELIMINARY YIEW 

OF 

THE REASON. 

SECTION I. 

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS RESPECTING THE 
REASON. 

The Reason can be comprehended only by a being en- 
dowed with reason. That which knows all things else, must 
know itself likewise. The very idea of objective knowledge 
implies self-knowledge. 

The faculty of knowledge can be known only through 
acts of knowing in the consciousness. What are these 
acts ? The answer is easy, for there is nothing more fa- 
miliar to consciousness. You know this book, this chair, this 
table ; you know this mathematical demonstration ; you know 
this law of nature— the gravitation of bodies ; you know this 
rule of morals — love thy neighbor as thyself; you know what 
happened yesterday — that the sun rose and set ; you know 
what will happen to-morrow — that the sun will rise and set ; 
you know the ideal beauty of a stature or a landscape ; you 



114 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

know axioms, first principles, and generalizations ; you know 
space and eternity. If you ask, What is it to know ? I re- 
ply, Look within yourself — you read there directly what it 
is. What other answer can you desire — what other answer 
can you obtain ? 

If you ask, What is the Reason ? I reply, it is that which 
knows — the knowing substance, if you please ; or, it is your- 
self, as far as you are a knowing being. In all this, it is ev- 
ident that we do not advance beyond the fact of knowing, 
and the conception of the faculty of knowledge in general. 

But what, then, is the aim of psychological investigations 
with respect to the Reason ? Does not the whole enquiry 
end in the simplicity and obviousness of the fact of know- 
ing? 

It is, indeed, true, that whenever, and in whatever rela- 
tions, the Reason is exercised, there is a perpetual recurrence 
of this fact : a perception is a knowledge ; an axiom is a 
knowledge ; a demonstration is a series of knowledges ; and 
all the relations of the parts in the making up of the whole 
ratiocination, are knowledges. But there must arise, upon 
the general fact of knowing, many enquiries respecting the 
various forms, the conditions, the limits, the relations, the 
characteristics, and the certainty of knowledge ; the know- 
ledge of the actual, as distinguished from the knowledge of 
the possible ; the relative determination of knowledge by 
the inherent powers and forms of the reason, and by the ob- 
jects of knowledge themselves ; knowledge, primitive and 
intuitive, and knowledge secondary and deductive. All 
these and the like enquiries must be related to the psycho- 
logy of the Reason. 

The Reason may be regarded in certain points of view, 



THE REASON. 115 

as the cardinal faculty of the mind. It is by knowledge 
and in knowledge that we live and move and have our be- 
ing. That I am — -that there is any being whatever — and 
all the interests, relations, aims, and laws of being, can be 
possible determinations, only on the supposition that this 
faculty exists. 

Hence men generally are prone, in representing mind, to 
speak of it simply as an intelligence. Let Reason be sup- 
posed to be extinct, and all other faculties are virtually ex- 
tinct likewise. Emotions and passions are dependent upon 
perceptions for their existence. The Will, although a cause, 
and self-determined, could not go into action without objects 
and aims of action.* But the Reason, on the contrary, 
can be supposed to exist without emotions, passions, and vo- 
litions. Intelligence, like a pure u dry light," is conceiva- 
ble without consequential emotions and volitions ; but 
emotions and volitions, without intelligence, are inconceiv- 
able. 

The Reason, in its full development, presents us various 
forms or offices, which by some philosophers are represented 
as distinct mental faculties. Consciousness, sensation, 
perception, judgment, abstraction, conception, attention, im- 
agination, fancy, and memory, have all been analysed as 
distinct faculties. In the actual constitution of the mind, 
some of these faculties, so called, show largely, when an- 
alysed, the action of the Will. This is true particu- 
larly of attention, abstraction, and fancy. But as far as 
they express intelligence, I take them to be all comprehend- 
ed in the Reason. These are not properly intellectual 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. 138. 



116 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

faculties; but the intellectual faculty, under its different 
modes, and in its different relations. This I shall presently 
exhibit. In the outset, let us accustom ourselves to look 
upon the Reason as one. It indeed exercises various offi- 
ces ; it perceives, it judges, it draws conclusions, it imagines, 
fancies, and remembers ; but it is still the same faculty—it 
is, in all these, the one and indivisible Reason. 

The Reason, as the faculty of knowledge, must have a 
peculiar constitution — it must be constituted for its office — 
it must be constituted to know. But it cannot know, unless 
there are objects of knowledge — unless there is something 
to be known : and that which is to be known, must like- 
wise have its peculiar constitution and properties. Now, if, 
on the one hand, the Reason does not make its objects in the 
very act of knowing them ; so likewise, on the other hand, 
the objects do not make the Reason in the very act of being 
known. The Reason and its objects may exist in relation 
to each other, but they exist also independently of each oth- 
er. I speak now of finite Reason. 

In the Divine and Infinite Reason, all possible forms of 
being and truth must have pre-existed in conception or 
idea, before any actual development or creation appeared in 
time or space : — And whatever actual existence or develop- 
ment there ever has been, must be consequential to the fore- 
cast, as well as to the causality, of the Divine mind. But 
in the constituted and finite Reason, there is no dependence 
of its objects for their existence, upon itself. Every form of 
truth, every form of being beside myself, would have a per- 
fect existence, although I did not exist. And so, also, al- 
though there were no objects for my reason, still, as a real 
intelligence; it would have its fixed and perfect constitution. 



THE REASON. 117 

Its development would, indeed, be impossible, but it would 
nevertheless be there, ready to be developed whenever the 
required conditions should be supplied. This may be illus- 
trated by the analogy of a grain of wheat, or the seed of any 
plant. Let it be laid up in a granary, and there can be no 
germination ; but let it have soil, light, heat, and moisture, 
and there springs up " first the blade, and then the full ear." 
But the seed had its own life and peculiar forms before it 
was introduced into the circumstances and conditions of ger- 
mination. The soil, heat, light, and moisture communica- 
ted no life, or distinctive forms : — the seed, if wheat, was 
perfect wheat in and of itself; if some other seed, it was of 
its kind, perfect in and of itself. The soil, light, heat, and 
moisture, only supplied the circumstances and conditions of 
its germination, growth, and fruit-bearing. So the Reason ; 
it is perfect in and of itself — it has its own life, energy, and 
distinctive forms inherent, inseparable, and independently of 
all exterior circumstances and conditions. The presenta- 
tion of objects through sensation, is like soil to the seed ; 
books, conversation, examples, the regular discipline of 
schools, are like light, heat, and moisture : these are requi- 
site to its germination, growth, development, perfection, and 
fruit-bearing ; but all that comes forth of it, comes forth 
of its own forms, capacities, and richness, as the Reason. 

Now, it is very interesting and instructive to think of the 
principle of life and the distinctive forms of seeds ; and by 
the aid of the microscope to look within its store-house of 
wonders — its preparations for endless propagation and in- 
crease ! Surely, he who thus thinks and examines, knows 
more of nature, attains to more truth, than he who merely 
plants and eats, without seeking any thing further. 



118 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

But of how much higher moment, to comprehend, if pos- 
sible, the forms of our own intelligence ! 

Is it possible to attain to this — can I know the inherent 
forms — the fixed and independent constitution of the Rea- 
son ? Can I find out with what preparations — with what 
pre-constituted and adapted capacities, the mind begins to 
know ? 

The earliest development of Reason must be spontane- 
ous, like the germination of a seed sown in the soil. There 
can be no self-direction and forecast before knowledge be- 
gins. But after Reason has gone out to an indefinite ex- 
tent among its objects, after it has germinated, sprung up, 
and increased toward perfection, unlike the plant, it has the 
power of reflection, or of looking back upon the process of 
its development, and of separating — at least so far as to es- 
tablish enquiries — between its inherent and pre-constituted 
forms and capacities, and the circumstances under which 
they make their appearance. It has the power of doing in 
relation to itself, what it does in relation to the plant. Nay, 
may not its self-knowledge be presumed to be more perfect, 
since it knows the plant by observation, while it knows it- 
self in the interior and most intimate consciousness ? 

The inherent and original forms and functions of the Rea- 
son, can indeed be known only on condition of experience ; 
but when known, they are seen to have an a priori exist- 
ence. They are not known a priori, understanding by this 
that they are known independent of experience ; — they are 
known through experience, but as in their nature prior to it f 
or the experience would not itself have been possible. 



THE REASON. 119 



SECTION II. 

OUTLINE OF THE IDEAS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE REASON. 

The pre-constituted forms or elements under which the 
Reason forms cognitions, and assigns laws, are called Ideas. 

The capacities of the Reason to know in different modes 
and relations, we shall call its Functions. 

Ideas and Functions make up the constitution of the 
Reason. 

Ideas. 

The Ideas may be classified in two ways- 
First : We may classify them as Ideas which determine 
our cognitions, and Ideas which determine our activity. 
Under the first head would be comprised the Ideas of time 
and space, the finite and infinite, of cause and substance, of 
quantity and quality, necessity and contingence, and the 
categories of purely cognitive ideas in general. 
Under the second head would be comprised — 
The Idea of Utility, — that which gives birth to human 
industry and all its achievements. 

The Idea of Right and Wrong, — that which gives birth 
to Ethics, Law, and Religion. 

The Idea of Beauty, — that which gives birth to the Fine 
Arts. 

The Philosophical Idea, — that which leads man to attempt 
the explanation of his own development. 

This classification, however, does not preserve its partic- 



120 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

ulars entirely distinct, for the last class determine cogni- 
tions as well as activities. 

We may therefore adopt a second method of classifica- 
tion according to the philosophical divisions given in Part 
I., Sec. XI. We shall then have, 

I. Metaphysical Ideas. II. Nomological Ideas. 

The first determine our conceptions in Psychology, Dy- 
namics, Anthropology, and Ontology. The second deter- 
mine laws in the Morale, Esthetics, Somatology, and Logic. 

In this classification we accept all Ideas as cognitive in 
their character ; while the last division embraces those only 
which have the additional remarkable characteristic of be- 
coming laws in the world of objective reality.* 

Functions. 

I. Intuition, or the function of primary and immediate 
knowledge. Ideas, Axioms, and First Truths in general, 
are the objects of this function. 

II. Sensuous Perception, or the function of forming 
cognitions upon sensations or the phenomena of the exterior 
consciousness. 

III. Abstraction and Generalization. It is by 
this function that the Reason, taking up the secondary phe- 
nomena, first views particular qualities separately, and then 
makes them the basis of extensive classifications. The 
quality is abstracted, and then generalized as a common 
sign ; and its name becomes the name of the class. Thus 
are formed genera and species. To this function we are 



* Vide Part I., Sec. VII. 



THE REASON. 121 

indebted for a clear and distinct knowledge of things, and 
the formation of a ready and convenient language. 

IV. Judgment, or the function of perceiving the agree- 
ment or disagreement between two cognitions, united as the 
subject and predicate of a proposition. 

V. Invention, or the function of rinding out and apply- 
ing principles and rules for the demonstration of theorems, 
the solution of problems, and the construction of machines ; 
and of making experiments for the determination of Science. 
The imagination acts conjointly with this, by calling up in 
the mind the images of diagrams, and of models or arche- 
types of the outward construction. 

VI. Mediate Perception, or the function of inferring 
or deducing conclusions through a mediate cognition, as 
formally exhibited in the syllogism. 

VII. Induction, or the function of examining and ar- 
ranging the secondary phenomena, so as to determine their 
causes and laws, and thus to construct scientific systems. 

VIII. Memory, or the perpetuity of knowledge. The 
Reason which knows, retains its knowledges. A faculty of 
knowledge without this power would scarcely deserve the 
name. 

Perhaps memory is too identical with the simplest notion 
we can form of Reason, to be called a function ; it is rather 
an inseparable characteristic. 

Recollection is more properly a function. The act of 
recollection is based upon memory. Its aim is to bring a 
permanent knowledge within the field of consciousness. 
The energy of the will in directing and holding the atten- 
tion, is involved in this act. 

Whatever we learn, we learn in certain relations, com- 

L 



122 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

monly termed association of ideas. Hence, when our past 
perceptions re-appear, they appear in their original rela- 
tions, or in relations nearly akin to them. Recollection im- 
plies a dim foreshadowing of the knowledge to be recalled 
in some of these relations ; upon this foreshadowing, the 
cognitive faculty is steadily fixed, until the whole comes 
forth in distinct form and fullness. 

Attention, which some have set down as an intellectual 
faculty, is really the energy of the Will exerted over the 
Reason in its several functions. 

IX. Imagination. Under its first and simplest presen- 
tation, this is the function of knowing objects which have 
form, or sensible qualities generally, when the actual sen- 
sations no longer exist. Thus in every act of memory, and 
in every conception of the distant, where the objects were 
originally known through the senses, the imagination re- 
vives the forms and sensible qualities. 

Again, the Imagination appears as a mediatory function 
between the world of Ideas, and the world of the Senses. 
The Imagination forms upon the Ideas, Ideals or Archetypes, 
according to which the outward constructions are fashion- 
ed and related. Even in respect to the Divine Mind, we 
cannot but conceive of this function as forecasting and fore- 
seeing the Universe before the creative act took place. 
The finite artist and mechanician — man, produces his works 
in the same way. 

This appears in the Fine Arts, where the ideal concep- 
tions of beauty and grandeur constitute the models or arche- 
types of the forms which spring up under the chisel, and 
upon the canvass, or which speak in poetry. This appears 
in the inventions of the useful arts, and in scientific discov- 



THE REASON. 123 

ery ; for unquestionably, the imagination forms archetypes 
of mechanical construction and scientific systems. The 
Idea is not always strictly followed, and hence the Imagina- 
tion degenerates into a fickle and wayward Fancy. But, 
nevertheless, where the Idea does become productive of sci- 
entific and mechanical results, this function must be em- 
ployed. 

Nor is the imagination excluded from the sphere of moral 
conceptions. Whenever man in his various relations and 
duties becomes the subject of thought, not only is the Idea 
of right and wrong the determining power of thought ; but the 
ideals of character, also, under the different varieties of moral 
greatness and beauty, present themselves in the imagination 
as standards with which to compare the actual, or arche- 
types to direct the creations of genius. 

The highest form of the imagination is the creative. 
Here the pure Idea generates an Ideal, which, surpassing 
the beauty of any natural form, inspires the artist to attempt 
a work of corresponding perfection. Whatever is created, 
is created according to the Idea. The Imagination is the 
creative function of the same faculty — the Reason, — which 
gives forth the Idea. 

The Imagination is thus the representative, the mediato- 
ry, and the creative function. 

Let none be startled or offended, when it is said, that man 
produces more beautiful proportions and forms than nature. 
Nature and man are both servants of the Infinite Mind of 
Beauty and Wisdom. The first works according to fixed 
and necessary laws, without choice or consciousness ; the 
second works according to the same laws, but with choice 
and consciousness : the one shadows forth the Divine attri- 



124 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

butes as the effect related to the cause ; the other is the 
very image of the Divine. Why should not God therefore 
empower the thoughtful hand of man to bring to light cer- 
tain forms of beauty, which he has not committed to the 
insensate mechanism of nature ? Has not the Idea of the 
Useful stimulated industry to make nature more commodi- 
ous and bountiful ? And why may not the Idea of the 
Beautiful inspire Art to make nature more beautiful ? 

" God has not limited man's knowledge to that which is ; 
but has enabled him to perceive that which may be ; and 
when he proceeds to modify God's work, he is not a 
trespasser and a violator, but a more noble instrumental 
power, by which God gives his creation a higher finish and 
a more perfect use."* 

Fancy is arbitrary imagination, or imagination not gov- 
erned by the pure Ideas of truth and beauty. It presents 
us, therefore, not Ideals, but humorous and grotesque im- 
ages, created by intentional violations of esthetical laws, and 
incongruous and disproportioned combinations. Beauty 
and truth have defined and perfect archetypes, and there- 
fore in given kinds, a limited variety ; but fanciful crea- 
tions can have no assignable limit, inasmuch as their very 
being consists in sporting with all law and rule.f 

X. Consciousness, is that function of the Reason by 
which it immediately knows phenomena.^ 

Consciousness has an exterior and an interior direction. 
In the former direction, it knows the phenomena of sensa- 
tion ; in the latter, the phenomena of the mental activities 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. 130. 

t Ibid, pp. 133, 134. X Vide Part I, Sec. II. 



THE REASON. 125 

beyond sensation. In the exterior and interior conscious- 
ness, we have all phenomena whatever, for we have com- 
prehended here ail the possible activities of our being. 

If we enquire, Whence do the phenomena of conscious- 
ness arise ? the only rational answer that can be obtained 
is, that they arise conjointly from the simple subjective, and 
the objective general, that is, when these form a uni- 
tion in knowing, feeling, and willing. There can be no act 
of knowing, that is, no phenomenon of knowing, unless 
there be both a faculty of knowledge, and an object to be 
known, either in the world of pure Reason or of the Sense, — 
at least, an object which shall be the foundation of the cog- 
nitions of the knowing faculty : even dreams, and the wild- 
est imaginings, have some relation to objective reality. 
There can be no sensations, unless there be both a sensitive 
faculty and real correlative objects ; and the same with respect 
to emotions and passions. There can be no volitions un- 
less there be both a will or cause, and objects and ends of 
causation.* 

From this unition of the subjective and the objective — 
unition, but not contact — the phenomenal appears, and is 
immediately known by the Reason in its function of con- 
sciousness ; and then follow all the other functions in their 
due place and order. 

Self-Knowledge, the affirmation Ego sum, I am, in an- 
tithesis to the objective general — the not myself— is often 
represented as a form of consciousness, and thence called 
self -consciousness. This, perhaps, is more justly compre- 
hended in the intuitive function, since the self is not phe- 



* Doctrine of the Will, p. 138. 
* 



126 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

nomenal, and therefore cannot be immediately recognized 
by consciousness. It is true, however, that the antithetical 
affirmation stated above, is the most primitive of all affirma- 
tions : — in the very unition of the simple subjective with 
the objective, by which a first phenomenon is given, the 
Reason knows the two terms, and makes the affirmation ; 
and with the consciousness of all subsequent phenomena, 
the affirmation is continually renewed . There is, therefore, 
a valid ground for representing self-knowledge as a form of 
consciousness ; and if properly explained and distinguished, 
the representation is striking, inasmuch as it expresses the 
intimate union of mind with itself when it awakes to the 
knowledge of its own being.* 

Reflection, is a subsequent form of consciousness. 
While the common consciousness is a spontaneous and ne- 
cessary recognition of phenomena, and a necessary self- 
knowledge, reflection is special and voluntary. In reflec- 
tion, my immediate aim is to know myself ; and it general- 
ly implies a proposing to one's self some particular analysis 
of the mind. In order to effect this analysis, we first re- 
produce a state of consciousness, or renew former experien- 
ces, by bringing into view the correlative objects : and then, 
in this state of reproduced consciousness, or renewed expe- 
riences, we awaken the reason to acts of close attention and 
thought. This state of mind is exceedingly complex : for 
the mind must at the same time keep before it, the correla- 
tive objects which are to awaken the required phenomena, 
and bend itself to the work of examining the phenomena in 
their subjective relations. But, still, let it be remembered 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 1, % 3. 



THE REASON. 127 

that it is complex only as all thought and investigation are 
complex. In investigating the objective world, we do real- 
ly produce within ourselves certain experiences or phenom- 
ena of consciousness, by means of the senses, and while 
these exist, we apply to them the Reason, in order to deter- 
mine the forms and laws of nature. 

Spontaneous consciousness embraces our necessary and 
natural experiences of the senses, and the mental acts which 
necessarily and naturally arise in connexion with them. 

Reflection or philosophical consciousness embraces the 
experiences produced intentionally in reference to some 
knowledges to be attained of the subjective or the objective. 



128 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 



SECTION III. 

EXPLICATION OF IDEAS. 

In the " Introductory View of Philosophy in General," 
much has been said respecting Ideas, and I cannot but 
hope some explication of them given in the natural un- 
folding of the line of thought there attempted. In bring- 
ing up this subject in this place directly, my aim is, if 
possible, in a clear and simple way to give an answer 
to what has always been regarded and treated as a very 
difficult question, viz : What are Ideas ? The difficul- 
ty which exists, arises chiefly, I think, from the primor- 
dial and predeterminative character of Ideas. Here all 
analogies must be exceedingly distant and imperfect, since 
Ideas precede every form of cognition. Thus, when it 
is said that Ideas are the moulds of the understanding, and 
sensations the materials cast in them and taking form, we 
have, perhaps, the most striking analogy that can be found ; 
but, nevertheless, how vague the resemblance between the 
plastic power of material moulds upon material substances, 
and the action of the first elements of thought in determin- 
ing cognitions upon phenomenal conditions ! 

We have spoken of several Ideas incidentally in the pre- 
ceding pages, such as Time, Space, Substance, Cause, 
Beauty, Right, and Wrong. Now, the Idea of Time is not 
Time, the Idea of Space is not Space, the Idea of Substance 
is not Substance, and so also of the others. Nor again, are 
the acts of knowing these Ideas, the Ideas themselves. 



THE REASON. 129 

That is, the Ideas are neither the realities from which they 
are named, nor the acts in which the realities are known. 
Time and space are realities ; substance, as essential being, 
is a reality ; cause is a reality ; the distinction between 
right and wrong is a reality ; infinity and spirit are reali- 
ties. They are, even although I do not know them. But 
how do I know them ? The mere experience of sensations 
does not give them. The Reason knows them by its own 
force or capacity. The Reason begins to act only when the 
sensations are experienced ; but it knows not only, by con- 
sciousness, the sensations ; it knows, by intuition, these ne- 
cessary realities likewise. But what is the force or capaci- 
ty of the Reason to know the metaphenomenal truths ? We 
say, the Reason has in its own constitution as the faculty 
of knowledge, ideas of time, space, substance, cause, beau- 
ty, right and wrong, and so on ; meaning by this, that the 
faculty of knowledge is preconstituted to know these objec- 
tive necessary realities ; and that, that within itself which 
capacitates or adapts it to know each of them, is called the 
Idea of this reality. 

The word Idea itself contains no mystery or magical pow- 
er. It is a word introduced by one of the greatest philoso- 
phers who ever thought, and using, perhaps, the most per- 
fect language in which thought was ever expressed. We 
cannot find a better word for our purpose ; and there is, 
therefore, no good reason for diverting it from its original 
use, or substituting any other in its place. 

We have in the preceding Section divided Ideas into the 
Metaphysical and the Nomological. The first express the 
inherent capacity of the Reason to know the Reality of Be- 
ing ; the second, its inherent capacity to know the Reality 



130 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

of Law. Mere phenomena, apprehended by consciousness, 
do not give either. These phenomena, as we have seen, 
arise from objective reality without, and subjective reality 
within. But what is the relation between the pure Reason, 
with its Ideas prepared to know Reality, and the phenome- 
na known by consciousness which form the conditions un- 
der which the knowledge of Reality begins ? Recollect 
Reality is of two kinds : the Reality of first and necessary 
truths and principles, relating both to being and law ; and 
the Reality of actual being, having specific constitution 
and qualities, and reduced under determinate law. Now, 
under the constitution of humanity, it is not intended that 
mind should attain to the Reality of truths, principles, and 
laws, separately from the Reality of actual being. As man 
is himself reason and sense* — a union of the two Realities 
above named, — it seems to be designed that both shall be 
developed in his cognition, consentaneously, and at the same 
time. The first and second Realities are related to each 
other in so much as the first is embodied in the second ; 
and man himself being the type of this union, he knows the 
two in their union. When he first awakes to conscious- 
ness, sensations or phenomena of the exterior consciousness 
first meet him, because thought in humanity is connected 
with physical life, and this life reveals itself in sensation. 
These sensations arise from the action of exterior causes 
upon his sensuous organism — the world without thus makes 
its approach to the Reason within. Here, then, is the oc- 
casion for cognition. If the mind had no cognitive power 
of its own, — a power expressed by the word Ideas, — if it 

* Part I., Sec. V. 



THE REASON. 131 

were a mere passive recipient, then there would be a mere 
consciousness of sensations, and nothing more : but now 
these sensations are like telegraphic signals given from the 
outer world, and the Reason has within itself the key or al- 
phabet wherewith to read them. The Reason can know the 
world without, because it can know the great truths and 
laws — the first form of Reality — which are embodied in the 
world without — the second form of Reality. The first 
knowledges thus embrace, as we have said, the two forms 
of Reality consentaneously. The second could not be 
known at all without the first — it would not be logically 
possible. The first would not be known without the second, 
because, in the constitution of humanity, mind is imprison- 
ed in its tabernacle, until the windows of the senses be open- 
ed, and the signals of life and being come rushing in. 

Let me recur in this place to a thought thrown out in my 
Introductory View, Section VII. The Great Creator, before 
he formed the worlds, must have had the Ideas of all truth 
and law, and all forms of being — He knew, and then crea- 
ted. He foreknew all possible being, because he had the 
Ideas of all possible being. Man, the finite mind, knows 
after creation has taken place, and after he has received in 
his sensitivity, motions from that creation ; but that he 
knows at all, arises from a Reason made in the likeness of 
the Divine, and having pre-constituted capacities or Ideas 
adapted to primordial, universal, and necessary truths — the 
very truths in which the outer world, indeed the whole world 
of created being, " lives, moves, and has its being." 

That man knows himself, is explained in the same way. 
He has the Idea of subjective, as well as of objective reality : 
And as the motions given in his sensitivity from without, 



132 PRELIMINARY VIEW OP 

and known by consciousness, give the call to the Reason 
furnished with its Ideas, to look without ; so the action of 
the mind itself gives the call to look within also. 

The two forms of Reality, which at first are concrete and 
complicated, are afterwards submitted to Reflection, and by 
Reflection distinguished. 

It may indeed require a high effort of thought to com- 
prehend Ideas ; but let this effort be made, and in the whole 
range of philosophy there is nothing so clear and interesting. 
Ideas are the elements of thought, the elements of philoso- 
phy, because the elements of Reason itself. A Reason 
without Ideas is an impossible conception. Ideas are the 
cardinal psychological explication of the Reason. 



THE REASON. 133 



SECTION IV. 

EXPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE REASON. 

The Reason, constituted with Ideas, goes into action. Its 
great office is to know. But the objects of its knowledge 
are not all of the same kind, do not stand in the same rela- 
tions, nor under the same conditions. Some of these ob- 
jects are truths absolute and necessary ; some are phenom- 
ena variable and contingent ; some are immediately, while 
others are mediately perceived ; some precede, while others 
are gathered from observation ; some are actual, while oth- 
ers are only possible ; some are in time present, others in 
time past, and others again in time future ; some, in space, 
are contiguous to the senses, while others are distant. 
Hence arises the necessity of considering the Reason under 
different functions. In its constitutive Ideas, it is not only 
adapted to every variety of knowledge ; it has, also, the 
power of searching out its objects under every variety of 
condition and relation. It can know phenomena and truths, 
and the relations between them ; it can know immediately 
and mediately ; it can know in various relations of time and 
space ; it can form pure cognitions, and cognitions upon 
sensuous conditions ; it can go out to the actual, and 
conceive of the possible. It has all these different func- 
tions. Its functions manifestly express the variety and 
scope of its activity. 



134 PRELIMINARY VIEW OP 



SECTION V. 

DOES LOGIC COMPREHEND ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF ) 
THE REASON'/ 

Logic has been defined in the general as comprising the 
laws which determine and govern the activities of the Rea- 
son.* Unless this definition receive limitations, Logic evi- 
dently must reach to every function. Limitations, how- 
ever, exist, and the reason for them is palpable. 

In one respect Logic, plainly, has general relations, viz : 
in so far as it determines the most original laws of thought 
and cognition. f 

But when we enter the domain of particular functions, we 
find much that legitimately comes under other divisions of 
philosophy. 

Logic comprises those laws of the Reason which deter- 
mine the processes by which it reaches the two forms of 
Reality — the Reality of Truth and of Actual Being. This 
is its separate, unique, and peculiar domain. 

But memory does not describe a process by which new 
truths are arrived at ; it expresses simply the power of the 
cognitive faculty to retain old truths, or truths already gain- 
ed. Hence it cannot belong to Logic. Recollection is 
memory permeated by the will, imagination, and fancy. It 
evidently can belong to logic no more than simple memory. 
It sometimes even becomes a mere art. 

♦ p. 73. t p. 74. 



THE REASON. 135 

Imagination also gives origin neither to ideas, and truths, 
nor to facts of reality. It is a mediatory, representative, and 
creative function ; forming ideals upon ideas, reviving the 
images of objects when the objects no longer address the 
sense, and combining forms of unreal beauty. Neither, 
therefore, does Logic comprise the laws of this function. 

It would, indeed, be possible to give Logic a designation 
so general as to make it embrace all the functions. In this 
case Esthetics would cease as a separate branch of rvTomolo- 
gy. But the distinction between Logic, as limited above, 
and Esthetics, is clear, natural, and convenient. They both, 
indeed, relate to forms of knowing ; but the one determines 
the laws of knowing the real ; while the other determines 
the laws of mere imitation of the real, and of knowing and 
projecting the possible. 

Imagination, therefore, must be assigned to the nomolo- 
gical determinations of Esthetics. 

Memory, considered as an inherent property of the Rea- 
son, belongs to psychology simply. The whole doctrine of 
the association of Ideas, which figures so largely in treating 
of this function, amounts to this : — Whatever is known, is 
known, not in an isolated way, but in various relations ; 
these relations themselves making up a part of the objec- 
tive reality. When, therefore, past perceptions are renew- 
ed in the consciousness, whether they be objects of the 
sense or pure truths, they must of necessity appear in their 
appropriate relations. Relations and parts of thought are 
often presented accidentally, or suggested by images of the 
imagination and fancy ; and when so presented, they are, 
of course, apprehended by the cognitive faculty, and the 
whole train of thought carried through, or dismissed in its 
unfinished state, at pleasure. 



136 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

Recollection, as a voluntary processes indeed based upon 
the memory. When, however, its object is pure truth, there 
is often in reality a renewal of the process of investigation or 
ratiocination, by which it was originally arrived at. In this 
case, it is difficult to determine how far the recollection ari- 
ses from memory, or from the pure reasoning power. There 
is a passage in Dugald Stewart, which illustrates this re- 
mark. " Sir Isaac Newton, as we are told by Dr. Pember- 
ton, was often at a loss, when the conversation turned on 
his own discoveries. It is probable that they made but a 
slight impression on his mind, and that a consciousness of 
his inventive powers prevented him from taking much pains 
to treasure them up in his memory." 

In Newton's mind the original proofs were renewed with 
little aid from memory. And Stewart farther remarks, that 
generally, while men of little inventive power trust to me- 
mory for the recollection of truths, men distinguished for 
this power are prone to rely upon it. What, therefore, of- 
ten appears to others as memory, is in reality reasoning, 
and consequently comes under the laws of Logic. 

The other functions, for the most part, come under the 
determinations of Logic, inasmuch as they contain processes 
by which the two forms of Reality are attained. 

It is not necessary, however, to give Logic the multifari- 
ous divisions of these functions. The functions often co* 
work together ; and there are a few general conceptions of 
the ends of Logic which happily embrace them all. 

Logic comprises the laws which determine the processes 
of arriving at Reality— the Reality of Truth and of Actual 
Being. 

First, therefore, we must consider the laws of the most 



THE REASON. 137 

original cognitions, both through pure intuition, and through 
sensuous phenomena. 

Secondly. The laws which govern the observation and 
classification of secondary phenomena ; and that inductive 
process by which general principles are obtained. 

Thirdly. The laws of deduction or inference. 

Fourthly. The laws of evidence, and the method of proof. 

This is the outline which, in the next Part, we shall at- 
tempt to fill up. 



mvt mk. 



LOGIC PROPER 



BOOK I. 

PRIMORDIAL LOGIC 



SECTION I. 

GENERAL LAWS OF THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS. 

In the prolegomena comprised in the two preceding Parts, 
many things were necessarily anticipated in an incidental 
way. As, however, they were merely preparatory to my 
main purpose, I may not mar the development contemplat- 
ed in this Part, through an apprehension of appearing some- 
times to repeat what had already been announced. Wher- 
ever this does happen, it will be found that a more formal 
and scientific announcement is attempted. 

On the subject of Ideas, also, it is somewhat difficult to 
mark with precision what strictly belongs to Psychology, 
and what to Logic. Ideas, regarded as the determining pow- 
ers of cognition, do certainly belong to the first ; and I have 
so endeavoured to treat of them in the explication given in 
the preceding Part. In this Part, besides giving the general 
laws of their determination, I shall weave in much respect- 
ing the mode and conditions of their development, together 
with their characteristics, which may appear more justly to 
belong to psychological disquisition. At one time, I had 



142 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

well nigh concluded to bring this all into the ' Preliminary 
View* ; but farther reflection has induced me to believe that 
I shall make a more simple and satisfactory presentation of 
the subject, and, on the whole, more philosophic, by compris- 
ing all these particulars under Primordial Logic. Lest any 
should object to this course, I thought it best to say thus 
much to shew that the same thoughts had occurred to my 
own mind, and that the difficulties had not been passed over 
without consideration. 

I. Humanity being the union of body and spirit, — the 
life of thought, and the physical life of the full-formed and 
constituted being, in the present sphere, begin, go on, and 
end together. Hence, even before birth, as Locke affirms,* 
there may be incipient thought, because, there is incipient 
sensation. 

But although thought begins with sensation, sensation is 
not the determinative power of thought. This power lies 
in the Ideas of the Reason. 

II. The first action of the Reason is spontaneous, and 
unattended by reflection. Mind in humanity being finite 
and dependent, hath not its starting point in itself. The 
main-spring is energised by an invisible and infinite power. 
But when it has reached a certain development, different in 
different individuals, reflection begins, and it now traces 
back the path through which it has run its course. 

III. By reflection, it analyses the knowledges actually 
attained, together with the simple sensations. By this analy- 
sis it does not find the determining powers and forms, nor 
even all the materials of thought in sensation : but it 

* Book II., ch. 9, § 5. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 143 

finds certain conceptions which, when separated from the 
sensations, are intuitively apprehended as universal, neces- 
sary, and absolute. 

IV. These conceptions must have been given in the dawn 
of cognition, as well as during the whole line of cognition, 
since cognition is impossible without them ; and yet they 
were not given before sensation, because, in the first place, 
as above stated, the life of thought, and physical life shew- 
ing itself in sensation, begin together ; and in the second 
place, the sensations are signals from the outward world of 
reality, that the time and occasion of thought have arrived, 
and that the field of thought stands invitingly open. 

V. Hence arises the distinction of antecedence in time, 
and in necessary existence, or chronological and logical an- 
tecedence.* The sensations are first in time ; but these 
absolute cognitions are first in necessary existence. But 
although we speak of an antecedence in time as something 
that we can conceive of, it is so slight, that consciousness 
cannot appreciate it, for no sooner does the sensation ap- 
pear, than the absolute element is mingled with it. 

VI. The first cognitions, or judgments, which take their 
expression in propositions, are not to be confounded with 
Ideas. The Ideas are the determinative power of cognition, 
which exists independently of all cognition. When the 
phenomenal conditions of thought are supplied, then the 
Ideas manifest themselves through the different functions. 
They manifest themselves through consciousness in the cog- 
nition of subject and object ; through the imagination in the 
cognition of ideals ; through sensuous perception in the cog- 

♦ Part I., Sec. IX. 



144 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

nition of exterior substances, causes, and laws. That is, the 
Ideas determine to particular cognitions of an objective re- 
ality, to which the universal is related — and in this way de- 
termine to the cognition of the universal itself. For exam- 
ple, sensations of resistance, of colour, and form, are given ; 
upon this, the ideas of substance, cause, and space, deter- 
mine to the cognition of a particular body, with its primary 
and secondary qualities ; and in determining to this partic- 
ular cognition by the function of sensuous perception, they 
determine at the same time by the function of intuition, to 
the universal and necessary cognitions of space, substance, 
and cause, as comprised within the first and highest form of 
reality. 

VII. In the evolution of the Ideas we have thus four par- 
ticulars : First, the phenomena of consciousness, as condi- 
tions in time, and effects of objective reality thrown within 
the sphere of the subjective simple ; Secondly, the cogni- 
tion of particular objective realities ; Thirdly, the absolute 
and universal cognitions of the intuitive function determin- 
ed by the Ideas ; and, Fourthly, the Ideas themselves. 
The Ideas are first of all in the antecedence of necessary 
existence. The cognition of the universal in like manner 
is the antecedent of the cognition of the particular. But in 
the antecedence of time, the reverse order takes place. Re- 
flection, analysing our actual cognitions first, separates the 
metaphenomenal from the phenomenal in the particular ; 
Secondly, it separates the universal from the particular ; and 
Thirdly, it evolves the Ideas as the necessary grounds and 
antecedents in the Reason itself, of every form of cognition. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 145 



SECTION II. 

METAPHYSICAL IDEAS. 

I. Subject, and Objective Exteriority. 

The phenomena of the exterior and the interior conscious- 
ness are the antecedents in time. Among the phenomena of 
the interior consciousness there is one class which have the 
remarkable characteristics of self-determination and free- 
dom, shewing themselves in the acts of attention, or acts ap- 
propriating the cognitive faculty. All the phenomena of 
the interior consciousness appear, therefore, either direct- 
ly, — as in simple volitions, — or indirectly, as in cogni- 
tions directed by volition, with these remarkable character- 
istics. 

On the other hand, the phenomena of the exterior con- 
sciousness manifest themselves independently of this inward, 
self-determining activity. They appear in me, but are in no 
sense produced by me. Upon these phenomena, the Reason 
is determined by the Ideas of Subject and Object to cognize 
the particular subject myself, and an exterior something not 
myself. From this particular cognition, as the initiative, 
it cognizes the universal distinction of the interior subject 
and the exterior object. 

Reflection now analysing the mental process, it becomes 
evident that the Ideas of Subject and Object must have had 
an antecedent necessary existence, or the several cognitions 
could not have appeared ; since the bare phenomena, whe- 

N 



146 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

ther of the interior or exterior consciousness, present us, in 
themselves, not realities, but appearances only, as the name 
intimates. The two classes of phenomena mentioned above, 
with their different characteristics, are the conditions on 
which the cognitions take place, but the Idea can alone be 
the power which determines the form of the cognition. 

II. Time and Space. 

That part of our knowledge which is obtained through, or 
by means of the senses and muscular resistance, is connect- 
ed with the Ideas of Time and Space. All the phenome- 
na of body are given in space. All succession of phenom- 
ena is given in time. It is impossible for us to conceive 
of body without space. It is impossible for us to conceive 
of succession without time. In order, therefore, to know 
body, I must have the idea of space : and in order to know 
succession, I must have the idea of time. 

The ideas of time and space are simple and primary ; — 
they can be resolved into nothing antecedent — they are di- 
rectly intelligible ; they neither require, nor can receive any 
definition. Their characteristics are obvious. They are 
necessary, that is, they cannot be supposed not to be, or 
not to have been ; they are infinite ; and they admit of no 
representation that can be addressed to the senses. 

It is impossible that they should have their origin in sen- 
sation. Neither the secondary nor the primary qualities of 
bodies bear any resemblance to them. This book which I 
hold in my hand, and the hand itself, are in space ; but 
clearly they are not space. Form and solidity must be con- 
nected with space, and cannot be thought of without space, 
but they have nothing in common with space, and nothing 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 147 

analogous to space. Body, conceived of under any modi- 
fications, and under any enlargement, is still in space, and 
totally distinct from space. The characteristics of body are 
contingency, form, and limitation — the very opposite of 
those of space. 

Time, if representable at all under forms addressed to the 
senses, must be representable by a succession of phenomena 
or events. But here we find the same opposition of cardi- 
nal characteristics. Time, taken as simple duration — the 
sense in which I here employ it, is necessary, without form, 
and unlimited' — as simple duration, it is eternity. Any suc- 
cession that may be given is contingent — that is, it may be 
supposed not to be, or not to have been ; it is limited — it 
must have had a beginning, and may have an assigned ter- 
mination ; and lastly, it may be represented in space, by 
the revolutions of the planets and a dial-plate. Succession 
must be in time, but is plainly totally distinct from time. 

As the cognitions of time and space cannot have their 
origin in sensation, their origin must be assigned to the pure 
Reason itself. 

How do these cognitions arise in the Reason ? Are they 
innate 1 The just reply is, that the Reason has an innate 
or inherent power of forming or developing those ideas, 
when the proper conditions are supplied. The conception, 
or act of intelligence, cannot be said to exist before it ap- 
pears in the consciousness. But the Reason, undoubtedly, 
in the potentiality of its substance, contains these ideas as 
constitutive forms of thought : and with these forms is pre- 
pared to give out true knowledges or judgments, whenever 
the sensations shall be supplied which form the occasions of 
its action. Sensations and muscular resistance are condi- 



148 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

tional to the development of these ideas ; but the pure Rea- 
son is the origin of them. 

Hence we affirm, that time and space are to be set down 
as original and inherent forms of the Reason ; — meaning by 
this, that it is of the essential and necessary nature of the 
Reason, to think and form cognitions under these ideas ; so 
that whenever certain conditions and occasions come up, 
the Reason moulds, as it were, into an exact knowledge, the 
sensations which otherwise were fleeting. If we were to 
suppose the Reason incapable of developing the ideas of time 
and space, what would become of all our notions of the 
forms, magnitudes, motions, and velocities of bodies ? What 
would become of the notion of body itself? Time and 
space seem two very simple ideas — and so they are : but 
how vast and momentous their relations and bearings ! 

When, however, we represent these ideas as inherent forms 
of the Reason, we do not mean to affirm that time and 
space have no existence independently of the Reason : this 
would be contradictory to the Reason itself; for in the de- 
velopment of these ideas, the Reason assigns time and space 
an independent existence. Time and space are necessary, 
absolute, and infinite, and are conceived of as existing, al- 
though there were no mind to recognize them, and to con- 
tain their ideas as forms of its thinking and knowing. Time 
and space are independent realities, which do not impress 
themselves upon the Reason through the sense ; but the 
ideas of which, Reason potentially contains within itself as 
the knowing power, and brings out into consciousness, when- 
ever sensations or any phenomena appear there, whose 
causes hold to them an actual relation. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 149 

III. The Infinite and the Finite. 

The very judgment which the mind passes upon any ob- 
ject of thought, — it is finite, — implies a conception of the in- 
finite : for how could it affirm, — it is finite, — unless it knew 
the infinite? If it be said that the finite is a positive idea, 
and the infinite only negative of it ; with equal propriety, to 
say the least, we may call the infinite the positive, and the 
finite the negative idea. 

Does not the mind have a distinct and positive cognition 
when it affirms of any thing, it is infinite ? Take space for 
example : when the mind affirms that space is infinite, does 
it not mean something more than that its limits cannot be 
assigned ? Truly we say, space can have no limits, — it is 
necessarily and absolutely infinite. 

When we can assign certain limits to an object, we say 
simply it is finite ; when we conceive that there must be lim- 
its, while still we are unable to assign them, we call it the 
indefinite ; but when no limit is conceivable or admissible, 
we say, it is infinite. 

Plainly, no phenomena, whether primary or secondary, 
present us the infinite ; it can be a cognition of pure Reason 
alone. Phenomena, indeed, are the conditions, but noth- 
ing more, since no multiplication of the finite can realise 
the infinite. Now, when through reflection we come to ac- 
count for this judgment of the mind, we are inevitably led 
to assign the Idea of the Infinite, in the Reason, as the de- 
terminative power and only sufficient ground. 

IV. Quantity. 
Our knowledges are connected, also, with the idea of 

N* 



150 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Quantity. Quantity comprehends Unity, Multiplici- 
ty, and Totality, or, One, Many, and All. 

Unity is the foundation of every form of quantity. Many 
is unity repeated indefinitely. All is the total sum of 
unities. 

What is the idea of unity ? Absolute unity is absolute 
indivisibility. 

In nature, there is no absolute unity in the sense of ab- 
solute indivisibility — matter is continuously divisible. In 
numbers, there is no absolute unity in this sense ; — every 
assumed unit is continuously divisible. But in matter, any 
body, any mass, or any organized system, may be taken as 
a unity relatively to any supposed or real multiplication of 
such body, mass, or system : and in numbers, any sum may 
be taken as unity relatively to any larger sum of which it 
is a fractional part. Here, every unity is made up of parts, 
and is itself but a part of some other unity. In matter, and 
in numbers, we have only parts and wholes ; and no abso- 
lute unity. In geometry, we have the indivisible point, but 
this is not really quantity, but the negation of a particular 
kind of quantity — that is, extension. It is where extension 
begins.* A line is, indeed, often represented as composed 
of an infinite number of points ; but the point in this case 
is really a degree of extension indefinitely and immeasura- 
bly small ; and not a point which has neither length, breadth, 
nor thickness. A negation of all extension cannot be mul- 
tiplied so as to compose a line. 

Infinite number is a contradictory idea ; for number pre- 
cludes the idea of infinity, as well as the idea of absolute 
i _____ 

* Part I., p. 78. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 151 

unity. Number may be continuously increased and dimin- 
ished : but it can never reach the infinite. 

When infinity and unity are united in the same idea, we 
have absolute totality. Thus time and space have unity, in 
that they are incapable of division into integral parts, or 
parts going to make them up : They are likewise infinite, 
and therefore are absolute totalities. God is the One, and 
Infinite being, and therefore an absolute totality. 

There are successions in time, but they are not time. 
There are bodies in space, but they are not space. Figures 
having extension may be imagined as drawn in space, but 
they are no integral portions of space, for space cannot be 
divided into any number of such figures as shall measure 
the whole of space. An indefinite variety and number of 
beings may be comprehended within the being of God as 
their cause ; but they are not God, nor a part of God : any 
possible multiplication of finite beings would not make up 
infinite being. 

Pantheism is contradicted by our very senses, in connec- 
tion with our Reason ; for this which we see, we can di- 
vide, and multiply, and measure ; and therefore, if it were 
a part of God, God would be capable of division, multiplica- 
tion, and measurement. 

In our own minds we have absolute unity again. But we 
have here only finite unity. Consequently, we have not 
absolute totality. There can be but one absolute totality of 
being, that is, God. But what is this finite unity which I 
affirm of myself — and how do I know it 1 I am one in the 
idea which I cannot but have of my spiritual substance, and 
its inherent and inseparable attributes. In my conscious- 
ness I find that J think, J feel, I choose, and / will. 



152 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

In the first place, it is plain that this I, or myself, is not 
capable of physical division — it cannot be distributed into 
parts separated in space. Again : it cannot be logically di- 
vided, that is, distributed into genera and species. It is pos- 
sible that its phenomena may admit of such a distribution ; 
but the spiritual substance itself cannot be conceived of un- 
der any such distribution. 

Neither can mind be numerically divided. It cannot be 
identified with any abstract number ; and since it cannot 
be resolved into physical parts, nor into mere extension, it 
cannot be represented by the relations and conditions of ab- 
stract numbers. Numerical multiplication and division do 
not apply to it. 

We may, indeed, have a numerical multiplicity of minds, 
and a numerical totality of minds ; but this has no bearing 
upon the question of the substance of the mind itself. 

A metaphysical division is equally out of the question, for 
such a division is, in itself, impossible. A metaphysical di- 
vision would imply either a division of the spiritual sub- 
stance itself, or a division of the attributes from the sub- 
stance : but the first would reduce the mind to the condi- 
tions of body, and remove it from metaphysical considera- 
tion ; and the last is metaphysically impossible, for sub- 
stance and attribute mutually and necessarily imply each 
other, and cannot be conceived of as divided. 

It is to be remarked here, that time and space, and God, 
being totalities, as well as unities, do not admit of the idea 
of multiplicity. It is, therefore, only in ourselves that we 
gain the idea of perfect unity, and yet admitting, also, the 
idea of multiplicity, and of totality without absoluteness. 

Absolute unity, and multiplicity and totality based upon 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 153 

it, and absolute totality, plainly, cannot be gained from the 
senses. These give the continuously divisible and multipli- 
cable. 

Upon the experience of my own personality, in my think- 
ing, feeling, and doing, I affirm that I am one, that I am 
neither a sum of parts which are separable units, nor is it 
possible for me to become a sum of parts. A collection of 
beings like myself will constitute multiplicity ; a complete 
collection will constitute totality : and upon this judgment 
respecting myself, arises the judgment of an absolute unity 
and totality — a one and all. 

The origin of the cognition of absolute unity and totality 
must, therefore, unquestionably be referred to the pure Rea- 
son, as constituted with the determinative Idea. 

But what is the origin of that unity which appears in one 
and many of a kind, where the particular representing uni- 
ty is itself divisible ; and of that unity which appears in ab- 
stract numbers ? 

The relative and the limited must have its origin in the 
absolute and unconditional. It is impossible that the latter 
should have its origin in the former. 

But by the senses, in the order of time, the relative and 
limited are first given : and thus divisible and limited unity, 
in material objects, is first given. But were the mind un- 
furnished with the idea, or the potentiality of the absolute 
conception, of unity, the impressions of the senses could not 
lead even to the limited cognition : and thus the absolute 
idea becomes the logical antecedent of the limited cogni- 
tion. This is a general exposition ; the following is the 
particular : Through the impressions received by the senses, 
I awake to the consciousness of my existence — these im- 



154 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

pressions are the conditions and antecedents in time, of 
knowing, willing, and feeling. In knowing myself, I have 
the knowledge of a particular, finite, but absolute unity — 
and this idea of unity, realized in myself, is the immediate 
logical antecedent of the limited, imperfect and relative, nu- 
merical and physical unity. But, on the other hand, the 
logical antecedent of the idea of the particular unity, my- 
self, is the absolute and infinite unity, the one and all. 

Now, when we affirm that the idea of Quantity is a form 
of the Reason, we mean that the finite Reason is so consti- 
tuted, that when it comes to know itself, it knows itself as 
an absolute and finite unity, because it has the power of 
conceiving of an absolute and infinite unity ; it is prepared 
to judge of itself as a unity and finite, in the potentiality of 
judging of a unity infinite as well as absolute. The infinite 
comprehends the finite ; the finite cannot be augmented to 
the infinite. And so, likewise, when the phenomena of 
sense are given, it is prepared, in this antecedent concep- 
tion of unity, to form cognitions of material and numerical 
unity. The material unity is concrete ; the numerical uni- 
ty is abstract. 

The conception of the divisibility of material unity arises 
upon the experience that that which is assumed as a unity, 
because standing alone in space, is separable into parts, each 
standing alone in space ; and as the assumed material uni- 
ty occupies and measures a portion of space ; and as the 
space occupied, taken as simple extension, is capable 
of constant division in an endless approximation to- 
wards the point absolute, so, likewise, the material unity is 
conceived of under the same conditions. Continuous divisi- 
bility is a struggling of the intellect after absolute unity : 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 155 

and continuous multiplication is a struggling after absolute 
totality. Numerical division and multiplication bear to the 
material the relation of the abstract to the concrete. 

V. Quality. 

Our intelligential activity developes also the idea of 
Quality. The quality of propositions is the affirmation or 
negation contained in them : — the nature or kind, that is, 
the quality, of a given proposition, is, that it affirms or de- 
nies the predicate of the subject. But a proposition only 
expresses or represents a judgment : and hence, quality be. 
longs to the judgment itself. Now, all judgments must be 
either simple or comparative. A simple judgment is the 
mere affirmation or denial of the existence of an object ; a 
comparative judgment is the affirmation or denial of agree- 
ment, relation, or connection, between two simple judg- 
ments ; the one being the subject, and the other the predi- 
cate. Comparative judgments do thus evidently depend 
upon simple judgments : the simple are primitive, or the 
first outgoings of the Intelligence; the comparative are 
secondary and dependent. In the simple, primitive judg. 
ment, the decision of the mind respects the reality or the 
negation of the object of thought ; and so in the secondary 
judgment, the reality or negation of the agreement of the 
two objects of thought compared. It will thus follow, that 
under Quality, as the general category, are embraced 
the particular categories of Reality and Negation. In ad- 
dition to these, a third particular category must arise, which 
is in some sort a combination of the two, and that is Limi- 
tation. Every reality of the sensible world has its limita- 
tions. It is a reality, but only within a certain limit, and 



158 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

at this limit, negation takes the place of reality. It is plain, 
that without negation, this limit could not be conceived, as» 
without reality, it could not be demanded. 

Now, let it be remembered, that the reality conceived of 
by the intelligence is not the mere reality of the phenome- 
na of consciousness, by which the world without, as well as 
my own actual existence, are given ; — It is the reality of 
objects lying beyond the phenomena, and existing indepen- 
dently of them. If the intelligence were a mere blank be- 
fore sensation began ; and if its whole capacity and office 
were described as a mere receptivity of sensations ; then 
there never could be in the intelligence any thought of ob- 
jective reality. Sensations are purely subjective affections : 
external causality and substance are not contained in them ; 
the reality of any being or thing is not contained in them ; 
not even is the reality of subjective existence contained in 
them ; for the mere sensations do not contain the subject ; — 
the sensations of seeing, hearing, and smelling, for example, 
no more contain the I, or myself, than they contain any 
external object : and even the sense of resistance, as it is 
but an internal experience, does not contain either subjec- 
tive or objective reality. 

It is true, that without sensations, the thought of reality 
would not arise in the consciousness, as, indeed, no thought 
whatever would arise — no knowledge — no experience. The 
sensations are conditional to the judgment of reality. But, 
then, whence comes the judgment of reality, whether ob- 
jective or subjective ? There is but one answer that can be 
given. It is an a priori judgment of the Reason, or a 
judgment determined by an Idea. 

Now, when we speak of Quality as an Idea of the Rea- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 157 

son, we mean that the Reason is so constituted, that when 
sensations are given, it on its part gives out the judgments 
of reality, negation, and limitation — it does not, analytical- 
ly, draw them out from the sensations, but, synthetically, af- 
firms them upon the sensations. The judgment of reality 
is its own, added to the experience of sensations. The 
mind is a receptivity of the sensations only ; its own inhe- 
rent form of thought affirms the existence of a real subject 
and a real object. 

The judgment of reality appears first, chronologically, in 
the particular and limited subject and object ; but the Rea- 
son, as the faculty of the universal, extends the judgment to 
universality, and affirms that all sensations must be connect- 
ed with subject and object — nay, that all phenomena of con- 
sciousness whatever must be thus connected. The judgment 
of reality extends to all our thinking, feeling, and volition. 

Again : the Reason, as the faculty of the absolute, upon 
the particular and limited reality, conceives of the absolute 
and unlimited reality, or the infinite. 

VI. Relation. 

Relation is another category under which our know- 
ledges appear. If relation were nothing more than juxta- 
position, it would still follow that a priori judgments would 
be necessary, in order thus to comprehend objects ; — for 
time and space, which are a priori judgments, would be ne- 
cessary. But relation is not mere juxtaposition. Juxtapo- 
sition in space and time is, indeed, all the relation which 
experience of the senses affords — immediate contiguity of 
objects, and immediate contiguity of changes, forming suc- 
cession. But when we reflect upon the objects of know- 
o 



158 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

ledge, we conceive of them as having interior relations, 
which are not representable under the forms of time and 
space. These relations are three : — 

1. Substance and Accidents, or Properties. 2. 
Cause and Effect. 3. Action and reaction, or re- 
ciprocity BETWEEN THE A GENT AND THE PATIENT. 

I. External objects are related to the human sensitivity 
in the production or development of sensations ; and are re- 
lated to each other in the production or development of 
changes in form, appearance, and properties ; all these last be- 
ing judged of again through the new sensations produced. 
The subject, also, is related to the consciousness in the devel- 
opment of many internal phenomena within its field of view — 
as the phenomena of thinking, feeling, and willing ; besides 
those phenomena which are marked as changes in external 
objects from the agency of the subject, such as the muscu- 
lar movements, and their extended sequents. Now, while 
nothing is immediately presented to the consciousness but 
the juxtaposition of the phenomena, there is an a priori syn- 
thetical judgment respecting the interior relation ; and the ob- 
ject and the subject, in respect of the changes connected 
with them, are affirmed to be Substance and Cause. Thus 
the external objects, in their connexion with the human 
sensitivity, develope sensations which are commonly known 
as the result of properties in these subjects ; form and so- 
lidity receiving the designation of primary properties, be- 
cause, without them, the objects cannot be conceived ; and 
heat and cold, sweetness and sourness, fragrance, and so on, 
receiving the designation of secondary properties, because, 
without these, the objects can be conceived, namely, by 
means of the primary properties alone. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 159 

Substance and property are thus necessary to the con- 
ception of the objects, and mutually imply each other. 

So, also, with respect to the subject and its thoughts, vo- 
litions, and emotions — we cannot avoid taking the subject 
as substance, and as such developing its properties. 

It is unquestionable, on the one hand, that unless the bare 
phenomena of consciousness were given, the idea of sub- 
stance and property could not make its appearance ; but, 
then, on the other hand, it is equally unquestionable, that 
this idea is not obtained by analysis of the phenomena — 
sensations, emotions, thoughts, volitions. These do not con- 
tain substance ; but here, again, the synthetic judgment, 
a priori of the Reason, affirms the relation. 

II. Cause cannot be developed from bare phenomena. 
Phenomena are not cause, nor do they contain cause ; but 
the Reason demands to account for their existence ; and in 
doing this, gives again a synthetic a priori judgment. 

Those phenomena which connect themselves directly with 
the properties of substance, as well as those which are the 
immediate sequents of causality, must be referred to cause ; 
because all finite substance must be referred to cause — 
cause absolute and infinite. It is impossible, therefore, to 
exercise thought without the judgment of the relation of 
cause and effect. 

The idea of cause could not be developed, except upon 
condition of phenomena. The phenomena form the antece- 
dents in time. But neither could the phenomena lead to 
knowledges unless the Reason, in its own inherent capacity, 
contained the Idea of Cause — as the idea of originating power. 

The idea of causality is first given specifically in the af- 
firmation of the causality of the Will in every individual ; 



160 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

and then generalized by the Reason, as the faculty of the 
Universal, into the axiom which connects cause with every 
phenomenon whatever, past, present, or to come. 

But the individual will, as a finite cause, presupposes an 
infinite : I could not say of myself, I am a cause and finite, 
unless I had already the idea of cause, and of cause infinite. 
The antecedent condition, in the order of time, being sup- 
plied, the true logical order of the development must, there- 
fore, be as follows : The Reason contains the Idea of 
Cause, and, as the faculty of the absolute and the infinite, 
forms the pure a priori cognition of an absolute and infinite 
cause ; and this is the basis on which I affirm of myself, I 
am cause finite ; and the basis on which I make any affirma- 
tion of causality whatever. As there is infinite and abso- 
lute cause, so, likewise, there must be infinite and absolute 
substance. Cause and substance are inseparable. 

III. The third particular is that of action and reaction, or 
the reciprocity existing between two substances with respect 
to any change which takes place in one or both, from their 
correlation. Thus, when one body impinges upon another, 
as when a ball is thrown against a wall and rebounds, there 
is, plainly, an action of the ball upon the wall, and a reac- 
tion of the wall upon the ball ; and it is in consequence of 
this reciprocity that the effect takes place. When fire is 
applied to a combustible substance, there is both an action 
of the fire upon the substance, and a reciprocal action of the 
elementary particles of the substance, as they enter into 
new combinations and increase the action of the fire, until 
its visible manifestations cease in the entire consumption. 
In all chemical changes and combinations, this reciprocity 
is exhibited. In the correlation of the human sensitivity 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 161 

with external objects, it appears again. Indeed, in all the 
developments of substance and property, and of cause and 
effect, this reciprocity comes into view. 

The conception of this relation is, that in the system of re- 
ality and being, substances and properties conditionate the de- 
velopment of substances and properties ; and causes and ef- 
fects conditionate the action of causes and effects ; and 
causes and substances mutually conditionate each other. 

This relation obviously depends upon the ideas of sub- 
stance and cause. But if substance and cause are synthetic 
and a priori, then this relation must have an a priori 
ground. 

The relation, indeed, could never be known, without the 
chronological antecedence of phenomena ; but as the phe- 
nomena do not contain the ideas of substance and cause — 
as these last cannot be analytically evolved — so, likewise, 
the phenomena cannot contain, and there cannot be analyt- 
ically evolved from them, this judgment of a mutual con- 
ditionating. 

If we confine ourselves to bare observation, we not only 
fall short of the idea of cause, and rest in mere succession 
unaccounted for ; we also substitute the conditions of the 
development of substance, and of the activity of cause, for 
the ideas themselves. But when we admit the synthetic a 
priori judgments of the Reason to have their place, then 
the distinction between the relation of mere conditions, is 
distinguished clearly from the relation of substances and 
causes to their developments and effects. 

Finite substances and causes conditionate each other : the 
condition is not the substance nor the cause, and yet the sub- 
stance cannot reveal its properties, nor the cause its effects, 



162 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

without the chronological antecedence of the condition. 
Motives are not the causes of volitions, and yet the Will 
cannot act without motives. Sensations are not the causes 
of cognitions, and yet the Reason cannot form cognitions 
without sensations, either in immediate or remote antece- 
dence. The wall or the pavement is not the cause of the 
rebounding of the ball, but the rebounding could not take 
place without it, or some similar condition. 

But the distinctive idea of condition, given in respect 
of the finite, although a logical antecedent of our particular 
cognitions, must itself have an absolute ground. The rela- 
tion of cause and effect, has its ultimate ground in cause 
infinite and absolute : and the relation of substance and 
property has its ultimate ground in substance infinite and 
absolute. In like manner, the relation of reciprocal action 
must have its ultimate ground in an infinite and absolute 
concurrence. The movements of finite mind, and the move- 
ments of nature, cannot at once be resolved into movements 
of the infinite and the absolute, without creating a system 
of Pantheism. But all these movements must be condi- 
tionated by the infinite and absolute — the infinite and the 
absolute must concur with them. In this way it holds 
true, that "in God we live, and move, and have our being." 

It appears, then, that Relation, in its three-fold form, is 
an Idea of the Reason. 

From the sensations it cannot be educed ; but the Reason, 
upon its own inherent fullness and capacity, forms cogni- 
tions from the sensations, in the relations of substance and 
property, cause and effect, action and reaction. It compre- 
hends, evolves, and employs the idea of relation, when the 
appropriate phenomena require it. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 163 

VII. Modality. 

Modality contains, 

Possibility and Impossibility ; 
Existence and Non-existence ; 
Necessity and Contingence. 

Every thing which the mind conceives of, is conceived of 
as possible or impossible ; as existent, or non-existent ; as 
necessary or contingent. Mode has respect to causality and 
substance. The enquiry of the mind is, whether a given 
conception can be realized, or whether it is impossible to 
causality : whether it is actually existent, or not . whe- 
ther it appears of necessity, or contingently? The an- 
swer to this enquiry gives us the mode or manner of the 
conception. 

No one will deny that we can think of that which we 
know to be impossible, as well as of the possible : that we 
can think of that which does not exist, as well as of that 
which does exist : that we can think of that which exists 
necessarily, or of that which exists contingently. 

But how do we come to think of the possible, contrast- 
ed with the impossible — the existent, contrasted with the 
non-existent — the necessary, contrasted with the contin- 
gent ? Can these ideas be analytically derived from the 
sensations, or are they synthetic, a priori judgments of the 
pure Reason ? 

I. The Possible and the Impossible. 

Our sensations are simple, actual phenomena ; they are 
nothing more. Whether any thing beyond, or different 
from these sensations can exist, is a question which the 
mind starts, and thus shews that it has an idea of the pos- 
sible ; but this idea is not a sensation, nor can it be com- 



164 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

prehended within a sensation ; it is something which su- 
pervenes from the mind itself upon the sensations. 

The idea of the possible cannot but imply its opposite, 
the impossible ; as the latter cannot but imply the former. 
The idea of the possible and impossible shews the mind 
leaping beyond the bounds of actual experience : so far from 
being confined to the bare sensations, it is not even con- 
fined to the cognitions of the actual, formed upon the sen- 
sations ; but multiplies forms of being in time and space 
indefinitely, r:>th of the possible, that is, such as in ac- 
cordance with rational laws might exist ; and of the im- 
possible, or such as imply a violation of all law, and there- 
fore cannot be supposed to exist. It affirms, also, the in- 
herent impossibility of certain conceptions, e. g., that 4+ 
5=1?. 

II. Existence and Non-existence. 

That we think of non-existence, as well as of existence, 
is undeniable. And that we form conceptions of objects 
under the mode of non-existence, as well as under that of 
existence, is equally undeniable. A point which has nei- 
ther length, breadth, nor thickness ; a line which has length, 
but no breadth nor thickness ; a cube which is formed of 
six planes united at right angles, bat without solidity, and 
bodiless ; the properties of a geometrical arch without a 
possible realization in any material arch ; the conception of 
a shadow ; the conception of empty space ; combinations of 
the imagination in endless diversity ; the conception of cre- 
ation out of nothing ; and again, the possible annihilation 
of creation — all these, and the like conceptions, imply the 
opposition of existence and non-existence, as a mode of 
thought. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 165 

But it is quite obvious that non-existence could never be 
contained in any mere sensation. As our sensations do not 
directly give us reality, neither do they give us non-exist- 
ence. Here, again, we must refer to the pure Reason, 
which, from the fullness of its own ideas, gives out cogni- 
tions and supplies the forms of knowledge. 

III. Necessity and Contingence. 

Two conceptions mutually imply each other, when the 
one cannot be thought of or defined without the other. It 
is thus with possibility and impossibility ; with existence and 
non-existence ; and again, with necessity and contingency. 

That these conceptions are in the mind is plain, because we 
are now speaking of them. That we are continually apply- 
ing them is equally plain. There cannot, be more than one 
straight line drawn between any two points — there cannot 
be — that is, it is impossible. But how impossible? Is it 
impossible, because there is no power or skill adequate to 
draw more than one line ? No, it is impossible in itself — 
it cannot be conceived of under any conditions — it is ne- 
cessarily impossible. 

Again : we conceive of existence absolute and necessary, 
namely, the existence of God. God cannot be supposed 
not to exist, for if he did not exist, there would be no ex- 
istence whatever. We have thus necessary truth and ne- 
cessary being. 

There are also necessary relations. The relation between 
the substance of any being and the attributes which go to 
make up our conception of that being, is necessary. The 
relation between Infinite Cause and the effects which it 
wills, is necessary. So, likewise, the relation between a 
finite cause determining itself to effects, and the effects 



166 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

determined, is necessary when these are both in its consti- 
tuted energy. 

Necessity is absolute, when there is no conceivable con- 
dition. It is relative, when there is a conceivable condi- 
tion. The being of God is absolutely necessary. Pure 
mathematical truths are absolutely necessary. The move- 
ments of the planets are relatively necessary ; because 
they continue to move upon condition that the system of 
nature remains unchanged : but it is conceivable that it 
may be changed. 

The opposite idea of contingency is clearly applicable 
likewise. That which is, but which may be conceived of 
both as not having been, and as having begun to be, under 
the possibility that it might not be, is a contingent existence. 
Hence, whatever is created, is contingent existence. Hence, 
also, all volitions are contingent. 

The distinction between natural and moral necessity, 
which has been frequently attempted, is absurd. Necessity 
is a simple idea, and entirely independent of the distinction 
between the natural and the moral. Besides, the distinc- 
tion between the natural and the moral cannot be made out 
without implying the ideas of necessity and contingency ; 
for that alone is moral which is free ; and that which is free 
cannot be necessitated. Hence, again, the terms moral ne- 
cessity are contradictory. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 167 



SECTION III. 

NOMOLOGICAL IDEAS. 

I am reminded of the extensive field of thought I have 
yet to travel over ; and since under the preceding head, I 
have been particular in illustrating the laws which deter- 
mine the evolution of Ideas, it will be admissible under 
the present head to bring the explication within narrower 
limits. 

I. Law. 

Law manifests itself in the orderly succession and the 
stated recurrence of phenomena. 

Phenomena, as barely existent, demand causality. The 
fixed relations and the uniform succession demand Law.* 
How beautiful and glorious to thought is Law ! Law gov- 
erns the sun, the planets, and the stars. Law covers the 
earth with beauty, and fills it with bounty. Law directs the 
light, moves the wings of the atmosphere, binds the great 
forces of the universe in harmony and order, awakes the 
melody of creation, quickens every sensation of delight, 
moulds every form of life. Law governs atoms, and gov- 
erns systems. Law governs matter, and governs thought. 
Law springs from the mind of God, travels through creation, 
and makes all things one. It makes all material forms one, 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 28, 29. 



168 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

in the unity of system ; it makes all minds one, in the uni- 
ty of thought and love. 

The observations of the senses yield us only limited suc- 
cessions and recurrences of phenomena. These have an 
antecedence in the order of time. But Law, eternal, abso- 
lute, and universal, has antecedence in the order of neces- 
sary existence, and is an Idea of the Reason. It is the 
Idea of Ideas, under the Nomological conception. 

II. Matter and Spirit, 

Is Spirit the negation of Matter ? With equal force, at 
least, we may say, Matter is the negation of Spirit. Do we 
know one better than the other ? Then do we know Spirit 
best, for we ourselves are Spirit, and Matter is without us. 
But neither Matter nor Spirit are contained in the phenom- 
enal. Here, again, the phenomenal is merely the condition, 
the antecedent in the order of time. But Matter and 
Spirit is a general cognition founded upon an Idea of the 
Reason. It is an Idea which comprehends the whole ac- 
tual and possible sphere of cause and law. Whatever exists 
and is governed, is either matter or spirit. 

III. Perfection. 

Where phenomena are compared — and by experience we 
can compare nothing else — it is impossible to judge even of 
relative perfection, unless there be in the mind principles 
and archetypes with which in the first place to compare the 
objects of experience. For how shall we say of this par- 
ticular, It is more beautiful than the other ; or of this, It is 
better, wiser, more just, unless there be in the mind a con- 
ception and archetype of beauty, and a conception and 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 169 

archetype of the good and the just, by which to determine 
the intrinsic character of each particular, in order to judge 
of their comparative perfection? But the conception of 
Perfection appears not merely in the comparison of quali- 
ties in particular objects. We think of an absolute justice, 
truth, wisdom, and goodness, an absolute beauty, an absolute 
order, harmony, and fitness. It is absolute law attaining an 
absolute development. We think of God as Infinite Per- 
fection—a form and measure of being to which nothing can 
be added, and from which nothing can be taken. But even 
in finite modes of being, we conceive of a Perfection which 
relatively to their archetypes, is absolute. There is an ab- 
solute beauty of the human form; an absolute truth and 
justice in human action ; and an absolute loveliness in na- 
ture, which, if not realised in experience, is nevertheless 
represented in the imagination. We may deny absolute 
perfection to the mode of being, because it is finite ; but we 
can represent it to ourselves as filling out its measure, as 
reaching the excellence, glory, and beauty of its archetype. 

Now, so far from absolute Perfection, under the form of 
the Infinite, being a presentation of the senses, not even in 
finite modes is it such a presentation. Actual experience 
gives us the limited and variable phenomena, and nothing 
more. But how do our minds come to leap beyond the 
actual realities of finite being, and to shape out an unseen 
perfection of truth and beauty? How do they ascend 
up to the conception of Infinite Perfection ? There is but 
one satisfactory solution : the Idea of Perfection in the 
Reason. 

Thus constituted, when the antecedent conditions in time 
are supplied by experience, the Reason forms those Ideal 



170 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

cognitions, through its function of the Imagination, which 
inspire to works of art, to self-cultivation, and to all great 
and good deeds ; and stretching its eye beyond all created 
being, sees the Infinite himself in his ineffable greatness 
and beauty. 

The Idea of Perfection thus attaches itself to the whole 
sphere of human activity. It is the leading Idea. In the 
particular development, however, we have several Ideas 
which we shall proceed to consider. 

IV. Right and Wrong. 

This antithesis is universally recognized. Men, indeed, 
have disagreed as to the particulars to be placed under the 
two terms — some placing under the first what others place 
under the second ; but the two terms themselves, as neces- 
sarily and absolutely opposed, is a universal conception : 
all men think of Right and Wrong. There are, also, many 
particulars which men agree in placing under the same term 
of the antithesis : there is a code of ethics embracing car- 
dinal principles, which is well nigh universal. 

Again : the diversities of sentiment which actually exist, 
can be explained in the same way that human error is ex- 
plained on subjects confessedly admitting of exact deter- 
mination, namely, the want of sufficient education in gen- 
eral, and the want of the requisite examination and thought 
in respect to the particular subject, unbiassed by prejudice 
and passion. 

The Right has been confounded with the Useful. The 
Useful is an Idea, or it is a mere induction of consequences. 
If the latter, then certainly it cannot be identified with the 
Right. By a bare induction of consequences, we can never 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 171 

attain to an absolute and fixed judgment, since the induc- 
tion can never be complete. But the judgment of Right 
and Wrong is absolute, fixed, and universal. The Reason 
affirms that the two terms can never be transposed ; and 
where any particular has received a clear and positive as- 
signment to one of the terms, no possible consequences can 
ever change its character. Thus, lying, injustice, malice, 
cruelty, blasphemy, adultery, murder, and many other par- 
ticulars, have received an assignment which is seen to be 
necessary and unalterable. And the same is true of the 
opposite virtues. 

But if we take the Useful as an Idea, the impos- 
sibility of identifying it with the Right is equally ap- 
parent. Ideas are distinguished by their aims. Now, the 
Idea of Utility aims at the improvement of the external 
world, so as to multiply the accommodations and comforts 
of man in his physical relations. But the Idea of Right 
and Wrong aims to fix the great law of duty in respect to 
both God and man, in the imperishable relations of moral 
obligation. The one determines what will minister to 
physical comfort and enjoyment ; the other determines 
simply what is Right, in distinction from Wrong, irrespec- 
tive of all physical comfort and enjoyment. Nay, it com- 
mands the Right in opposition to physical comfort and en- 
joyment, and exalts self-denial into one of the most glorious 
and majestic forms of virtue. It indeed promises to perse- 
vering virtue ample rewards in the ultimate issue ; but it at 
the same time reveals virtue as pursuing its end, charmed by 
its own convictions and sweet consciousness, and in this way 
alone gaining its title, and establishing its meritoriousness. 
The judgment of Right and Wrong then could be derived from 



172 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

experience only as a distinct induction of consequences, since 
Utility as an Idea transcends experience ; but an induction 
of consequences being inadequate to account for this judg- 
ment, with its actual characteristics of necessity and uni- 
versality, we are here again led to the conception of an Idea 
of Right and Wrong in the Reason. 

Phenomena comprising the volitions of a free and respon- 
sible being, together with their sequents, form the antece- 
dents in time conditional to the development of the Idea. 
Constituted with this Idea, no sooner does an act of such a 
being appear in the consciousness, than the Reason affirms 
of it, it is Right, or, it is Wrong, Upon this particular 
judgment, it forms the axiomatic judgment. Every act of 
a free and responsible being must be Right or Wrong : and 
thence proceeds by reflection to recognize its own Idea. 

The Idea of Right and Wrong, projected in the various 
relations of humanity, determines a moral law for the gov- 
ernment of human conduct. The highest determination of 
a moral law is that made by the Divine Reason. A moral 
law, thus determined, is called, in respect to its origin, Di- 
vine Law. The human Reason, although it may fail to de- 
termine, of itself, an adequate moral law, nevertheless, no 
sooner reads the Divine law with a clear and open eye, 
than it beholds the marks of eternal and necessary truth, 
and bows to the august and awful authority. The moral 
Idea within determines to the recognition without. The 
voice which speaks from Sinai, and the voice of the Divine 
Word, who walked among men, find their echoes within, 
in thoughts which seem to connect our being with a past 
Eternity. 



PRIMOEDIAL LOGIC. • 173 

V. Fkeedom and Responsibility. 

Right and Wrong can be affirmed of the acts of a free 
and responsible being alone. 

The conception of Freedom is involved in that of Con- 
tingence, which has already been considered. A free being 
is one endowed with the power of contingent determina- 
tion ; that is, the opposite of a necessary determination.* 

Responsibility is involved in Freedom and Intelli- 
gence. A being who knows Law, and is capable of obey- 
ing or disobeying, is bound to account for his acts ; and is 
worthy of praise or blame, according to the account which 
he legitimately renders.f 

Freedom and Responsibility are affirmed by the Reason 
upon the consciousness of self-determining acts, because it 
is constituted with the Idea of Freedom and Responsibility. 

The Reason, as evolving the momentous Ideas of Moral 
Law, of Right and Wrong, of Freedom and Responsibility, 
is technically called the Conscience. 

VI. Personal Identity. 

The phenomena of consciousness present us, in them- 
selves, neither Personality nor Personal Identity. They are 
a bare flow of variable appearances. The personality is the 
subjective simple, in whose consciousness all these appear- 
ances pass along ; and who knows himself both as a cause 
and recipient of them. The identity of this personality is 
its unchanged substance and properties in all time and cir- 
cumstances, amid every variety of phenomenal presenta- 

* Doctrine of the Will, Ch. II., Sec. III. and VIL 
t Moral Agency, Chilli., Sec. I. 



174 • PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

tion. It is the conception of identical and indivisible one. 
ness. The phenomena here again take antecedence in 
time ; while the unchanging subject holds the antecedence 
of necessary existence. 

When the conditional phenomena make their appearance, 
the Reason, furnished with the Idea of Personal Identity, 
knows itself and its cognates in their simplicity and one- 
ness. The cognition of Identity does not appear under any 
limitation of time. The Reason affirms, What I now am 
I always have been, and always shall be, in the whole cir- 
cuit of my being. 

VII. Immortality. 

It needs no argument to satisfy any mind, that immor- 
tality cannot be a conception of experience. Indeed, many 
affirm that it is not even a truth of philosophy, but purely a 
doctrine of revelation. It appears to me that the history 
of this doctrine affords unanswerable proof that the concep- 
tion of Immortality is developed in the human mind inde- 
pendently of a Divine Revelation. But, if we grant as a 
matter of fact, that it was not developed in the human mind 
until it was formally announced by Divine Revelation, it is 
nevertheless necessary that the Idea of Immortality should 
belong to the Reason, in order to make the acceptance of 
the doctrine possible, unless it can be shewn to be compre- 
hended within elements of thought furnished by the senses. 
Whatever new doctrine is taught us, must be contained un- 
der facts or principles, and forms of thought which we al- 
ready have. If, therefore, the sense cannot give us the 
conception of Immortality — as confessedly it cannot — and 
if we have no constituted principle or Idea within to give 
it, then the doctrine cannot be taught us ; just as a moral 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 175 

law cannot be taught us unless there be a Reason or Con- 
science, furnished with Ideas of law and moral obligation, 
to respond to it, by forming the corresponding conceptions. 

Some seem to entertain the very strange notion, that Di- 
vine Revelation is dishonoured by granting to human rea- 
son the possibility of arriving at the cognition of Immortal- 
ity by its own innate powers. Now, it ought to be recol- 
lected that the human reason is no less the work of God 
than the written Word, and hence, that the acknowledg- 
ment of the glorious constitution of the former is doing 
honour to God in the same sense as the acknowledgment of 
the latter. The latter assumes that we have the former, by 
appealing to it. The mission of Divine Revelation is spe- 
cial, to renew to human thought truths which sensuality and 
sin had lulled to repose ; and to bring to light that extraor- 
dinary system of grace which could belong neither to Logic 
nor to Observation ; but which, when brought to light, ap- 
pears all ever inscribed with those moral characters which 
meet the moral ideas as the light meets the eye of the new- 
born infant — a blessed visitation, for which it is prepared. 

The above are strictly the Moral Ideas. We next pro- 
ceed to the Esthetical. These, also, are allied to Perfec- 
tion as the leading Idea. 



VIII. The Beautiful. 

The Perfect is the conception of the utmost development 
of Law in general. Appearing in different spheres, it takes 
different denominations. In The Morale, it is Rectitude ; 
in Logic, it is Truth ; in Somatology, it is The Useful ; 
in Esthetics, it is The Beautiful. 



176 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

The Useful relates to the physical sensibilities and well- 
being of creatures that can enjoy and suffer. 

The Beautiful relates to a peculiar class of emotions be- 
longing only to creatures endowed with Reason — a Reason 
constituted with Ideas determining to cognitions which 
stand in a causal relation to the emotions. 

The Useful determines the constitution, forms, and rela- 
tions of bodies in respect to physical life and enjoyment. 

The Beautiful determines the forms, relations, and proper- 
ties of bodies in respect to its peculiar emotions. These 
emotions are explained by referring simply to consciousness. 

Emotions are clearly distinguishable from sensations, in 
this, that the latter precede, while the former follow cogni- 
tions. Emotions of beauty obviously, therefore, cannot 
arise out of simple sensations. A judgment of forms, re- 
lations, and properties, intervenes between the two. 

The simple cognition of objects which we pronounce 
beautiful, is made on the general laws of sensuous percep- 
tion. The question is, Why do we add the judgment, they 
are beautiful ? 

It may be replied, we experience the peculiar emotions to 
which, likewise, we apply this epithet ; and then, by analy- 
sis, ascertaining the peculiar forms and qualities which are 
invariably connected with these emotions, we accordingly 
pronounce them the Objective Beauty. 

Even according to this, the conception is not derived from 
sensations, but from emotions. But the emotions are pre- 
ceded by cognitions, and these not merely the cognitions of 
the beautiful objects by the laws of ordinary perception ; 
but cognitions of those very forms and qualities as beauti- 
ful, which produce the emotions. It is, indeed, true, that 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 177 

the experience of the emotions claim antecedence in time ; 
and a particular judgment of beauty assumes the appear- 
ance of a result of a mere analysis of properties ; but the 
conception which springs up in the mind, is of the Beautiful 
as applying universally and determining the forms to which 
the emotions correlate. We think of Beauty as a principle 
on which the Creation was constituted and ordered. We 
are conscious of conceiving of a Beauty far transcending 
that which we behold. Nay, the Imagination forms ideals 
and archetypes of specific forms unrealized in nature. The 
mind proceeds still farther, and conceives of an Infinite and 
Absolute Beauty. The Beautiful, therefore, has its consti- 
tutive Idea in the Reason. 

The Beautiful is the generic form of the Idea. It is the 
Perfect, determining outward forms, relations, and proper- 
ties, in respect to the esthetical sensitivity. But when we 
come to the particular spheres in which the Idea goes out as 
Law, we find it under several specific forms. 

The Beautiful is connected with the objects of two senses, 
the Eye* and the Ear. 

The Beautiful in the World of the Eye becomes specifi- 
cally : 

I. Symmetry, or the proper relation of the parts entering 
into an organic whole, determined by a common measure. 
Thus the parts of the human body are symmetrical, when 
in size and form they seem to melt into a visible harmony. 
Thus, too, the parts of a building are symmetrical, when the 
dimensions, in relation to each other, and the pillars and or- 

* The Eye, of course, is assumed to have been informed by the mus- 
cular resistance respecting distance and motion. 



178 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

naments, in relation to the main structure, flow into one 
common unity and harmony. Symmetry, as an Idea, de- 
termines the Ideals of the Imagination, which constitute the 
Archetypes of the Artist. Mathematical ratios and propor- 
tions are employed to determine precise measures and rules 
of mechanical execution. These, however, without the 
idealized eye, would present a stiff and ungraceful outline. 

II. Grace. — Grace appears in motion. Graceful lines 
are those which a beautiful, animated body naturally and 
spontaneously describes in space, from the moving power 
energizing within. Grace is symmetry in motion. Never- 
theless, the expression of Grace does not always demand 
actual motion ; it appears no less in attitude. But this al- 
ways relates to motion. It expresses the point where mo- 
tion has ceased, and where motion is just about to begin. 
There is Grace in a motionless statue, because the attitude 
expresses the motion which has been, just as it is passing 
into the motion which is about to be. This grace, this 
moveable beauty,* is the life of painting and sculpture. A 
dead body has a heavy, painful beauty, because every mus- 
cle is relaxed. There is here a total and final cessation of 
motion, and no prophecy that it shall begin again. 

III. Regularity, Uniformity, Variety. — Regularity 
is the indication of law, and is opposed to confusion and 
disorder. Uniformity expresses the recurrences and rela- 
tions which indicate the presence of extended system, and is 
opposed to isolation and accidental production. Variety 
expresses the multiformity and richness of the beautiful. 
These three are ever united in beautiful productions. 

* Schiller. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 179 

There is no beauty in a straight line, — it has regularity and 
uniformity, but no variety. But a curved line, as it pos- 
sesses all, is beautiful. A simple colour cannot be called 
beautiful : for example, look at colours as disposed in a paint- 
box. Nor yet is a confused jumble of colours beautiful. 
It is when beheld in connection with form, and regularly 
blended, as in the flowers, the foliage, the rainbow, and the 
* human face divine,' that they claim to be beautiful. The 
great system of Nature is constructed upon these Estheti- 
cal Ideas. 

IV. Determinate Form. — All forms are composed of 
straight or curved lines. The curved line is beautiful. The 
spiral line is a composition of curves. The straight line, in its 
simplicity, is indifferent, or it is the line of utility. When two 
or more straight lines are joined together in the construction 
of regular forms, the esthetical properties begin to appear. 
But, what determines the different forms of bodies and the 
lines of their motions ? Unquestionably, somatological ne- 
cessities and laws enter extensively into the determination. 
The world is made as it is, because it is designed for use. 
This is one solution, but not of itself sufficient. It is not 
difficult to shew how mere use might be attained without a 
thousand particulars which appear both in the works of God 
and man. Man is but copying the Great Maker, when he 
aims to make beautiful, as well as/ useful. The union of 
the two is the perfection of the universe. The Idea of the 
determinate form of beauty, in the mind of God, evolved 
all the varieties of beautiful form in the creation. These 
forms are not arbitrary ; nor are they merely the best for 
use ; they are the proper forms of the beautiful likewise. 
The human reason hath the same Idea ; and hence, it both 



180 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

recognizes the beauty of actual form, and projects new 
forms of beauty in the creations of Art. 

V. The Sublime. — This is usually embraced under Es- 
thetics. The fundamental Idea, however, is not the Beauti- 
ful, but the Infinite. Strictly, esthetical properties are gained, 
when the Infinite unites itself to the Beautiful, or to the 
higher Idea of the Perfect. This, indeed, is the common 
form ; and hence the reason why the emotions of grandeur 
and sublimity are assigned to Esthetics. Infinite Beauty — 
Infinite Perfection, — these are the highest sources of the 
Sublime. 

Sublimity and grandeur are scarcely distinguishable in 
the emotion. In the natural world, usage has applied the 
one to the lofty, and the other to vast extent. 

Those objects of either kind which awaken the emotion, 
are objects which suggest the conception of the Infinite, by 
reason of their magnitudes, or the amazing power, wisdom, 
or perfection which they display. 

The Moral Sublime can be traced to the same element. 
Prometheus upon the rock, fills the mind with a sense of 
its own greatness and nobleness ; and we think on in the 
long track of our immortality until we seem lost in infinite 
being. 

The objects and beings of our experience cannot reveal 
to us the Infinite directly ; but when presented under forms 
of indefinite greatness — a greatness which surpasses the 
ordinary standards of comparison — the mind instinctively 
springs forward to meet the realization of its own Idea. It 
seems to see the skirts of the glory of the Infinite. 

Majesty and dignity belong to the same category. They 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 181 

are expressions of mental power and greatness, in the cor- 
poreal person of man. In the Arts of Sculpture and Paint- 
ing, they are capital qualities. 

Thus far with respect to the World of the Eye. We pro- 
ceed to the beautiful in the World of the Ear. 

Beauty unquestionably relates to sound. The emotions 
of sweet music and of the sight of loveliness, melt together 
into one harmonious emotion. 

The esthetical qualities of sound are manifested in three 
ways : in Music, in Language, and in Tone. 

Beginning with Music, we have, 

I. Melody. — As a constitutive Idea, it determines the 
cognition of beauty in the relations of sounds flowing on in 
succession ; the laws which are to govern the succession ; 
and the movements of the Creative function in endless mu- 
sical production. 

II. Harmony. — The Idea of harmony determines, the 
cognition of beauty in two or more successions of sound 
flowing on in the same time ; the laws which govern their 
union ; and the creative function in new and varied produc- 
tions. 

Sensations cannot give the judgment of melody and har- 
mony. If the judgment were derived from the mere sensi- 
tivity, it would belong to the emotions. But emotions are 
always preceded by cognitions ; and the cognitions must 
have their determinative Idea. 

Language has sound for its material. The Idea of me- 
lody determines the construction of Language likewise. 
This appears in the selection of elementary sounds, their 
combination into syllables and words, and the arrangement 



182 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

of words in propositions. Smoothness, euphony, elegance, 
and energy of style, all proceed from this Idea. 

Rhythm, whether in music or verse, is comprehended in 
the general Idea of melody. It expresses the relative pro- 
portion of sounds as measured by time. 

Verse is language, which, while used as the proper vehicle 
of thought, and retaining its laws as such, is wrought into the 
highest form of melody, of which the capacities of the con- 
stituent sounds will admit. 

Tone, in music, respects the intervals of sound, and is 
comprehended under the general Idea of melody. 

Tone, in speech, comprehends the universal language of 
thought and passion, superadding itself to the articulate 
and conventional sounds of language ; and contains the 
esthetical properties of Oratory. Accent, emphasis, and 
all the inflexions accompanying the expression of thought ; 
majesty, melody, tenderness, and force, accompanying the 
words of passion, make up its varieties. 

We here end our outline of the Esthetical Ideas. It is 
by these that we know and enjoy the beauty and sublimity 
of Nature. It is by these also, as the powers of creative 
thought, that all the wonders of art are produced. 



The Ideas which follow next are the Somatological. 
In the general philosophical classification already given 
in Part I., I have adverted to the difficulties attending 
the determination of this class of Ideas.* What follows 
I wish to be regarded as an indication, or an attempt, 

* pp. 71, 72. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC, 183 

rather than a pretension to be a complete evolution. Be- 
sides, a full developement of this very extensive subject, 
were it possible, would inevitably lead me to transcend the 
proper limits of an elementary treatise. A strictly prim- 
ordial logic, also, requires mainly the laws which regulate 
the determination of Ideas, and not their application, except 
so far as may be necessary for the purpose of illustration 
and a clear understanding. 

Before giving Somatological Ideas, we ought to suppose 
the Dynamical Ideas already to have been determined. But 
a reference to the Metaphysical Ideas will shew that no 
farther determination has as yet been attempted, save 
those included under the category of Relation. By re- 
flecting, however, we shall perceive that every form of 
Dynamical Conception is embraced by this Category. All 
movement and change lie in cause producing effects, in 
substance developing properties, and in action and reaction. 
Advancing into the world of bodies, we are introduced to 
various classes of secondary phenomena ; and these, while 
generally connected with the Cardinal Ideas above named, 
are still farther, in their peculiarities, conditional of the 
developement of particular Dynamical Ideas. 

The most important particular Dynamical Ideas, are the 
Idea of centripetal and centrifugal forces ; the Idea of polar- 
ized forces ; the Idea of chemical affinity and repulsion ; the 
Idea of vital powers, or the grand Idea of Life, as the organ- 
ific power; and the Idea of instinctive activity. All these 
are powers and forces recognised in the Science of Nature. 
When I speak of the Ideas of these powers and forces, I 
mean that they are not determined by the mere observa- 
tion of phenomena ; but that the Reason contains within 



184 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

itself the constitutive elements which grasp, distinguish, 
and arrange the phenomena, and reduce them under their 
respective powers. 

Cause conceived of in its universality is metaphenome- 
nal, known on condition of phenomena. If, then, there be 
specific causes, they likewise, as causes, must be metaphe- 
nomenal, and therefore capable of determination only by 
the supervention of Ideas. 

Cause, however, is an Idea of the utmost simplicity. It 
is that which accounts for actual existence, and all changes 
or phenomena. 

The diversity of causes apprehended and described under 
Dynamics arises from the diversity of the phenomena.* But 
in reality have we, under all this diversity, more than one 
cause in nature — a cause universal ? Admitting this, the 
diversity of phenomena arises from the various spheres in 
which cause acts, and the various laws which direct and 
govern its activity. And then, in evolving the Idea of 
Cause simply, we have really given all necessary considera- 
tion to pure dynamical philosophy ; and what remains to 
us legitimately, is the evolution of the Somatological Ideas, 
or the Ideas which go forth into the world of bodies, and 
give the law to all its forms, relations, and changes. 

All Ideas have some form of reality answering to them, 
although not adequate to them. The great law of their 
developement is, that the reality must first move certain 
phenomenal conditions in the consciousness, and then the 
Ideas come forth to determine cognitions and laws. There 
may be in the human Reason, Ideas yet undeveloped, be- 
cause the realities to which they relate have not yet come 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 30-32 and 294. 



PRIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 185 

within the field of Experience. And especially may this 
be true in respect to the world of bodies where there is such 
vast diversity and possibility. Mind does not penetrate 
matter as it penetrates itself. Hence the laws of bodies 
appear under two kinds or degrees : 

Theoretical and Positive Law. 

The first is the conception of a possible constitution of 
bodies, and one which will embrace and account for a cer- 
tain number of the phenomena presented. But the Mind 
still remains in doubt, first, whether its conception be realized 
in any system, or be a mere appearance ; secondly, whether, 
if realised, the elements of universality and necessity can 
be connected with it. While these doubts remain, it is re- 
latively to the Mind-judging, a Theory, or a mere view 
taken for the occasion. 

When we speak of possible systems, we speak according 
to a limited observation. We think of vast diversity and 
possibility only in particular spheres. In the great universe 
there may be but one possible system determined by abso- 
lute and necessary laws, comprehending the whole, and yet 
permeating the minutest particulars : and all that we see 
may be but parts of this grand system, appearing imperfect 
in particulars, because these are imperfectly seen in their 
separation from the whole. Space is thus the infinite field 
in which the Infinite Being plants the perfect elements of 
worlds, which, under perfect and necessary laws, are led forth 
to perfect developements in long successions in Infinite Time. 

But if there be a diversity of principles possible, on 
which worlds can be projected into being, and linked to- 
gether on this extended scale, must we not believe that the 
Q* 



186 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Infinite and Perfect Being has chosen the best ? Can his 
work be less than the best and the perfect ? 

The absolute and perfect laws — if such they be — which 
are embodied in the Creation, must have their correspond- 
ing Ideas in the Divine Mind ; and therefore, as far as we 
are constituted to apprehend them, must have their corres- 
ponding Ideas in our minds likewise. 

According to this view, every law realized will appear 
under the characteristics of universality and necessity. 
The first it certainly must have, and the last can be sus- 
pended only upon the question, whether Somatological laws 
in the Divine determination are of fixed and absolute per- 
fection, or are arbitrary, and of various degrees of perfec- 
tion. And again, on the other hand, every conception of 
law appearing under these characteristics, even if supposed 
not to be realised in any known system, must find its real- 
ity somewhere, — either in some other part of space, or in 
some other period of time ; — it must be a prophecy of the 
distant or the future. But such a prophetic Idea could be 
developed only in connection with some form of reality in 
some degree symbolising with it. Could this be called 
Theory ? I think the mind would repose in it as something 
higher than Theory. Newton's mind grasped the great law of 
gravitation before he verified it. He did not yield to it as the 
actual law of our system, until he had verified it : but it al- 
ways seems to me to have laid in his mind from its first 
conception, as a law which must find its verification some- 
where. It was a law penetrated by an Idea. 

Theory strictly is an ingenious conjecture — a tentative 
act — a feeling after a law, determined by the mere nascent 
developement of an Idea, and serving the purpose of gene- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 187 

ralizing the phenomena, reducing them to order, and pre- 
paring them for exact and proportionate expressions. This 
is exemplified in the Theory of Atoms, employed to repre- 
sent the determinate proportions of chemical affinities. 

In attempting an enumeration of cardinal Somatological 
Ideas, I shall begin with 

IX. The Useful. 

I have already introduced this Idea in distinguishing be- 
tween it and the Beautiful. It comprehends the final end 
of Material Creation in respect to creatures endowed with 
natural sensibilities— with the capacity of physical enjoy- 
ment and suffering. The Useful, as an Idea, reaches to 
the perfect constitution and developement of the world un- 
der this point of view. 

The universe, as far as presented to our observation, does 
not fully meet this Idea. When we reflect upon the char- 
acter of the Great Creator, and the beneficent designs which 
every where appear, taken in connection with the glorious 
prospects opened to our view in Divine Revelation, we 
must believe that the universe is constituted upon this Idea, 
and that all things are tending to its realization. Nay, 
may it not be already realized in other parts of the vast 
whole ; and is not the Christian's heaven those perfected 
worlds ? 

This Idea has stimulated human industry to work its 
wonders. Man finds the world a rude uncultivated wilder- 
ness before he begins to exert his industry. He fills it with 
comfortable dwellings, transforms it into smiling harvest 
fields, appropriates its mineral resources in a thousand use- 
ful arts, and even controls its powerful elements, to accom- 



188 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

plish his designs. He refines and multiplies his wants, and 
by contriving to gratify them, multiplies his enjoyments. 

God has made his highly endowed creature the skilful in- 
strument of perfecting for kindly uses, a world which he 
had filled with ample resources. Human industry has not 
yet attained its limit : the resources of the world are not 
yet exhausted : this beneficent Idea has new wonders yet 
in store. 

The world was made under the Idea of Utility, as one of 
the constitutive elements ; and the improvements which are 
in progress, whether by physical laws in their necessary de- 
velopement, or by human industry, are governed by this 
Idea. But this Idea is general and comprehensive ; and 
gives only the most general form of Somatological law. 
We have yet to enquire into the Ideas which determine its 
interior forms, relations, and qualities. 

X. Centralization and Diffusion. 

The Idea of Centralization is that of perfect dependency 
and union. The conception of body involves the concep- 
tion of parts and a whole. But no whole is possible with- 
out centralization. 

If there were but one vast Whole existent, a law 
of centralization would be sufficient. But if distinct 
wholes are to be arranged into a system with mutual rela- 
tions and dependencies, and with one common and universal 
dependency constituting the unity of the system ; then 
there must be likewise a law of diffusion, harmoniously op- 
posing itself to the law of centralization, and preventing a 
universal consolidation. This is the grand Idea upon which 
the universe is constituted. Gravitation, or the Centripetal 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 189 

force and law, is the great principle of centralization ; — the 
Centrifugal force, the great principle of diffusion. 

That it is an Idea, and not a mere theoretical conception, 
cannot well be questioned ; for the characteristics of uni- 
versality and necessity seem plainly to belong to it. In the 
wide space, beyond the utmost limits of observation, what- 
ever worlds and systems may there exist, we believe, under 
all the force of a commanding Idea, to be arranged and 
governed on these two stupendous and all-sufficient princi- 
ples. The history of science shows the constant tendency 
of the human Reason to the evolution of this Idea: and 
now that it is evolved, no other can be admitted as the Idea 
of the Universe. 

XI. Affinity and Repulsion. 

This is akin to the preceding, and perhaps comprehended 
within it. There is this important distinction, however, 
which is obvious : centralization and diffusion relate to 
cosmical masses ; whereas, affinity and repulsion relate to 
the constitution of the generic and specific varieties of the 
particular and minute masses which enter into the great 
wholes which are governed by the former. 

Affinity is of two kinds : First, the cohesion of homoge- 
neous matter ; secondly, chemical affinity. The first is per- 
manent affinity, existing independently of change; the 
second takes place through change. 

Repulsion is likewise of two kinds : First, mechanical ; 
secondly, chemical. The first relates to the motion of bo- 
dies by mechanical force ; the second, to the motion of 
chemical decomposition. 

No less universal and necessary is the principle of Affin- 



190 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

ity and Repulsion, than that of Centralization and Diffu- 
sion. One is the Idea of the great harmonious and all-com- 
prehending system ; the other, the Idea of the minute and 
interior composition of the forms and orders of particular 
bodies. One determines the laws which grasp the wholes, 
without respect to their interior constitution ; the other de- 
termines the laws of this interior constitution. 

XII. Life. 

Life is the Idea of the Organiflc power. Organic bodies 
are distinguished from inorganic in three ways : First, they 
possess determinate, generic, and specific forms, which re- 
main unchanged amid the ceaseless flux of the particles 
which enter into them. Secondly, the actuating or moving 
power here tends to an unceasing change of particles ; while 
mechanical forces tend to equilibrium, chemical to compo- 
sition or to decomposition, and then pause. Thirdly, in inor- 
ganic bodies accretions are made either by a simple cohe- 
sion of homogeneous matter, or by a simple union of particles, 
determined by inherent affinities ; while in organic bodies, 
a new power, acting from within, resists cohesion and affini- 
ties ; and, by a process of assimilation, projects, as from a 
centre, distinct particles metamorphosed into substances of 
qualities and forms determined by its own inward law. 

Wonderful is the law of life ! Under the myriad varieties 
of vegetable and animal bodies, it still preserves its identity. 
Observation gives us only the phenomena : the law is me- 
taphenomenal. We think of it too as a law universal and 
necessary. It springs therefore from an Idea of the Reason. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 191 

XIII. Polarity. 

Polarity, as thus far determined, is magnetic, electric, 
chemical, chrystalline, and optical. It is the conception of 
disturbance, repulsion, and separation, produced by the at- 
tempted union of like kinds ; and of harmony and repose, 
produced by the actual union of unlike kinds. 

That an Idea lies behind all the observations which have 
been made respecting polarity, determining their processes 
and results, is manifest : and that the conception of polarity, 
as an attempted expression of the Idea, has been the guid- 
ing star to the most eminent philosophers in their investi- 
gations in magnetism, electricity, chemistry, chrystalliza- 
tion, and light, is abundantly attested : nevertheless, it does 
not yet appear, notwithstanding the confident assertion of 
Schelling, that the conception fully embodies the Idea, and 
leads it forth to the determination of a universal and neces- 
sary law. As yet, it is a theory, like a thin and almost 
transparent cloud, with the sun behind it. 

XIV. Instinct. 

In vegetables we have vital forces, and the law of life, in 
its beautiful and wonderful variety of manifestation. In 
animals, as the genus, we have life and instinct. In 
man, the thinking species, we have life, instinct, and 
spirit. Instinct and spirit manifesting themselves in the 
sphere of observation, are not organific, but motive. Vital 
forces produce motion, but it is the motion of the organific 
process. Instinct and spirit produce muscular activity in 
the accomplishment of an end. 



192 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

The motion produced by spirit, or voluntary motion, be- 
longs to psychology : Instinctive motion belongs to soma- 
tology. Instinct is not volition, it is the shadow of volition 
in the animal sphere. In both activities, ends are pro- 
posed, intelligential ends. In volition, the ends are deliber- 
ated .upon and estimated by the agent himself, and selected 
by an act of freedom. In instinct, the ends are proposed 
by the infinite and all- governing intelligence, just as ends 
are proposed by this intelligence for all the movements of 
nature ; and then the activities of the animal are deter- 
mined to these ends by necessary laws manifesting them- 
selves in the constitution of the animal, unaccompanied by 
deliberation and exclusive of choice. The all-comprehen- 
sive law of the mere animal nature is instinct. It is a uni- 
versal and necessary law, governing a mode of being, and 
springing from a constitutive Idea. 

XV. Regularity, Uniformity, Variety, Symmetry, 
and Determinate Form. 

These have already been considered in their esthetical 
relations. They exist likewise in somatological relations. 
They bear a relation to the useful, analogous to the rela- 
tion which they bear to the beautiful. They all necessari- 
ly result from determinate and yet diffusive law. This ap- 
pears palpably in the action of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces, in vital forces, and in chrystallization. 

In the absolutely perfect, they will not appear in conflict 
under the two Ideas of Beauty and Utility. In the actual 
nature submitted to observation, they do appear in conflict. 
In the arts cultivated by man, this conflict is constantly 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 193 

experienced ; for example, in the form and apportionment 
of buildings. The Grecian Temple is a pure developement 
of beautiful symmetry ; a commodious dwelling-house is a 
developement of useful symmetry. There is a constant 
struggle in human art to unite the two ; and they appear 
together, in consequence, in a union of compromise. 

The determinate form of nature viewed on a grand scale, 
as in the shapes of the planets, the line of their orbits, and 
the vast arrangements of the starry heavens, present us a 
perfect union of the two Ideas. It is only in the details of 
the particular orbs that we perceive the opposition^ and es- 
pecially in the sphere of human activity. In these details, 
we judge under the light of Astronomy and Geology, that a 
mighty progress is making from lower to higher states. 
The intelligential activity, too, in being brought to task it- 
self in the field which it occupies, is at the same time de- 
veloping its own greatness, and reaching forward to its 
ultimate destiny. 

XVI. Identity, Difference, Resemblance. 

Identity and Difference are antithetical conceptions. 
Resemblance is the union of the two, in two or more ob- 
jects compared together. Personal Identity is the same- 
ness of the individual being in substance and essential pro- 
perties, taken in different and indefinitely distant times and 
places. 

In material particles or parts, there is no necessary identi- 
ty, for matter, under the forces and laws of nature, is liable 
to indefinite change. The identity of bodies is an identity 
of certain forms and qualities, admitting differences in other 
forms and qualities. Here an identity of substance can- 



194 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

not be considered, for the reason above stated — the constant 
flux of matter. 

Identity and Difference actually existing in nature, lays 
the ground for the classification of bodies into genera, spe- 
cies, and individuals. Generic forms and qualities are those 
which are the most general and comprehensive ; thus animal, 
for example, embraces only the forms and qualities which 
distinguish all animals from all other living organisms. 
But in man, forms and properties are added which, as differ- 
entia, distinguish him from all other kinds or species of ani- 
mals, and, at the same time, identify all the individuals of 
his own species : while in the individual man George, or 
Thomas, forms and properties are added which distinguish 
him from every other individual of his kind, and of course 
identify him with no one. 

It has been said that genera and species are names of 
general conceptions, which we may form and vary at pleasure ; 
and that consequently they have no corresponding realities. It 
is indeed true that we have no such living and real being as 
animal, comprising only generic forms and qualities ; 
and no such living and real being as man, comprising only 
specific forms and qualities. It is true, also, that we can 
widely vary our classifications by uniting together different 
particulars under new points of agreement. But let it be 
recollected, that the words animal and man do express forms 
and qualities which really exist : The forms and qualities 
indicated by animal are found really existing in every par- 
ticular animal ; and the forms and qualities indicated by 
man, are found in every individual man. And when we 
vary our classifications, we are still conversant with reali- 
ties, for our classification still corresponds to real identities 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 195 

and differences. We indeed view them in different rela- 
tions, and invent new names to represent our new views ; 
but, nevertheless, we cannot view them out of actually ex- 
isting relations. 

The truth is, that the determinate forms and qualities of 
bodies exhibit both identity and difference ; and these in 
their universality constitute the possibility of all classifica- 
tion. If there were all difference, there would be all varie- 
ty, and of course no classification. On the other hand, if 
there were all identity, there would be no variety, and 
here again no possibility of classification. Identity ena- 
bles us to bind together in classes and systems : Dif- 
ference enables us to separate the classes, systems, and par- 
ticulars : so that, when we view parts, we still assign 
them their general relations; and when we view wholes, 
we still distinguish and comprehend the particulars which 
go to make them up. We thus know the harmony and 
variety of the Universe. 

If any one were to remark, that universal identity would 
not be incompatible with some diversity, inasmuch as the 
identical forms and qualities might be presented in differ- 
ent relations of time and space; it would be sufficient to 
reply, that as we should in this case have continually the 
same recurring perception, we in reality would be unable to 
distinguish different points in space, and different periods in 
time. 

On the other hand, if any one were inclined to merge 
identity into mere resemblance, by calling it the most per- 
fect resemblance, he might be convinced of the utter im- 
possibility of this conception, by reflecting, that resem- 
blance cannot be constituted without identity. There must 



196 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

be sameness in some forms or qualities, to enable us to 
bring them together ; and the union of points of sameness 
with points of difference, in fact, makes resemblance. 

The conception of Identity and Difference, and their 
common relation in resemblance, is a universal and neces- 
eary conception. We extend it not only to what we see, 
we know it must pervade all worlds. As a necessary 
somatological conception, it must find in the reason its cor- 
responding and constitutive Idea. Hence, when phenomena 
are given as the required conditions and antecedents in 
Time, the Reason under this constitutive Idea — the Idea 
from which sprang forth the perfect system and the mani- 
fold variety of the Universe — begins to cognise resemblance, 
to classify the objects of perception, and to seize upon the 
glorious unity reigning amid the glorious diversity. 

XVII. Design, Final Cause, Means, and End. 

These are only different ways of expressing the same 
Idea. The great Architect of the Universe forecasted his 
design ; this design, contemplated by himself, is the final 
cause of the Creation ; and the Creation itself is a great 
system of means and ends, in which the means are ends, 
and the ends means, in a long chain of linked and harmo- 
nious subordination, and all connected with an ultimate end 
which is not a means, upon which the eye of God reposes 
in infinite and quiet delight. 

This Idea of the Infinite Reason, is found also in the 
human reason. Hence nothing is more natural and spon- 
taneous than the enquiries which the mind makes after final 
causes in the structure of plants and animals, nay, in the 
whole order of Creation. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 197 

As a principle of philosophical research, the conception 
of Final Causes has been adopted chiefly in respect to or- 
ganised bodies, because here more manifest and certain ; 
and here unquestionably it has achieved stupendous re- 
sults, of which the labours of Cuvier alone are a sufficient 
attestation. 

The conception of final causes, like other universal and 
necessary conceptions, accepts the observations of the senses 
as its condition and antecedent in time ; but it can rest 
upon an Idea of the Reason alone as its constitutive element. 
Phenomena fleeting and apparently irregular and confused, 
are grasped by this idea and reduced to orderly and beauti- 
ful relations. And it is not only in fields of observation 
actually presented, that it arranges and composes phenom- 
ena, and educes system ; as a watchful and expectant eye, 
it is ever looking about to find phenomena that shall fall in 
with its own preconceptions. It is a necessary prophetic 
thought, which wanders through the universe. Where no 
observation can reach, it has full assurance there is design. 

I here close my view of Somatological Ideas. However 
brief and imperfect, it will answer the end I have in view, 
namely, Logical Construction. 

I will .complete this outline, with the Logical Ideas. 

XVIII. Truth. 

Truth is an antithetical idea : its opposite is Falsehood. 

The great aim of the Reason is Truth : and Logic com- 
prises the Laws which govern the Reason in its searches 
after, in the processes by which it arrives at, Truth. 

Truth in itself is identical with the highest form of Real- 
ity — with absolute and necessary Reality ; and it is the 

R* 



198 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

parent of all other reality — the Reality of actual objective 
Being. The Ideas, and the necessary and universal con- 
ceptions which immediately spring out of them, are the es- 
sential body of Truth : Actual Being is the exterior em- 
bodiment of Truth. Hence Truth is that in which the 
Reason ultimately, necessarily, and securely reposes. 

When the Reason, contemplating Ideas and necessary 
conceptions, and their exterior embodiment in the constitu- 
tion of the Universe, gives the judgment of Truth, it does so 
under the great Idea of Truth. Mere phenomena contain 
no truth, because they contain no reality, and consequently 
they cannot contain the judgment of Truth. The phe- 
nomena being given as conditions or occasions antecedent 
in time, the Reason under the Idea of Truth forms the con- 
ception of the subjective and objective Realities — it affirms 
that they are true. 

Falsehood is the opposite or negative of Truth, with the 
appearance or pretension of being Truth. In the highest 
— the pure region of Truth, Falsehood cannot well find 
place. Ideas, and primary absolute conceptions, have such 
decided characteristics that it is difficult to imagine how a 
falsehood can disguise itself in their habiliments. They 
are necessary, universal, and intuitively clear. How can 
a falsehood put on the appearances of these ? The very 
supposition seems to involve an absurdity. If it were so, 
could we ever have a certain and infallible test of Truth ? 
Is not this the great distinction between a presumed truth 
and a presumed falsehood, that when carried up to the prima- 
ry conceptions and their determining ideas, the first quietly 
flows into these as a congenial essence, while the latter is re- 
pelled and flows back to seek its home elsewhere ? The ne- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC 199 

cessity, the universality, the intuitive clearness, of the con- 
ception, are what give it the character of absolute Truth. Un- 
less itattaia these characteristics it cannot be absolute Truth ; 
and when it does attain them, it cannot but be absolute Truth. 
Falsehood here then must be excluded. In this pure re- 
gion, a mind may mislead itself by bringing along with it 
the gross prejudices, the wild and baseless theories, which it 
has collected in a lower region, and dogmatically investing 
them with the attire of Truth. But it is a wilful act — the 
act of a professed Sophist and Sectarian. But to the hum- 
ble, sincere, open-eyed, and pure-hearted child of Truth 
falsehood can find no entrance among these primary ideas 
and principles. It is in the lower region itself — the region 
of observation, induction, and deduction, of human will 
and human passion, that falsehood finds a wide and natural 
field to walk in. Here the sense may be deceived by ap« 
pearances, and the intellect amused and led astray by 
" Idols of the Tribe, the Den, the Market-place, and the 
Theatre." 

But in whatever region of Knowledge the Reason takes 
its stand, Truth is its great and legitimate object. The 
Idea of Truth is the spring of all its activity. 

XIX. The Philosophical Idea. 

This is the Idea of accounting for the developement and 
progress of humanity in science, art, government, and re- 
ligion. It is the Idea of accounting for every thing per- 
ceived or thought of. 

Enquiry supposes that the mind cannot rest satisfied with 
phenomena, whether of immediate consciousness, or taken 
in their secondary state and representing the actual objects 



200 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

and events of the external world. No enquiry would in- 
deed be made, if there were no phenomena presented. But 
why is not the mind satisfied with its sensations, and spon- 
taneous and natural perceptions ? Why does it raise en- 
quiries respecting causes and laws 1 Not only is the Idea 
of Cause and Law here presumed, but also the Idea, that if 
causes and laws can be assigned, the phenomena will be ac- 
counted for. This restlessness of the human mind, when 
dealing with mere phenomena ; this conception, that there 
must be causes and laws ; this firm conviction, that science 
is gained, when the causes and laws are determined; and 
this quick satisfaction in the result — all show the working 
of the philosophical Idea, or element of our being. 

That this is an Idea, cannot be doubted, for it is both ne- 
cessary and universal. The Reason affirms that all phe- 
nomena are to be accounted for ; and that the principle of 
every phenomenon really and necessarily exists, or the phe- 
nomenon would not be possible. 

The connection between this Idea and the preceding is 
very close ; and some, at first thought, may even look upon 
them as identical. There is, however, one obvious distinc- 
tion : Truth embraces all absolute and necessary principles, 
and, although gained upon phenomenal conditions, it may be 
contemplated separately from all phenomena: the philoso- 
phical Idea, on the other hand, always connects itself with 
phenomena, as determining the activity of the Intelligence 
in respect to them. Truth is the cardinal Idea of Primor- 
dial Logic ; the philosophical, the cardinal Idea of Inductive 
Logic. Truth is the simple Idea of the primal and absolute 
authority ; the philosophical, the Idea of reducing every 
thing under that authority. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 201 

XX. Intuition. 

Intuition has already been represented as one of the func- 
tions of the Reason — the function of immediate insight. 
Now, connected with this function, is the Idea of the per- 
fect and the absolute authority of such an insight. Hence 
we assign the name of the function, to express the corres- 
ponding Idea. Thus the Reason, by the function of Intu- 
ition, perceives, directly, that there are three, and only three, 
dimensions in space. Such is its immediate and necessary 
perception. Now, this is a particular perception, or one 
instance of Intuition : but, upon this one instance, or upon 
any similar instance, there appears the universal affirmation, 
that Intuition is an absolute and perfect law of cognition, — 
that whatever is known by Intuition, is ultimately and cer- 
tainly known. All axioms — all first principles, and all pri- 
mary sensuous perceptions, are thus legitimated. But the 
universal affirmation, or conception, itself reposes upon an 
Idea of the Reason, — namely, the Idea of Intuition, as 
the primal and highest and most authoritative form of Cog- 
nition. This Idea permeates Primordial Logic, and governs 
all its particular determinations. 

XXI. Involution and Evolution. 

Besides Intuition, there are two other forms of cognising 
truths or realities. These are Induction and Deduction. 
In the inductive form, we cognise universal truths through 
particular phenomena in which the truths are embodied. 
In the deductive form, we cognise particular truths through 
universal truths which comprehend them, and out of which 



202 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

they are evolved. The two forms, in relation to each other, 
may be represented under the following formulae : 

C a, b, c, d, &c. are X 
Induction •{ Z is a, b, c, d, &c. 
^Therefore Z is X. 

fZisX 
Deduction 1 a, or b, or c, or d, &c. is Z 
^ Therefore a, or Z>, &c. is X. 

The first is an involution of inducted particulars, into a gene- 
ral expression. The second is an evolution of the general 
expression to a particular determination. 

According to these formulae, it is evident that the Induc- 
tion must precede the Deduction, and that the latter is a 
return to the elementary particulars of the former. 

If the mind be supposed to be placed at the point of ob- 
serving the particulars, then, by the Inductive formula, it 
arrives at the general expression. If the general principle, 
or expression, be already gained by a previous Induction, 
and the mind be placed at this point, then it can perceive 
each particular through the Deductive formula. 

But here the question may be started, what value is there 
in the Deductive formula, since it is a mere return to par- 
ticulars which were grasped by the Inductive at the outset ? 

First. There is a more perfect comprehension of the ge- 
neral truth when viewed under the two forms, in their re- 
ciprocal relation. 

Secondly. The Induction, as an inference, does not mea- 
sure itself by the Induction, as a mere bringing in of the 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. . 203 

facts. The grounds of the general inference, made upon 
the limited colligation, will be hereafter explained. But this 
general inference upon the limited colligation, is the fact 
which, shows the necessity of deductions, subsequent to the 
induction which establishes the general principle from which 
the deductions are made ; for, since all the particulars were 
not really brought in and colligated, the general principle, 
when once established, beeomes an authority for conclu- 
sions respecting particulars not originally inducted. 

Thirdly. The Deductive formula does not invariably 
connect itself with the Inductive, as above exhibited. Gen- 
eral principles are not universally the result of Inductive in- 
ferences, but are often d priori and intuitive. The first 
principles of morals and mathematics are palpable instances. 
These principles are established as a priori and intuitive 
judgments ; and then sciences, vast, complicated, and mo- 
mentous, are evolved by the Deductive formula. 

Fourthly. In the practical affairs of life, there are re- 
ceived principles which are constantly applied by all men, 
without instituting anew enquiries respecting their origin 
and basis. Indeed, multitudes who are capable of applying 
the principles, are unfitted for the investigations through 
which they were originally obtained. This practical applica- 
tion is made in a series of deductions, which, although not 
assuming, in the common language of men, the syllogistic 
form, nevertheless admit of being reduced to it. 

These considerations are sufficient to show the value of 
the Deductive formula. 

The fundamental Ideas of the Inductive and Deductive 
formulae, and of the modes of cognition which they repre- 
sent, are Involution and Evolution. On the one hand, the 



204 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Reason does not contemplate any phenomenon or fact 
apart and isolated. It must be colligated with some other 
fact, and these again with others, and so on until we have 
a mass of facts bound together in the unity of system, and 
involved in a great central law. 

On the other hand, when the Reason seizes upon any 
law, axiom, or first principle, it does not contemplate it as 
dormant, unproductive, or ever revolving within itself. It 
feels impelled by its own Idea to look out for an exterior 
sphere in which the great truth shall unfold itself in mani- 
fold varieties. 

The Reason takes these two directions necessarily and 
universally ; and hence manifests here again the determi- 
native power of Ideas. 

XXII. Analysis and Synthesis. 

According to a general definition, Synthesis is the con- 
ception of the composition of systems — of systems of Truth 
according to logical principles and formulae ; and systems 
of bodies according to natural and mechanical laws : while 
Analysis is the conception of the decomposition of systems 
reversing the order of the Synthesis, and running back in the 
chain of principles, formulas, and laws. Geometry is a com - 
pleted synthesis of principles and consequences. When 
taught, the synthetical order is observed — the pupil being 
instructed how to put together the several theorems in a 
way to show their dependence upon the axioms and defini- 
tions, and upon preceding demonstrations constantly accu. 
mulating in the progress of the synthesis. A watch, also, or, 
any piece of machinery, when its separated parts are taken 
up and put together according to the laws of the mechanism 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 205 

presents us a synthesis. On the other hand, we may begin 
with the remotest deductions of Geometry, and enquire upon 
what grounds they rest ; these grounds, in part, at least will 
prove to be other propositions deduced from something still 
going before : in this way we may continue to unwind the 
whole concatenation of dependent demonstrations until we 
arrive at the self-evident principles. So, likewise, we may 
take in pieces the watch in the order of the mechanical de- 
pendency, until we arrive at the main-spring. We thus 
accomplish an analysis. He that has a perfect knowledge 
of Geometry, and of the watch, can readily synthesise or 
analyse both ; and the same kind of knowledge enables him 
to do one or the other. To one ignorant of Geometry, and 
just setting out to gain a knowledge of it, the synthetical 
mode is the true and certain mode ; for every step here is 
made according to established principles and demonstrations, 
which are continually evolving. Here the analytical mode, 
by constantly referring to previous demonstrations which 
are not yet comprehended, is liable to produce perplexity 
and confusion. In respect to the watch, also, an ingenious 
learner would more safely make experiments in putting to- 
gether than in taking apart. 

In the construction of scientific systems, and in mechani- 
cal constructions, a synthesis of the parts necessarily pre- 
cedes an analysis of the whole. The natural mode of con- 
structing is likewise the natural mode of learning. But 
where wholes are presented us, as in pieces of machinery 
which are strange to us, and in natural organisms such as 
animals and plants, and in the subtile combinations of 
chemical affinities, analysis of necessity precedes synthesis. 
In such cases analysis cannot at once proceed with the nice 



206 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

accuracy of geometry and the watch, where the geometer 
and the mechanician know precisely where to begin, and 
how to separate, because they know the beginning, the con- 
tinuity and the completion of the systematic and the organic 
wholes before them. Instead of this, many tentative, and 
even destructive and futile experiments are made before the 
laws and the harmony of the construction appear. 

Analysis and Synthesis do not correspond to Induction 
and Deduction, but precede or accompany them. In geo- 
metry there is, in the progress of the evolution, a constant 
synthesis of axioms, definitions, previous demonstrations, 
and new forms and relations. The whole putting together 
must be made accordingly to a rigid logic : but neverthe- 
less, there is an ingenuity exercised in the combinations 
and ordering of the parts, for the purpose of eliciting con- 
clusions or evolving proof, which is not provided for in the 
rules of deduction. This belongs in reality to another 
function of the Reason, which we have named Invention,* 

Analysis precedes Induction with experiments which are 
often the starting point ; and then accompanies it, by 
evolving in the continued experiments new and important 
phenomena. 

Synthesis also accompanies Induction, arranging and 
combining the discovered truths so as to form a compact 
and harmonious system. 

Analysis and Synthesis are thus subsidiary to Induction 
and Deduction. The Inductive Function is striving to see 
the general truth through the manifold particulars in which 
it is manifested, in the unity of system. The Deductive 

* .Supra, p. 121. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 207 

Function is striving to see the particular and remote con- 
clusions comprehended in the general truth, in the unity of 
system also. The Inventive Function, by its analysis and 
synthesis, presents the requisite media of the Inductive and 
Deductive cognitions, and preconceives and suggests the 
systematic construction. 

All these functions are related in their operations to the 
Intuitive Function, as will appear in subsequent develope- 
ments. 

Analysis and Synthesis, considered as Ideas in the Rea- 
son, are certainly nearly akin to, if not identical with, the 
Ideas of Involution and Evolution. If the Ideas be regard- 
ed as Identical, then Analysis and Synthesis are only con- 
ceptions under the common Ideas distinguishable from In- 
duction and Deduction by the characteristics above given. 

It appears to me, however, that Analysis and Synthesis 
are distinct Ideas determining Invention ; while Involution 
and Evolution determine Induction and Deduction. Invo- 
lution and Evolution are Ideas which determine the 
conception of phenomena running together and colligated 
in general laws, and general laws reciprocally governing 
the developement of phenomena ; and the conception of 
particular truths and conclusions comprehended in general 
truths, and general truths evolved into the particular truths 
and conclusions. But Analysis and Synthesis, taken as 
Ideas, determine the conception of a system of laws govern- 
ing a system of bodies — where the whole implies constitu- 
ent parts, and the parts imply an harmonious whole ; and 
the conception of a system of truths, where each particular 
truth with the long chain of consequences which it involves 
is interlinked with other truths and consequences, constitu- 



208 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

ting the unity of absolute science, and where the particular 
truths and consequences ultimately lead back to pure in- 
tuitions. 

It thus becomes plain how Analysis and Synthesis aid 
Induction and Deduction. While inducting facts for the 
purpose of finding a law in relation to any subject of en- 
quiry, there must be some preconception or Idea to guide in 
the selection of phenomena, and the form of the experi- 
ments : and now the Inventive function is busy in arrang- 
ing and combining, and in various tentative suggestions. 
But what governs the Inventive function 1 Is it not the 
great Idea of System, where constituted wholes and con- 
stitutive parts are reciprocal ; or, in other words, is it not 
Analysis and Synthesis? And so again, when engaged in 
demonstrating theorems, and solving problems, the Idea of 
the wide-spread relations of truths and principles — the Idea 
of their synthetical and analytical capacity — determines 
the Inventive function in searching for, and finding, the 
material of the ratiocination. 

The same appears also in our reasonings on moral and 
all practical questions. We find arguments, because, under 
the Ideas of Analysis and Synthesis — the Ideas of the wide- 
spread and systematic relations of truth — we know where 
to look for them. 

It is sufficiently obvious that the Ideas of Analysis and 
Synthesis are necessary and universal. Whatever be the 
scope or the subject of our reasoning, they inevitably make 
their appearance. Nor is it conceivable that any course of 
reasoning can be conducted independently of them, since 
truth, in its very nature, is analytical and synthetical. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 209 



I here close the outline of Ideas. Next in order will be 
the consideration of axioms, and of primary cognitions 
and definitions — those which belong to the Intuitive Func- 
tion. We shall thus complete Primordial Logic. 



210 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 



SECTION IV. 

PRIMARY SENSUOUS COGNITIONS, OR COGNITIONS OF THE 
EXTERIOR CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The primary sensuous cognitions, in general, are those 
which are formed intuitively by the Reason, respecting the 
exterior world, through the force of its constitutive Ideas, 
and upon condition of sensuous impressions in the exterior 
consciousness. 

When these impressions are received in the exterior con- 
sciousness, the Reason, under the Idea of objective exte- 
teriority,* conceives of an outer world. This is its first 
sensuous cognition. 

Exerting the muscular activity under the Idea of our 
personal causality, and experiencing a resistance in this 
outer world, we now, under the Ideas of cause, space, limi- 
tation, and substance, cognise body. In this cognition are 
involved at once what are commonly called the primary 
qualities of body, namely, hardness or resistance, extension 
and form. They are primary, because they comprise the 
necessary contents of the cognitions. Indeed, the cogni- 
tion is now complete. Secondary qualities are cognised 
in particular bodies through the appropriate organs, un- 
der the Idea of Cause, or of determinate law. When body 
is known, then the sensations of which we are immediately 
conscious, are referred to causes inhering in bodies, or to 

* Supra, p. 145. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 211 

their specific constitution, correlating with the human sen- 
sitivity. 

The cognitions of body involving the primary qualities, 
are thus primary sensuous intuitions. 

The knowledge of specific forms, of relative magnitudes, 
and of relative distances, implies acts of memory, in con- 
necting the successive impressions made upon the muscular 
organism, in handling bodies, and in locomotion. There 
are also various acts of calculation, and inferences from 
comparison. 

Introduced into the external world, phenomena now put 
on their secondary* form : we are no longer engaged with 
the simple sensations of our being, but with the realities 
from which they spring ; and which, in the case of the 
secondary qualities of bodies, we name from the very sen- 
sations which they supplant in our habitual thought. 

Next in the order of this developement of sensuous cogni- 
tion, is to be noticed the remarkable transfer which is made 
of the knowledge originally belonging to the muscular or- 
ganism, as the medium, to the organs of the secondary 
qualities, and, as chief of these, to the eye. The colors of 
objects, and the varieties of light and shade, become early 
associated with the primary qualities of bodies, with their 
specific forms, relative magnitudes, and distances ; so that, 
the simple sensations of color become such ready and fa- 
miliar signs of the external world, that we now know every 
thing by the eye alone. Next to the eye, in importance, 
is the ear, in this acquired system of signs. The other 
senses, however, play a part by no means insignificant. 

* Supra, p 47. 



212 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. • 

Thus, by the power of Ideas, man steps out from his in- 
ternal sensations into the world which is correlated to him ; 
and so appropriates these sensations, that every act of con- 
sciousness becomes an act of observation. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 213 



SECTION V. 

PRIMARY SUBJECTIVE COGNITIONS, OR COGNITIONS OF THE 
INTERIOR CONSCIOUSNESS 

These are the cognitions which are formed intuitively 
by the Reason, respecting the simple subjective, through 
the force of its Ideas, and upon condition of the phenomena 
which arise from the subjective activity. 

When these phenomena are recognised in the interior 
consciousness, the Reason, under the Idea of subject,* con- 
ceives of the simple subjective, or the Me. 

Under the appropriate Ideas, we are next determined to 
cognise the Me as the spiritual substance, antithetical to the 
material substance which we have cognised without. 

Here the same remarkable transfer of phenomena, which 
we have noticed in the preceding Section in respect to 
bodies, takes place in respect to the spiritual being.f 
Having cognised the subject, we no longer think of bare 
phenomena of the consciousness, but of effects and mani- 
festations of spiritual faculties ; and the intelligence, caus- 
ality, and sensitivity which constitute our triune being, are 
known and distinguished. The Ideas of personality, Right 
and Wrong, Freedom, Responsibility, and Immortality, now 
clothe this being with lofty and glorious attributes; and 

* Supra, p. 145. t Supra, p. 48. 



214 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

through the simple consciousness of interior phenomena, as 
conditions, we have the intuitions of self-knowledge. 

It will be understood both in respect to sensuous, and 
to subjective intuitive cognitions, that when I undertake to 
point out their progressive developement ; and the transfer 
of phenonomena from the consciousness to the objective 
and subjective realities — thus associating the phenomena 
with the causes which produce them, instead of viewing 
them in the field of their immediate manifestation, — I ne- 
vertheless do not mean to aver that this progressive devel- 
opement and this transfer are really recognised in the con- 
sciousness in relation to successive and marked periods of 
time ; but only to indicate the logical order and relations 
of the facts. In the very dawn of our being in the world 
of the senses, our faculties open their play unitedly and 
harmoniously ; and ere we begin to exercise reflection, we 
find ourselves in a world already realized. But when we 
attempt to know ourselves, we must of necessity represent 
to ourselves in clear propositions the logical order of the 
cognitive developement. In doing this, we assume periods 
of time corresponding to the order of this developement for 
the sake of distinctness, while yet, in relation to time, there 
was actually simultaneity. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 215 



SECTION VI. 

AXIOMS. 

Axioms* are those truths which depend neither upon In- 
duction, nor upon previous deductions ; but which are in- 
tuitively cognised under determinate Ideas. 

It is evident that before deductions are possible, there 
must be judgments expressed in propositions. Now these 
judgments must of necessity be resolved either into intui- 
tions, or into Inductions. If into the latter, even then, in 
the last result, we come to intuitions, since all facts of ob- 
servation, whether belonging to the interior or exterior con- 
sciousness, must ultimately rest in simple intuitions. 

The consciousness of phenomena, if regarded as a form 
of perception, is manifestly immediate and intuitive. But 
beyond this, the primary sensuous and subjective cogni- 
tions, as we have seen, are intuitive likewise. The Real 
is not an induction from the phenomenal : The latter is 
a condition ; the former an Intuition. 

But Axioms, while they are independent of Induction and 
Deduction on the one hand, — on the other, must not be con- 
founded with the primary cognitions whether sensuous or 
subjective. These primary cognitions relate to the Reality 
of Being ; axioms relate to the Reality of Truth. f A prima* 

* Greek 'Aliw/m, Authority, Worth. Hence, an established princi 
pie — one the authority of which cannot be called in question, 
t Supra, p. 130. 



216 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

ry cognition expressed, becomes a proposition which af- 
firms existence. Thus a primary sensuous cognition ex- 
pressed, becomes an affirmation of the existence of bodies 
and their qualities : and a primary subjective cognitive ex- 
pressed, becomes an affirmation of the existence of the 
simple subjective with its faculties and functions. 

But an axiom is a proposition expressing a judgment of 
universal and absolute truth — of truth which indeed holds 
important connections with actual Being, when actual Be- 
ing is given ; but which, nevertheless, is no less true, if 
being be not given, or only hypothesised. For example, 
the axiom, If equals be added to equals, the sums will be 
equal, is a truth no less, if there be no actual Being. And 
the axiom, every body must be in space, demands merely a 
hypothesis of body, and not an affirmation of the existence 
of body. It is true, indeed, that the mind does not proceed 
to form axioms antecedently, in the order of time, to judg- 
ments of actual Being ;* but still, when the axioms are 
formed, they are seen to have a necessary and independent 
existence, and a logical antecedence. 

Axioms are determined immediately by Ideas. The 
judgments which they express are the first judgments of 
Truth ; and they in themselves are the first propositions of 
Truth. 

Axioms may be classified, according to the philosophical 
divisions above given, into the metaphysical, and the nomo- 
logical. The Reason, with its Ideas entering into the world 
of Reality, forms not only its cognitions of that which is, 
conceived of as mere facts of existence, but affirms also 

* Supra, pp. 49 and 130. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 217 

truths universal and absolute. The Reason again, by its 
Ideas, not only determines the laws which actually govern 
the Real, but here likewise makes universal and absolute 
affirmations respecting the necessary forms of law. These 
axiomatic affirmations reach the spheres of determinate 
science, and constitute the starting points of the scientific 
construction. 

Metaphysical Axioms. 

I. Axiom of Substance and Attributes. — The Rea- 
son not only cognises particular substances and attributes, 
but upon such particular cognitions as the chronological 
conditions, makes the universal affirmation, Every substance 
implies attributes, and every attribute implies substance. 

II. Axiom of Cause and Effect. — The Reason first 
cognises a particular cause upon certain phenomenal condi- 
tions ; and then upon this particular cause, taken in its turn 
as a condition, it affirms the axiom, Every phenomenon im~ 
plies a cause. 

III. Axiom of Body and Space. — Body is a primary 
sensuous cognition ; but no sooner does the cognition take 
place, than the Reason affirms, Every body must be in 
space* 

IV. Axiom of Time and Succession. — The cognition 
of some particular succession is the conditional starting 
point: upon this the Reason affirms, Every succession 
must be in time. 

V. Axiom of the Finite and the Infinite. — Time 
and Space and the Deity are cognised under the Idea of 
the Infinite. In the antecedence of Time, the limited and 
finite are indeed first cognised ; but it is only by the Idea 



218 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

of the Infinite that it becomes possible for us to affirm of 
any thing, It is finite. Thus a particular instance of the 
Finite becomes to us a condition of the judgment of the Infi- 
nite. The axiom which immediately follows this judgment 
in the order of Time is, Every Finite implies the Infinite, 

VI. Axiom of the Objective and the Subjective. — 
The Subjective and Objective are cognised on the condi- 
tion of particular phenomena, and their relations seen in 
particular instances. But here again the Reason affirms, 
Universally the Objective implies the Subjective. 

VII. Axiom of Universal Being. — The Reason cog- 
nises matter and spirit in the particular, and then goes on to 
affirm, All being must be either matter or spirit. 

These are the fundamental and most general metaphysi- 
cal axioms. My object, however, in the above, as well as 
in what follows, is not to give a complete enumeration of 
the axioms, but only so far as shall serve to illustrate their 
peculiar characteristics, and the law under which they are 
determined. The characteristics of axioms are manifest : 
they are, absoluteness, independency, and universality. 
The law of their determination is equally clear ; they are 
affirmed by the Reason, under the comprehension and force 
of its Ideas. In the general view already given of the 
evolution of Ideas,* the axioms will be recognised in the 
separation of the universal from the particular. In the or- 
der of time, we have the phenomenal, the particular, and 
the real, before we have the Axioms and Ideas ; but when 
we have arrived at Axioms and Ideas, we perceive that in 
necessary existence they claim antecedence. Ideas deter - 

* p. 144. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 219 

mine those universal judgments of truth which are ex- 
pressed in axioms ; and these universal judgments make 
the particular cognitions logically possible. For example, 
although I cognise a particular body in space, before 1 af- 
firm the axiom, Every body must be in space, nevertheless, 
the potential existence of this judgment in the Reason con- 
stitutes the possibility of the particular cognition. This 
two-fold order, — the order of actual developement in time, 
and the order of logical determination, — is the all-important 
principle to be kept in mind. 

NOMOLOGICAL AXIOMS. 

I. Axiom of Universal Law. — The Idea of Law de- 
termines this axiom, in the same way that the Idea of Cause 
determines the axiom of Causality. When particular phe- 
nomena are given, the Idea of Cause determines to the as- 
signment of a particular cause ; and then upon this deter- 
mines the affirmation, Every phenomenon must have a cause : 
so here, likewise, when particular phenomena are given, 
the Idea of Law determines to the assignment of some law ; 
and then upon this determines the affirmation, Every phe- 
nomenon must have a law. The Reason does not admit the 
possibility of chance. No-Law is as great an absurdity as 
No-Cause. A violation of law is conceivable only in the 
case of free, and therefore moral, agents ;* but even here 
the violation takes upon itself a form of law — a law of evil. 

II. Axiom op the Uniformity of Nature. — Involved 
in the Idea of Law is that of order, harmony, and system. 
Order, harmony, and system are the developements of law. 

* Moral Agency, Chap. VII. Sec. 1. 



220 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

The Reason, therefore, not only affirms on the presenta- 
tion of phenomena, there must be law governing them ; 
but still farther, these phenomena, thus governed, must pre- 
sent uniform recurrences and adjusted relations. The 
judgment thus formed is as universal and absolute as law 
itself. The axiom which has obtained as the expression of 
this judgment is as follows : Nature is uniform in her opera- 
tions. By this axiom, we are led to bring together the ho- 
mogeneous phenomena under the laws ; and to expect with 
certainty the reappearance of phenomena. 

III. Axiom of Universal Design. — This Axiom is de- 
termined by its appropriate Idea, and is as follows : What- 
ever exhibits marks of design, is the work of an Intelligent 
Creator. 

The Ideas of Law and Design being developed, upon the 
condition of particular phenomena, the Axiom is thereupon 
immediately affirmed by the Reason, and becomes thence- 
forth the starting point and guide in all subsequent obser- 
vations and experiments. This Axiom lies at the founda- 
tion of the so-called a posteriori argument for the existence 
of a God. Hence the ultimate basis of this argument is 
an d priori principle. But the ultimate basis of all cog- 
nition and ratiocination is, as we have seen, composed of 
d priori principles. 

IV. Axiom of the Correspondence of Ideas and 
Reality. — Every Idea implies a Reality of Actual Being 
or of Truth; and every Reality of Actual Being or of 
Truth, implies an Idea. Every Idea developed is developed 
in connexion with some form of Reality,* in the effort of 



* Supra>PartII., Sec. 3. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 221 

the Reason to grasp Reality. On the other hand, let us 
place ourselves in the world of Reality, and all our attempts 
at rational explanation lead us back to the Constitutive 
Ideas.* Now, upon the particular instances of this two- 
fold movement, the Reason supervenes with the universal 
affirmation which we have given above. All Ideas must 
attach themselves to Realities. All Realities must corres- 
pond to Ideas. It is the cardinal Axiom of pure Philosophy. 

V. Moral Axioms. — I have given the cardinal moral 
Idea, namely, the Idea of Right and Wrong ; but have not, 
for obvious reasons, entered into an explication of the par- 
ticular Ideas of Justice, Benevolence, and so on, contained 
under it. It would, in like manner, transcend the objects 
of this elementary Treatise to attempt, in detail, a presen- 
tation of the Moral Axioms. I will only remark, that the 
Divine Code announced at Sinai, and afterwards expounded 
and exemplified by the Redeemer of men, is in truth a col- 
lection of the fundamental Moral Axioms. They are in- 
deed given under the form of laws, but they, at the same 
time, contain the affirmation of great and universal truths, 
uttered by the Infinite Reason, and responded to and re- 
affirmed by the Reason of every moral being. 

VI. Esthetical Axioms. — These are determined by the 
Idea of Beauty, and comprise the first principles of Estheti- 
cal Science and of the rules of Art. I will adduce only 
two or three. These will answer the end of illustration. 
And I propose nothing farther. 

1. Beauty of every species and form has its Ideal or 
Archetype in the Imagination. 



* Supra, Part I., Sec. X. 



222 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

2. Every particular form of Beauty presents a union of 
regularity and variety. 

3. Nature and Art are homogeneous ; but the former 
does not limit the latter. 

VII. Somatological Axioms. — A complete exhibition 
of these would strictly belong to a Philosophy of Nature. 
Here, also, I am aiming only at an illustration of the great 
law of determining Axioms by the Ideas of the Reason. 

1. Axiom of the Inertia of Bodies. — This axiom is deter- 
mined by the Idea of Matter, as a passive, and not a self- 
moving substance. Our actual experience is limited ; nay, 
as to one part of the Axiom, we have no experience what- 
ever, namely, that a body, when put in motion, will continue 
to move on forever in the line of the impulse, unless it meet 
with resistance from another force : for we have no example 
of a body moving on without meeting with a resistance, 
tending eijther to bring it to a state of repose, or to change 
the direction of its motion. Besides, the universality and 
absoluteness of the entire affirmation must carry it beyond 
the possibility of experience. 

2. Axiom of Action and Reaction. — The equality of re- 
action to action in an opposite direction, is an affirmation 
of universal and necessary truth, and therefore transcends 
the reach of experience. It is determined by the Idea of 
Relation under the third form.* 

3. Axiom of the Centre of Gravity. — That every body 
has its centre of gravity, or a point, around which, when 
supported, all the parts of the body are balanced by the 
gravitating force, is unquestionably a universal and neces- 

* Supra, p. 160. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 223 

sary conception. By mere experience it could not be de- 
termined ; nor has any one ever attempted to determine it 
by experience. On the other hand, the Ideas of Action and 
Reaction, and of Centralization, cannot but determine it. 
It is a truth with which we begin our investigations in 
Nature, and of which no subsequent experience renders us 
more certain and confident. 

It will be seen by reflecting upon these and other axioms, 
which might be adduced from mechanical science, that 
the order of developement is as follows : 

First. The Reason, by its function of consciousness, 
comes, in the order of time, in connection with the pheno- 
mena of the external world. 

Secondly. Its constitutive Ideas now form the original 
sensuous cognitions. 

Thirdly. Thus introduced to particular Realities, the 
Ideas determine the universal judgments, which, when ex- 
pressed in clear and convenient language, become axioms. 

VILI. Axioms of Pure Science. — These belong to the 
Mathematics. They are universal and intuitive affirma- 
tions of the Reason respecting the two forms of quantity, 
namely, continued and discrete,* 

The most remarkable of these Axioms are those general- 
ly laid down in mathematical treatises as Axioms of Equal- 
ity and Inequality. The Ideas which determine these 
Axioms are Quantity, Identity, and Difference. 

Unity, multiplication, and diminution are the fundamen- 
tal conceptions of the Science of Numbers : and these are 
contained in the Idea of Quantity. Equation is the funda- 

* Supra, p. 81. 



224 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

mental conception of Geometry and Algebra ; and this is 
given in Identity. Proportion, as an equation of ratios, is 
embraced by the same conception : and Ratio is but a com- 
parison of quantities in respect to a common unit. 

What remains to be remarked respecting axioms of this 
class will naturally come up under the following section. 

IX. Logical Axioms. 

Axioms of this class relate to the processes of the Rea- 
son in general in its truth-seeking activity. We have seen 
that there are three cardinal forms of this activity, Intui- 
tion, Induction, and Deduction. Logical Axioms, there- 
fore, may be classed under three corresponding heads. 

Axioms relating to Intuition. — 1. Whatever the Rea- 
son intuitively knows, it knows under the characteristics of 
Universality and Necessity. Intuitive truths are universal, 
that is, true without any exception ; and necessary, that 
is, their opposites are impossible. 

2. Whatever is known intuitively neither requires nor ad. 
mits of demonstration. Demonstration always presumes 
something going before which is already known. An end- 
less retrogression of demonstrations is an absurdity. 
There must be some first truths which do not require de- 
monstration ; and which, because they are first, do not ad- 
mit of demonstration, since there is nothing by which to 
demonstrate them. 

3. Whatever is known intuitively must reach beyond any 
induction of "particulars, and be antecedent to them in the 
order of necessary existence. All induction is to us una- 
voidably limited, and must be led on by some antecedent 
and guiding principle. Induction without a purpose does 
not belong to philosophy. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 225 

Axioms relating to Induction. — Axioms relating to 
Intuition properly belong to this division of our Treatise. 
Axioms relating to Induction cannot be discussed here 
without anticipating what properly belongs to the next di- 
vision. I shall therefore adjourn any statement of them. 

Axioms relating to Deduction. — The reason above 
given applies to this class of Axioms likewise. I shall ac- 
cordingly adjourn them to the appropriate division, only re- 
marking, that the " Dictum de omni et nullo" that whatever 
is affirmed or denied of any term distributed, or, taken uni- 
versally, is affirmed or denied of every "particular compre- 
hended under it, — which Aristotle employs for explaining 
the validity of Deduction, — is a cardinal Axiom of this 
class. 



226 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 



SECTION VII. 

OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AXIOMS IN GENERAL. 

These characteristics have appeared in the course of the 
preceding section ; they are Universality, Necessity, and 
Logical Antecedence to Induction and Deduction. My prin- 
cipal object in presenting them in a separate section, 
is to meet certain objections which have been urged against 
them. 

It has been said that Axioms are merely statements of 
general observations. For example, that "Every body 
must be in space," means nothing more than that " Every 
body," as far as observation goes, " is in space ;" and that 
the Axiom, " If the same or equal quantities be added to 
equal quantities, their sums will be equal," and all the other 
Axioms of Equation, are merely of the same nature — ex- 
pressions of general observations, unattended by any ex- 
ception. Here, it will be perceived, that universality is 
merged into generality ; the necessary into the inconceiv- 
able ; and absolute truth into phenomenal conditions. 
That " Every body is in space" is thus merely a fact in the 
experience of all men ; and it is inconceivable that any 
body should not be in space, because no fact of this kind 
has ever appeared in human experience. And if it be 
affirmed in opposition to this, that our thought at least sur- 
passes our observation when passing beyond the possibility 
of actual observation — beyond all visible stars, — we think 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 227 

that if bodies be there also, they must there also be in space ; 
—then it is replied that we make to ourselves in this case, 
an imaginary representation of facts, which are merely 
copies of real facts, and that we are thus still in the region 
of observation : — The imagination takes the place of the 
sense, and wherever it goes, it only represents facts of the 
sense ; — wherever it goes, it still makes for itself locality and 
particular facts. It does not fill immensity nor grasp the 
universal, it is only extending observation, and multiplying 
facts in another way. 

The above is the argument fully stated. The answer 
does not appear to me difficult. 

First. Before we can determine the validity of Axioms 
as necessary, universal, and intuitive truths, we must deter- 
mine the validity of Ideas. Have we ideas of Space, of 
Necessity, of the Infinite, and so on ? It does indeed seem, 
that if We have any positive cognition whatever, space is 
such an one. Equally positive is our cognition of its charac- 
teristics. Space is necessary and infinite, and having no 
limits, it has no form. And when we affirm that it is infi- 
nite, we do not mean to express merely our incapability of 
conceiving of limits ; but the utter impossibility of limits. 
And again, when we affirm that space is necessary, we do 
not mean to express merely our incapability of conceiving 
of no-space, but the absolute being of space independently 
of all conception whatever. To make all cognitions per- 
sonal and relative — deriving their characteristics from the 
individual constitution, is to deny to Truth any independ- 
ent and absolute foundations. Then are we, for aught we 
know, only entertained with shadows, and without any 
fixed certainty of Reality. But we cannot yield to such 



228 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

doctrines ; because we have that within us which assures 
us of their falsity. Our cognitions are facts, which are ex- 
plained, and can only be explained by referring to the Ideas 
of the Reason. 

Secondly, It has been shewn in the preceding pages 
that the primary phenomena are simple sensations and af- 
fections of our own being revealed to consciousness ; and 
that they assume their secondary character as manifesta- 
tions of Reality, only through the supervention of Ideas. 
Without Ideas we should never attain substance, cause or 
law, nor the exterior sphere of their manifestation. The 
very cognition of Body therefore depends upon Ideas which 
assign it substance and qualities, connect it with causes, 
and give it limits and form and place. Not even a parti- 
cular body can be cognised in space without Ideas. 

Now, when we have the Idea of Space and the Cognition 
of Body with their opposite characteristics, the Reason 
cannot but affirm " Every Body must be in space." It is 
by no means an affair of observation and induction — it 
does not depend upon looking at this body and that body, in 
order to see whether they really are in space, and thus from 
multiplied observations drawing a general conclusion : On 
the contrary, no sooner do we cognise Space and Body, 
than we affirm absolutely and necessarily " Every Body 
must be in space." So far from requiring imagination 
beyond actual observation, actual observation itself is anti- 
cipated. 

The same reasoning will apply to all other Axioms. 
Take the Axiom, "If equals be added to equals, the 
sums will be equal." This Axiom is not a general con- 
clusion from repeated trials and observations ; but no 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 229 

sooner have we cognitions of Quantity, Identity, and so on, 
under the corresponding Ideas, than we make this and the 
kindred affirmations as universal and necessary affirmations. 
Here again, instead of multiplying observations by imagin- 
ary cases, we pause for no observation whatever, but 
directly determine the Axioms by the Ideas. 

Take another Axiom, ' If two straight lines intersect or 
cross each other, they can never meet again, but if pro- 
duced, must go on diverging forever.' Now, having formed 
the conception of two straight lines, drawn in space in the 
position above stated, we require no observation along the 
course of their production, either actually or by the imagi- 
nation, in order to gather facts for a general conclusion : 
the instant the thought is fixed upon the lines at the point 
of intersection, the affirmation is made under the character- 
istics of Universality and Necessity. 

The distinction between a conclusion gained by extended 
and careful observation, and a truth which at once flashes 
upon the mind — between the result of a long drawn out in- 
duction, and an immediate determination of the Reason, — is 
clear and palpable. The phenomenal conditions, under 
which such a truth is given are easily separable from the 
truth itself; since they neither contain nor measure it : for 
example, the sensation of hardness which is conditional to 
our cognition of Space neither contains nor measures 
Space. Again, the universality of such a truth is clearly 
distinguishable from the generality of an observation ; — for 
the truth is affirmed without admitting the possibility of 
limits or exceptions, as that * Every body must be in 
space ;' but an observation, as that of the rising and setting 
u 



230 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

of the sun, and that of the rising and falling of the tides, 
admits of the possibility of limits and exceptions. Omni- 
potence can change the whole order of the system, but not 
even Omnipotence can form a body not in space. Once 
more, the inconceivableness of a fact, and the necessity of 
a Truth, are also clearly distinguishable. A fact is incon- 
ceivable, when it is both removed from the sphere of our 
observation, and unlike any fact which has come under our 
observation. Thus a person residing within the Tropics, 
and who has never seen ice, cannot conceive of freezing 
water. The Cartesians rejected the Newtonian doctrine of 
the gravitation of bodies, on the ground that it is incon* 
ceivable that a body can act where it is not. Their error 
lay in adopting a theory of causality which made the causal 
activity a matter of sensuous conception. The Newtonian 
doctrine is inconceivable as a sensuous fact, if causes act 
only in the contact of material particles. But the doctrine 
was to be determined on other grounds than the possibility 
of observing the attractive force itself. A necessary truth, 
on the other hand, is not received, because it is conceivable 
as an observed fact, nor because its opposite is simply in- 
conceivable : It is received because it is absolute and fixed 
as a cognition of the Reason, and its opposite impossible. 
That * Every body must be in space,' that * Two straight 
lines cannot enclose a space," are necessary truths, because 
seen by intuition to be such that their opposites are impos* 
sible. You may say, if you please, that their opposites are 
inconceivable, taking this term in an intense and superlative 
sense, and indeed identifying it with the impossible : but the 
term is objectionable, because ambiguous, and liable to con* 
found pure intuitions of the Reason with facts of observation. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 231 



SECTION VIII. 

GENERAL RELATIONS OF AXIOMS. 

I. Axioms, in themselves, primary universal and neces- 
sary intuitive truths, are related as logical antecedents to 
universal and necessary deductive truths. The science of 
Geometry affords us a perfect and stupendous example of 
this relation. 

II. Axioms are related also as logical antecedents to our 
cognitions. The axiom * Every body must be in space' 
offers an illustration. When we come to cognise any par- 
ticular body, we of necessity must cognise it in space ; but 
we can cognise it in space only upon the ground of the 
Axiom, * Every body must be in space.' As the idea of 
space is the logical antecedent of the cognition of the body, 
so also the universal affirmation is the logical antecedent 
of any particular designation, for a particular designation 
implies the general truth. The sensation of resistance is 
the antecedent in time — the condition or occasion of the 
cognition of both body and space : and as comprehending 
the cognitions in their relation to each other, appears the 
Axiom, ' Every body must be in space.' The same course 
of remark applies to the Axioms, * Every phenomenon im- 
plies a Cause,' and ' Every phenomenon implies a Law,' 
and other similar Axioms. To attempt to establish these 
Axioms by induction, is forever to travel in a circle, since 
every fact inducted implies the Axioms themselves. 



232 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

III. Axioms either take immediately the form of Laws, 
or determine Laws. As instances of the first, we may ad- 
duce the great moral laws announced at Sinai. I have 
already referred to these. Every one of these utters a uni- 
versal and necessary moral truth. Duty as here presented 
is not arbitrary, but rational. 

In the department of Physics, we have a striking illustra- 
tion in the Three Laws of Motion. The first Law is 
the Axiom of the inertia of bodies, the Axiom itself being 
determined by the Idea of Cause : The second law is the 
Axiom of Effects proportioned to their causes, and is de- 
termined by the same Idea : The third law is the Axiom of 
Action and Reaction. These are Axioms, because universal 
and necessary truths determined by Ideas. 

They are universal, for no exception is admissible ; they 
are necessary, for the Reason affirms the impossibility of 
their opposites. They are true on a mere hypothesis of 
bodies. But when taken in their relations to actually 
existing bodies, they become actual primary laws. 

All primary laws are Axiomatic : but there are secondary 
laws which proceed from the Axioms. All ethical laws for 
the specific regulation of human conduct, and all civil juris- 
prudence, are thus derived. 

All the secondary laws of Physical Science are depend- 
ent in like manner upon the primary Axiomatic laws. 
Here, too, the Mathematics are applied, inasmuch as the 
motions, magnitudes, distances, times, weights, and forces of 
bodies are representable either as continued or discrete 
quantities.* 

* Supra, pp. 81-4. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 233 

I have already shewn* that science in general is con- 
structed out of phenomena by the aid of Ideas and Axioms. 
In the pure Mathematics, the phenomenal material belongs 
to the interior consciousness — that is, is given in reflection 
— and comprises particulars comparatively few in number, 
simple, and definite. 

In physical science, on the contrary, the phenomena be- 
long to the exterior consciousness, that is, are given in 
sensation, and are various, complicated, and multitudinous. 
In the latter, therefore, observation and experiment, nice, 
laborious, and extensive, are required. And here it is that 
Inductive Logic receives its widest and most important ap- 
plication, 



* Part I., Sec. XII. 



234 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 



SECTION IX. 



DEFINITION. 



" The end or scope of all definition, is to make any given 
object clearer, plainer, and more distinct to the Intelligence. 
Adopting the usual division of logicians, we represent defi- 
nition as either nominal or real. A nominal definition is 
merely substituting one name for another, — the name sub- 
stituted being supposed to be better understood. A real de- 
finition aims to explain the nature of the thing, by enume- 
rating its parts, assigning its classification, pointing out its 
substance, describing its properties and relations, or fixing 
its limits and distinctions. 

" A real definition may be accidental or essential. 
When accidental, it explains merely those accidents or pro- 
perties of an object which are not constitutive of it, and 
without which it can be conceived ; — for example, the 
name, time, place of birth, and employment of an indivi- 
dual, are accidents. When essential, it explains the essence 
and properties of an object which are constitutive of it, and 
without which it cannot be conceived ; — for example, mind 
and body are essential parts of an individual man. 

" Again : an essential definition is logical, when it as- 
signs the object, its place under generical and specific classi- 
fication. Thus man is logically defined an intellectual ani- 
mal — animal being the genus, intellectual the differentia, 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 235 

or that which distinguishes him essentially from all other 
animals. 

" An essential definition is physical, when, where the ob- 
ject admits of it, the physical parts are enumerated, mean- 
ing by physical parts those which are presented to the ob- 
servation of the senses. 

" An essential definition is metaphysical, when it assigns 
essence and properties to the object, which are metaphysi- 
cal — meaning by metaphysical that which is not known 
by observation of the senses, but by intuition of Reason ; — 
for example, Man is a spiritual being ; body is a resisting 
substance. From this it appears that a logical definition 
is dependent upon antecedent, physical, and metaphysical 
definitions. 

" Now, it is plain, that in order to define, we must have 
some prior conceptions by which to define. In a mere 
nominal definition, we must have a prior word already bet- 
ter understood than the word we are about to define. In a 
real definition, we must already have a clear knowledge of 
the essences, properties, and accidents we may make use of 
for this purpose. A definition, therefore, which we are at 
this moment framing, must be preceded either by definitions 
already made, or by conceptions which do not require or 
admit of antecedent definitions. 

" When present definitions presume antecedent defini- 
tions, these antecedent definitions must be preceded by 
other antecedent definitions, or by conceptions which do 
not require or admit of antecedent definitions. We must, 
therefore, in all cases, at length come to conceptions 
which do not require or admit of antecedent definitions ; 
for a retrogression of definitions ad infinitum, is an absurdity. 



236 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

" These starting points of thought, — these primary con- 
ceptions and beliefs, are logically necessary to account for, 
explain, and define all our other knowledges. They are like 
the light, which, while it reveals all objects of sight, can 
find nothing by which it itself can be more plainly revealed. 
That we cannot analyse light proves nothing against its 
existence : we know it must exist, because we see all things 
by means of it. Indeed, we must affirm in general, that 
whatever is clearest to our minds, and really best known, 
must be incapable of explanation, definition, or demonstra- 
tion : for if these were required in reference to the objects 
supposed, then it would follow that there must be something 
beyond these still clearer, and still better known, namely, 
that by which the explanation, definition, or demonstration 
is to be effected,— which is contrary to the hypothesis."* 

The distinction above made between a nominal and a real 
definition is palpable; for to give the signification of one 
word, by means of another more familiar, is widely different 
from pointing out what is designed to be expressed by the 
word itself. But inasmuch as a real definition is designed 
to point out what is expressed by the word itself, it has been 
contended that no definition can properly be said to explain 
the nature of a thing ; but only to determine the appropria- 
tion of a word : Thus, to define Man is not to point out 
the nature of man, but to shew what is intended to be ex- 
pressed by it. 

Now it seems to me that to determine the appropriation 
of a word is equivalent to defining the nature of the thing 
for which the word stands. Take the usual definition of a 

* Doctrine of the Will. Ch. II. Sec. I. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 237 

circle, for example : — * A circle is a figure contained by one 
line, which is called the circumference, every point of which 
is equally distant from a common point called the centre.' 
Here it is evident that the word circle cannot be defined, or, 
in other words, its appropriation determined without ex- 
plaining that for which it stands. In the course of this real 
definition we give also two nominal definitions, when we call 
the containing line the circumference, and the common point 
the centre. We may also nominally define a circle by 
saying, * it is a figure bounded by a circumference.' But 
taken together as above, we have a real definition of circle. 
In this definition we have undoubtedly an intuitive cogni- 
tion expressed ; for in defining a circle it is implied that it 
is an actual magnitude. We may indeed define that which 
has no real existence, as a griffin, a centaur, or a harpy ; but 
then it is understood that we are referring to imaginary 
beings. 

Real definitions, in so far as they contain or imply judg- 
ments of truth, are authoritative. This is true of geome- 
trical definitions, with the exception of those which are 
merely nominal. ' A surface is that which has length and 
breadth without height or thickness,' is a real definition, 
because it points out and affirms two dimensions in space ; 
and it is authoritative just to the extent of this affirma- 
tion. Strictly nominal definitions can be made out only by 
synonymes or by a circumlocution. 

A real definition is complete or incomplete. It is com- 
plete, only when all that is comprehended by the word 
which represents the object of thought is expressed. Thus 
that ■ Man is a rational animal' is a real definition, but still 
an incomplete one ; for the object of thought represented 



238 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

by the word ' Man' comprehends more than is expressed 
by the genus ' Animal,' and the differentia ' Rational.' 

Definitions are varied according to different ends pro- 
posed. The definition is always adequate when it meets 
the end proposed. To define ' Man' as a s rational animal' 
is sufficient in ordinary classification to distinguish him 
from all other animals. According to a distribution whic h 
Cuvier made of the species of the Animal Kingdom, he 
found it necessary to define * Man' " a mammiferous animal 
having two hands." Both definitions are real, because 
giving in part what really belongs to Man : both are in- 
complete, considered in respect to the whole subject ' Man ;' 
and yet both are adequate when considered in respect to 
their particular ends. Indeed, what are technically called 
definitions must of necessity, in numerous instances, be in- 
complete, either from our imperfect knowledge of the sub- 
ject ; or from its manifold richness, so that to give a com- 
plete definition would be equivalent to a scientific disquisi- 
tion. 

In Geometry, and in all absolute science, the definitions 
are complete. They express a complete and perfectly clear 
cognition, and give a name to the object of the cognition. 
That 'a straight line is the shortest distance between 
two points,' and that * a curve line is one which changes 
its direction at every point,' are cognitions clear and full, 
while the objects of the cognitions are distinctively named. 
Were not this the case, the definitions could not be re- 
ceived as a basis of the exact and rigid scientific con- 
struction. 

There is one enquiry which yet remains. What dis- 
tinguishes an Axiom from a real Definition ? An Axiom 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 239 

has been shewn to be a universal and necesssary truth de- 
termined immediately by Ideas. A real definition is the 
explication of a cognition represented or expressed by 
some particular word or phrase. Cognition may be primi- 
tive and intuitive, or secondary and derived. If the latter, 
it plainly cannot be axiomatic. But suppose it be the 
former, like the definitions of Geometry ? Then, in this 
case, it is unquestionably authoritative as an original intui- 
tion : — the definitions of a straight and of a curve line, of 
a circle, of a triangle, of a right angle, of a parallelogram 
and so on, must be rigidly adhered to in all the subsequent 
demonstrations ; but still they are only cognitions, of certain 
magnitudes. Now, an Axiom does not respect any particu* 
lar magnitude* but comprehends all alike. Thus when it is 
affirmed that ' things which are equal to the same thing, are 
equal to each other ;' that, * if equals be added to equals, the 
wholes will be equal,' no respect is had to any particular mag- 
nitude or quantity : the Axioms are true alike of all Geome- 
trical magnitudes, of all real quantities, or of quantities repre- 
sented generally under Algebraic Symbols. We have thus a 
very plain distinction — the distinction between an original 
intuitive cognition in relation to a particular subject, and a 
universal judgment limited to no particular subject. The 
definition of a circle is authoritative, but it is so only in rela- 
tion to a circle ; while the Axiom, " If equals be added to 
equals, the wholes will be equal," is so manifestly universal, 
and independent of any particular subject, that it not only 
appears just as clear in the general expression as in the parti* 
cular, but really takes logical antecedence in the general 
expression, and determines by its authority the truth of the 
particular. 



240 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

I here complete the view I proposed to take of Primor- 
dial Logic. Next in order is Inductive Logic Before we 
can proceed to Deduction, we must have truths arid prin- 
ciples from which to deduce. These are furnished by In- 
tuition and Induction. Hence the two corresponding forms 
of Logic. 



BOOK II. 

INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

It is sometimes said, that to an Omniscient Being neither 
Induction nor Deduction are necessary ; but that to such a 
Being all truth and knowledge are intuitive. Induction and 
Deduction indeed are not necessary to an Omniscient Being, 
considered as indispensable means of knowledge. Such a 
Being must have the power of seeing all truth directly. It 
is told of Newton that his mind grasped the conclusions of 
Geometry without laboriously passing through the usual 
process of reasoning. This indicated a mental energy su- 
perior to that of men in general. But, nevertheless, the 
truths and knowledges, at which we arrive by Induction 
and Deduction, do not stand in the same relation to the 
mind with intuitive truths. An intuitive truth is not only 
— in respect to the mode of knowing — seen directly ; —it is 
also seen to be true in itself — true independently of all an- 
tecedents. But a deductive truth, even if — in respect to 
the mode of knowing — seen to be true without passing 



242 INDUCTIVE LOGIC* 

through the deductive process j still, if a reason be giveii 
for its truth, and it be minutely analysed, it must to every 
mind be seen to be true, not in itself and independently of 
all antecedents, but true, because something going before 
and upon which it depends, is true. So also an inductive 
truth, although known directly by the power of an Omnis- 
cient mind, must be known in all its relations and depen- 
dencies ; otherwise it is not truly and perfectly known. It 
thus appears, that when we speak of Intuitive, Deductive 
and Inductive truths, we refer not merely to modes of know- 
ing, but to the intrinsic character of the truths themselves* 

What, then, are those truths and knowledges, which are 
arrived at in the way of Induction ? In other words, what 
is the field of Induction ? 

The field of Induction is that in which we find the se« 
condary phenomena. 

The primary phenomena are simply the conditions of the 
primary cognitions. In these we attain objective reality* 
Then, the phenomena— thenceforward recognized as the 
phenomena of objective reality — become the materials of 
Induction. 

Phenomena have Cause and Law as necessary antece* 
dents. The phenomena do not by generalization make up 
the Cause and Law ; but the Cause and Law are the 
ground of the phenomena. The mere classification of phe^ 
nomena under Resemblance and Difference, for the pur- 
pose of affixing a common name, is widely different from 
assigning them Cause and Law. In attempting to account 
for the resemblance and difference, we of course have to 
proceed to Cause and Law ; but the classification itself gives 
us neither the one nor the other. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 243 

tn the Divine Mind, cause and law existed before pheno- 
mena were developed. Here was the actual necessary an- 
tecedence. The mind which conceived and created, con- 
ceived and created from its own plenitude. The Divine 
Mind, therefore, foresaw the phenomena in the cause and 
law which it contained within itself. The phenomena 
must have been connected with cause and law in the Di- 
vine Conception, since the connection is necessary to the 
completeness of the knowledge. But here we see that the 
order of knowing is identical with the order of necessary 
existence. 

It is conceivable that the Divine Being might have con- 
stituted finite minds with such lofty powers as directly to 
know the causes and laws of the Universe, and through them 
the appropriate and necessary phenomena. Now, that these 
causes and laws are attained, phenomena through them can 
be known in regions of space where the eye has yet made 
no observations, and predicted in periods of time lying far 
away in the future. And these lofty minds, in possession 
of the causes and laws by a superior intuition, might in like 
manner grasp the phenomena springing out of and depend- 
ing upon them. But man is not a being thus constituted. 
The order of his development presents us— First, simple 
sensations : Secondly, the realization of the objective world 
by Ideas appropriating the sensations : Thirdly, the observa- 
tion of the phenomena of this objective world in order to de- 
termine its causes and laws. Now, under the last, we 
have the field of Induction as before stated : and the great 
point to be determined is, how by the observation of phe- 
nomena the causes and laws are arrived at. 



244 INDUCTIVE LOGIC, 



SECTION II, 

CAUSES AND LAWS. 

The philosophical distinction between Cause and Law is 
perfectly clear. Cause is that which accounts for the ex- 
istence of being and phenomena : Law is that which ac- 
counts for the order and relations of being and phenomena. 

Cause may be divided into two grand classes, spiritual 
or mental, and physical ; the former presenting two grades, 
the infinite and the finite, the latter presenting the finite 
only. 

Now, in philosophical strictness, the only enquiry that 
can arise here respecting Cause is, Whether the physical 
cause is really distinct from the spiritual. In respect to all 
our enquiries into the constitution of the objective world, 
every end is answered by granting at once — First, that in 
every finite intelligence there is a proper Cause which ac- 
counts for all the voluntary acts : Secondly, that in the 
universe of matter all causality is resolvable into the First 
and all-comprehending Cause. Physical causes, viewed in 
philosophical simplicity, are invisible powers lying behind 
the phenomena of the universe. Whenever we attempt to 
classify these, we in reality classify only the phenomena 
which are received as the signs or expressions of the 
Causes.* 



* Phenomena, and phenomena alone, are classed into genera and 
species on the grounds of resemblance and difference. We indeed 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 245 

What are ordinarily termed physical causes are merely 
phenomena which are stated and invariable antecedents, or 
fixed conditions of other phenomena : for example, the sun 



speak of a magnetic cause, a healing cause, a consuming cause, and so 
on ; but these differentia really refer to the phenomena ; — the phenome- 
na of magnetism, of healing, and of combustion, all differing from each 
other; but Cause is one simple Idea, the Idea of that which accounts 
for the possible and actual existence of these various phenomena. In- 
deed, we can conceive of the same cause as producing them all ; as 
when we conceive of the Divine Being as the universal and sole Cause. 
This plainly is possible : and in the case of second causes we do actu- 
ally attribute a vast variety of phenomena to one cause ; the phenome- 
na being capable of being reduced to genera and species, while the 
cause retains all its simplicity. 

" Human power, taken under any point of view, is one of perfect 
simplicity ; it is nothing that can be described under any form ; it can 
neither be physically separated into parts, nor logically distributed into 
genera ; it always manifests itself by volition ; and yet how various are 
the phenomena produced — the phenomena of which volition is the im- 
mediate antecedent ! 

" There may, however, be differences in degree ; one cause may 
produce a greater variety of phenomena than another ; and thus, causes 
which produce certain phenomena, and act in relation to certain sub- 
stances only, may be conceived of as simply limited in power without im- 
plying difference in kind. If, for example, I were gifted with the 
power of regulating my digestive functions, or the circulation of my 
blood, or of moving my ears after the manner of a dog or a horse, it 
would argue no new power differing in kind, but merely the extension 
of my causality. My volition now is limited to the movement of cer- 
tain members, and cannot influence others ; if I could move my ears as 
I do my hands, then my volition would do one thing more than it is 
now capable of doing. 

" Again, water is known to hold salt in solution : Now, if we were 
to suppose water to have the additional power of dissolving wood and 
holding the potassium in solution, we would not be altering in our con- 



246 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

and moon in the changes of the tide ; visible fire in combus- 
tion ; water and steam as propelling powers, the conjunction 
of substances in" chemical changes ; light, heat, air, and 
moisture in vegetation, and so on. In making out a science 
of nature it is immaterial, as before intimated, what we 
conceive the invisible and real causes to be ; or whether 
we conceive of only one universal cause producing all this 
variety of effect. On the other hand, the very determina- 
tion of such a science depends upon observing the order 
and relations of the phenomena. But the order and rela- 
tions of the phenomena do not truly belong to cause, but to 
law. Hence the aim of Induction, when expressed with 
philosophic precision, is not to arrive at causes, but to arrive 
at laws. Thus in gravitation, the great enquiry did not so 
much respect the nature of the cause, as the fact of the re- 
gulated central determination of bodies. The expansion of 
steam is a phenomenon ; and other phenomena are con- 
nected with it as invariable consequents : We know there 
must be cause lying behind the phenomena — of this we are 
satisfied — whether it be a physical cause, distinct and mea- 
sured in its own sphere, or the all-pervading universal 
Cause : but the great points of interest to us in science and 
practical mechanics are the order and relations of the phe- 
nomena ; in other words, the law which governs the evolu- 
tion of the phenomena. 

ception the nature or kind of solvent power in water :-*-We would only 
be enlarging that power. It is manifest that if we had made the expe- 
riment of the solvent power of water only upon sugar, we might with as 
much reason conjecture that, if further tried, it would dissolve wood, as 
that it would dissolve salt"-'Daetrme of the Will, pp. 31-33. See also 
p. 294. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 247 

If the undulatory theory of light be established, the inter- 
est of the thing does not arise from having arrived at an ulti- 
mate cause ; but in having gained new phenomena with 
wider relations artd more comprehensive laws. An ulti- 
mate cause we have not attained ; the etherial undulations 
precede the sensations of light, and the presence of the sun 
precedes the undulations ; and thus we have a succession 
of related phenomena ; — while enquiries still arise respect- 
ing the correlation of the sun and the all-pervading elastic 
ether which may bring to light other antecedent phenome- 
na. The real enquiry then is, not after the ultimate cause 
of light, but after the whole succession of inter-dependent 
phenomena connected with the sensation under all its 
phases. Throughout the whole succession of phenomena 
there is cause acting, cause developing the phenomena ; but 
that which we seek after — the characteristics of phenome- 
na, their order and relation, is comprehended by law. We 
can conceive of one universal cause producing from its own 
fulness every variety of phenomena ; but this variety itself 
denotes diversity of design and therefore diversity of law. 

The attraction of gravitation draws bodies towards the 
centre of the earth. Suppose it were ascertained that an 
exceedingly subtile ether exists between the particles of 
matter, having in itself a central determination by which all 
bodies are made to tend toward the centre : Then indeed 
we should have a new class of antecedent phenomena ; but 
the tendency of bodies towards the centre would be no 
more explained than before, as far as cause is considered ; 
we would only be carried one step farther back in our ob* 
servations ; and we might now institute enquiries respect- 
ing the force acting upon or in the particles of the subtile 



248 IXDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

ether. Unquestionably, however, were such an ether dis- 
covered, we should enlarge our view of the laws and order 
of creation. 

To revert to the theories of light. By the common theo- 
ry, luminous particles are supposed to be thrown off in 
straight lines from the luminous body, the phenomena of this 
emission being the antecedent phenomena deemed sufficient 
to account for the consequent phenomena : By the undu- 
latory theory, the sensation of light and all the phenomena 
are supposed to find their sufficient antecedent phenomena 
in the undulations of the elastic medium ; that is, the ethe- 
rial undulations being granted as the invariable antecedent 
to the sensation of light, and the cessation of these undula- 
tions as the invariable antecedent of darkness or the absence 
of this sensation, then the movement of these undulations 
will serve to explain all the phenomena of vision. In both 
theories we have in part a hypothesis of phenomena, and in 
part a statement of actual phenomena ; and the object in 
both is so to connect the hypothetical with the actual as to 
exhibit not the cause of the actual phenomena, but the law. 
That light consists of fine particles thrown off from lumin- 
ous bodies and moving in straight lines with an inconceiva* 
ble velocity, is a theory which legitimately connects itself 
with the phenomena of reflection and refraction as exhibit- 
ed in speculums, prisms, lenses, and so on. These pheno- 
mena can also be legitimately connected with the undula- 
tions of the imponderable medium. Other phenomena, 
however, are deemed by philosophers to be legitimately con- 
nected only with the last theory. But in neither theory 
do the hypothesised constitute the cause of the actual phe- 
nomena, but only the required conditions of their manifest 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 249 

tations. If now we conceive of the great and all-compre- 
hending Mind designing to produce the phenomena of light 
and vision, whether by his direct agency, or by second 
causes, permeating and acting in material substances, then 
the manner in which different substances are related to 
each other, and the fixed order and dependency of the phe- 
nomena, become to us the exponent of the law, which the 
Great Designing Mind ordained for his own efficiency, or for 
the governance of the secondary powers. The two theories 
present us in part, two different orders of phenomena, and 
hence two different laws of light and vision. In the minute 
and complete determination of these laws, so far as the 
conception of quantity comes in, the mathematics, as the 
science of quantity, is employed to give the expressions. 

What then is law ? Is it only the invariable succession 
of phenomena ? May the Creator, by his omnipotence, fix 
the succession of phenomena in any order he pleases, and is 
this fixed and arbitrary succession the law of Nature ? 

Law is not arbitrary in the morale. Hence that succes- 
sion of phenomena which comprises the conduct of respon- 
sible beings can be right and fit only when conformed to 
one law. 

Equally clear is it that the law of the Beautiful is not ar- 
bitrary. 

But how stands this question in Somatology 1 This is 
the point now to be considered. 

In the first place, in any system of bodies there can be 
no room for arbitrary laws, so far as the conditions of the 
system bring the bodies under mathematical formulae. And 
bodies, since they must have magnitudes and determinate 
forms, and be related to each other, and have motion as the 



250 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

resultant of forces, cannot escape these formulae. It is in- 
conceivable and impossible, that a universe of bodies should 
have been constituted in violation of the principles of the 
science of quantity. 

In the second place, the very notion of arbitrary law is ab- 
surd. Law is the work of the Reason — the necessary out- 
flow of its Ideas. The Will may institute arbitrary rules, as 
the word arbitrary indicates. The Will may violate the Rea- 
son ; but the institutions of arbitrary choice in opposition to 
Reason, or in the mere freakishness of Fancy, are not to be 
dignified with the name of laws, in the high and proper sense. 

In the third place, arbitrary choice cannot be ascribed to 
Infinite Intelligence. He who is the Fountain of truth, 
law, beauty, benignity, and order, cannot be thought of as 
creating the universe otherwise than under the light of his 
Eternal Ideas. And when we come to look into his works, 
we find everywhere the resplendent marks of law : and 
the farther our observation penetrates, the more varied, re- 
splendent, and positive do these marks become. 

The axiom, " that every phenomenon presumes a law," or 
that every phenomenon is the result of intelligent design, is 
affirmed by the Reason in the clear insight that Infinite In- 
telligence, and not arbitrary choice, decided the system of 
Nature. 

There might indeed have been a variety of systems go- 
verned by laws more or less benign and perfect, a concep- 
tion which we allow in the various theories by which we 
attempt to express the laws of given phenomena; but 
nevertheless, we are constrained to believe that an infinitely 
perfect Intelligence could not but have projected the best 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 251 

possible system, taking it in all its relations. When we 
look therefore into Nature, we expect not only to find laws 
properly so called ; but we expect also to find the wisest 
and most benign laws. 



252 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION III. . 

THE HUMAN REASON AS RELATED TO THE OBJECTIVE WORLD. 

The great and all-wise Being, who constituted the outer 
world, constituted also the Mind which is to investigate its 
laws. The Mind does not go to its work unfurnished. 
Made after the likeness of the Creator — after the likeness 
of that Reason from whose Ideas all law sprang forth ; — 
constituted therefore with Ideas, and thus having sources of 
law within itself, it cannot go out into the world where law 
is embodied and realized, without waking up the glorious re- 
cognition. Having eyes to see, the light which pours in 
upon it seems not a strange, but an expected and genial 
visitation. The human mind is prepared to know a world 
which had its origin in mind. As an artist comprehends 
the works of art, so does the mind of man comprehend the 
works of God. 

I have already, in the preceding Parts, said so much of the 
Ideas of the Reason, that I need here barely allude to the 
subject, or call it up again only so far as to apply it to the 
matter in hand. 

The developement of the Ideas, as we have seen, does 
not take place separately from Reality ; but when the real- 
ity is present in relation to which they are to act, then they 
manifest themselves. The manifestation is spontaneous — 
the earnest outflow of the mind to reach its proper objects. 

In the first place, Ideas of cause and law, and of conse- 
quent system and order, Ideas psychological and somatolo- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 253 

gical, as soon as phenomena are given, determine the mind 
to undertake investigation, and hold up the objects to be 
attained. 

Then, inasmuch as Ideas comprehend the coustitution of 
the universe, just so far as in the presence of the condition- 
al ng and quickening Reality they are developed, does 
there appear a prophetic power of the Intellect preconceiv- 
ing, suggesting, theorizing, and sometimes, as in the case 
of Newton, seeming to grasp at once the great system of 
things. It is impossible to express the extent to which the 
spontaneous inspiration of Ideas carries the mind, or all the 
modes of their action. Like the formation and growth of 
a common Language in masses of mind, like the develope- 
ment of Music without rules of art in popular tunes, or the 
growth of Poetry from rude ballads to the Iliad of Homer, 
like the spontaneous inventions and discoveries of man before 
he began to philosophize, from the results we feel assured 
there is law exact and beautiful ; but still, as in the fine vibra- 
tions of the air, and in the more subtile oscillations of the ethe- 
rial medium of light, no representation is possible : The 
movement lies so far behind all ordinary and familiar forms, 
and is so much more delicate and subtile than any thing we 
are accustomed to handle, to speak of, or to represent, that 
we can find nothing by which to convey it. In the germina- 
tion and growth of plants, how many fine influences are at 
work of which the physiologist presents us no diagram, and 
which he can command by no formula ; so likewise in 
mind, the germs of thought, their first springing forth, and 
their infinite and beautiful complexities in reasoning, inven- 
tion, memory, imagination, and taste, while exhibiting in 



254 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

their result the commanding presence of law, surpass the 
finest skill of the analyser. 

The superior power which some minds display in induc- 
tive reasoning may be accounted for mainly by the remark- 
able degree in which they are endowed with three qualities, 
Clearness, Candour, and Patience. Clearness of mind, 
the result of exact and laborious discipline, prevents uncer- 
tain, confused, and inapposite observations and experiments, 
and leads to accurate and sound judgments. Candour pu- 
rifies the mind from all " idols," and makes it an honest 
truth-seeker. Patience disposes to undistracted attention, 
quiet and protracted thought, cheerfulness in undertaking 
labours, perseverance in overcoming difficulties, and wil- 
lingness to wait until investigation shall ripen the harvest 
of knowledge. 

But Ideas not only impel the philosopher to undertake 
investigation, and suggest the rout he is to pursue, and fore- 
shadow the results at which he is to arrive, — they also de- 
termine the Method of Investigation. 

There are three particulars in relation to which this 
method requires to be expounded : 

I. The induction of phenomena for the purpose of classi- 
fying them into genera and species. 

II. The induction of phenomena for the purpose of arri- 
ving at the expression of a general fact, or a general order 
of sequence, but without determining a fixed and absolute 
law. 

III. The induction of phenomena leading to the deter- 
mination of a fixed and absolute law. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 255 



SECTION IV. 

GENERAL VIEW OF CLASSIFICATION. 

Classification is dependent upon abstraction and gener- 
alization. When phenomen^are realized under their second- 
ary form, the first impression must be that of an undistin- 
guished totality. By abstraction the mind fastens upon a 
particular quality or feature, and separates it from the mass. 
This quality or feature is then noted in other objects ; and 
at length generalized as a common sign for the whole class 
to which it belongs. In the next place, a name is given to 
the common sign, which thenceforth becomes the name of 
the class. When there is but one quality generalized, the 
class must be exceedingly general, and described in great 
incompleteness. As we add on qualities, we narrow the 
limits of the class, and at the same time describe with greater 
completeness. 

The most general arrangement of classes is that of Genus 
and Species. The Genus, or kind, expresses only the par- 
ticular, or particulars, in which all the species comprehended 
under it are identified. The Species, or the particular forms 
of the kind, express all of the Genus, and in addition to this, 
the differentia, or points of difference between one species 
and another. The Genus is thus divided into Species by 
the addition of qualities. Every Species is made up, in the 
last analysis, of Individuals. An individual is that which 
admits of no farther division, because all the qualities be- 
longing to the object are supposed to be indicated by the 



256 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

name assigned to it. The above may be conveniently re- 
presented as follows : 

Genus=The common Essence or Quality. 
Species = Genus + Differentia. 
Individual = Genus + Differentia -f- Accidents. 
By Accidents are meant the individual peculiarities. We 
will illustrate by an example : 

Genus Animal=The common property or essence by 
which animals are distinguished 
from vegetables. 
Species Man=Animal+Rational. 

Individual Caesar=Animal-f Rational + All the qualities 
which distinguished Caesar from 
all other men, and made himpar- 
ticularly Caesar. 
There are different orders of Genera ; for a genus may 
be a species* in relation to some higher genus, while a genus 
truly in relation to orders comprehended under it. Thus 
Animal may be said to be a species of Creature, understand- 
ing by Creature any thing created 5 Vegetable being another 
species of creature. The distinction thus arises between a 
Maximum and a Proximum Genus, — Maximum denoting a 
genus which is not a species, and Proximum a genus next 
above a species, but yet not the highest genus. It is evident, 
however, that in our Classification we are not necessarily 
limited to a certain number of divisions : on the contrary, 
we can multiply them according to our convenience. Hence 
we find naturalists making Orders and Classes, in addition 
to Genera and Species. 

* Species here is taken in an imperfect sense. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 257 

Classification is either Natural, Scientific, or Arbi- 
trary. 

I. Natural Classification. This is that spontaneous 
Classification which appears in all language, independently 
of scientific investigation. Thus all the objects of nature, 
as Animals, Vegetables, and Metals, in their different kinds, 
and all the products of human art, are distinguished and 
classed. 

II. Scientific Classification. This is the result of 
scientific and elaborate investigations, and appears in books 
of Science and Natural History. The terms here employed 
are invented for the purpose, and are generally unintelligible 
to the vulgar, because remote from common use. 

Scientific Classification is strictly natural, also, in one 
point of view ; that is, it is conformed to the actual System 
of Nature. Natural spontaneous Classification arises from 
that striking, palpable, and outside view of Nature, which 
all men readily and unavoidably take : Scientific Classify 
cation arises from a more intimate and curious, and an in- 
terior view of Nature, determined by philosophical aims and 
principles, formally laid down and reflected upon. 

III. Arbitrary Classification. This is an intentional 
violation of natural identity and difference. It consequently 
is altogether distinct from the two preceding forms of Classi- 
fication. It is an incongruous and grotesque assemblage of 
particulars produced by the sportive fancy for humorous and 
witty effect. 



258 INDUCTIVE LOGIC, 



SECTION V. 

PRINCIPLES DETERMINING THE INDUCTION OF PHENOMENA IN 
CLASSIFICATION. 

Ideas of Identity and Difference, Ideas of Synthesis and 
Analysis, belong to the common human mind, and impel it, 
whether spontaneously and without reflection, as in the first 
form of Classification, or whether through reflection and in- 
vestigation, as in the second form, to classify and distinguish 
the objects of perception. The world without made after the 
Ideas of the Divine Architect, derives from these Ideas its 
diversity and unity ! And here, again, the mind of man, made 
after the likeness of its great Original, is prepared to read 
this diversity and unity. The Identities and Differences of 
all created things, the beautiful variety amid perfect system 
and order, find within our reason the key of interpretation. 
We do not really classify : the Classification is already made 
in the constitution of the world ; We only read and com- 
prehend it. 

And even Arbitrary Classification has its law within our- 
selves : for it is only the nice perception of natural and ra- 
tional identity and difference which enables us to make those 
violations of congruity which produce the humorous and lu- 
dicrous effect. Hence we find that minds of the most deli- 
cate and perfect structure are most keenly alive to genuine 
wit and humour. In Addison, we have a striking exemplifi- 
cation of this fact. 

After pointing out the Ideas which lead us to classify at 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 259 

all, it still remains to explain the principles on which the dif- 
ferent classifications arise. 

The conception of general Classes, such as Genera, com- 
prehending other Classes such as Species, the conception 
of divisions and subdivisions, until we arrive at Classes com- 
posed barely of individuals, naturally arises out of the Idea 
of the unity and variety of system. But the particular ques- 
tion to be determined is, How do we select the distinct char- 
acteristic of the Genus and the Species? In other words, 
Why, amid many identities and differences, do we fix upon 
the particular ones ? 

I. We have seen* that the Idea of Determinate Form, 
both esthetically and somatologically, enters into the struc- 
ture of all things. Hence the identities and diversities of the 
world appear in the forms of things as limited in space. 
Nothing is more obvious to the common eye than these, and 
therefore no classification springs up more readily and spon- 
taneously. Thus animals and plants are known, distinguish- 
ed, arranged, and named. The Idea of Determinate Form 
within the human mind prepares and predisposes it for the 
actual knowledge of the generic and specific forms of nature. 
The conception of the determinate forms of objects, how- 
ever, is connected with that of interior functions and pro- 
perties ; and even in the most unreflective and spontaneous 
judgments, the two are not entirely separated. Thus the 
distinction between the animate and inanimate never lies 
wholly in form, but in the Idea of Life, as an organific power 
determining the difference. And, again, the distinction be- 
tween animals and plants never lies wholly in the form, but 
in sensibility, locomotive activity, voluntary appropriation 

* pp. 179, 192. 



260 



and skill, and various functions belonging only to the for- 
mer. There is, in fine, a conception of different laws govern- 
ing these different forms of life. 

Specific Identity may be defined by the form alone. It 
is the Identity of the outline drawn and limited in space, 
and the Identity of proportion and mechanism, making to- 
gether one distinct picture for the imagination. 

Generic Identity, on the contrary, lies not in the collec- 
tive outline of form, but in the outline of capital parts, and 
in connection with this, in the oneness of relations, ends, 
and functions. 

The Individual embodies the generic and specific identi- 
ties, and superadds all the lineaments, shades, and expres- 
sions, which combined constitute the finished and unique 
picture. 

II. Another ground of Classification is found in the Iden- 
tities and differences of the order of antecedence and se- 
quence of phenomena. The important ideas which govern 
here are Cause and Law. But nevertheless we have not in 
the mere classification,the determination specifically of causes 
and laws, but only the arrangement and naming of pheno- 
mena, from the fact that they uniformly precede as imme- 
diate antecedents certain other phenomena, or uniformly 
succeed them as immediate sequents. 

This, like visible form, is a principle of ordinary classifi- 
cation : for although the uniformities imply Law, and would s 
not excite attention unless the Idea of Law were in the mind, 
still they are not contemplated in particular reference to 
Law, or with a view at once to establish Law, but simply 
to obtain a convenient arrangement and nomenclature, 
Such a classification is indeed subsidiary to the determina* 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 261 

tion of law — a preparatory process of the highest moment. 
We have a striking exemplification of its importance, as well 
as of its mere subsidiary character, in the history of Chemi- 
cal Science. Experiments were multiplying from the age 
of the alchymists, and the observed uniformities of the phe- 
nomenal sequence as they continually became enlarged and 
modified, suggested new classifications and new terms. The 
facts were thus preserved, disseminated, and handed down ; 
philosophical meditation had distinct objects before it ; new 
investigations had their obvious starting points ; and a widen- 
ing avenue of knowledge gave still more inviting prospects. 
But it was reserved, at a late period, for Dalton and Faraday 
to propound Theories which, if indeed still theories, ap- 
proach very near the line where theory merges into law, and 
proclaims the ultimate end of human thought attained. 

III. The highest ground of classification is the concep- 
tion of a fixed law comprehending and governing the phe- 
nomena. 

The determinate forms of bodies spring from some law, 
whether somatological or esthetical, or from a union of both ; 
and the uniform sequences of phenomena have likewise 
their law somewhere. Now, before any law is distinctly 
conceived of, the classification, as we have represented, 
takes place by the mere marks of likeness and unlikeness 
in form, and the mere correspondency of the sequences. 
Thus arise the classifications which obtain commonly among 
men, and which are expressed in the general terms of or- 
dinary language. Thus also arise the earlier classifications 
of Science, while, by various tentative efforts, it is groping 
its way to stupendous and sure results. But no sooner have 
conceptions of general and fixed laws become developed, 



262 INDUCTIVE LOGIC* 

than the human mind attempts classifications from a higher 
point of view. Now the law which is conceived of as bind* 
ing together the widely diffused and multiform parts of an 
extended system, gives the generical designations ; while 
the species shew the complete unfolding of formative powers, 
whether by a plastic force impressed from without, or by 
an organific energy acting from within. If the laws which 
govern the widely extended systems in their unity, and those 
which control the specific developements in their complete* 
ness, be accurately discovered, then the classification will 
attain its highest perfection. And just, as under theoretical 
conceptions, an approximation is made towards the point of 
accurate discovery, will an approximation be made towards 
a perfect classification — *a classification which at the same 
time is the most philosophical and the most natural. 

The history of Natural Science affords us abundant illus* 
trations of the progress of classification. I have already 
referred to Chemistry. Botany and Zoology afford per- 
haps the most striking illustrations, since on account of the 
multitude of particulars, classification becomes at once an 
object of paramount importance. The earlier classifica- 
tions in these sciences were formed by arranging the parti- 
culars according to their external parts. Hence they were 
merely descriptive ; and as description must vary according 
to the accuracy and variety of the observations, new sys- 
tems were continually appearing, and endeavoring to sup* 
plant one another. Linnaeus, by introducing the sexual 
principle, henceforth gave to the classification of plants a 
phytomological character, and advanced Botany to the dig- 
nity of determinate Science. Cuvier accomplished a similar 
reformation in Zoology. With him the interior organization, 



1NDUCTIAE LOGIC, , 268 

as manifesting a wise and harmonious design, became the 
great object of research. Under this great Idea, he not 
only arranged the tribes of animals at present existent, but 
even called forth into beautiful and rational symmetry, 
the fossil and fragmentary remains of ancient and extinct 
generations. It was the apprehension of the rational design 
and of the organific law, which led these great philosophers 
to their invaluable and immortal achievements. 

Having distinguished the cardinal principles of classifi- 
cation, we may next proceed to enquire particularly into the 
distinctive characteristics of genus and species. 

[ have already remarked, that we are not necessarily con» 
fined to the particular classes of genus and species. In re- 
ality, wherever a number of particulars have any common 
characteristic, they may be classed together on this ground. 
And so also, on the other hand, any point of difference be* 
tween particulars may be assumed as a ground for separate 
ing them, and seeking for them some other distribution* 
But we have seen that there are principles, which, amid the 
vast number ofpossible classifications, demand a limitation ; 
and even spontaneously constrain the common mind to con- 
form to it. Besides genus and species, which have univer- 
sally obtained, and which therefore seem to be a most natu- 
ral division, we have Orders of a widely comprehensive 
character, including genera ; and again, Orders of a limited 
character, included under species. The comprehensive or- 
ders, however, are only a higher description of genera, and 
the limited orders a variety of the species ; so that an expo- 
sition of genus and species must include the main principles 
of logical division. 

I shall begin with Species. In respect to form, I have al- 



264 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

ready defined species, a completed picture for the imagi- 
nation. If we take the species on the higher ground of law 
working in the interior organization, the same conception of 
completeness becomes the governing conception. In the 
species we have the completed organization. Every indi- 
vidual, of course, is a completed organization. But the in- 
dividual contains no organism, powers or properties, which do 
not belong to the species. Indeed, every individual may be 
taken as a representative of the species to which he belongs ; 
and the species is but a collection of individuals identified 
in the whole organism, and in all the powers and properties 
which go to make up the distinct and complete being under 
its organific and determining law. The individual is justly 
said to be distinguished from the species only by accidents, 
and not by essential constitution and properties. These 
accidents are either circumstantial and separable, that is, 
they stand around the individual, describing locality, posi- 
tion, and exterior relations generally, but forming no part 
of the essential being ; or they are modifications of the es- 
sential and constitutive organism and properties of the spe- 
cies. The clear conceptions of Identity and Constitutive 
Law enable us to compare and limit the species ; and the 
equally clear conception of difference enab es us to detect 
those higher modifications which do not affect the identity 
of the species, and only form the accidents which serve to 
distinguish the individuals. These conceptions are deve- 
loped under their proper Ideas in the process of making 
comparisons of phenomena. There is thus the union of a 
certain tact acquired by experience, and of rational a priori 
determination. It is this union which makes classification 
truly philosophical. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 265 

The orders formed under species are based upon modificar 
tions more remarkable, yet not destructive of the palpable 
identity of the species. 

Genus differs from species in this, that while the last ex- 
presses a completed organization, and all the essential pro- 
perties, and is capable of full representation in the individ- 
ual, the former comprises only a part of the organization 
and properties, and cannot take the individual as its repre- 
sentative. It is true, indeed, that the common mark by 
which several species are united under one genus, must be 
found in every individual of the several species ; but then 
it appears in the individual in the unity of all the parts, 
while in the genus it is abstracted from them. 

The all-important inquiry here is, what shall govern us 
in the selection of the generic mark ? Having a clear con- 
ception of species as determined by the identity of the con- 
stitutive law of the complete organization, and of the essen- 
tial properties, we now, under the idea of system, proceed 
to consider the relations between the several species. Here 
identities are also perceived ; and it is possible to select any 
one of them as the generic mark. But suppose an identi- 
ty be perceived in a certain number of instances, with re- 
spect to a particular mark, how can we be certain of 
its universality 1 We cannot be certain of its uni- 
versality, unless it be a mark which is the exponent of 
a universal law. The occurrence of the mark in a great 
number of instances, and to the extent of our observation, 
would lead us to suspect the presence of a law ; and there- 
fore the selection of this mark as a generic designation be- 
comes a convenient and wise expedient, until we are ena- 
bled to reach a higher ground. A proper generic classifi- 
w 



266 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

cation then cannot be based upon a trivial and doubtful 
mark. It must be one, which, by its importance and pre- 
valence, points at least towards a law. But where the law 
is gained, there the generic mark becomes permanently fix- 
ed, and there alone. We may take as an illustration, the ge- 
nerical distinction between the animate and the inanimate. 
Here the great Idea and the laws of life are the ground of the 
distinction ; and here we are assured that it is fixed unalter- 
ably. Of equal clearness and fixedness is the distinction be- 
tween the animal, and the vegetable, because we comprehend 
clearly the peculiar laws of their organizations. And so 
universally, wherever we perceive a common mark in se- 
veral species, which stands as the exponent of a law work- 
ing in all these species, there we have the sure and proper 
element of the genus. 

As several species are embraced by a genus under a 
common mark, so again several genera may be embraced 
by a higher genus under a common and more comprehensive 
mark. This mark is the exponent of a higher and more 
comprehensive law, binding together laws, which, in their 
particular spheres, govern and explain the phenomena. 
The human mind is ever intent upon system, and hence is 
ever seeking for higher generalizations. By synthesis, it 
aims at a universal unity, and by analysis, developes unity 
into constituent parts harmoniously colligated. 

From the foregoing, I think it must be clear that classi- 
fication has its starting-point in Ideas of the Reason ; and 
that definite laws already known, or the theoretical concep- 
tion of laws, form the determining principles. 

These principles undoubtedly obtain an expression in the 
form of axioms and definitions, which, if they have not 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 267 

been formally laid down, have nevertheless, as current and 
generally understood judgments, formed the immediate au- 
thority and guide of all just and philosophical classification. 
A statement of the leading axioms and definitions be- 
longing here will close this part of our subject. 

I. Every universal is made up of particulars identified 
either in their determinate form, or in their cardinal pro- 
perties, or in their organific or constitutive law, or in all 
conjointly. 

II. Every particular is comprehended within a universal 
by the identity either of determinate form, or of cardinal 
properties, or of organific or constitutive law, or of all con- 
jointly. 

III. Species is the identity of determinate form, cardi- 
nal properties and organific or constitutive law, conjointly, 
where all these exist in the subject, so that every particular 
is essentially complete in the description of its species. 

IV. Genus is the identity of several species in a cardi- 
nal form, property, or law, which comprehends them in the 
unity of system. 

V. The unity of nature lies in identity ; the variety of 
nature lies in difference. 

VI. Where difference consists in the opposition of deter- 
minate forms in the organisms compared, and in essen- 
tial properties, while at the same time there is an identity 
in some constitutive law comprehending all alike, there 
arises the distinction of species. 

VII. Where the difference consists in the opposition of 
determinate forms in the organisms, and of essential proper- 
ties, without identity in some general comprehending law, 
there arises the distinction of genera. 



268 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

VILI. Where several genera are comprehended within an 
order or higher genus, the identity which binds them toge- 
ther, appears also in the several species under each particu- 
lar genus ; but then it appears alone in the higher generali- 
zation, leaving behind in the lower classes the other points 
of identity. 

Scholium. Species is an identity throughout. Genus is an 
identity in part. As the points of identity diminish, the 
generalization advances. Thus from the individual we ad- 
vance to the species, from the species to the proximum 
genus, from the proximum to the maximum. The univer- 
sal law sits like a sovereign in lofty state, regulating all ; 
but having under it a multitude of subordinates, which it 
binds together in an intimate and harmonious co-working. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 269 



SECTION VI. 

r DISTINCTION BETWEEN A GENERAL FACT AND A FIXED AND 
ABSOLUTE LAW. 

The relation between Ideas and Laws has been treated 
of in a preceding Part.* If the views there presented are 
just, then that alone is entitled to the name of law which 
finds its correspondent and basis in an Idea. Moral laws 
thus answer to the Ideas of right and wrong, freedom and 
responsibility, personal identity, and immortality. Esthetical 
laws answer to the Idea of the beautiful, under its different 
modifications. And so, likewise, somatological laws must 
answer to their appropriate Ideas. This' I have attempted 
to exhibit under Primordial Logic. The characteristics of 
Ideas are necessity and universality in their proper spheres. 
Hence the axioms, definitions and laws, must be necessary 
and universal likewise in their proper spheres. 

The Intuitive Function, in connection with sufficient ob- 
servation, perceives these laws. The law is seen to compre- 
hend the facts of observation, and thus to be the law of the 
facts ; while, as a law, it is seen to be universal and neces- 
sary. 

Now, on the other hand, a general fact is the mere state- 
ment of a series of facts, appearing to the extent of our ob- 
servation in a uniform relation of sequence. We may pro- 
ceed to give a theory, or even to determine a law of the 



* Part I., Section VII. 



270 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

facts ; but this is another affair. Taken as a mere general 
fact, the series is neither theory or law. 

But the enquiry may here be made, How, then, does a 
general fact differ from generalization under genus and spe- 
cies ? Generalization is a grouping of phenomena on the 
ground of identity in one or many particulars, for the pur- 
pose of assigning a common name, which may thenceforth 
be employed in our thinking and reasoning, as the sign of all 
contained under it. But the general fact is the affirmation 
of the identity itself as a truth belonging to the whole class 
of things contemplated. The identity affirmed in the gene- 
ral fact, however, is not always the one upon which the 
generalization is based. For example : upon the observa- 
tion of certain identities and differences we have classed 
certain animals under the terms sheep, ox, deer. Upon a 
farther observation of these animals, we find that they are 
deficient in the upper cutting teeth, and that they ruminate. 
We extend our observations, and we find that all animals, 
deficient in the upper cutting teeth, ruminate. Now, upon 
these identities we may class together all these animals as 
ruminating animals. But the general fact is the affirmation 
that all sheep, oxen, deer, and so on — that is, all animals al- 
ready classed by certain identities and differences — have 
this additional identity, of being deficient in the upper cut- 
ting teeth ; and again, that all animals thus deficient, ru- 
minate. So, also, in chemistry, we call all substances which 
change vegetable blues into red, acids ; and those which 
change them into green, alkalies ; but the general fact is 
the affirmation that all acids, and all alkalies, possess these 
respective properties ; and again, that acids and alkalies 
neutralise each other. In the general fact is contained the 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 271 

affirmation of a uniform order of sequence, upon which we 
may base a classification or not, as we please, e. g. when 
we observe that the animals above described ruminate, we 
are under no necessity of classing them as ruminants : but 
whether we do so or not, the general fact remains. In fine, 
in the one case we are aiming simply to arrange and name : 
in the other, we are affirming a truth and the semblance of 
a law. To name all animals which have the above-men- 
tioned characteristics, ruminating animals, is plainly different 
from affirming, generally, all animals which want the upper 
cutting teeth ruminate. 

I call the general fact the semblance of a law, for the 
general fact, as such, is not a law. But, nevertheless, it 
answers the most important ends in calling before the mind 
the stated connections existing between phenomena. " Bake- 
well, the celebrated cattle-breeder, observed, in a great num- 
ber of individual beasts, a tendency to fatten readily ; and 
in a great number of others, the absence of this constitu- 
tion : in every individual of the former description, he ob- 
served a certain peculiar make, though they differed widely 
in colour, &c. Those of the latter description differed no 
less in various points, but agreed in being of a different 
make from the others. These facts were his data : from 
which, combining them with the general principle that Na- 
ture is steady and uniform in her proceedings, he logically 
drew the conclusion, that beasts of that specified make have 
universally a peculiar tendency to fattening." * This was 
the general fact at which Bakewell arrived, a fact of great 



* Wkateley's Logic, Book IV., ch. ii, § 2. 



272 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

practical moment to all cattle-breeders. But as announced 
by him, it was no law, because connected with no Idea. 
Now let us suppose that the peculiar make was one con- 
nected in respect to climate, food, &c, with the freest and 
most genial developement of the organific power of life ; 
and also, that it combined the finest esthetical proportions, 
so that the conclusion might have been announced as fol- 
lows : — The most genial culture gives the highest animal 
beauty, and the highest animal beauty is connected with 
the highest animal utility, exhibited in strength, activity, 
and a tendency to fattening. Should we not here be ad- 
vanced beyond a general fact to the conception of a univer- 
sal law, and that because we have brought in points of con. 
sideration connected immediately with Ideas ? 

That bodies fall to the earth, was a fact of general obser- 
vation before Newton saw the apple fall ; and as a general 
fact, it was of eminent and daily use among men ; but it 
was not until this general fact had been elaborated in the 
mind of Newton that it became the exponent of a law. But 
what gave to gravitation now the characteristics of a law ? 
Was it not the Idea of centralization— the Idea of the uni- 
versal and necessary arrangement of matter in order to form 
a system 1 The centrifugal law is no less based upon an 
Idea ; for the Reason sees with intuitive certainty that 
without a diffusive movement harmoniously united with the 
central movement, matter could not exist in space in sepa- 
rate masses.* 

Chemistry has, until very recently, been a science of 



Supra, p. 188, 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 273 

general facts, and, therefore, an imperfect science. Now, 
the great advance made by the combined labors of Dalton, 
Davy, and Faraday, and especially by the investigations 
and acute reasonings of the last, are just an advance from a 
mass of general facts to a comprehensive, law, developed 
under the force of an Idea : at least, it is a near approxi- 
mation to such a result. The identification of chemical and 
electrical attractions is a lofty generalization. But the Idea 
and the law are indicated, if not fully expressed, in the con- 
ception of Polarity,* or, to use Faraday's language, in the 
conception of " an axis of power having equal and opposite 
forces." In the law of gravity and of the centrifugal force, 
we have the law of the cosmical masses : in Polarity, or the 
" axis of power," we have the dawn at least of the law which 
governs the interior constitution of bodies. These are the 
great laws of the universe. 

The method of arriving at general facts is the empirical 
method. It is the method of the earlier processes of science, 
and preparatory to the determination of laws. On many 
subjects the human mind has not advanced beyond these 
general facts. This is true of medicine, for example. From 
accident and investigation, certain substances have been 
found to possess a remedial effect ; until at length some- 
thing like general rules have been instituted for the treat- 
ment of various diseases. The whole history of Therapeu- 
tics exhibits a conflict of theories, and a mass of conjectures 
often sagacious, but more frequently wild and loose. The 
subject is one of extreme difficulty, on account of the mul- 



* Supra, p. 191. 



274 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

titudinous influences which have to be taken into the ac- 
count. Even at the present day, more reliance, perhaps, is 
to be placed upon individual experience, judgment, and tact, 
than upon any established general principles. Curious and 
hopeful generalization may have been made, but no law has 
as yet appeared. 

But the defect in Therapeutics is not merely the want of 
laws, but the want of clearly ascertained general facts ; for 
were it certainly known that certain substances could ex- 
pel disease, for instance, as certainly as that a particular 
breed of cattle fatten easily, we should obtain practical 
rules of the highest value. 

General facts, when once established by a sufficient num- 
ber of experiments, show the presence of law, although the 
law has not yet attained to an expression, and they may, 
therefore, be applied as authoritative. Numerous chemical 
compositions and decompositions were settled as unques- 
tionable facts, before the later great chemists appeared. 
Rules of practical mechanics obtained before the laws of 
the science were discovered. On all subjects open to com- 
mon observation, the uniform order of sequences has been 
noted among the multitude, and general facts have been at- 
tained with more or less accuracy. 

But notwithstanding the many beneficial results arising 
from spontaneous observations of the uniformities of Na- 
ture, it must be confessed that errors have likewise arisen in 
this way. Observations may be defective in many ways : 
They may be made hastily and inaccurately ; they 
may not be sufficiently varied, nor often enough repeat- 
ed ; and they may be made under prejudice, with an ex- 
cited imagination, or with a concealed, obstinate determi- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 275 

nation to arrive, at all events, at a particular conclusion. 
These defective observations have been so rife in Therapeu- 
tics, that the word empiricism has in common usage become 
diverted from its original and just meaning, and is applied 
to express those loose and baseless methods of treating dis- 
ease which are enveloped in mystery, at once to excite the 
imagination of the multitude, and to conceal their own ab- 
surdity. Popular beliefs, also, in dreams and omens, are 
only another form of empiricism, or loose and insufficient 
observation. And yet, even these errors show the noble 
constitution of the human mind ; for it is the strong sense 
of law which creates the tendency to draw general conclu- 
sions, wherever uniform sequences appear. 

The importance of establishing principles and rules of 
observation in view of arriving at general facts and laws, 
is apparent to every one. This, indeed, comprises, in the 
main, the Logic of Induction. To this we shall now pro- 
ceed. In the first place, we shall speak of observation in 
respect to general facts ; and in the next place, in respect 
to laws. The distinction between the two which I have at- 
tempted to draw, I think, will not be misconceived. It may, 
indeed, be summed up as follows : General facts are the uni- 
form sequences of phenomena — or the uniform dependence 
and involution of phenomena, so that a given consequent 
cannot exist without a certain antecedent, nor a given an- 
tecedent without involving a certain consequent : Law, in 
distinction from the orderly sequence itself, is that which 
governs it and accounts for it, and without which the se- 
quence would not have been possible. 



276 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION VII. 

THE LOGIC OF GENERAL FACTS. 

The great Francis Bacon, the first who labored at a full 
exposition of the Inductive Philosophy, himself signally 
failed in all his attempts to give an exemplification of its 
principles. The catalogues of facts which he has left are 
of little or no value. The reason is obvious : — -The facts 
are heterogeneous, mixed, scattered, casual, and ofter trivial. 
The observations appear to have been governed by no prin- 
ciple, no definite aim, no prophetic thought, in fine, by no 
Idea. As the observation of facts and ideas are both de- 
manded in a philosophy of Nature, so the omission of one 
or the other must be fatal to any attempt to arrive at such 
a philosophy. Bacon exposed the errors of those who had 
attempted this work by Ideas alone. He himself failed be- 
cause he attempted it by observation alone. 

The point now distinctly before us is to ascertain the 
true logical grounds of deciding when phenomena have a 
real and fixed connection, as antecedent and consequent, so 
that we may affirm, as a general fact, that they are thus 
connected. 

The connection of phenomena, as stated antecedent and 
consequent, is the exponent of law. Hence, we are deter- 
mined to the observation of orderly sequences as naturally 
presented, and to make experiments in order to enlarge the 
field of observation by the Idea of lav/. If we do not find 
the law itself, we shall find its beautiful manifestations — we 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 277 

shall know at least that we are dwelling in the light of its 
countenance. 

The Idea of law gives rise to the axioms of universal law 
and of the uniformity of Nature.* These axioms are like the 
voices of the Idea, ever speaking to our thought as we search 
ahout and pry into the phenomena of Nature. 

Thus, then, in seeking to establish general facts, we are 
looking out for the uniformities of Nature. 

The phenomena which we examine and compare, must 
stand in the one or the other of the two relations of antece- 
dent Or consequent, for phenomena are in a continual flux, 
and conditionate one another in this way, the same phe- 
nomena being consequents of antecedents, and antecedents 
to consequents. The flux of phenomena, however, is not a 
lengthening chain of succession, ever presenting new par- 
ticulars, but is composed of cycles, where the end returns 
into the beginning : and the complexity of Nature presents 
us cycle winding within cycle, cycle crossing cycle, and all 
in perfect harmony ; for not only are the particulars of each 
cycle related, but cycle also is related to cycle in the unity 
of one vast system. The acid which is itself a consequent 
of the union of two simples, returns by one cycle into these 
simples again ; and by another relation, becomes an ante- 
cedent in another cycle, and aids its movement, as in double 
elective affinity. General facts, therefore, may be more or 
less extensive. The perpetual relation of a particular an- 
tecedent and consequent is in itself a general fact ; an es- 
tablished cycle of antecedents and consequents is a general 
fact ; and the established connection between different cy- 

* Supra, p. 219. 



278 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

cles is another form of general fact. But the principles are 
the same which govern the whole ; for the observation in 
all is the observation of recurring antecedents and conse- 
quents. 

There is one thing here worthy of being remarked, name- 
ly, that when we are seeking for the stated consequent of 
an antecedent, we may employ experiment as well as ob- 
servation, since being already in possession of the antece- 
dent, we can place it in different relations in order to see 
what consequents are connected with it ; but that, on the 
contrary, when we are seeking for the stated antecedent of 
a consequent, we can employ observation only, for the con- 
sequent being subsequent to the antecedent, we cannot place 
it in different relations in order to see how it arises, since it 
already is ; and, therefore, we have to watch for new in- 
stances where the consequent in question is presented to- 
gether with its proper antecedent. 

Our object being to establish the fact of uniformity, it 
is necessary to settle, as a preliminary question, how many 
instances are demanded to this end. As Nature is governed 
throughout by exact law, if it can be shewn, in respect to 
any succession, that a given consequent does take place 
when a certain antecedent is present, all other antecedents 
being excluded, then if there be only one instance, this one 
is sufficient to establish the fact of the sequence. Suppose, 
for example, that we exclude, in the combustion of a metal, 
all antecedents but oxygen gas, then it becomes certain, 
upon the axiom of the uniformity of Nature, that the pre- 
sence of oxygen is a condition of this phenomenon. But it 
does not appear from this that oxygen is a general condition 
of combustion. We may, therefore, proceed to observe and 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 279 

experiment other combinations, excluding oxygen — and if 
we find that in all such instances no combustion takes place, 
then, and not until then, we infer that oxygen is a general 
and indispensable condition of this phenomenon. Here one 
instance is not sufficient, since, although oxygen is a sup- 
porter, there may be other substances which act in the same 
way. When several instances concur, the conclusion be- 
comes strong ; and when all known observation and experi- 
ment give the same result, no doubt is any longer enter- 
tained, for the uniformity seems now fully developed. The 
case in which we determine that oxygen is a condition of 
combustion, and the case in which we determine that it is 
a general condition, are widely different, since one instance 
is sufficient for the first, whereas the induction must be ex- 
tended in the second.* Wherein lies the distinction between 
the two cases ? Is it not that in the first case we take a 
given antecedent, and excluding from it all other antece- 
dents, we observe it in circumstances where, if any conse- 
quent ensue, it alone can be the condition and antecedent 
of that consequent ; while, in the second case, we take a 
given conseqent, and observe it as it occurs in a variety of 
circumstances, in order to see whether in all these circum- 
stances there is a general difference, and but one uniform 
point of agreement, and that point the presence of the oxy- 
gen ? 

Here, then, we see the greater advantage we possess in 



* Oxygen, for some time, was considered the only supporter of com- 
bustion. This was the general fact until subsequent discoveries brought 
to light other supporters of combustion." In no general fact, therefore, 
do we attain the necessary — this belongs only to law. 



260 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

following the sequence from the antecedent to the conse- 
quent, than in the reverse order. In the first, having the 
antecedent, we can, as before remarked, by experiment 
place it in different circumstances and isolate it ; but in the 
second, we cannot experiment, but must merely observe the 
instances in which the consequent appears in connection 
with an antecedent : and here the circumstances may be so 
numerous as to require many comparisons in order to detect 
the particular antecedent required. But, on the other hand, 
the antecedent itself may be complex, and require analysis 
in order to determine the force of the different elements. 
Where this analysis is possible, so that we may separate the 
elements, we can reduce the experiment again to the utmost 
simplicity. If we have established that common air is ne- 
cessary to combustion, and afterwards find that combus- 
tion takes place in another gas different from common air, 
we may be led to enquire whether this gas is present in com- 
mon air ; and when by analysis we have arrived at the com- 
position of the atmosphere, v/e may test the elements in 
order to determine whether one element alone is the condi- 
tion of combustion. 

But it often happens that we cannot analyse the complex 
antecedent. For example, a certain remedy appears to be 
efficacious in a particular disease ; now, if all the circum- 
stances are precisely the same in any other case of the dis- 
ease, the remedy may here be expected on the general uni- 
formity of Nature to be equally efficacious. But the com- 
plexity of the antecedents creates a two-fold difficulty. Do 
we have such a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances 
in the first case — the constitution of the individual, the in- 
fluences of regimen, &c, the nature of the disease itself, and 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 281 

the force of the recuperative power of nature, as to be con- 
fident to what extent, or even if at all, the remedy is to be 
taken as an antecedent to the recovery? And if all this 
were granted, is our knowledge of all the circumstances in 
the second case sufficiently minute and accurate to enable 
us to decide upon the identity of the two cases ? Now, it is 
evident that where antecedents are thus complicated, obser- 
vations and experiments need to be multiplied in order to 
arrive at a general expression in any degree satisfactory. 

It appears from the preceding remarks, that the number 
of instances necessary to enable us to decide upon a pre- 
vailing uniformity, depends upon our success in eliminating 
all the antecedents and consequents foreign to the particu- 
lar sequence we are contemplating. If, in the case of the 
treatment of disease, we can eliminate every thing but the 
disease and the remedy, then we shall at once be in a condi- 
tion to decide upon the sequence. We shall proceed, there- 
fore, to consider the 

Principles of Elimination. 

I. General difference with: uniform agreement 
in one point. — Here we suppose several instances of con- 
joined antecedents to be brought under observation, in each 
instance, all the antecedents being different but one. Now, 
if in all these instances a particular consequent uniformly 
appears, then we infer the general fact that the unvarying 
antecedent is connected with the unvarying consequent. 
Two instances thus agreeing would, on the axiom of uni- 
formity, lead us to a conclusion. This conclusion, how- 
ever, attains its greatest force only where the agreement is 
verified by general observation and experiment, that is, by 



282 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

all the observation and experiment, not only of the individual 
philosopher, but also of the whole fraternity engaged in the 

same course of investigation. Thus, if in several eombina- I 
tions of elements, all differing except in the single circum 

stance of the presence of oxygen, and if in all these an acid jj 
is uniformly produced, then we would conclude, under the 
conditions above laid down, that oxygen is the acidifying 

element. c 

The same principle applies to the observation of an un- js 

varying sequent appearing amid varying sequents : here, if j$ 

the antecedents generally appear irregular and indetermi- a 

nate, but among these there is one antecedent, which, in all a 

the observed instances, is uniformly present, then we infer i 

that it is connected with the unvarying sequent. I 

There is another mode of applying this principle, which, V 

wherever it is possible to combine it with the preceding, a 

makes the elimination far more perfect. Suppose that, |;j 

after having determined, in several instances generally n 

unlike, the connection of an unvarying antecedent with an e 

unvarying consequent, we are able next to compare instan- i 

ces which are also generally unlike, and agree only in the uni- o 

form absence of the particular antecedent noted before, and jl 

in the absence of the corresponding consequent, or in the t 

absence of the consequent and the absence of the corres- \ 

ponding antecedent, — then we have here an indication of I 

uniformity tending to the same general result. By the first | 

mode of applying the principle, we eliminate all the unlike l j 

and varying antecedents and consequents from the particu- I 

lar antecedent, and consequent on the ground of their unva- J 

rying co-presence : by the second, on the ground of their \ 

unvarying joint absence. i 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 283 

II. General agreement with uniform difference 
in one point. — By this principle, we effect a complete 
elimination. There are three modes of applying it. 

First : Let there be a number of antecedents and conse- 
quents conjoined : remove one of the antecedents, the con- 
sequent which disappears with it is its particular consequent. 
Or if we observe the disappearance in some instance of one 
of the consequents, and find that a certain antecedent has 
also disappeared, then we infer again the sequence of the 
two. In the first case, we may experiment as well as ob- 
serve ; in the second, we can only observe ; since we can 
compel the disappearance of a consequent by the removal 
of its antecedent, but we cannot act upon the antecedent 
through its consequent. Where we repeat the experiment 
or the observation, and in every instance remove, or note 
the disappearance of, the same element, and in every in- 
stance find that the same corresponding antecedent or con. 
sequent is likewise wanting, we of course confirm the gen- 
eral fact by a wider induction. 

Second : Let there be several antecedents attended with 
certain consequents ; and among these let there be in- 
troduced a new antecedent, the new consequent which now 
appears we infer to be in sequence with the new antece- 
dent. Let this be repeated in other instances, and if, 
wherever we introduce the particular antecedent the same 
consequent uniformly appears, and there only, then the 
elimination of all foreign influences is complete, and the 
sequence under investigation firmly established. 

On the other hand, if, among several phenomena, a new 
phenomenon should make its appearance, and if, upon exa- 
mination, a new antecedent should be found to be also 



284 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

present, then a connection between the two would be in- 
ferred. If, in repeated instances, the same concurrence 
takes place, nothing seems wanting to the elimination. 

Third : Let there be a number of antecedents, presenting 
complicated effects, concurrent, opposing, or independent 
of each other. If, upon examination, we can trace certain 
of the consequents to particular antecedents, then we may 
at once subduct these consequents with their antecedents 
from the sum total. What remains now, becomes the sub- 
ject of new investigations ; and thus we may successively 
eliminate antecedents and consequents, until, we will sup- 
pose, only one consequent remains. Now, if there be only 
one antecedent also remaining, then we infer its connection 
with the consequent. This remaining consequent is what 
Sir John Herschel calls the residual phenomenon, I borrow 
from him the following illustration : '« The return of the 
comet predicted by Professor Encke, a great many times in 
succession, and the general good agreement of its calculated 
with its observed place during any one of its periods of visi- 
bility, would lead us to say that its gravitation towards the 
sun and planets is the sole and sufficient cause of all the 
phenomena of its orbitual motion ; but when the effect of 
this cause is strictly calculated and subducted from the ob- 
served motion, there is found to remain behind a residual 
phenomenon, which would never have been otherwise ascer. 
tained to exist, which is a small anticipation of the time of 
its re-appearances, or a diminution of its periodic time 
which cannot be accounted for by gravity, and whose cause 
is therefore to be enquired into. Such an anticipation 
would be caused by the resistance of a medium dissemina- 
ted through the celestial regions ; and as there are other 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 285 

good reasons for believing this to be a vera causa, it has 
therefore been ascribed to such a resistance."* 

III. Elimination by corresponding quantities and 
intensities. — ^Antecedents and sequents may be brought 
under the conception of Quantity ; and as Quantity has its 
exact science, antecedents and sequents are reducible 
to precise expressions. Now, there are certain antecedents 
which never entirely disappear, and therefore we cannot 
effect an elimination on the preceding principles. For in- 
stance : heat is always present, so that we can never deter- 
mine by actual experiment what consequent would disap- 
pear if heat were entirely withdrawn. But if, by changing 
the quantity of heat, we find corresponding changes in the 
consequents, then we know, as before, that a sequence ex- 
ists. We do not remove the antecedent, nor change the 
essential order of the sequence, — we only modify the ante- 
cedent, and uniformly a like modification takes place in a 
stated consequent. Thus, we notice, in the first place, 
certain changes in our sensations with respect to heat and 
cold ; then, observing quicksilver, we see that as our sensa- 
tions of heat increase in intensity, a corresponding expan- 
sion of its bulk takes place, and that, as our sensations mo- 
derate, its bulk contracts, and that this contraction regular- 
ly goes on as the cold becomes more and more severe, until 
at length we make out an exact scale of temperature. 
Now, having determined that quicksilver regularly ex- 
pands and contracts, as the temperature increases or de- 
creases, we apply the scale to the observations we make 
upon other metals, and then upon bodies indiscriminately ; 

* Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, p. 156. 



286 INDUCTIVE LOGIC* 



and thus the general fact appears, that all bodies are expand- H 
ed by heat, and contracted by a loss of heat. In the same f 
manner, we may determine that all bodies, when put in mo- ^ 
tion, will continue to move until brought to a state of rest | 
by an opposing force, taking this in the light of a gene- f{ 
ral fact : We continue to remove obstacles, and as the ob- jf 
stacles are removed, the time of the continuation of motion f\ 
is increased, and thus, although we can never remove all R| 
obstacles, we may infer that if all obstacles were removed, p| 
the body would continue to move on forever.* » 

" Sound consists in impulses communicated to our ears $ 
by the air. If a series of impulses of equal force be com- iJj 
municated to it at equal intervals of time, at first in slow \ 
succession, and by degrees more snd more rapidly, we hear H 
at first a rattling noise, and then a hum, which by degrees j 
acquires the character of a musical note rising higher and P 
higher in acuteness, till its pitch becomes too high for the fl 
ear to follow. And, from this correspondence between the 
pitch of the note and the rapidity of succession of the im- 
pulse, we conclude that our sensation of the different pitches H 
of musical notes originates in different rapidities with which |j 
their impulses are communicated to our ears."f W 

There is another form of the method to be noticed. We $ 
may succeed in removing entirely the antecedent, but the H 
consequent, instead of disappearing with it, may only un- ft 



* I introduce this merely as an illustration of the process of elimina- 
tion under the principle laid down. The proposition is really an axiom 
— a universal and necessary affirmation, determined by the idea of 
matter itself. — Vide supra, pp. 168 & 222. 

t Herschel's Discourse, p. 153. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC* 287 

dergo some modification, — perhaps a mere change in the 
degree of its intensity. If this modification of the conse- 
qent be uniform, then we cannot but infer a real sequence ; 
but inasmuch as the consequent is modified only, and does 
not disappear with the removal of the antecedent in ques- 
tion, it must be consequent to some other antecedent or an- 
tecedents also. This, then, becomes a case of compound se- 
quence ; and the only way to arrive at the several antece- 
dents is by tentative experiments, in which we eliminate 
successively various circumstances of the phenomenon, or 
introduce new circumstances. In this way we enlarge our 
knowledge of the antecedents, or at length, by making the 
phenomenon disappear in conjunction with the eliminations, 
ascertain the entire compound antecedent. 

IV. Elimination of the terms of a Sequence, in 

ORDER TO DETERMINE WHICH IS THE ANTECEDENT, AND 

which the Consequent. — Phenomena may be invariably 
concomitant, and therefore be known to have a fixed connec- 
tion, as antecedent and consequent, but the order of the se- 
quence may not at once appear. Now, inasmuch as the 
causal influence acts through the antecedent to the produc- 
tion of the consequent, it follows that a consequent can be 
made to disappear, or be modified only by the elimination 
or modification of the antecedent. Hence, if in attempting 
to eliminate or modify one of the terms of a sequence, we 
hit upon the consequent, we shall soon find that it is the con- 
sequent, by being compelled to introduce an antecedent in 
order to accomplish our purpose : whereas, if we hit upon 
the antecedent, we shall remove or modify it without intro- 
ducing the other term, and its removal or modification, im- 



288 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

mediately acting upon the other terra, will show the order 
of sequence. 

We have an illustration of this in the Theory of Dew, by 
the late Dr. Wells, and which Sir John Herschel, in his Dis- 
course already referred to, introduces as throughout " one 
of the most beautiful specimens of inductive experimental 
enquiry lying within a moderate compass."* 

We propose dew as a phenomenon whose invariable ante- 
cedent we would ascertain. "In the first place, we must 
separate dew from rain and the moisture of fogs, and limit 
the application of the term to what is really meant, which 
is, the spontaneous appearance of moisture on substances 
exposed in the open air when no rain or visible wet is fall- 
ing. Now, here we have analogous phenomena in the 
moisture v which bedews a cold metal or stone when we 
breathe upon it ; that which appears on a glass of water 
fresh from the well in hot weather ; that which appears on 
the inside of windows when sudden rain or hail chills the 
external air ; that which runs down our walls, when, after a 
long frost, a warm, moist thaw comes on : all these instan- 
ces agree in one point, the coldness of the object dewed, in 
comparison with the air in contact with it." In the above 
we have an illustration of our first principle, there is here 
a general difference with uniform agreement in one point. 

But with respect to night dew, is this the real antecedent ? 
" Is it a fact that the object dewed is colder than the air ? 
Certainly not, one would be at first inclined to say ; for 
what is to make it so 1 But the analogies are cogent and 



* Ibid., &c, pp. 159-163. 



INDUGTIVE LOGIC 289 

unanimous ; and, therefore, we are not to discard their in- 
dications." The similarity of the consequents argue a simi- 
larity of the antecedents. In this case, to settle the ques- 
tion, we have only " to lay a thermometer in contact 
with the dewed substance, and hang one at a little distance 
above it, out of reach of its influence. The experiment has 
been therefore made ; the question has been asked, and 
the answer has been invariably in the affirmative. When- 
ever an object contracts dew, it is colder than the air. Here, 
then, we have an invariable concomitant circumstance." 
But is cold the antecedent or the consequent of dew ? The 
vulgar prejudice would make it the consequent. " We 
must, therefore, collect more facts, or, which comes to the 
>same thing, vary the circumstances ; since every instance 
in which the circumstances differ is a fresh fact ; and, espe- 
cially, we must note the contrary or negative cases, i. e. 
where no dew is produced." 

" Now, 1st, no dew is produced on the surface of polished 
metals, but it is very copiously on glass, both exposed with 
their faces upwards, and in some cases the under side of a 
plate of glass is also dewed ; which last circumstance ex- 
cludes the fall of moisture from the sky in an invisible form." 
Here, then, according to our second principle of elimina- 
tion, is a general agreement with a difference in one point, 
namely, the substance of the material. But what relation 
have the metal and glass to the invariable concomitant cir- 
cumstance of cold in the production of dew ? Have we re- 
moved the dew, and thus prevented the cold in the case of 
the metal, or have we removed the cold and prevented the 
dew 1 Unquestionably the latter ; for the metal being a 
good conductor of heat, has continually brought the heat 



290 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

from within itself, or from the earth beneath, upon its sur- 
face, while the glass, being a poor conductor, has suffered 
its surface to become cooled . " This done, a scale of intensify 
becomes obvious. Those polished substances are found to 
be most strongly dewed which conduct heat worst ; while 
those which conduct well resist dew most effectually." We 
have thus determined that cold is the antecedent of dew, 
and not dew the antecedent of cold. 

The same fact is confirmed by other striking experi- 
ments. Thus, rough surfaces, which radiate heat most free- 
ly, are most copiously dewed, the substance remaining the 
same. Again, substances of a loose texture, such as cloth, 
wool, eider-down, cotton, velvet, &c, contract dew more 
readily than substances of a close texture, such as stones, 
metals, &c, and the former are precisely those which are 
selected for clothing, since, on account of their feeble con- 
ducting power, they do not carry away the heat from the 
skin to the air. 

" Lastly : among the negative instances, it is observed 
that dew is never copiously deposited in situations much 
screened from the open air, and not at all in a cloudy night ; 
but if the clouds withdraw, even for a few minutes, and 
leave a clear opening, a deposition of dew presently begins, 
and goes on increasing." This remarkable fact shows the 
same order of sequence. -" Those surfaces which part with 
their heat outwards most readily, and have it supplied from 
within most slowly, will of course become coldest, if there 
be an opportunity for their heat to escape, and not be re- 
stored to them from without. Now, a clear sky affords 
such an opportunity. It is a law well known to those who 
are conversant with the nature of heat, that heat is con- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 29l 

stantly escaping from all bodies in rays, or by radiation, 
but is constantly restored to them by the similar radiatim 
of others surrounding them. Clouds and surrounding ob- 
jects, therefore, act as opposing causes, by replacing the 
whole or a great part of the heat so radiated away, which 
can escape effectually, without being replaced, only through 
openings into infinite space." We are thus led to the ge» 
neral fact, that any surface " cooling by radiation faster 
than its heat can be restored to it by communication with 
the ground, or by counter-radiation, so as to become colder 
than the air," condenses the moisture of the air upon itself 
in the form of dew. 

Herschel remarks, "In the analysis above given, the 
formation of dew is referred to two more general phenome» 
na : the radiation of heat, and the condensation of invisible 
vapor by cold. The cause (antecedent) of the former is a 
much higher enquiry, and may be said indeed to be totally un- 
known ; that of the latter actually forms a most important 
branch of physical enquiry. In such a case, when we rea- 
son upwards till we reach an ultimate fact, we regard a 
phenomenon as fully explained ; as we consider the branch 
of a tree to terminate when traced to its insertion in the 
trunk, or a twig to its junction with the branch ; or rather, 
as a rivulet retains its importance and its name till lost in 
some larger tributary, or in the main river which delivers it 
into the ocean." Now, the ultimate fact upon which all 
enquiry reposes can, in respect to cause, be nothing less 
than the Divine volition ; and the ultimate fact in respect 
to law can be that law only which rests immediately upon an 
Idea. We may continue, by observation and experiment, 
to enlarge our knowledge of the order and relations of phe- 



292 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

nomefta— of antecedents and consequents indefinitely, reach- 
ing from one antecedent to another ; but no mere antece- 
dent phenomenon gives a place for the repose of thought. 
The radiation of heat, and the condensation of vapor by 
cold, are antecedents to the formation of dew. Could we 
now discover their antecedents, we should only have new 
phenomena calling for other antecedents again. We thus 
accumulate general facts, but we want still the centralising, 
all-comprehending, and necessary Law. An infinite series 
of sequences there cannot be. But if the ultimate fact be 
a mere antecedent like the other antecedents, that is, uni- 
formly preceding its consequent, and having no distinguish- 
ing characteristic except that of being the last, then must 
enquiry cease here by a mere arbitrary decision of the 
Deity or of Fate. It does not cease because the mind feels 
satisfied, but because it is permitted to go no farther. But 
if the ultimate fact be not a phenomenon, but a law, affirm- 
ing, in the light of Ideas, what must be, not a thing of ob- 
servation, but an intuitive thought, then indeed must enquiry 
cease, not by a necessity of compulsion, but by a necessity 
of pure Reason itself. 

I have already remarked that the flux of phenomena is 
not to be represented as a lengthening series of particulars, 
which, as it runs back, is ever evolving some new antece- 
dent, until we reach an ultimate phenomenon ; but that, on 
the contrary, this flux goes on in cycles where the end runs 
into the beginning.* In a series of the first kind, the ulti- 
mate fact would be either an unconditionated phenomenon, 
which is contrary to the nature of phenomena ; or it would 

* Supra, p. 277. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 293 

be law as we have defined it, removed from the sphere of 
phenomenal development ,* whereas the rational conception 
of law demands that it be everywhere present, permeating 
the whole development. But, in a series of the second kind, 
all the phenomena are both conditionated and conditionat- 
ing, and the law, as from a centre, radiates into the whole 
cycle, filling out and governing the whole. 

It ought to be remarked here, also, that theory applies to 
general facts as well as to law. In the latter application, 
the conception has already been given.* In the former ap- 
plication, we mean by it the hypothesis of an antecedent 
general fact for the purpose of conditionating a known fact, 
and thus enabling us to give a more full and rational ex- 
plication of the whole series under consideration. As in- 
stances, we may cite the undulating theory of Light ; and 
Dalton's theory of Ultimate Atoms. In both instances, we 
have antecedents hypothesised and connected with actual 
phenomena. We hypothesise, in order to supply undisco- 
vered parts of a cycle of phenomena, the parts which are 
known suggesting those which are unknown : or the un- 
knc wn facts may be hypothesised on the basis of a theory 
cr a law, which, already comprehending the known facts, 
demands certain other facts to complete the cycle. 

In making observations, we may hit upon any part of a 
cycle of facts, and thence be led through the relations of 
antecedents and consequents to other parts. Herschel re- 
marks, in respect to the induction in the case of dew, " Had 
we no previous knowledge of the radiation of heat, this 
same induction would have made it known to us, and, duly 

* Supra, p. 185. 



294 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

considered, might have led to a knowledge of many of its 
laws." That is, any part may serve as a good starting 
point. " In the study of nature," he adds, " we must not, 
therefore, be scrupulous as to how we reach to a knowledge 
of such general facts : provided, only, we verify them care- 
fully when once detected, we must be content to seize them 
wherever they are to be found."* Now, it is because the 
development of phenomena moves in a cycle that we may 
begin at any point indifferently, since, beginning wherever 
we please or happen to, we cannot lose the connected par- 
ticulars. If we go back from consequent to antecedent, 
the last antecedent becomes the consequent of the first 
consequent, which, relatively to it, becomes an antecedent ; 
and if we go from antecedent to consequent, the last con- 
sequent becomes an antecedent to the first antecedent, 
which, relatively to it, becomes a consequent. 

Were the cycles of phenomena completed, then observa- 
tion and experiment would have done their work in respect 
to establishing general facts ; then the uniform antecedents 
and consequents would all be known. 

I shall close this section by summing up the cardinal 
points. 

I. The governing ideas are Cause and Law. 

II. The leading axioms are those of Universal Law, and 
of the Uniformity of Nature. 

III. The last named axiom may be conveniently expand- 
ed into two particular axiomsf : 

1. Like antecedents involve like consequents. 

2. Like consequents imply like antecedents. 

* Supra., p. 164. t p. 219. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 295 

IV. General facts may be determined to an indefinite 
extent before the law is arrived at, but whenever a law is 
arrived at, or a theory adopted, the cycle of facts may be 
enlarged or completed by their necessary demands. 

V. Hypothesis relates either to fact or to law. Hypo- 
thesised laws are theories. 

VI. In the observation of phenomena we must be both 
general and minute ; noting all the phenomena, and all 
their characteristics. 

VII. Uniform antecedence and sequence of phenomena, 
the semblance and exponent of law, is determined by a 
method of elimination which excludes whatever is foreign 
to the particular relation to be determined. 

VIII. The formula of Induction* comprehends every 
mode of elimination, since it determines the general ex- 
pression of the uniform sequences. 

IX. When general facts are attained, they may be ve- 
rified by returning to the particular instances from which 
they were derived, or by multiplying instances. There are 
often accidental and unlooked-for verifications, which are of 
great weight, because they seem like a spontaneous testimo- 
ny of nature. 



202. 



296 INDUCTIVE LOGIC 



SECTION VIIK 

INDUCTIVE LOGIC OF UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY LAWS,' 

Laws are determined in two ways, either directly in the 
form of axioms ;* or indirectly, through an induction of 
facts. The ultimate determining power in both cases lies 
in Ideas of pure Reason. 

We have seen that even Ideas and Axioms demand phe- 
nomenal conditions for their development ; but this is wide- 
ly different from that induction of facts which at the first 
leads us to uniform antecedents and consequents, and in the 
end to universal and necessary laws. 

The axiomatic forms of law appear in the most original 
laws, such as the laws of Logic itself, and The Moral ; but 
the great laws of Nature, those which comprehend the inte- 
rior constitution of substances, and the constitution of 
systems of bodies, are laws arrived at by Induction. 

The Idea of Law, that sublime Idea so quickening to 
thought, leads on all observation and experiment, whether 
the result be merely general facts of uniform sequences, or 
universal and necessary laws. Uniform sequences are 
the exponents of law ; hence, in seeking for them, we 
are really seeking ultimately for law. In the progress 
of our research we pass from one generalization to another 
more extensive and comprehensive, until at length we seem 
to reach an ultimate generalization, and this we call the 

* Supra, p. 232. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 297 

great and ultimate law. But it is not the great and ulti- 
mate law simply because it is at present the ultimate point 
of investigation ; it may be only the most general fact, or 
an antecedent the most remote, which we have as yet 
reached. To make it law, something is required in its own 
intrinsic nature, as exhibited to the eye of Reason. Law, 
taken on its highest ground, lies in the pure Idea ; taken 
under its highest manifestation, it is the determinate pur- 
pose or design of the Creative Mind. And in its sphere ; 
in relation to its appropriate phenomena, it is universal and 
necessary. Thus the great moral law in its sphere, that is, 
responsible being ; in relation to its appropriate phenomena, 
that is, the conduct of responsible being, is universal and 
necessary : it is the law without exception and in every in- 
stance ; and it is the necessary law, no other being admis- 
sible. It lies originally in the Idea of Right and Wrong ; 
it appears as the wise design in the Creative Mind which 
bodied forth this noblest form of being ; and it gives birth 
to every rule of moral action. 

So also in Somatology, law taken on its highest ground 
lies in the pure Idea ; taken under its highest manifestation, 
it is the determinate purpose or design of the Creative Mind. 
In its sphere — e. g. the interior constitution of bodies or 
their arrangement into system, in relation to its appropri- 
ate phenomena — e. g. the changes of bodies in composition 
and decomposition, or their motions in masses through 
space, it is universal ; and, considered as the wisest and the 
best,* it is necessary. Now, that upon which the Reason 
fastens when it becomes satisfied that a law is attained, is the 



• Part L, Sect, VII. Also, Part III., pp. 185, 186. 



298 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

correspondence between the outward generalization and its 
own Idea, and the presence in the generalization of the 
characteristics of universality and necessity. Thus, Gra- 
vitation is an ultimate generalization ; but it is more, for the 
Reason perceives its correspondency with its own Idea of 
Centralization,* and therefore judges not only that it is the 
ultimate generalization actually attained, but also that 
there is no other beyond it that can be attained, and affirms 
that it is the law, and the necessary law, of all systems of 
bodies. 

The logical process by which we arrive at universal laws 
is akin to that by which we arrive at general facts. Indeed 
the establishment of general facts is a part of the process. 
The principles, therefore, laid down in the preceding Sec- 
tion, are applicable here also. 

It is impossible to prescribe the number of general facts 
which are demanded as conditions of the determination of a 
universal law. Sometimes the law is preconceived at a 
very early stage of the investigation ; such was the fact in 
the case of Newton in respect to gravitation. Although 
believed to be a law, it can, under these circumstances, be 
received only as a hypothesis, until verified in numerous 
and decisive applications. But the secret conviction, the 
earnest hope, and the indomitable purpose of investigation, 
inspired by the conception from the beginning, proves it t 
lie deeper in the soul than a fortunate guess or an enticing 
fancy. 

The verification of a law hypothesised is strikingly illus- 
trated in Physical Astronomy. "The law, for example? 

* p. 188. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 29U 

which asserts that the planets are retained in their orbits 
about the sun, and satellites about their primaries, by an at- 
tractive force, decreasing as the square of the distances in- 
creases, comes to be verified in each particular case by de* 
ducing from it the exact motions which, under the circum- 
stances, ought to take place, and comparing them with the 
fact. This comparison, while it verities in general the ex* 
istence of the law of gravitation as supposed, and its ade- 
quacy to explain all the principal motions of every body in 
the system, yet leaves some small deviations in those of the 
planets, and some very considerable ones in that of the 
moon and other satellites, still unaccounted for ; residual 
phenomena, which still remain to be traced up to causes. 
By further examining these, their causes have at length 
been ascertained, and found to consist in the mutual actions 
of the planets on each other, and the disturbing influence of 
the sun on the motions of the satellites."* And thus these 
residual phenomena turn out an additional verification of 
the law of gravitation. 

In other instances the law dawns slowly, and is preceded 
by many vague and inadequate hypotheses which have to 
be overcome before the true light can shine clearly. And 
when it begins to shine, hypotheses appear, which indeed 
are more or less ingenious and satisfactory, but still indeci- 
sive. And thus there appears a gradual convergence from 
many points to the all-comprehending law. But when the 
law is attained, whatever be the process by which we 
attain it, it is known to be the law by its sufficiency in 
respect to the phenomena to be explained, by its univer- 

* Herschel's Discourse, p. 166. 



300 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

sality and necessity, and its echo to the Idea of the Reason 
within. 

There is also to be remarked a difference in the mental 
constitution, by which a superior degree of the intuitive 
function seems to be awarded to some individuals. These 
are the chosen interpreters of nature. By a sudden and 
wonderful leap they are seen to pass from a limited induc- 
tion to a stupendous conclusion. With a prophetic power 
they seem to foretel the law, which, before ordinary minds, 
lies only as the result of an immense and laborious obser- 
vation. The mere experimenter and observer collects facts, 
but does not gain laws. On the other hand, a mind of high 
intuitive energy cannot make itself independent of experi- 
ment and observation ; for those high prophecies require 
the verification of facts. It is the union of the two which 
makes the finished philosopher of nature, for it is the union 
of the two which constitutes the true Inductive Logic. 
And indeed, where these high gifts are found, we may gene- 
rally expect a corresponding skill and diligence in collating 
facts ; for the mind that can penetrate the laws of nature 
under her simplest manifestations, will be prone to seek the 
fullest confirmations of these laws from observation and ex- 
periment. 

In the discovery of laws there is so much that appears 
like inspiration, and indeed so much that is really inspira- 
tion, if Reason be the inspiration of the Almighty in man, 
that to lay down exact logical rules and formulas designed 
to govern and represent the process of discovery, would ap- 
pear puerile in the attempt, and prove impracticable if 
attempted. 

The great principle, however,, can be clearly expressed. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 301 

It is that which has already been alluded to, namely, the 
union of Ideas and Observation. It is the force and light 
of the cardinal Ideas of Cause and Law which at first im- 
pel and guide us in investigation. Ideas of Time and Space 
open to us the possibility of succession and arrangement. 
But, beyond this, the laws which govern the world, inas- 
much as they had their origin in the Divine Mind, cannot 
be strange to us. While, therefore, the perceptive and in- 
ductive functions are busy in collecting facts, the mind is 
intensely meditative, and intuition is awake. Now it is 
that the Ideas which are to spring forth into law are quick- 
ened and called upon. The orderly and uniform sequences 
of phenomena are noted ; — these we have called the expo- 
nents of law. Generalization follows generalization. Hy- 
potheses are framed. Observation is enlarged, and rendered 
more exact by experiment. The Reason conceives more 
and more clearly. All that lies before it in the phenome- 
nal world, having proceeded from the Divine Ideas, is ready 
to meet corresponding Ideas in the human mind. At 
length the required Idea is developed, and it projects itself 
into the external world as the law of the phenomena. 

It will be perceived that we have limited the term law to 
the universal and necessary. In common usage the term is 
applied to uniform sequences in general. The former is the 
strictly philosophical use. While we are looking at particu- 
lar sequences separately from the universal law, or in igno- 
rance of it, it may perhaps be convenient to call them laws 
of nature ; but when viewed in connexion with the law, 
they are seen to be only forms of its manifestation or expo- 
nential facts. For example, it might be called a law of 
wood, and of vegetable matter generally, to float in water, — 



302 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

and of metals and minerals, to sink ; a law of vapour to rise* 
in the atmosphere ; a law of water, to flow down descents of 
any degree, — and of bodies generally, to roll down declivities 
when moved off their balance ; a law of the tides, to rise and 
fall ; a law of the pendulum, to preserve a determinate 
vibration ; and so on. But when the law of universal gra- 
vitation is understood, then these particular laws, so-called, 
are perceived to be mere uniform sequences determined by 
the universal law. 

And here we may understand the difference in the intelli- 
gent apprehension, between uniform sequences and univer- 
sal laws. All these particular laws, taken in themselves as 
uniform sequences, are mere arbitrary facts. We come to 
know them familiarly ; and, indeed, we seem to understand 
them, because we are accustomed to their appearance ; but 
still, all we can say of them is, that such is the order of na- 
ture. But when we can refer them all to one universal 
law, we gain a deeper and more satisfactory insight. Now 
we perceive a unity and simplicity in nature which awakens 
admiration, like that which we experience when we view a 
grand and perfect mechanism. But still more, we now per- 
ceive the great comprehending law to be a universal and ne- 
cessary law — the law of the universe springing from an Idea. 
Nothing is so intelligible as Ideas, for they are the elements 
of the Reason itself, " the light of all our seeing." In the 
Idea of centralization we perceive how the universe must be 
constituted, and in the law of gravitation we find the reali- 
zation of the Idea. Equally satisfactory is the law of cen- 
trifugal force, as the realization of the Idea of Diffusion.* 

* p. 188. 



INDUCTIVE IOGIC. 303 

The human intellect has oftentimes expended its force in 
hypothesising new and more remote antecedents, instead of 
directing itself through an induction of unquestionable facts 
to the discovery of a law. Des Cartes hypothesised vortices 
as antecedents to the primary phenomena of the planets in 
their revolution about the sun, and of the satellites about 
the planets. And Bernoulli attempted, in accordance with 
this hypothesis, to explain the elliptical form of the orbits by 
the shape of the planets, acting like the rudder of a boat in 
the stream of the vortices. But how Were the vortices them- 
selves to be explained ? A mere multiplication of the ante- 
cedents only threw the difficulty farther back without over- 
coming it. Nay, more ; it introduced new difficulties, in 
the necessity of sustaining the hypothesis. 

Chemistry, the science of material elements and their 
mutual relations in the composition and decomposition of 
bodies, was, until a late period, a mere collection of uniform 
sequences. As such, it was of immense practical impor- 
tance. And as the facts of chemistry had to be elicited by 
nice, ingenious, and difficult, and often dangerous experi- 
ments, the discovery of a new fact often formed an epoch 
in the science, and conferred a just and lasting fame on the 
discoverer. But still the facts stood out to view simply as 
facts, unexplained by any central and comprehensive law. 
They indeed revealed a beautiful and benign constitution 
of nature — they connected themselves with the idea of pa- 
ternal wisdom and goodness ; but this was accounting for 
them only under a moral aspect. The same wise and be- 
nign ends might perhaps have been reached equally well by 
a different constitution. What was required, was the intel- 
lectual purpose growing necessarily out of an Idea, and 



304 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

projecting itself in the outer world as the all-pervading law 
in the interior constitution of bodies. 

I have already had occasion to refer to the stupendous 
results to which the genius of Faraday has conducted us. 
In these results, chemistry attains to simplicity and unity. 
All chemical changes are now made to appear under one 
great law, by whatever name we call it, whether of Polarity 
or of Electrical Induction. Behind the law there lies an 
Idea.* Neither the Idea nor the law have as yet reached a 
full development, but to this point we are evidently tending. 
The Idea must be an Idea of the pure Reason, related to 
the elemental constitution and changes of bodies analogous- 
ly to the Idea of centralization and diffusion in its relation 
to the masses of constituted bodies ; and the corresponding 
law must comprehend and govern in its sphere, analogously 
to the law of gravitation in its sphere. In Faraday we 
perceive, in an extraordinary degree, the union of the most 
exact, elaborate, and extensive experimentation with Ideal 
conceptions. It is a union of the world of the Senses with 
the world of the Reason ; like the union of those opposite 
polar forces by which he solves the mysteries of his favorite 
science, and brings to light the order and harmony of Na- 
ture in her elements. 

The application of the mathematics to the expression of 
physical laws arises from the fact that the subjects of these 
laws are real quantities, such as magnitude, motion, time, 
and distance. For example, gravitation implies motion, 
and motion is related to space ; the intelligible expression 

* p. 191. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 305 

of the law, therefore, requires its expression in the relation 
of space. 

Ere we close this part of our investigation, we must re- 
turn for a moment to the cyclical order of phenomena, and 
the central position of law. Receiving this, at least, as a 
convenient, if not a purely rational conception, it must be evi- 
dent that the law, as law, cannot be absent from any point 
of the phenomenal movement ; but is like an indefinite num- 
ber of raSii drawn from the centre to the circumference, 
which are many, and yet, in their perfect identity, one ; so 
that we may regard the circumference as formed either by 
the extremities of an indefinite number of equal radii pro- 
jected from a common centre, or by the extremity of one of 
the radii revolving about the centre. Now, suppose our 
observation were fixed upon only one point of the circum- 
ference, we might account for its existence by conceiving 
of it as merely the extremity of a straight line : or, suppose 
we were to observe several points in curvilinear juxtaposi- 
tion, then we might account for them by conceiving of an 
angle of which the whole arc formed the measure. But as 
our observation became more extended, we might be led to 
the conception of a circle, and then every point would be 
explained in reference to it alone, and the particular straight 
line and the particular angle would pass out of thought in 
the wider generalization. Now, our first conclusions were 
true, but they did not contain the whole truth ; and when 
the whole truth is ascertained, we no longer require our 
first conclusions. In like manner, in a cycle of phenome- 
na, our observation is fixed at first upon a certain antece- 
dent and consequent, and we name the particular end of 



306 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

the uniformity, a law. Here indeed is no error, for the 
law from the centre radiates into this particular uniformity, 
and is the true source of it. But, inasmuch as the particu- 
lar sequence in question is only one of a wide circle of 
sequences, we require the law of the whole ere we have 
the sufficient law of the part. This law of the whole per- 
meating every part explains every part ; and like the cen- 
tre and radii of a circle, is a conception of pure Reason 
based upon an Idea. * 

The Reason in its Ideas enjoys a perfect and quiet cog- 
nition ; and when phenomena are explained by laws, which 
again are explained by Ideas, then we have reached the 
clearest light, and the highest satisfaction of knowledge.* 

The leading axioms and definitions of the Inductive 
Logic of Universal and Necessary Laws, so far as implied 
in the foregoing, may be summarily stated as follows : 

I. Every particular phenomenon is both an antecedent 
and a consequent, taken in different relations; and, as a 
part of a harmonious whole, is comprehended by a law. 

II. Every law is the projection of an Idea. 

III. Observation and experiment supply the orderly se- 
quences of phenomena, and thus conditionate the develop- 
ment of law ; but the law itself, with its characteristics of 
universality and necessity, is a conception of the Reason. 

IV. A rational hypothesis is an effort to find a law by 
tentative acts ; — it is feeling after a law by rational fore- 
thought, if haply we may find it. 

V. Observation and experiment, without a rational hypo- 
thesis, is like a man groping at objects at random with his 

* Part I., Sec. X. " 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 307 

eyes shut. But even rational hypothesis, unaccompanied 
by the former, is only felicitous dreaming. 

VI. Inasmuch as the world of the senses was created by 
the Divine Reason from its own Ideas ; and inasmuch as 
the mind of man is made after the likeness of the Divine 
Mind, therefore can it truly be said to know the world of 
the senses only so far as, like the Divine Mind, it finds its 
Ideas there projected. 

VII. Hence the Science of Nature can be determined 
only by a union of Sensuous Phenomena with Ideal Concep- 
tions. 

VIII. The criteria of a law are, its sufficiency in respect 
to the phenomena, its characteristics, viz., universality and 
necessity, and its correspondence to an Idea. 

IX. Law implies Cause. Cause is present wherever law 
is manifested. Law expresses the rational plan, the wise 
and fit developments of Cause. 



308 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION IX. 

THE LOGIC OF ART. 

Art depends upon the Inventive Function.* There is a 
Logic of Science ; is there also a Logic of Art 1 

Art exists before Science. Sometimes it is the effect of 
accident. Generally, in its earlier stages, it is the effect of 
human wants inspiring an unreflecting ingenuity to empi- 
rical efforts. Art, in its highest state, is an effect of ripened 
science. 

Pure accident and empiricism reach art by mere felici- 
ties. But even where there is no science, there is often ex- 
hibited an ingenuity and skill which impress us as a mani- 
festation of high and extraordinary powers. Men of this 
mould seem to invent by a sort of inspiration. They seem 
prepared for every difficulty, and arrive at results the most 
curious with wonderful ease and tact. These instances are 
found both in the mechanical and the fine arts. There 
must be here an exceedingly vigorous spontaneous develop- 
ment of Ideas, together with a nice and quick observation, 
and a vivid imagination. 

There is, therefore, a true Inductive Logic, leading virtu- 
ally to important conclusions, although they be not stated 
in the form of distinct propositions. These conclusions 
really direct the hand of the mechanician and the artist. 
They are not reflected upon as universal principles, and 



121. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 309 

therefore are not elaborated into a scientific system ; they 
appear to the individual as something belonging to him, 
something that answers his special purpose, and with this he 
remains content. In his use. they soon become reduced to 
mere rules of art. This natural and spontaneous Logic 
plays an important part in the development of humanity ; 
and that which we call Genius, and which so proudly over- 
comes all obstacles, presenting us the unscientific but skil- 
ful mechanician and artist ; or leading onward the untutored, 
as in the case of Ferguson and Corregio, and a multitude of 
others, to the loftiest eminence of science or art, is chiefly a 
natural logical power, lying in the proper union of Ideas and 
external observations — a union of the Ideal and the Sensu- 
ous. Unite with this the highest form of the imagination, 
and you have the most splendid form of genius : for it is 
the imagination which from Ideas creates those ideal repre- 
sentations which constitute archetypes of all that man ac- 
complishes of the great, the beautiful, and the sublime. 

Where all the lights of science are enjoyed, invention 
exhibits a chain of the nicest reasoning, both inductive and 
deductive. The latter form of reasoning appears indeed in 
the cases above mentioned ; but more remarkably here, in- 
asmuch as the invention sets out with principles already 
ascertained. In its progress it may have to make many 
inductions, and to exert that high prophetic power which 
gives birth to rational hypotheses. Indeed, the imagination 
is here also tasked in ideal representations of mechanism. 
The steam engine, from its conception to its present state, 
exhibits a constant series of scientific inventions springing 
from a rigid logic. 

One of the most beautiful instances of scientific invention 



310 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

is Davy's safety-lamp. Here conclusions were drawn from 
established scientific principles; new inductions were made; 
a hypothesis formed ; an ideal of the invention represented 
in the imagination, from whence an external model or dia- 
gram could be produced ; and thus every thing was made 
ready for that simple effort of mechanical skill which com- 
pleted the great achievement, — great as a work of the intel- 
lect, and no less great as a merciful visitation to poor and 
laboring men. 



BOOK III. 

DEDUCTIVE LOGIC, 



SECTION L 



INTRODUCTION. 



We have hitherto been engaged with the Logic of First 
Truths, General Facts, and Universal Principles and Laws. 
We are now to consider the Logic of drawing inferences 
from a comprehending or containing Whole, to particulars 
concluded under it. In Inductive Logic, particulars were 
shown to be involved into universals : In Deductive Logic, 
we must show that universals may be evolved into particu- 
lars.* 

Deductive Logic implies, 1. That some first truths, ge- 
neral facts, and universal principles have been established : 
it implies, therefore, a considerable advance of human know- 
ledge. 2. It implies that a cultivated language exists, one 
adequate to express truths, principles, and facts, in clear 
and precise propositions. 

It is, therefore, with propositions that we begin in Deduc- 

* pp. 301-904, 



312 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

tive Reasoning. These propositions may themselves be 
conclusions drawn from antecedent propositions, or they 
may be primary and underived. They may be analytical 
or synthetical ; and synthetical a priori, or a posteriori.* 
But the manner in which they may have been obtained is 
not taken into account in the particular deduction with 
which we may be engaged. Neither do we take into ac- 
count the subject matter of the propositions ; this is re- 
ferred to particular scien ies. If the subject matter be pure 
quantity, it is referred to the mathematics ; if it be com- 
posed of natural phenomena, it is referred to physiology, na- 
tural philosophy, or chemistry, and so on. In considering 
any branch of science, or any subject whatever, we may 
have occasion to make many deductions — these may be a 
means to one end : but in each particular deduction we have 
only to pay regard to the proper relation between those pro- 
positions which form our premises, and the conclusion we 
deduce. This part of Logic, therefore, aims to express a 
universal form of deduction, — one that shall apply to every 
subject indifferently. 



* Vide Part I., Sec. X. 



REDUCTIVE LOGIC. 313 



SECTION II. 



ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS. 



A judgment is an affirmation of the mind. When ex- 
pressed in language, it becomes a proposition, because it is 
then propounded to general attention. Every proposition 
consists of a subject and a predicate. The subject is that of 
which the affirmation is made $ the predicate is that which 
is affirmed of the subject. 

The affirmation is either positive or negative ; that is, an 
affirmation of agreement or of disagreement. * 

The subject and predicate are collectively called terms. 
Each term expresses an object of thought complete in itself. 

That which connects the terms together in a proposition, 
is called the Copula. This copula must always be is, in 
positive propositions ; and is not, in negative. The reason is 
obvious, viz., that the verb to be enters necessarily into the 
simple and direct form of affirmation. In the ordinary 
forms of language, propositions do not, indeed, generally 
employ the substantive verb ; but they are always capable 
of being reduced to this form, by using a participle or an ad- 
jective, in connection with the verb : e. g. " Caesar con- 
quered," may be reduced to the form, " Caesar was victo- 
rious," in which the copula appears. A term may consist 
of one or of several words. No single word is capable of 
being a term in itself, except a nominative noun, because 

* Supra, p. 53, 



314 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

no other word, in itself, expresses a complete object of 
thought. The infinitive mood of the verb is not an excep- 
tion, for this is really a noun : e. g. " To be loved is to be 
happy :" i. e. 

Sub. Pred. 



" The state of being loved is a state of happiness." 
When the adjective appears as a predicate, the noun, of 
course, is understood in connection with it. Where a 
term consists of one word, it is called a simple term ; 
where it consists of several, a complex term. 

Sometimes no little circumlocution is necessary, in order 
to reduce a proposition, consisting of complex terms, to its 
exact form : e. g. " If he starts to-day, he will probably 
arrive the day after to-morrow :" i. e. 

Sub. 



" The event of his starting to-day, 
Pred. 



an event which makes it probable he will arrive the day after to-morrow." 
Again: "I am sure he said so:" i. e. 

Sub. Pred. 



" The thing referred to by ' so,' is what I am sure he said." 

Simple terms are singular or common. A singular term 
stands for an individual, and can be predicated only of itself* 
A common term stands for many, and, of course, can be 
predicated of many. 

Propositions are categorical or hypothetical. The former 
is an unconditional affirmation ; the latter a conditional. 

Propositions are distinguished again by Quality and 
Quantify. 



Deductive logic. 31§ 

The Quality of a proposition refers to its positive or ne- 
gative character : e, g. "A horse is a quadruped," is posi- 
tive ; " A covetous man is not contented," is negative. 
We must be careful to distinguish between a strictly nega- 
tive proposition, L e. one which connects the negative par- 
ticle with the copula, and one which contains a descriptive 
negative particle in one of its terms: e. g. " He was con- 
versing with a man net like the one you describe," is 
positive ; u He was not conversing with a man like the 
one you describe," is negative. Sometimes it is conve- 
nient to transfer the negative particle from the copula to 
one of the terms, and thus to exchange the negative form 
for the positive : e. g. " Man is not perfect" is equivalent 
to " Man is imperfect." 

The logical use of the negative particles must be distin- 
guished from those uses which obtain in the familiar idioms 
of conversation. In the latter, they sometimes not only 
deny, but affirm the contrary : e. g. the remark sometimes 
playfully made, " He is no fool," is intended not merely to 
deny one kind of quality, but to attribute no common share 
of the opposite kind ; whereas, in the logical use, the nega- 
tive particles simply deny, and never imply, an affirmation of 
the contrary. 

The Quantity of a proposition expresses the extent of the 
affirmation or negation. When the predicate is affirmed or 
denied of the whole of the subject, the proposition is uni- 
versal', when it is affirmed or denied only of a part of 
the subject, the proposition is particular : e. g. "All men 
are mortal," " No miser is happy," are universal ; " Some 
men are prudent," " Some animals' are not sagacious," are 
particular. 



31 # DEUUCTIVE ICfGfC* 

Propositions, as positive, and negative, and universal, and 
particular, are distributed into four kinds* These are 
generally, for the sake of brevity, represented by the sym- 
bols A, E, I, and O. And since Deductive Logic con* 
sideTS the form of propositions, and not the matter, we may 
conveniently represent the subject and predicate by symbols. 
The whole, then, may be represented as follows : 
A, Universal affirmative. Every X is Y ; 
E, Universal negative. No X is Y ; 
I, Particular affirmative. Some X is Y ; 
O, Particular negative. Some X is not Y. 

In conversational idiom, when we affirm a part, we intend 
to deny the remainder. Thus, when we say, " Some of the 
company have arrived," we intend to signify that a part 
have not arrived. But, in logical language, on the contrary, 
we intend to signify no more than we express. Thus, 
when we say some X is Y, we do .not mean to imply that 
some X is not Y ; this may or may not be, and no doubtful 
form of predication is admissible. 

Indefinite propositions, e. g. " Birds have wings," " Food 
is necessary for life," " Fish live in the water," are those 
whose quality is left unexpressed. These do not belong to 
the province of Logic, for here no proposition can be inde- 
finite, but to that of Rhetoric. The truth is, that indefinite 
propositions never appear in correct writing— unless the in- 
tention be to mislead—except where, from the connection, 
or from the well-known nature of the matter, every reader 
at once is able to supply the true quantity. Thus, when it 
is said '* Food is necessary to life," the writer is sure he 
will not be misunderstood ; otherwise, he ought to supply 
the quantitive particle. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 317 

Where the subject of a proposition is a singular term, 
the proposition is reckoned among universals, because the 
whole subject is spoken of : e. g. " Socrates was an Athe- 
nian philosopher," means the whole of Socrates. 

Propositions may be universal, without having both their 
terms taken universally : e. g. when it is said, " All horses 
are quadrupeds," the term " horses" is taken universally, 
but not the term " quadrupeds ;" for it is not true that all 
quadrupeds are horses : but in the proposition, " No mer- 
ciful man will abuse dumb animals," both terms are taken 
universally ; for, in excluding merciful men from that class 
who abuse dumb animals, we do also exclude the latter from 
the former. In the other example, although all horses are 
affirmed to be contained in the class "quadrupeds," this 
does not imply that all quadrupeds are contained in the 
class " horses." In particular affirmative propositions, it 
is evident that neither term is taken universally : e. g. 
u Some undeserving men are prosperous." 

In particular negatives, the subject plainly is not taken 
universally ; but the whole of the predicate being excluded 
from the subject, must be regarded as taken universally : 
e. g. " Some good men are not prosperous." Here the sub- 
ject enters only partially ; but the predicate composed of 
the class " prosperous," is entirely excluded from the sub- 
ject " Some good men." When any term is taken univer- 
sally, it is technically said to be distributed. Employing 
the symbols already introduced, the whole can be presented 
at one view. 

A, X is Y. Subject distributed. 

E, X is Y. Subject and predicate distributed. 

I, X is Y. Neither term is distributed. 

O, X is Y. Predicate distributed. 



SI 8 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION III. 

OF PROPOSITIONS AS OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER. 

Propositions are opposed to each other when the subject 
and predicate remain the same ; and they differ in quantity 
or quality, or in both. 

I. Opposition in quantity. A is opposed to I ; and E to 
O. The nature of this opposition is such, that A being 
affirmed, I must be affirmed likewise ; and the same in re- 
spect to E and O : and the denial of I and O respectively 
involves the denial of A and E ; but the denial of A and 
E does not involve the denial of I and O. 

This results from the axiom, That the affirmation of the 
universal is the affirmation of the particular : and the nega- 
tion of the particular destroys the universal ; but the nega- 
tion of the universal does not destroy the particular. 

II. Opposition in quality. A is opposed to E ; and I to 
O. The nature of this opposition is such that A being 
affirmed, E must be denied ; but I being affirmed, O is not 
to be denied ; and vice versa. The denial of A or E does 
not involve the affirmation of the other ; but the denial of 
I or O does involve the affirmation of the other. 

This results from the following axioms: 1. A universal 
positive and a universal negative being contraries through- 
out their whole extent, cannot both be true. 2. A particu- 
lar positive and a particular negative being contraries with- 
in limitation, may lie upon different parts of the samo 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 319 

field, and therefore both be true. 3. The denial of a uni- 
versal of one quality does not legitimate the affirmation of 
a universal of the opposite quality, since both universals 
may be false, and the truth lie only in the particulars : but 
both the particulars cannot be false, for then both the uni- 
versals would be true. 

III. Opposition in both quantity and quality. A is opposed 
to O ; and E to I. The nature of this opposition is such 
that A being affirmed, O must be denied ; and E being 
affirmed, I must be denied ; and vice versa. And again : 
A being denied, O must be affirmed ; and E being denied, 
I must be affirmed ; and vice versa. 

This results from the axioms : 

1. Opposition in quantity and quality, inasmuch as it ex- 
cludes all agreement, amounts to positive contradiction, so 
that the affirmation of one form of the proposition cannot 
be less than the destruction of the other form. 

2. The opposition of a universal positive to a particular 
negative, or of a universal negative to a particular positive, 
constitutes a perfect alternative, — the denial of the one be- 
ing the affirmation of the other. 

The most general form of this axiom is as follows : To 
deny a positive, is equivalent to affirming a negative ; and to 
deny a negative, is equivalent to affirming a positive. In this 
form, quantity is not taken into the account ; but the in- 
troduction of the idea of quantity modifies the expression 
of the axiom ; since to deny a universal positive, is not to 
affirm a universal negative, inasmuch as this may also be 
false, i. e. the universality may be false ; but it is to affirm 
a negative, i. e. the negative must be true in some form ' 
and therefore, as it is not necessarily true in the universal 



32G 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



form, it remains that it must be true in the particular form : 

and so also of denying a universal negative in relation to 

a particular positive. 
The following table presents the whole at one view : 

Affirming is equivalent to denying and affirming* 
A = E, O, = I, 

E = A, I, = O, 

I =» E, 

= A. 

Denying is equivalent to affirming and denying* 
A = O, 

E = I, 

1 = E, O, = A, 
O & A, I, = E, 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 321 



SECTION IV. 

OF THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 

A proposition is converted by the transposition of its 
terms : i. e. the subject becomes the predicate, and the pre- 
dicate the subject. 

The proposition as given, is called the exposita ; when 
converted, it is called the converse. 

The law which governs the conversion of propositions is 
as follows : No converse may assert more generally than the 
exposita. This law results from the axiom, that, A conse- 
quence cannot transcend its premises. Hence, what is af- 
firmed in the exposita of a part only, cannot, in the con- 
verse, be affirmed of the whole. The application of this law 
is very evident. 

1. Universal affirmative. A, X is Y, does not distribute 
the predicate, but only the subject : all the X's are in the 
Y's, but the Y's may contain more than X's ; and, there- 
fore, from the affirmative, every X is Y, we can only affirm 
some Y is X ; i. e. as much of the Y as answers to the X. 

2. Universal Negative. E, X is Y distributes the predi- 
cate as well as the subject. If there is No X in Y ; then, 
consequently, there is No Y in X. 

3. Particular affirmative. I, X is Y distributes neither 
one nor the other : If only Some X is Y, then only Some 
YisX. 

4. Particular negative. O, X is Y distributes only the 
predicate : only some X's are not contained in the Y, but 

Y* 



322 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

all the Y's are excluded from the some X's in question. 
Hence, a simple conversion cannot take place ; for this 
would distribute the X, and, of course, make it to assert 
more generally than the exposita : From some X is not 
Y, we cannot infer some Y is not X, for then, by the con- 
verse, all the X's are excluded from the some Y's in ques- 
tion. It is true, indeed, that some Y is not X may, in 
some instances, be consistent with the exposita some X is 
not Y, but it is consistent, not as the converse of this form, 
but as a deduction from another form of the proposition : 
e. g. " Some soldiers are not brave men," is consistent with 
the exposita, " Some brave men are not soldiers ;" but the 
first is not true, as the converse of the last, which plainly it 
is not ; but as the contradictory of the universal affirma- 
tive, " All soldiers are brave men," this contradictory, from 
our knowledge of the matter, being first denied. 

In like manner, the several forms A, Y is X ; E, Y is X ; 
I, Y is X, may be consistent with O, X is Y, in particular in- 
stances, where the matter is such as to admit of it. But 
legitimate conversion takes place independently of the mat- 
ter. According to a strict exposition of the form, there- 
fore, a particular negative exposita has no converse. A 
negative proposition, however, may be changed into a posi- 
tive, by connecting the particle of negation with one of its 
terms : e. g. 

Sub. Pred. 



" Some brave men are not soldiers," 
may be converted as a particular positive, thus, 

Sub. Pred. 



" Some not soldiers are brave men." 
Here the exposita and converse are identical, and may be 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 323 



represented under the bare form thus, some X is not Y ; 
converse, some not Y is X. Where the particle of nega- 
tion is a component of the term which it affects, the con- 
version, by a particular positive, is peculiarly graceful : e. g. 
" Some good men are not fortunate" ; converse, " Some 
unfortunate men are good men." 

To deny a negative being equivalent to affirming a positive, 
we may convert a positive, under a form of negation or 
contraposition : e. g. " Every poet is a man of genius." 
This is equivalent to " No poet is not a man of genius ;" 
which may be converted by " He who is not a man of ge- 
nius is not a poet."* 

The following table contains the different kinds of con- 
version under the bare form : 

Exposita. Converse. 

A, XisY = I, YisX, 

E, X is Y = E, Y is X, 

I, XisY - I, YisX,] 

O, X is Y = I, n^tY is X. 

By contraposition. 
A, X is Y = E, iiolY is X. 

Some universal positive propositions, such as definitions, 
for example, have convertible terms, i. e. exactly equivalent 
terms, and, in this case, are said to admit of a universal po- 
sitive as a converse : e. g. " All equilateral triangles are 
equiangular" ; but to state this strictly, we should say, 
" All the equilateral triangles are all the equiangular tri- 
angles." And so, again, the example, " A good govern- 



* Whately's Logic, Book IL, Chap. II., § 4. 



324 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

ment is that which has the happiness of the governed for 
its object," and which also seems to admit of conversion by 
a universal positive, if stated strictly, becomes, " All the 
good governments are all those which have the happiness of 
the governed in view." But these propositions need not be 
considered universal, for, in the first example, we are speak- 
ing not of " all triangles," but only of some triangles, i. e. 
those which are " equilateral :" and in the second example, 
we are speaking, not of "all governments," but only of 
some governments, i. e. " good governments." We may 
therefore convert them by particular positive propositions, 
as follows : 

" Some triangles, i. e. all the equilateral, are all the equi- 
angular." 

" Some triangles, i. e. all the equiangular, are all the 
equilateral." 

" Some governments, i. e. all the good, are all those 
which have the happiness of the governed in view." 

" Some governments, i. e. all which have the happiness 
of the governed in view, are all the good governments."* 



* Whately's Logic, ibid. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 325 



SECTION V. 

PROPOSITIONS CONSTRUCTED INTO SYLLOGISMS. 

A syllogism* is the formula of the most direct and 
simple deduction possible. 

Let X is Y represent, as before, any proposition. If the 
agreement of X and Y is directly perceived, then intuition 
supersedes the necessity of deduction : but if it cannot be 
perceived directly, then we must enquire for a medium. 
Now, suppose this medium to be Z, and that we perceive, 
by intuition, or as the result of a previous deduction,! that 
X and Y respectively agree with Z, then we infer that they 
agree with each other. We have thus the formula of posi- 
tive conclusions : 

X is Z, 
YisZ, 

therefore 

X is Y4 

The axiom which determines this formula is the follow- 
ing : If two terms agree with one and the same third term> 
they agree with each other. 

Again : Let X is not Y represent any proposition in which 
disagreement is affirmed between two terms. If this disa- 
greement be not intuitively perceived, we must once more 
seek for a medium through which to deduce it. Let Z, again, 
be that medium ; and suppose that either, by intuition, or 
as the result of a previous deduction, we perceive that X 

* Vide supra, p. 73. t pp. 53, 54. X p. 202. 



326 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC, 

agrees with Z, but that Y disagrees with Z ; then we infer 
that X and Y disagree with each other. We have thus the 
formula of negative conclusions : 
XisZ, 

Y is not Z, 

therefore 

X is not Y. 

The axiom which determines this formula, is the follow- 
ing : If of two terms, one agrees, and the other disagrees 
with the same third term, they disagree with each other. 

If the two terms both disagreed with the third term, no 
inference could be made, because no relation could be es- 
tablished between them. 

The above axioms are really axioms of pure science.* 
They apply rigidly to the formula of deduction, because 
this formula is wholly independent of the matter of propo- 
sitions. 

It is evident that the syllogism can have neither more 
nor less than three terms. If it had two terms, there would 
be no deduction, but merely a proposition. If it had four 
terms, it would have one term more than is required for a 
simple deduction ; and this fourth term would either be ir- 
relevant, or would be a term in another link of a chain of 
deduction. A chain of deduction may be of an indefinite 
length, as in geometry, for example, where the whole sci- 
ence is a chain of deduction from the axioms and primary 
definitions ; but the links of the chain must each consist 
of the syllogism, — this being necessarily the ever-recurring 
form. 

As the syllogism or formula of deduction has three, and 
only three, terms, so also it has three, and only three, pro- 

* Vide supra, p. 233, 



f 

DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 327 

positions. Two of the propositions contain the compari- 
sons of the two terms, respectively, with the third term. 
The third proposition contains the comparison of the two 
terms with each other, in which their agreement or disa- 
greement is inferred. The term with which the two are 
compared is called the middle term ; the term compared with 
the middle in the first proposition, is called the major term ; 
the term compared with the middle in the second proposition, 
is called the minor term. The first two propositions are 
together called the premises; and the last proposition is 
called the conclusion. The proposition which contains the 
major term, i. e. the first, is called the major premiss ; and 
that which contains the minor term, i. e. the second, is 
called the minor premiss. 

But now the question arises, what determines the order 
of comparisons, or the major term, and the major premiss ? 
Before we can answer this, several principles must be con- 
sidered. 

1. It is evident that if all the terms were distributed, it 
would be quite immaterial how we arranged the premises. 
If all X be contained in all Z, and all Y be contained in all 
Z,then X and Y cannot be otherwise than compared through 
Z, in their whole extent. 

2. If the middle term be not distributed, then the two 
terms or extremes cannot be certainly compared through it, 
for one of them might agree with one part of it, and the 
other with another part, and thus no relation between them 
be established : but a distribution of the middle in one of the 
premises is sufficient, for if one extreme has been compared 
to the whole of the middle term, and the other to only a 
part of it, a relation is evidently established between them, 
since every part of the middle term, in this case, presents 



328 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

the extreme compared with the whole of it, to the extreme 
compared with a part of it. 

3. Hence it appears, again, that where there are two par- 
ticular premises, no legitimate conclusion can be drawn ; 
for we shall then have either an undistributed middle, e. g. 

Some Z is X, 

Some Y is Z ; 
or we shall fail in establishing a relation between the two 
extremes ; for the only case of a distributed middle with 
particular premises, is where the middle term is the predi- 
cate of a particular negative, e. g. 

Some Z is X, 

Some Y is not Z, 
in which, some Z and X being first affirmed to agree, and 
then some Y only being excluded from Z, it cannot follow 
certainly that some Y is not X, since some other part of X 
may not agree with Z, and some other part of Y may agree 
with Z, for particulars of opposite qualities may both be 
true ; and thus the conclusion is left wholly indefinite. 

4. But the case is widely different where one of the pre- 
mises is universal, and the middle term is distributed, e. g. 

All Z is X, 

Some Y is Z ; 
here all Z being contained in X, the some Y con- 
tained in Z must be contained in X also. Again : in 
the premises, 

No Z is X, 

Some Y is Z, 
inasmuch as the whole of Z is excluded from X, and some 
Y is contained in Z, it follows that some Y is not in X. 
Hence if one of the premises is a universal, it is suffi- 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 329 

cient, if only the middle term be distributed, and this takes 
place when the universal premiss is E, or when, if it be A, 
the middle term is the subject. 

5. We may not distribute in the conclusion a term which 
has not been previously distributed in a premiss, for this 
would violate the cardinal axiom, that A consequence cannot 
transcend its premises. 

6. From two negative premises no inference can be 
made ; for, since in this case both extremes disagree with 
the middle term, we cannot know, by means of this term, 
whether they agree or disagree with each other. 

7. If one of the premises be negative, the conclusion 
must be negative also. Here one of the extremes is affirmed 
to agree, and the other to disagree, with the middle term, 
and consequently they must disagree with each other. 

8. If one of the premises be particular, the conclusion 
must be particular also ; for, although the whole of one ex- 
treme is compared in the universal premiss with the middle 
term, yet, as in the particular premiss, only a part of the 
other extreme is compared with the middle term, only a 
part of the first can be compared with the second in the 
conclusion. 

9. Where there are two universal premises, we cannot 

draw a universal conclusion, if the two extremes are both 

predicates in the premises, for then they are both undistri* 

buted : e. g. 

All Z is X, 

All Z is Y, 
therefore 

Some Y is X. 

The ambiguity of the middle term is a fallacy arising 

from the matter, or the peculiar use of words, and there. 



330 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

fore is not to be considered here, where we are discussing 
the pure deductive formula. 

It is evident that only four different conclusions can be 
drawn, viz : A, E, I, and O ; now the premises which are 
to determine these conclusions must be constituted in ac- 
cordance with the above principles. Let us consider them 
in order. 

I. A universal affirmative conclusion. This can be drawn 
where all of one extreme can be inferred to be contained 
in the other. It is not necessary that the containing ex- 
treme should itself be distributed ; it may contain the other 
extreme, and a great deal more ; all which is necessary to 
the universal conclusion is, that all of one extreme should 
be affirmed to be contained in the other. Now, as the 
middle term must be distributed, it must be the subject of 
one of the premises ; and as one of the extremes must be 
distributed, it must be the subject of the other premiss ; 
and again, as it is the only extreme distributed, it must be 
the subject of the universal conclusion. And, once more, 
as the middle term is the medium of comparison, it, on the 
one hand, must embrace the whole of one extreme, and, on 
the other hand, must itself be all embraced by the other 
extreme. The following arrangement of the terms is the 
only one which comprises all the conditions of a universal 
conclusion : 

A, Z is X, 
A, Y is Z, 
A,YisX.* 

Hence the major term is here the one which contains the 

* Barbara. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 331 

middle, and the minor is the one which is contained in the 
middle. 

We might arrange the premises thus, 
A, Y is Z, 
A, Z is X, 
A, Y is X, 
but the major premiss is generally placed first. 

II. Universal negative conclusion. Here the two ex- 
tremes are universally denied of each other. Hence there 
is only one possible arrangement of the terms, viz : so that 
one extreme shall be universally excluded from the middle term, 
and the other extreme universally contained in it, as follows : 
(1.) (2.) 

E, ZisX,* .E, XisZ,t 

A, Y is Z, or A, Y is Z, 

E, Y is X, E, Y is X. 

The only difference between the two syllogisms above, 
is the conversion of the major premiss, in the last. 
Or we may express the same thing thus, 
(3.) (4.) 

A, X is Z,X A, X is Z,§ 

E, Y is Z, or E, Z is Y, 

E, Y is X, E, Y is X. 

The only difference between the last two is the conver- 
sion of the minor premiss, in the second. And the only 
difference between the first and the last two is, that the ex- 
treme which, in the first two, is excluded from the middle 
term, in the last two is contained in it ; and the extreme 
which, in the first two, is contained in the middle term, in 
the last two is excluded from it. 

* Celarent t Cesare, t Camestres. § Camenes. 



332 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

But it is evident that all these different forms satisfy the 
conditions required, and are virtually the same. 

As to the title of the extremes, the term which becomes 
the subject of the conclusion is generally called the minor 
term, and that which becomes the predicate of the conclu- 
sion, the major term. In a universal negative conclusion, 
however, this is of no account, inasmuch as it is simply 
convertible. It is quite immaterial whether we express the 
conclusion by E, Y is X, or E, X is Y. 

Indeed, the 2, 3, and 4 forms may all be easily reduced 
to the first : the 2, by simply converting the major ; 
the 3, by simply converting the minor, and making it to 
change places with the major, and then simply converting 
the conclusion ; and the 4, by transposing the premises, 
and simply converting the conclusion. 

III. Particular affirmative conclusion. This conclusion 
is drawn where one of the premises is a particular affirma- 
tive, or where both premises are universal affirmatives. 

1. Where one of the premises is a particular affirmative, 
all of the middle must be contained in one extreme, and some 
of the other extreme in the middle, or, which amounts to the 
same thing, since a particular affirmative is simply convert- 
ible, some of the middle in the other extreme. The form 
which directly presents this is the following : 

A, Z is X, 
I, Y is Z, 
I, Y is X.* 



Darii. 



bEbtJcfiVfi logic. 333 

The deduction here is manifestly valid. There are three 
other forms, viz : 



(2.) 


(3.) 


(40 


I, ZisX,* 


A, Z is X,f 


I, xisZ4 


A, Z is Y, 


I, ZisY, 


A, Z is Y, 


I, YisX. 


I, Y is X. 


I, YisX. 



All these evidently fulfil the required conditions. Here 5 
again, the 2, 3, and 4 forms may be reduced to the first i 
the 2, by simply converting the major, transposing the pre- 
mises, and then converting the conclusion ; the 3, by con- 
verting the minor ; and the 4, by transposing the premises, 
and converting the conclusion. 

Scholium. It will be remarked that the change of the 
forms, by conversion of propositions, and the transposition 
of the premises, does not alter the current of the deduction. 
We have seen§ that a proposition, when lawfully converted, 
asserts no more than it did before : the transposition of the 
premises obviously does not change their character, nor their 
relation to each other ; and since, when this transposition 
is made, what was before called the major becomes the 
minor term, and vice versa, the conclusion is converted, to 
correspond to it. 

2. Where both premises are universal affirmatives. 
Here, either both extremes are predicates, and of course 
undistributed, or one only is a predicate, and undistributed. 

There are then two forms : 



* Disarms. t Datisi. t Dimaris. 

§ Supra, Sec. IV. 



334 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



(5.) 


(6.) 


A, Z is X,* 


A, X is Z,t 


A, Z is Y, 


A, Z is Y, 


I, YisX. 


I, Y is X. 



These also can easily be reduced to the first : the 5, by 
converting the minor premiss into I ; and the 6, by trans- 
posing the premises, and simply converting the conclusion. 
After the transposition, we consider A, X is Z, as I, X is Z, 
for only the particular is required for the conclusion. In- 
deed, these forms are quite unnecessary, since a particular 
affirmative conclusion requires only one universal premiss ; 
and two universals, arranged as above, cannot form the 
premises of any thing more. 

IV. Particular negative conclusion. We have seen that 
from two particular premises no inference can be drawn, not 
even where a particular negative, of which the middle term is 
the predicate, and consequently distributed, is one of the 
premises. Nor, again, can any inference be drawn from two 
negatives. One at least of the premises, therefore, must be 
a universal, and only one of them a negative. If there be 
two universal premises, the extreme contained in the uni- 
versal positive must be a predicate, so that it be not distri- 
buted, for if both extremes were distributed, then the con- 
ditions of a universal negative would be fulfilled. From this 
it follows that we can draw a particular negative conclusion 
only in the three following ways : 

1. The whole of one extreme must be excluded from the 
middle term, and some of the other extreme must be con- \ 
tained in it. There are six forms in this division : 

* Darapti. i Bramantip. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 335 





(10 


(2.) 




(3.) (4.) 


E, 


Z is X,* 


E, X is Z,f 


E, 


ZisX4 E, ZisX,§ 


I, 


Y is Z, 


I, Y is Z, 


A, 


ZisY, I, ZisY, 


0, 


YisX. 


0, Y is X. 

(5.) 


o 


Y is X. O, Y is X. 

(6.) 




E, 


Y is Z,|| 




e, x is z,ir 




A, 


Zis Y, 




I, ZisY, 




0, 


YisX. 




0, Y is X. 



2. The whole of one extreme must be contained in the 
middle term, and only some of the other extreme excluded 
from it. In this the preceding is reversed. Here is only 
one form, viz : 

(*) 

A, X is Z,** 

O, Y is Z, 
O, Y is X. 

3. Some of the middle term must be excluded from one 
extreme, and the whole of it contained in the other extreme. 
Here also is only one form, viz : 

(8.) 

0,ZisX,ft 
A, Z is Y, 
O, Y is X. 

Every one must perceive, upon a little reflection, that 
these three divisions embrace all possible negative conclu- 
sions. 

Here, again, all the forms can be shown to be identical in 
their principle, by reducing all the others to the first 



* Ferio. t Festino. i Felapton. § Feriso. II Feaapo. 1T Fresison. 
** Baroko. +t Bokardo. 



336 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 

form. 2 is reduced by simply converting the major \ 
8, by converting the minor into I ; 4, by simply con- 
verting the minor ; 5, by simply converting the major, and 
converting the minor into I ; and 6, by simply converting 
both the major and minor. In these the mode of reduction 
is obvious and easy. 7 and 8 are reduced in a manner 
more circuitous : In 7, the major term must be changed 
by contraposition, and the minor changed into I, by con- 
necting the negative particle with the predicate,* thus : 



A, X is Z, by contraposition^ E, not Z is X, 

O, Y is Z, by connecting the particle I, Y is not Z, 
O, YisZ, " " 0,YisX. 

In 8, the minor is changed into E, by double negation, 
and is not converted as before ; the major is converted into 
I» as before ; the premises are then transposed ; and lastly, 
the conclusion, by a double negation and conversion, is 
made to correspond legitimately as well as in form with the 
premises, thus : 

O, Z is X converted into I, not X is Z, 



A, Z is Y by double negation becomes E, Z is not Y. 



Transposing these premises we have 



E, Z is n ot Y, 
I, not X is Z, 



Then O, Y is X, by double negation } _____ _- 

and conversion gives the proper > O, not X is not Y. 
conclusion S 



* Vide Section IV. 

t Contraposition supposes a previous double negation ; it is a simple 
conversion, after a change has been made by this negation, e. g. E, X is 
not Z is the double negation, and then by conversion, E, not Z is X. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 337 

As this is somewhat complicated, I will give an illustra- 
tion : 

O, " Some oppressed men are not discontented ; 

A, All oppressed men are wronged ; 
Therefore 

O, Some wronged men are not discontented, 1 ' 
This, when reduced as above, becomes 



E, " No oppressed men are not wronged ; 

I, Some not discontented are oppressed men ; 



O, Some not discontented are not not wronged." 
This may also be reduced to the first form of the particu- 
lar positive, viz., to A, I, I, by converting the minor terra 
and the conclusion into I, by connecting the negative par- 
ticle as before, and then transposing the premises, thus : 
O, Z is X converted and transposed to minor J, not X, is Z 
A, Z is Y transposed to major A, Z is Y 

0, Y is X converted I, not X is Y 
A, All oppressed men are wronged ; 

1, Some not discontented are oppressed men ; 
I, Some not discontented are wronged I* 



From the foregoing analysis, it appears, that there are 
but four original distinct syllogisms, comprising the four 
possible conclusions, viz., A, A, A ; E, A, E ; A, I, I ; and 
E, I, O, as arranged under the first form of each kind ; — 
all the other forms being capable of a legitimate reduction 
to these primary forms. 

,* Whately's Logic, Book II., Ch. III. § 5. 
z 



338 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 

At the beginning of this section we considered the two 
primary axioms of pure science which determine the gene- 
ral formula of Deduction. But in analysing this formula 
under the ideas of quantity and quality, we find another 
axiom developed. In every form of the syllogism one of the 
extremes is more comprehensive than either the other ex- 
treme, or the middle term ; and the middle term compre- 
hends this other extreme, whether it be the whole or a part 
of the class to which it belongs, thus, 
.All Z is X, 
All, or, some Y is Z, 
therefore we may infer 

All, or, some Y is X. 

Hence, it appears, that what is affirmed of Z, viz., that it 
is comprehended by X, must be affirmed of Y also to the 
extent that it is comprehended by Z. So far with respect 
to Quantity, 

With respect to Qualify, the middle term is always uni- 
versally affirmed, either to be comprehended by, or to be 
excluded from, the first extreme ; and the other extreme is 
in whole or part affirmed to be comprehended in the middle 
term, thus, 

AH, or, no Z is X, 

All, or, some Y is Z f 
therefore we may infer 

All, or, some Y is, or is not, X. 
Here, again, what is affirmed of Z, viz., that it univer- 
sally does, or does not, agree with, or belong to X, must be 
affirmed of Y also, to the extent that it is comprehended by 
Z. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 339 

Now all this is evident ; and the axiom which forms the 
basis of it, is the Dictum de omni et nullo of Aristotle, viz., 
Whatever is affirmed or denied of any term distributed, 
\i, e. taken universally,) is affirmed or denied of every par. 
ticular comprehended under iL 



340 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION VI. 

OF MOODS AND FIGURES. 

The Mood of a Syllogism is determined by the quantity 
and quality of the three propositions which compose it, and 
is represented by the corresponding symbols ; thus, A, A, 
A, expresses the mood of the syllogism which gives a 
universal positive conclusion ; and so with respect to the 
others. 

The Figure of a Syllogism refers to the situation of the 
extremes in the premises with respect to the middle term. 
Now, obviously, there are but four variations that can be 
made, viz., the middle term must be the subject in both 
premises ; or the predicate in both ; or the subject of the 
major, and the predicate of the minor ; or the predicate of 
the major, and the subject of the minor. The following 
table presents their several relations : 

(1.) (2.) (3.) (4.) 

Z is X, X is Z, Z is X, X is Z, 

YisZ, YisZ, ZisY, ZisY, 

YisX. YisX. YisX. YisX. 

Now as there are four kinds of propositions, A, E, I, O, 
and three are appropriated to each syllogism, all the possible 
ways of combining them must be sixty four. For four 
different majors multiplied into four different minors, and 
these again into four different conclusions, is a combination 
of four, three times, 4 X 4 X 4 = 64. Regarding it as 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 341 

a mere arithmetical problem, since the sixty-four Moods can 
be each stated in the four different Figures, we shall have in 
all 4 X 64 = 256 varieties of the syllogism. The arith- 
metical determination, however, although noticed by logi- 
cians, is of very little use. We find out in this way the 
utmost limit of the syllogisms, but we are not aided, in the 
least, in discriminating between the true and the false. 

This discrimination can be made only on the principles 
laid down in the preceding section ; and which have there 
been applied to determining the legitimate and required 
syllogisms, independently of the apparatus of Moods and 
Figures. And yet, after having completed this analysis, 
there may perhaps be some convenience in employing 
Moods and Figures in distinguishing the different forms. 

The legitimate forms, we have seen, are in all nineteen ; 
of which, one only is used for universal positive conclusions, 
four for universal negative, six for particular positive, 
and eight for particular negative conclusions. These 
are found in the different Figures. That figure which 
embraces the four cardinal forms, is called the first. 
All the other forms, we have seen, can be reduced to these 
cardinal forms. 

The following lines have been contrived to aid in com- 
mitting the Moods to memory ; and to present, at one view, 
the mode of reducing the secondary Moods to the primary : 

Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, f ErIOque prioris. 

Fig. 2. cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, f EstlnO, bArOkO, se- 
cundae. 

Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptl, drsAmls, dAtlsI, fElAptOn, 
bOkArdO, ErlsO, habet : quarta insuper 
addit. 



342 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Fig. 4. brAmAntlp, cAmEnEs, dlmArls, fEsApo, 
frEsIsOn. 

In the above, the initial letters b, c, d, f, denote the mood 
of the first figure to which the secondary mood must be re- 
duced : e. g. In brAmAntlp the b indicates that it is to be 
reduced to bArbArA ;* and so of the others. 

The capital letters denote the moods ; s, denotes the simple 
conversion of the proposition which precedes it ; p, the con- 
version per accidens of the proposition which precedes it, i. e., 
the conversion of A into I, or of I into Aj* ; m, (mutandi) that 
the premises must be transposed. 

Baroko and Bokardo are names given in reference to 
Reductio ad impossibile; a method of reduction employed 
by some, particularly in respect to these moods. The B 
denotes that the new mood is to be formed in Barbara ; and 
the K, that for the proposition immediately preceding it, the 
contradictory of the conclusion must be substituted. These 
moods, however, have in the preceding sections been reduced 
in the ordinary way.f 



* If reduced to Barbara, it of course is true in Darii. 

t This last occurs in Bramanivp only, and here not because a "par- 
ticular can legitimately be converted into a universal, but because the 
new arrangement of the premises requires a universal conclusion. The 
transposition of the premises places the mood in the 1st Fig. and it be- 
comes Barbara necessarily. 

t The kind of arguments to which the different moods are in their 
nature best adapted, is an investigation of very high interest. I have 
not entered upon it in this treatise. Perhaps I shall undertake it here- 
after. In the absence of any thing original to offer, I take the liberty of 
appending the following striking remarks from Dr. Whately's excel- 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 343 

lent work. They are given in a note at the foot of one of the pages of 
Book II., Ch. III., § 4 : 

" With respect to the use of the first three Figures {for the fourth is 
never employed but by an accidental awkwardness of expression,) it 
may be remarked, that the First is that into which an argument will be 
found to fall the most naturally, except in the following cases: — First. 
When we have to disprove something that has been maintained, or is 
likely to be believed, our arguments will usually be found to take most 
conveniently the form of the Second Figure : viz. we prove that the 
thing we are speaking of cannot belong to such a Class, either because 
it wants what belongs to the whole of that Class (Cesare), or because it 
has something of which that Class is destitute (Camestres) ; e. g. ' No 
impostor would have warned his followers, as Jesus did, of the perse- 
cutions they would have to submit to: : and again, 'An enthusiast 
would have expatiated, which Jesus and his followers did not, on the par- 
ticulars of a future state.' 

" The same observations will apply, mutatis mutandis, when a Par- 
ticular conclusion is sought, as in Fes tin o and Baroko. 

" The arguments used in the process called the c Abscissio Infiniti,' 
will in general be the most easily referred to this Figure. 

" The Third Figure is, of course, the one employed when the Middle 
term is Singular, since a Singular term can only be a Subject. This 
is also the form into which most arguments will naturally fall that are 
used to establish an objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an opponent's 
Premiss, when his argument is such as to require that Premiss 
to be Universal. It might be called, therefore, the Enstatic 
Figure. E. G. If any one contends that ' this or that doctrine ought 
not to be admitted, because it cannot be explained or comprehended,' 
his suppressed major premiss may be refuted by the argument that 
* the connection of the Body and Soul cannot be explained or compre- 
hended,' fyc. 

" A great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may be exhibited 
in this form." 



344 DEDUCTIVE^ LOGW. 



SECTION VII. 

OF THE REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 

Reduction of Syllogisms is of two kinds, Ostensive Re* 
duction, and Reductio ad impossibile. The aim in both kind3, 
in respect to Syllogisms, is to prove the validity of the se- 
condary forms. 

I. Ostensive Reduction, — Here the proof is made out by- 
showing the identity of the secondary and primary forms ; 
and this is done by actually changing the secondary into the 
primary, without making them assert more, or, differently 
from what they did before. 

This change is effected by conversion of terms, and 
transposition of premises. But it has been fully shown that 
these do not effect either the kind or the extent of the pre- 
dication. When the secondary are reduced to the primary 
form, the proof is made out, because these forms are a direct 
expression of the Dictum de omni el nullo. 

II. Reductio ad impossibile. — By this method we prove 
the validity of a secondary Syllogism as a form of reason- 
ing, by showing that if we grant the premises, the conclusion 
cannot be false. For that in all cases must be a valid form, 
by which, from true premises, we cannot draw a false con- 
clusion. 

The method is simply this : Since by the opposition of 
propositions, every proposition must be true if its contradic- 
tory be false, and false if its contradictory be true, we 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 345 

take the contradictory of the conclusion of the Syllogism or 
form in question, and construct with it, as a premiss in con- 
nection with another unquestionable premiss, a new Syllo- 
gism in the first Figure. Now if the new conclusion thus 
deduced be false, then the assumed premiss must be false, 
for there is no question respecting the validity of the form 
in the first Figure : and if the assumed premiss be false, 
then the original conclusion of which it is the contradictory 
must be true : e. g. Let us take Baroko : 

A, X is Z, 

O, Y is Z, 

O, Y is X. 
If this conclusion be not true, its contradictory is true, 
viz., A, Y is X. Let us, then, construct a new Syllogism 
with this contradictory as a premiss, in the first Figure. 
This we can do by merely substituting it for the minor 
premiss in the above Syllogism ; we shall then draw a con- 
clusion in Barbara, thus : 

A, X is Z, 
A, Y is X ; 
therefore, 

A Y is Z. 
Now it will be perceived that this new conclusion is the 
contradictory of the original minor premiss, — and the pre- 
mises it will be recollected were granted ; hence it must be 
false ; and being false, the new premiss is false, and this 
being false, its contradictory, the original conclusion, must 
be true. 

All the secondary forms may be tested in the same way, 
e, g. Feriso. 



346 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

E, Z is X, 
I, Z is Y, 
O, Y is X. 

Substituting the contradictory of the conclusion A, Y is X, 
for the major premiss, we form the following Svllogism in 
Darii : 

A, Y is X, 

I, Z is Y ; 
therefore, 

I, Z is X. 
But the new conclusion contradicts the original major 
E, Z is X ; consequently it is false ; and being false, the 
new premiss is false, and this being false, its contradictory, 
the original conclusion, must be true. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 347 



SECTION VIIT. 

OF MODAL, HYPOTHETICAL, AND DISJUNCTIVE PROPOSITIONS. 

I. Modals. — These propositions do not differ in form from 
what are called pure categorical propositions. X is Y re- 
presents both. The modality is merely a peculiarity of the 
matter, and consequently does not pertain to the pure logical 
formula. Besides, in tb.3 matter itself, modal propositions 
can be so disposed as to become pure categoricals. This is 
effected by attaching the modal words to the subject or the 
predicate. E, G. " It is probable that all knowledge is 

useful," u e. 

Sub. Pred. 



" All knowledge is probably useful." 
Again : 
" It is possible that he may arrive tomorrow ;" i. c. 

Sub. Pred. 



" His arrival to-morrow is possible." 

A subject and predicate may each be expressed by seve- 
ral words, but this cannot affect the form. 

II. Hypothetical^. — These are propositions which contain 
a hypothesis in one of their terms, and are therefore like 
Modals capable of being reduced under the categorical form. 
Where the force of the reasoning lies in the hypothesis the 
case is widely different ; but it is evident that this is not the 
fact in Examples like the following : 
Every Z is X or p, 
Every Y is Z ; 
therefore, 

Every Y is X or p. 



348 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

The aim here is not to conclude which of the two Y is, 
whether X or p : but only that Y is X or p. 

III. Disjunctives. — These are a kind of compound pro- 
positions, consisting of several categoricals, one of which 
is affirmed to be true ; e. g. A is either B or C or D. Now 
if we can deny all but one, then that one is true ; or if we 
can affirm one to be true, then the others are false ; thus, 
But A is not B or C ; therefore A is D : or A is D, there- 
fore it is neither B nor C. 

A Disjunctive proposition, however, is capable of being 
reduced like a Modal to a pure categorical, thus : 
Sub. Pred. 



All A not B or C is D ; 
Or, 

Sub. Pred. 



All A not B or D is C. 

A Syllogism with such propositions contains the usual 
forms ; e. g. 

Every A not B or C is D. 
All Z is A not B or C. 
Therefore, all Z is D. 
" It is either Spring, Summer, Autumn, or Winter ; but 
it is neither Spring, Autumn, nor Winter ; therefore it is 
Summer," i. e. 

Every season not Spring, Autumn, or Winter, is Sum- 
mer. 



The present season is a season not Spring, &c, there- 
fore, the present season is Summer. 

When we affirm one to be true, and infer the falsity of 
the others, the same reduction may be made ; thus ; 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 349 



No A being D is B or C, 



Z is A being D, 

Therefore, Z is not B or C. 



No season being Summer, is Autumn or Winter, &c. 

The present season is a season being Summer ; therefore, 
&c. 

Or, again, a Syllogism of this kind may be put into the 
form of a conditional, thus : 

If A is not B or C, 
Then A is D, &c. 

It is evident, therefore, that the preceding kinds of pro- 
positions require no new formula, but lie within the princi- 
ples already established. 



350 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION IX. 

HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. 

A Conditional proposition consists of an Antecedent 
and a Consequent, each of which is a distinct proposition, — 

e.g. 

Antecedent. 



" If the Scriptures are not wholly false, 

Consequent. 

They are entitled to respect." 
If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 
There are two rules generally applied in hypothetical 
reasoning. 

1. If the Antecedent be granted, the Consequent is 
granted also ; e. g. 

If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 



But Y is Z, 

Therefore, Y is X. 
2. The Consequent being denied, the Antecedent must | 
be denied also. 

If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 



But Y is not X, 
Therefore, Y is not Z. 
The first rule is founded upon the obvious principle, that 
a false Antecedent or Premiss cannot yield a true eonclu. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 351 

sion. The second rule is founded upon the no less obvious 
principle, that an Antecedent or Premiss must be false, 
which yields a false conclusion. 

But, from the falsity of an antecedent, we cannot infer 
the falsity of the consequent, for the consequent may flow 
out of some other antecedent which is true : e. g. 

If Y is Z, 

Then Y is X. 
Now, suppose Y is Z to be false, still Y is X may be 
proved by some other antecedent, e. g, Y is P. 

Hypothetical reasoning really differs from categorical, 
only in that, one of the premises is a hypothesis. The 
formula and all the principles are the same. If Y is Z, 
then Y is X : this is an affirmation that if one proposition be 
granted, another must be granted also. But, one proposi- 
tion alone cannot authorise an inference. We here then 
have only part of an argument, viz : the conclusion and one 
of the premises. Which premiss have we, and can we supply 
the other? There is no difficulty. The conclusion always 
contains the minor and major terms ; the other premiss 
contains the middle, together with either the major or minor. 
Now, if there be a term in the antecedent or premiss, the 
same as the subject of the consequent or conclusion, then 
the given premiss is the minor premiss ; but if the same as 
the predicate of the consequent, then the given premiss is 
the major. And in either case, in order to supply the 
wanting premiss, we have only to connect the middle term 
with that term of the conclusion which is not found in the 
given premiss or antecedent : e. g. 

If Y is Z, 

Then Y is X. 



352 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Here the wanting premiss, obviously, according to the 
above, is the major, which supply, and we have the following 
syllogism : 

ZisX, 
If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 
Or we may state it thus : It is affirmed, that if Y is Z, 
then Y is X : but why does it follow, that, if Y is Z, Y is X 
also 1 The answer to be given is, Because Z is X — if Y 
is contained in Z, then Y must be contained in X also, be- 
cause Z is contained in X. 

" If the Scriptures are not wholly false, then the Scrip- 
tures are entitled to respect." 

But, why does this follow ? Because, u Whatever is not 
wholly false, is entitled to respect." Or, ■" Every book of 
pure morality and heavenly promises, &c, not wholly false, 
is entitled to respect :" 

" If the Scriptures are such a book, not wholly false," 
"Then the Scriptures, &c." 

Take another case* in which the minor premiss is want- 
ing: 

If Z is X, 
Then Y is X. 
The antecedent here must be the major premiss, because 
it compares the middle with the predicate of the conse- 
quent or conclusion. We can easily supply the minor : The 



* The suppression of the minor premiss, and the construction of a 
conditional out of the major and the conclusion, gives that casein which 
the antecedent and consequent have a different subject, and which, by 
some, is supposed to involve peculiar difficulties. See Whately's Logic, 
Book II., Chapter IV., § 6, note at the foot of the page. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 353 

affirmation is that, If Z is X, then Y must be X also. But, 
why must this follow 1 Because Y is Z. 

" If whatever exhibits marks of design is the work of an 
Intelligent Creator ; 

Then the universe must be the work of an Intelligent 
Creator." But why ? 

Because, " The universe exhibits marks of design." 

In ordinary language, all reasoning is usually in an En- 
thymematic form ; i. e. one premiss is suppressed ; because, 
when one premiss and the conclusion are stated, the mind, 
generally, readily supplies the other. Thus the syllogism 
just above, usually appears, in ordinary language, with the 
major suppressed ; since when it is affirmed that, " The 
universe must be the work of an Intelligent Creator, be- 
cause it exhibits marks of design," every one assents on the 
ground that, " Whatever exhibits marks of design, must be 
the work of an Intelligent Creator." 

What therefore is called by logicians, a Conditional Pro- 
position, is nothing more than an enthymeme, with the 
given premiss hypothesised. And to grant the antecedent, 
is merely to remove the hypothesis. The hypothesis has 
nothing to do with the pure logical form, for, that we ever 
hypothesise is owing to considerations lying wholly in the 
matter or subjects of our reasoning. And to reduce a 
conditional, we have only to supply the suppressed 
premiss. 

The validity of the Rules before given, now, also, appears 
clearly to arise out of the nature of the syllogism. To 
grant the antecedent, is to grant the consequent, because, 
since the suppressed premiss is of course granted, not being 
hypothesised, to grant the antecedent is to remove the hy- 



354 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

pothesis from the other premiss, and consequently to re- j 
move all doubtfulness from the argument. And to deny the , 
consequent, must be the destruction of the argument, since 
it is equivalent to granting the contradictory of the conclu- 
sion, and consequently denying the premises. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 355 



SECTION X. 

OF THE DILEMMA. 

A dilemma is formed by bringing together several 
Conditional Propositions, so that different antecedents 
shall have the same consequent ; or, different antecedents 
shall have different consequents ; or, the same antecedent shall 
have different consequents. 

I. Different Antecedents with the same Consequent. 

If A is B, And if A is C, And if A is D, 
Then A is X, then A is X, then A is X, &c. 

Now, if the matter be such that we can disjunctively 
grant the antecedents, thus : 

But, A is B, or C, or D ; then it must follow that A is X. 

II. Different Antecedents with different Consequents. 
If A is X, If A is Y, If A is Z, 

Then A is B, then A is C, then A is D. 

Now here again, if the matter is such that we can dis- 
junctively grant the antecedents, then we must disjunctively 
grant the consequents likewise ; thus, 

But A is X, or Y, or Z, 

Therefore A is B, or C, or D. 

III. The same Antecedent with different Consequents. 
If A is B, If A is B, If A is B, 

Then A is X, then A is Y, then A is Z. 

Now, if we perceive from the matter, that the common 
antecedent admits of all these consequents, then of course, 



356 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

by granting the common antecedent, we grant all the con- 
sequents. 

Where we grant the antecedent, and establish the conse 
quent, the dilemma is called constructive. 

But where we deny the consequent, and destroy the an- 

tecedent, the dilemma is called destructive. 

1 1 
We have already remarked in the preceding section, thaty 

the hypothesis arises from the peculiar character of thej 
matter of the proposition ; for the logical form supposes the il 
connection between the subject and predicate to be certain. 1 
And so here again the possibility of disjunctively affirming J 
the antecedents, or of disjunctively denying the conse- J 
quents, lies in the peculiar character of the matter. The j 
force and keenness of the dilemma, as a weapon in debate, J 
arises from the matter also, and from many relations and jn 
circumstances of which the forensic disputant knows how J 
to avail himself: e.g. An individual maybe so situated I 
that his words, or conduct, or both, justify two or more in- jj 
ferences unfortunate for himself, from one or the other of J 
which he cannot escape. He must admit one fact or the I 
other, and either is an antecedent involving a stinging con- I 
sequent. We have here described the second kind of Di- II 
lemma, and of which the several antecedents are the , 
" horns" : e. g. "If iEschines joined in the public rejoic- j 
ings, he is inconsistent ; if he did not, he is unpatriotic : 
but he either joined or not ; therefore he is either incon- i| 
sistent or unpatriotic." 

From the denial of one or the other of the consequents, 
we necessitate the denial of one or the other of the antece- 
dents ; and this proves no less forcible than the other 
mode. Thus we may state the preceding example, in the 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 357 

following manner : " If JEschines is consistent, he did not 
join in the public rejoicings ; if he is patriotic, he did join 
in them : but he either joined or not ; therefore he is either 
not consistent, or Dot patriotic." 

The first kind is forcible taken in the constructive mode ; 
for here the individual who is the subject of the dilemma 
is involved in several facts, so related, that some one must 
be admitted, and any one leads to the torturing inference. 

The third kind is the weakest, and perhaps ought not to 
be considered a dilemma at all. Having only one antece- 
dent, it wants the " horns." In the constructive mode, it 
is merely a conditional, in which the antecedent involves 
several consequents ; and this is common to many con- 
ditionals, without yielding any peculiar advantage in debate. 
On the other hand, there is no point in disjunctively de- 
nying the consequents, since the denial of any one of 
them destroys the common antecedent, so that the whole 
force of the argument is found in one of the simple con- 
ditionals. 

Where the dilemma has the subject of the consequents 
different from the subject of the antecedents, the antece- 
dents are major premises. This is obvious from what was 
shown in the preceding section. 

Since the dilemma is merely a combination of condi- 
tionals, it may be resolved into these again, and each con- 
ditional reduced to the complete syllogism, by supplying the 
suppressed premiss. 



358 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC* 



SECTION XL 



OP THE SORITES. 



Titis is an abridged form of an argument consisting of 
several Syllogisms. It is either categorical or hypothetical* 

I. Categorical Borites. — This is so arranged that the 
predicate of the first proposition is the subject of the second, 
and the predicate of the second the subject of the third, and l 
so on. In every new proposition a new predicate appears ; 
and in the last proposition it is inferred that the first subject 
agrees with the last predicate ; e. g. A is B, B is C, C is 
D, D is E ; therefore A is E. It is evident that in the 
same manner the last predicate may be affirmed of all the 
intermediary subjects. The truth of the argument is evi* 
dent. If all A is contained in B, and all B in C, and all C 
in D, and all D in E, then all A, B, and C must be con* 
tained in E likewise. 

By carefully inspecting the Sorites, we shall perceive 
that the first proposition of the series is a minor premiss, 
and all the other propositions major premises, except the 
last, which is a conclusion ; so that we have here parts of 
several Syllogisms, which are so related that the conclusion 
of the preceding becomes the minor premiss of the succeed- 
ing ; and the Sorites is constructed by suppressing all the 
minor premises but the first, and all the conclusions but the 
last ; thus i 



deductive iodic. 350 

(1.) (2.) 

A is B, B is C, C is D, 

B is C, A is B, A is C, 

C is D, Therefore A is C, Therefore A is D, 
D is E, (3.) 

Therefore A is E. D is E, 

A is D, 
Therefore A is E. 
The Sorites is formed of the Primary Syllogisms, i. e. 
those of the first Figure, because in this, inasmuch as it is 
the natural form of the Syllogism, no change by conversion 
or otherwise has to be made in the propositions in transfer- 
ring them from one Syllogism to another, which will be the 
case in the other figures, since the middle term is contin- 
ually changing ; e. g. In Darapti the 1st Syllogism would 
be, 

B is C, 

B is A, and then the next Syllogism is C is D, 
Some A is C, Some A is C, 

Some A is D, 
Which is Darii ; and this can be prevented only by con- 
verting A is C. 

It will be perceived, also, that the first and last proposi- 
tions of a Sorites alone can be Particular ; for the major 
premiss in the first Figure is always universal, but the minor 
term and the conclusion may be particular. 

Where a Sorites has a Negative Conclusion, only the last 
term of the series, before the Conclusion, can be negative* 
Thus/A is B, B is C, C is D, and No D is E, therefore No 
A is E. Otherwise we should have two Negative Pre* 
mises in the Syllogisms. 



360 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

II. Hypothetical Sorites. — This consists of a series of 
Conditionals, so related and arranged, that the Consequent 
of the first becomes the Antecedent of the second ; and the 
Consequent of the second, the Antecedent of the third, and 
so on ; and then, by granting the first Antecedent, we 
grant the last Consequent, and indeed all the Consequents, 
thus : If A is B, then A is C, and it' A is C, then A is D, 
and if A is D, then A is E ; but A is B, therefore A is E. 

By denying the Consequents successively, we of course 
deny the Antecedents ; and this forms the destructive Sorites. 
The Conditional can, as before shewn, be reduced to com- 
plete Syllogisms ; and then the Syllogisms will be found to 
be related in the same way with those of the Categorical 
Sorites, viz., the conclusion of each preceding Syllogism 
being the minor premiss of each succeeding one. The only 
difference, then, between the two kinds, lies in the hypotheti- 
cal character of one of the premises in the last kind. 

A Sorites may be constructed either by suppressing the 
major or minor, just as conditionals in general. 

Scholium. — It appears from the preceding Analysis of 
Hypothetical reasoning under all its different modes, that it 
involves no new formula or principles. Every kind of De- 
duction therefore is comprehended by the Dictum de omni 
et nullo, and the axioms of agreement and disagreement. 
The fundamental Ideas are Evolution, Identity and Differ- 
ence, Quantity and Quality. 



SEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 361 



SECTION XII. 

APPLICATION OF THE DEDUCTIVE FORMULA. 

The greater part of human reasoning is of the Deduc* 
tive kind. The number of first principles and general 
truths is comparatively few, but their application is infinite. 
Many of them, and especially in Religion, Morals and Poli- 
tics, have been spontaneously developed in the human 
mind ; and many others, the result of nice and laborious in- 
vestigation, have become current, through the means which 
now exist for widely circulating knowledge. In the constant 
expansion of knowledge by scientific men; and the improve* 
ments of art by the ingenious and skillful ; and in the multi- 
form practical duties of the general human life, these first 
great principles and truths receive their continual and di- 
versified application. Hence there is no department of 
knowledge, of art, or of duty, where Deductive Logic is not 
required. 

But are Conclusions, in order to be legitimate, required 
to be drawn strictly according to the deductive formula ? 
By no means, if we intend by this the formal expression 
of every step of the reasoning. This is not necessary, for 
many things are so plainly implied when not expressed, that 
their formal expression would only encumber the style. But 
still in every case of legitimate inference no logical princi- 
ple can be violated, and the language is capable of being re- 
duced to the Syllogistic form. Hence, whenever it is re- 



362 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

quired to test the validity of inferences, a resort to the 
Syllogism is decisive. 

It would not be difficult to give here examples of the ap- 
plication of the formula in testing deduction in a variety of 
subjects. I at first intended this. Upon reflection, how- 
ever, I have concluded to limit these examples to one sub- 
ject, and this one eminently clear and beautiful. I mean 
Geometry. My first plan would have tended considerably 
to swell a work, already, perhaps, transcending the just 
bounds of an elementary treatise ; besides, all the ends of il- 
lustration will, I think, be found to be answered by this one. 

Demonstration is of two kinds, direct and indirect. 
Direct demonstration is the deduction of a conclusion from 
admitted truths and principles : indirect shows the truth 
of a proposition by proving that its contradictory violates ad- 
mitted truths and principles. Geometry employs both. 
It is a science* of absolute certainty, for its fundamental 
Ideas are clearly developed ; its Axioms are perfect ;*(" its 
Definitions adequate and precise : its subject pure and ex- 
act quantity ; and its deductions are made with the utmost 
rigour. 

After laying down its axioms and definitions, Geometry 
proceeds to make its deductions. The first deduction must 
necessarily be made directly from the axioms and defini- 
tions. But the next may employ the deduction already 
made as a basis, in connection with the axioms and defini- 
tions, and so onward. Hence the field of deduction is con- 
tinually enlarging. 

In constructing this science, much depends upon the order 

* pp. 78, 79. t p. 223. 



SEDUCTIVE LOGIC* 363 

of arrangement; for since propositions already demon- 
strated are employed in demonstrating others, it is evident 
that one arrangement may be superior to another in afford- 
ing facilities for the progressive demonstration.* 

After the science has been constructed, it is highly ad- 
vantageous and beautiful, to reverse the order, and trace back 
remote propositions through the connected chain of demon- 
strations to the axioms and definitions. 

In illustrating the application of the Deductive formula in 
this science, I shall first take an instance of direct demon- 
stration. The proposition I have selected is the following: 

" A line which bisects the vertical angle of a triangle, 
divides the base into two segments, which are proportioned 
to the adjacent sides." 

We have in this proposition, deductions both from axioms, 
and from propositions previously deduced, so that it will 
serve to illustrate both. 

A C B is the triangle, and the angle at C is bisected by 
the line C D. 

Now, to aid the deduction by bringing in other relations 
besides those simply presented in the triangle, we produce 
the line A C, and draw B E parallel to C D, so that the 
two lines thus added meet in E. We now have a case 
of alternate angles included between two parallel lines and 

* Corollaries are important links in the chain of demonstration. 
They are propositions which in all cases require demonstration. In 
the usual definition of a Corollary, it is said to be " An obvious conse- 
quence deduced from something going before." But because it is 
" obvious," the deduction is not given, but left to be supplied by the 
learner ; and yet in some instances the deduction of the Corollary is 
more difficult than that of other propositions where it is formally given, 



864 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 




an intersecting line, and this is our first syllogism in Darii, 
as follows : 

All alternate angles are equal ; 

But the angles BCD and E B C are alternate angles ; 
Therefore these angles are equal. 

But BCD and A C D are equal by construction ; and 
this leads to another syllogism in Barbara, viz : 
B C D is equal to A C D, 
E B C is equal to B C D, 
Therefore 

E B C is equal to A C D : 
i> e. All B C D, as an equal, is contained in A C D, 
All E B C, as an equal, is contained in B C D, 
Therefore 

All E B C, as an equal, is contained in A C D. 
In the second deduction, the conclusion of the first deduc- 
tion is made the minor premiss : it will be remarked, that 
this is therefore a case of the Sorites ; but the Sorites com- 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 365 

prehends all cases where one deduction flows out of 
another. 

Or we may deduce it directly from the axiom, " Things 
equal to the same thing, are equal to each other :" thus, 

All things equal to the same thing, are equal to each 
other ; 

E B C and A C D are things equal to the same thing, 
viz. BCD; 

Therefore, they are equal to each other. 

This is a syllogism in Darii, of which the axiom forms 
the major premiss. It is evident that in all cases of deduc- 
tion from an axiom, the axiom must form the major premiss. 

Inspecting the diagram still farther, we perceive that the 
angles A C D and C E B are an outward and inward angle, 
opposite to each other on the same side of a line A E, cut- 
ting the two parallel lines C D and E B ; hence their 
equality is inferred in Darii as in the first deduction ; the 
major premiss being here again a proposition before proved, 
viz. " All outward and inward opposite angles on the same 
side of a line intersecting two parallel lines, are equal." 

But we have just before inferred the equality of A C D 
and E B C, therefore we infer again from the axiom already 
quoted, and, in the same way, the equality of C E B and 
EBC; thus, 

All things equal to the same thing are equal to each 
other ; 

C E B and EBC are things equal to the same, viz. 
A CD; 

Therefore, they are equal to each other. 

We have now two angles of a triangle EBC, opposite 
two of its sides, equal ; we therefore infer the equality of 



366 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 

these sides from a proposition already proved, which here 
again becomes the major premiss of the syllogism, thus : 

" Every triangle equal in respect to two of its angles, is 
equal also in respect to the two sides opposite these angles ;" 

The triangle E B C is a triangle equal in two of its 
angles, viz. C E B and E B C ; 

Therefore, it is equal in the two sides opposite these 
angles, viz. the sides E C and B C. 

Inspecting next the whole triangle A B E, we perceive 
that it is a triangle having its two sides, A B and A E, di- 
vided by a line C D parallel to its base E B ; we can there- 
fore infer the proportionality of the segments of the sides 
from a proposition already demonstrated, thus, 

" Every triangle having a line drawn parallel to its base 
dividing its other two sides, is a triangle whose sides are 
divided proportionally ;" 

The triangle A B E is such a triangle ; 

Therefore its sides are divided proportionally, viz. 
AD:DB;:AC:CE. 

But, if A C is proportional to C E, it must be propor- 
tional to C B, equal to C E ; for 

E C is a proportional of A C ; and 
CBisEC; therefore 
C B is a proportional of A C. 
Hence AD : DB : : AC : CB, 

The above analysis shows conclusively that the formula 
of Deduction permeates geometrical demonstration. 

Although, for the purposes of demonstration, it is not ne- 
cessary, generally, to draw out the whole deduction in de- 
tail, still a better insight would be gained of Geometry, and 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 367 

striking illustrations afforded of this part of Logic if it were 
occasionally done. Indeed, by raising questions respecting 
the axioms and definitions in order to show their necessary 
and intuitive character, as well as by analysing the demon- 
strations, the study of Geometry may be connected with 
the highest parts of Logic, and be made to embrace the 
whole, with the exception of Induction ; and this again may 
be happily connected with the whole range of natural science. 
The study of science would thus be placed on the most 
elevated grounds, and Science herself be clothed with light 
as with a garment. 

In the course of the preceding analysis we have referred 
to several propositions previously proved. Now we might 
go back to these and analyse them in like manner until we 
should repose amid the axioms and definitions and their 
governing Ideas. But this process has been so amply, and 
I hope so clearly indicated, that I do not deem it necessary. 
One of the propositions referred to, however, affords an il- 
lustration of the indirect mode of demonstration, otherwise 
called the Reduciio ad absurdum, or the Reductio ad im- 
possibile. I will therefore proceed to give an analysis of 
the demonstration of this one proposition more. The pro- 
position is stated as follows : — 

" Every triangle equal in respect to two of its angles, 
is equal also in respect to the two sides opposite these 
angles." 

If this be not true, its contradictory is true, viz :-— > 

" Some triangles equal in respect to two of their angles, 
are not equal in respect to the two sides opposite these 
angles." 



368 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Let A B C be the triangle having its two angles A ami 
B equal. 




Now if the contradictory be true, and the two opposite 
sides, B C and A C, are not equal, then of course one must 
be greater than the other. Let us therefore suppose A C to 
be the greater, and take A D, on A C, equal to B C. Next 
join B D. Now we have a triangle A D B within the tri- 
angle A B C 5 and, comparing them, we have, by the con- 
tradictory, in the first triangle, side A D equal to side B C f 
in the second ; also the side A B is common to both ; also, 
by the hypothesis contained both in the proposition and the 
contradictory, the angle A in the first, is equal to angle B, 
in the second. But it has previously been shown in the 
chain of geometrical deductions, that " Any two triangles 
having two sides and the included angle in the one, equal 
to two sides and the included angle in the other, are equal 
each to each." This we assume as a major premiss ; and 
then add as a minor, " The two triangles A D B and A B 
C, by the contradictory, are, two triangles having two sides 
and the included angle in the one, equal to two sides and 
the included angle of the other." Hence the conclusion, 
" The two triangles A D B and A B C are equal." 

Here we assumed the contradictory as a minor premiss 
in connection with an unquestionable major. But what is 



REDUCTIVE LOGIC. 369 

the conclusion ? That one triangle, A D B, contained in 
another triangle, AB C, is equal to its container ; i, e. 
That a part is equal to a whole. The conclusion then, in- 
asmuch as it violates the axiom, " A whole is greater than 
any of its parts," is false. But the falsity of the conclu- 
sion must be traced to the falsity of one or both of the pre- 
mises, since the form is correct, being Darii ; but the major 
was granted ; therefore the falsity is in the minor ; and the 
minor being false, its contradictory must be true ; but the 
contradictory is the original proposition. 

Illustrations of the Syllogism can be drawn from Geo- 
metry and from the Mathematics generally, to an indefinite 
extent. The above, however, will answer the ends of a ge- 
neral and elementary work. 



AA^ 



370 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION XIII. 

OF FALLACIES. 

A Fallacy is a false argument artfully constructed, 
with the intent to deceive ; or, unwarily stumbled upon, 
from an ignorance of the Logical form, or of the subject 
under consideration. 

The full examination of this subject would lead us into a 
wide field, and one in which all the principles of Logic 
would have to be brought under review. The limits we 
have judged fit to assign ourselves will prevent an exami- 
nation in detail ; but we hope, nevertheless, to present the 
important points with sufficient amplitude. 

In giving a division of Fallacies we must follow the di- 
visions of Logic itself. We shall not, however, pursue the 
same order ; but as we have just now been engaged with the 
Deductive Formula, we shall first consider the Fallacies per- 
taining to this part, so as nut to break the continuity of the 
investigation, and reserve what remarks we may have to 
make on Fallacies pertaining to the other parts of Logic for 
the close of this Section. 

Fallacies of Deduction. 

These are divided into Fallacies in the formula ; and 
Fallacies in the matter. 

The latter are not strictly logical ; but inasmuch as they 
lie in the matter of propositions employed in deduction, and 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

where also a rigid adherence to the formula is used to con- 
ceal the Fallacy in the matter, this appears to be the most 
appropriate division to which they can be assigned. 

I. Fallacies in the Formula. — These have virtually 
been set forth already in the Analysis of the Formula in 
Section V. Nothing more is necessary here than a sum- 
mary view of them : 

1. Undistributed Middle ; e. g. 

I, Z is X, 

A, Y is Z, 

A, Y is X. 
Here, although all Y is contained in Z, yet as only some 
Z is contained in Y, and only some Z in X, that part of Z 
which is contained in X may contain no part of Y, and thus 
there can be ground for an inference. 

2. Illicit Process. — This designates the fallacy of distri- 
buting a term in the conclusion which has not been pre- 
viously distributed in the corresponding premiss, and thus 
drawing a conclusion beyond the data ; e. g. 

A, Z is X, 
A, Z is Y, 
A, Y is X. 

3. Two Negative Premises. — Here, since both terms are 
excluded from the middle, no comparison of them can be 
made through it ; e. g. 

E, Z is X, 
E, Y is Z. 

4. Positive Conclusion, where there is a Negative Pre- 
miss ; or a Negative Conclusion, where both premises are 
positive. 

5. Particular Premises.— In all cases where both pre- 



372 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

mises are particular, we shall have an undistributed middle, 
or an illicit process of the major or the minor term, or both 
combined. 

6. More than three terms plainly expressed, — This is an 
attempt to combine two Syllogisms into one. 

7. Inferring the falsity of the conclusion from that of the 
premiss ; or the truth of the premiss from that of the con- 
clusion. 

The first of these fallacies appears where, when an inade- 
quate or false argument has been used to establish a con- 
clusion, and the argument having been successfully refuted, 
it is inferred that the conclusion is false ; e. g. If it be ar- 
gued in favour of the immortality of the soul that all men 
entertain a belief of it ; admitting that the argument might 
be refuted by adducing the instance of some nation who 
manifest no conception of immortality, still this is no ground 
for concluding against the doctrine. The argument must 
go for nothing, but the doctrine of immortality may still have 
a real and impregnable foundation. This fallacy indeed 
identifies itself with the illicit process ; e. g. 
A, Z is X, 
I, Y is Z, 
I, Y is X. 
Now if the minor be refuted, as is supposed in the ex- 
ample above, then the argument will stand 
A, Z is X, 
O, Y is not Z, 
O, Y is not X. 
In which there is an illicit process of the major. 

The second of these fallacies, viz., inferring the truth of 
the premiss, from the truth of the conclusion, is a case of 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 373 

undistributed middle ; e. g. If from the truth of the doc- 
trine of immortality we infer its universal belief, thus, 
" Whatever is universally believed is true. The doctrine 
of Immortality is true. Therefore it must be universally 
believed ;" i. e. 

A, Z is X, 
I, Y is Z, 
I, Y is X. 

The above, therefore, is not really a distinct branch of 
fallacies in the formula, although at first view it might ap- 
pear to be so. 

II. Fallacies in the Matter. 

In this class of Fallacies, the formula is supposed to be 
strictly observed. 

1. Ambiguous Middle. — This fallacy consists in using a 
word, as a middle term, which admits of two significations. 
In the major premiss, the major term agrees with the middle, 
taken in one of its significations ; and in the minor 
premiss, the minor term agrees with the middle, taken 
in another signification ; and then in the conclusion, 
the minor and major are, according to the formula, in- 
ferred to agree with each other. The two extremes are 
indeed compared with the same word, but with two very 
different ideas ; so that in reality we have two middle terms ; 
e. g. 

" A pitiful man is beneath respect. 
Howard, the philanthropist, was a pitiful man. 
Therefore he was beneath respect." 

Many words, however, are so settled in their signification 
that such fallacies cannot be successfully practised with 
them. Perhaps the word 'pitiful is one of these. 



374 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Logicians have distinguished several kinds of Ambiguous 
Middle : 

Fallacia Figures Dictionis, in which the middle term 
is not precisely the same word, in form, in both premises, 
but so nearly akin that they may be assumed to have the 
same meaning ; e. g. 

" A designing man is unworthy of confidence. 
This man has formed a design. 
Therefore he is unworthy of confidence." 

Many fallacies may be formed in this way ; and the 
slighter the shades of difference in the meaning of the two 
kindred words, the more likely is the fallacy to pass un- 
detected. 

Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum. — This fallacy consists 
in asking several questions apparently the same, and yet in 
reality of several different meanings, and therefore admit- 
ting of several different answers. The question forms one 
of the premises of the argument ; and then, when an answer 
is given, the sophist stands ready with another premiss to 
make out a conclusion, which, because unexpectedly op- 
posite to what the one replying intended, serves to embar- 
rass, if not to confound, him ; e. g. There are cases in 
which we may strictly follow the statute law, and yet be 
guilty of great injustice and cruelty. Now let the question 
be asked, Is not a man justified when he does that which is 
lawful ? Here a reply would not be likely to be given in 
the negative : and when given in the affirmative, another 
premiss might be formed embodying some act of oppression 
— as a landlord seizing the goods of a worthy, but sick and 
unfortunate tenant ; and then the conclusion appended that 
the landlord is justified in doing so. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 375 

Fallacy of Division and Composition. — In this fallacy the 
middle term in one premiss is taken collectively, in the other, 
distributively. If in the major premiss it be taken collec- 
tively, and in the minor distributively, it is a Fallacy of 
Division ; e, g. 

" Five is one number ; 
Three and two are five ; therefore, 
Three and two are one number." 

If in the major the middle term be taken distributively, 
and in the minor collectively, it is a fallacy of composition ; 
e.g, 

" Three and two are two numbers ; 
Five is three and two ; therefore, 
Five is two numbers." 

" There is no fallacy more common, or more likely to de- 
ceive, than the one now before us ; the form in which it is 
most usually employed, is, to establish some truth, separately, 
concerning each single member of a certain class, and thence 
infer the sense of the whole collectively : thus some infidels 
have labored to prove concerning some one of our Lord's 
miracles, that it might have been the result of an accidental 
conjunction of natural circumstances. Next, they endea- 
vour to prove the same concerning another ; and so on ; 
and thence infer that all of them might have been so. 
They might argue in like manner, that because it is not very 
improbable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hun- 
dred throws, therefore, it is no more improbable that one 
may throw sixes a hundred times running."* 

Fallacia accidentis.— In this form of the ambiguous mid- 

* Whately's Logic, Book III. 5 11. , 



376 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

die, the middle term in one premiss is used to express merely 
the essence of a thing ; and in the other premiss, to express 
the same thing, together with its accidents ; e. g. 

" What is bought in the market is eaten ; 
Raw meat is bought in the market ; 
Therefore raw meat is eaten." 

In the major premiss we are considering edible substances 
in general, without referring to their circumstances ; in the 
minor, we bring into view one of these substances with its 
circumstances ; and then infer of the latter what was true 
only of the former. 

There are many ways in which words become ambigu- 
ous ; but the discussion of this subject does not properly be- 
long to Logic. To reason well, a thorough knowledge of 
some one language, at least, as the vehicle of thought, is evi- 
dently indispensable ; but the language in which our rati- 
ocinations are expressed, and the principles and formulas 
which are to govern and direct the reasoning process itself, 
are two different branches of study. 

2. Fallacies relating to the connection between the mat- 
ter of the premises and that of the conclusion. 

The preceding head related to the matter of the middle 
term as ambiguously expressed in the two premises. Now 
as the same matter is expressed in the two premises, and in 
the conclusion, inasmuch as the last compares together the 
two terms, which in the former had been compared with the 
middle term, it is obvious that Fallacies may arise also in 
respect to the correspondency between the representations 
of the premises and the conclusion, admitting the form to 
be correct and the middle term to be unambiguous. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 377 

Logicians have distinguished and given names to several 
forms of this Fallacy. 

1. Petitio Principii, or, arguing in a circle. — In this form 
of the Fallacy in question, the connection between the pre- 
mises and conclusion is such, that the premises themselves 
are dependent upon the conclusion ; so that the conclusion 
must first be assumed to be true, before we can find pre- 
mises to prove it. This Fallacy, in order to be successful, 
must of course be artfully constructed, for, when exposed, it 
is too gross to delude any mind for a moment. Hence 
much here depends upon obliquity and obscurity of the lan- 
guage. To attempt to prove the existence of a God 
from the Sacred Scriptures must be a petitio principii, 
since they profess to be a revelation from God, and therefore 
assume His existence. 

This Fallacy, however, is not by any means always an 
intentional one. Acute reasoners have sometimes very 
honestly fallen into it. 

Thus the famous argument used by many writers on 
Moral Agency, to prove that the " Will is always deter- 
mined by the strongest motive," is a notable instance of 
this fallacy, where the reasoners were eminent both for 
logical skill and moral integrity.* 

" The will is always determined by the strongest motive." 
How do you prove this 1 " The will is always determined 
to some volition or other, and it is always determined by 
motives, for they always are present." But how does this 

* One of the roots, if not the root of this error, is the not distinguish- 
ing between an order of sequence, and the principle of causality ; be- 
tween the motives as uniform antecedents to volitions, and Will as it- 
self, the cause of volition. 



378 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

prove that it is determined by the strongest motive 1 " That 
must be the strongest which determines it." Why 1 " Be* 
cause it could not otherwise be determined." How do you 
know that ? " Because it must be determined by the strong- 
est motive." It is evident that the very point to be proved 
is the point assumed. 

2. False or undue assumption of premises. This embraces 
those instances in which the premises, although not depend- 
ent upon the conclusion, require to be proved before the 
reasoning can be admitted to have any force. In all cases 
of Deduction we have to begin with principles already es- 
tablished ; or if assumed at the beginning of a course of 
reasoning — as is sometimes convenient — they must, before 
the course is completed, be satisfactorily proved. It is 
therefore always an important enquiry, whether the princi- 
ples with which we begin are sufficiently established to be 
made the premises of an argument. A judicious and hon- 
est reasoner will be cautious in this respect ; but it is of the 
nature of sophistry boldly to assume, and to supply by a 
show of confidence, the want of a true or an adequate basis. 

"Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an un- 
founded assertion, by being confidently told that it is so evi- 
dent that it would argue great weakness to doubt it. In 
genera], however, the more skilful sophist will avoid a di- 
rect assertion of what he means unduly to assume, because 
that might direct the reader's attention to the consideration 
of the question whether it be true or not ; since that which 
is indisputable does not so often need to be asserted : it suc- 
ceeds better, therefore, to allude to the proposition as some- 
thing curious and remarkable ; just as the Royal Society 
were imposed on by being asked to account for the fact 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 379 

that a vessel of water received no addition to its weight by 
a live fish put into it ; while they were seeking for the 
cause, they forgot to ascertain the fact, and thus admitted, 
without suspicion, a mere fiction." 

There are several species of false assumption mentioned 
by Logical writers, but as they all involve the same princi- 
ple, we shall only give a brief summary of them. 

Non causa, pro causa. A false assumption of causes. 

Here the facts are given, and assuming a cause for them, 
we reason from it as a real and established connection. 

A non vera, pro vera. This, if it differs from the preced- 
ing, is probably meant to designate a false assumption of 
facts, as in the anecdote of the Royal Society, quoted above. 

When causes and facts both exist, the connection between 
the two may be assumed on insufficient grounds : it may be 
assumed either that the causes necessarily involve the facts, 
or that the facts cannot be referred to any other antece- 
dents. The first relates to the inherent nature of causes ; 
the last to the necessary conditions of the facts. 

A non tali, pro tali. This is reasoning from a false as- 
sumption of parallelisms ; or from false analogies. 

False assumption of references. This appears chiefly in 
references made to the Holy Scriptures. Every passage is 
authoritative. Hence, although a writer may find few or 
none which in reality bear upon a favorite dogma, still a 
mere array of the references strikes the eye ; and if the pas- 
sages are not examined, which, through the indolence of 
human nature, is apt to be the case, the desired end of the 
sophist is obtained. 

* Wbately's Logic, ibid. § 14. 



380 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Assumption of probabilities* When the premises are 
each probable with a certain degree of probability, the com- 
bined probability is assumed to be an addition of probabilities, 
whereas it is only a probability of a probability. 

If Z is only probably X, and Y is only probably Z, then 
Y is probably X, not with an increasing, but with a decreas- 
ing probability ; e. g. 

Z is probably (say f ) X, 

Y is probably (say f ) Z ; therefore 

Y is probably (f X| = T %) X. 

In a sorites the probability is still more weakened, and 
weakened the more the sorites is extended. A cumulation 
of arguments consists of arguments drawn from distinct 
sources ; this differs widely from arguments depending one 
upon the other. 

3. Ignoratio elenchi, or irrelevant conclusion, — This 
fallacy consists in connecting with given premises, 
not the legitimate conclusion, but one which, although 
widely different from it, shall, in the language, so resemble 
it, or be so covertly substituted for it, that the deception 
goes undetected by the reader or hearer. " Various kinds 
of propositions are, according to the occasion, substituted 
for the one of which proof is required. Sometimes the par- 
ticular for the universal ; sometimes a proposition with dif- 
ferent terms ; and various are the contrivances employed 
to effect and to conceal this substitution, and to make the 
conclusion which the sophist has drawn answer practically 
the same purpose as the one he ought to have established." 

" A good instance of the employment and exposure of 
this fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon 
and Diodotus, concerning the Mitylenasans : the former 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 381 

(over and above his appeal to the angry passions of his au- 
dience) urges the justice of putting the revolters to death ; 
which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to the purpose, 
since the Athenians were not sitting in judgment, but in 
deliberation, of which the proper end is expediency." 

Archbishop Whately, from whom the above extracts are 
taken, has so admirably exhibited the different forms of this 
fallacy, that I cannot resist the temptation of becoming 
still more largely his debtor. Indeed, on the whole subject 
of Deductive Fallacies, I freely confess my indebtedness to 
him. 

Argumentum ad hominem, <$pc. — " There are certain kinds 
of argument recounted and named by Logical writers, which 
we should by no means universally call Fallacies ; but which 
when unfairly used, and so far as they are fallacious, may 
very well be referred to the present head ; such as the * ar- 
gumentum ad hominem,' or personal argument, ' argumen- 
tum ad verecundiam,' ' argumentum ad populum,' Sfc. all of 
them regarded as contradistinguished from ' argumentum ad 
rem,' or, according to others, (meaning probably the very 
same thing,) ' ad judicium ' These have all been described 
in the lax and popular language before alluded to, but not 
scientifically : the * argumentum ad hominem,' they say, 
' is addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, 
avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual, and 
therefore has a reference to him only, and does not bear di- 
rectly and absolutely on the real question, as the * argumen- 
tum ad rem' does :' in like manner, the ' argumentum ad ve- 
recundiam' is described as an appeal to our reverence for 
some respected authority, some venerable institution, &c, 
and the * argumentum ad populum,' as an appeal to the pre- 



382 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

judices, passions, &c, of the multitude ; and so of the rest. 
Along with these is usually enumerated * argumentum ad 
ignorantiam? which is here omitted, as being evidently no- 
thing more than the employment of some kind of Fallacy, 
in the widest sense of that word, towards such as are likely 
to be deceived by it. It appears then, (to speak rather more 
technically,) that in the * argumentum ad hominem' the con- 
clusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and 
general one in question, but relative and particular ; viz, 
not that 'such and such is the fact,' but that 'this man is 
bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of Rea- 
soning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation,' 
dec. Such a Conclusion it is often both allowable and ne- 
cessary to establish, in order to silence those who will not 
yield to fair general argument ; or to convince those whose 
weakness and prejudices would not allow them to assign to 
it its due weight : it is thus that our Lord on many occa- 
sions silences the cavils of the Jews ; as in th'e vindication 
of healing on the Sabbath, which is paralleled by the au- 
thorised practice of drawing out a beast that has fallen into 
a pit. All this, as we have said, is perfectly fair, provided 
it be done plainly, and avowedly ; but if you attempt to 
substitute this partial and relative Conclusion for a more 
general one — if you triumph as having established your 
proposition absolutely and universally, from having estab- 
lished it, in reality, only as far as it relates to your opponent, 
then you are guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we are 
now treating of: your Conclusion is not in reality that 
which was, by your own account, proposed to be proved : 
the fallaciousness depends upon the deceit or attempt to de- 
ceive. The same observations will apply to « argumentum 
ad verecundiam,' and the rest." 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 383 

Fallacious refutation* This is the refutation of a propo- 
sition assumed to belong to an opponent ; and thus really 
an evasion of the point in dispute. 

Nearly akin to this is the expedient of shifting one's 
ground, by covertly adopting and discussing some other 
question than the one taken up at the beginning. 

"A practice of this nature is common in oral controversy 
especially ; viz. that of combatting both of your opponent's 
premises alternately, and shifting the attack from the one to 
the other, without waiting to have either of them decided 
upon before you quit it." 

We refer to the same head, " the very common case of 
proving something to be possible when it ought to have been 
proved highly probable ; or probable, when it ought to have 
been proved necessary ; or, which comes to the very same, 
proving it to be not necessary, when it should have been 
proved not probable ; or improbable, when it should have 
been proved impossible." 

Fallacy of Objections. This consists in " showing that 
there are objections against some plan, theor)^, or system, and 
thence inferring that it should be rejected ; when that which 
ought to have been proved is, that there are more or stronger 
objections against the receiving than the rejecting of it. 
This is the principal engine employed by the adversaries of 
our Faith : they find numerous ' objections' against various 
parts of Scripture, to some of which no satisfactory answer 
can be given ; and the incautious hearer is apt, while his 
attention is fixed on these, to forget that there are infinitely 
more and stronger objections against the supposition that 
the Christian religion is of human origin ; and that when 
we cannot answer all objections, we are bound in reason, 



384 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

and in candor, to adopt the hypothesis which labors under 
the least. That the case is as I have stated, I am author- 
ised to assume, from this circumstance : that no complete 
and consistent amount has ever been given of the manner in 
which the Christian religion, supposing it a human contri- 
vance, could have arisen and prevailed as it did." 

Fallacy of proving part of a Question. The skilful sophist 
having proved or disproved a part of the question, by en- 
larging upon this, often succeeds in removing out of view 
another part, perhaps the most important of all. 

" This is the great art of the answerer of a book ; suppose 
the main positions in any work to be irrefragable, it will be 
strange if some illustration of them, or some subordinate 
part in short, will not admit of a plausible objection ; the 
opponent then joins issue on one of these incidental ques- 
tions, and comes forward with * a Reply' to such and such 
a work. 

" Hence the danger of ever advancing more than can be 
well maintained, since the refutation of that will often 
quash the whole : a guilty person may often escape by hav- 
ing too much laid to his charge ; so he may also by having 
too much evidence against him, i. e. some that is not in 
itself satisfactory : thus, a prisoner may sometimes obtain 
acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses against him 
is an infamous informer and spy ; though perhaps if that 
part of the evidence had been omitted, the rest would have 
been sufficient for conviction." 

Suppressing the Conclusion, There are two ways of sup- 
pressing the true conclusion : First, by omitting to state the 
proposition you are to prove, at the beginning of the argu- 
ment 5 and then, after a long spun and elaborate argument, 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 385 

drawing a conclusion remote from the true one, with a con- 
fident and plausible air. Secondly, by omitting to give the 
conclusion altogether, but framing an argument in such a 
way as to lead the hearer to draw the wrong conclusion' 
which the sophist aims at. We have a striking instance of 
this species of reasoning in Antony's speech over the dead 
body of Caesar. 

" Jests. Jests are Fallacies ; i. e. Fallacies so palpable 
as not to be likely to deceive any one, but yet bearing just 
that resemblance of argument which is calculated to amuse 
by the contrast ; in the same manner that a parody does, 
by the contrast of its levity with ' the serious production 
Which it imitates. There is indeed something laughable 
even in Fallacies which are intended for serious conviction, 
when they are thoroughly exposed. There are several 
different kinds of joke and raillery, which will be found to 
correspond with the different kinds of Fallacy : the pun (to 
take the simplest and most obvious case) is evidently, in 
most instances, a mock argument founded on a palpable 
equivocation of the middle Term : and the rest in like man- 
ner will be found to correspond to the respective Fallacies, 
and to be imitations of serious argument." 

Jests, however, are often very serious arguments, when 
their effects are considered ; for that which is turned into 
ridicule, becomes, in some degree, an object of contempt, or, 
at least, ceases to command respect and careful attention. 
They are also popular arguments, for they require no 
thought, and afford a piquant amusement 

Fallacy of Epithets. This appears in the disputes of po- 
litical parties and religious sects. The fallacy is of a two- 
fold character : First, the odious name may be fastened 

B B 



386 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

upon an individual, or upon the party or sect to which 
he belongs,^vith the utmost injustice : there may be merely 
a seeming agreement arising from similar names and cir- 
cumstances, without any real identity of principles ; or 
there may be an agreement only in points unimportant, or 
even commendable ; but, notwithstanding, when the hue 
and cry is once raised, the multitude are prone to rush to 
the chase, and join in the ferocious sport. Secondly, the 
name itself may have become odious unjustly ; it may be a 
good name, darkened and marred by the prejudices and 
persecutions of a benighted and bigoted age \ but its cha- 
racter has become fixed in the popular apprehension, and 
no one now stops to enquire into its origin or its principles : 
it is the symbol of enormous error, if not of crime, and he 
who is adjudged worthy to wear it, may fail to gain a se- 
cond hearing. In this fallacy, the conclusion is not gene- 
rally concealed until the close of an argument, and covertly 
applied ; it is brought out at the beginning in the epithet 
itself, and frequently supersedes the necessity of even the j 
show of an argument. 

We close here our view of the Deductive Fallacies. It ' 
will be seen that those arising from the matter of the pro- j 
positions are numerous. It requires both mental discipline 
and tact to guard against and to detect them. But one 
thing is evident, that a pure, benevolent, and truth-loving 
spirit is the most effectual protection against this species of 
false reasoning. 

The fallacies which I next propose to consider, are those 
of Induction and Intuition : fallacies belonging to the two 
former parts of Logic, and therefore rather improperly in- 
troduced here. Notwithstanding this seeming impropriety, I 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 387 

have concluded to do so, for the purpose of making the whole 
subject of fallacies a unique portion of the work. Besides, 
I propose to handle what remains briefly, as it is not of a 
nature to require nor to admit of an exposition running 
much into details. The common human life is peculiar y 
the theatre of deduction, for it is here that principles are 
applied or violated most extensively ; it is therefore the the- 
atre which presents most abundantly both the opportunities 
and the temptations of sophistry. 

Fallacies of Induction. 

These are of three kinds, Fallacies of Observation, Fal- 
lacies in determining General Facts, and Fallacies in in- 
ducting Laws. 

I. Fallacies of Observation. — We note here three 
Fallacies : 

First. Inadequate Observation. — All the phenomena, if 
possible, in relation to a given subject should be observed : 
and the mind should not rest content while any phenomena 
probably remain which, by any labor and diligence in obser- 
vation and experiment, may be brought to light. But 
human nature is prone to accept as sufficient a set of limited 
but familiar observations lying within the immediate neigh- 
borhood of the individual. Men are, as it were, divided into 
tribes dwelling in deep vallies ; and each tribe looketh upon 
its valley as the wide universe, and the high mountains 
around as the horizon of being and the impassable boundary 
of thought. This begetteth narrow-mindedness, bigotry, 
and imperfect and crude knowledges. The philosopher 
passes over the mountain tops, walks through valley after 
valley, converses with all the different tribes, sees the same 



388 ©EDtTCriVE LOGIC. 

things as they appear in different places ; and thus prepares 
himself to learn the general laws which govern God's crea- 
tures, and to enjoy the harmony and beauty of all things. 
Again, human nature is impatient of the slow and persevere 
ing labor demanded in prosecuting observation and expert 
ment. It is far more pleasant to our natural indolence to 
take such observations as force themselves upon us, and to 
leave the rest to conjecture, than to endure the toil and re- 
straint, and wait for the results of thorough investigation* 

Another form of this Fallacy appears where the observa- 
tion, although extensive, is imperfect and hurried. Such are 
the busy collectors of facts, the ambitious founders of ly« 
ceums and cabinets, who bring us abundance of things and 
but little thought ; who indeed manipulate, but do not nicely 
examine. 

Facts show the state of the world. He, therefore, who 
does not look at all the facts, and examine their character- 
istics minutely, is not prepared to form sound judgments. 
He may express opinions, but he is not entitled to any 
authority. 

Secondly. The Fallacy of making Observation and Ex- 
periments without a purpose, or a prophecy of the end in the 
form of a rational hypothesis. 

We have already alluded to the catalogues of facts made 
by Bacon.* These are an example of the Fallacy under 
consideration. By the knowledge already attained of the 
constitution of the world, and the spontaneous inspiration of k 
Ideas awakened in profound and patient meditation, the k 
mind when it comes within a new field of investigation is 



276, 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 389 

prepared and impelled to form some hypothesis of the order 
of sequences, if not of the ultimate law. We call this a 
rational hypothesis, because it considers laws already ascer- 
tained, and thoughtfully watches the indications of the ini- 
tiative phenomena. Such a hypothesis at the early stage of 
investigation is necessary, in order to arrange the facts al- 
ready gained, and to know where to make further observa- 
tions, and how to adjust experiments. 

Without such a hypothesis, every thing is done at ran- 
dom. It is indeed sheer empiricism — a trying of experi- 
ments like a blind casting of dice, with a wondering and 
puerile curiosity to know what will turn up next. Philoso- 
phical investigation foresees its end with more or less clear- 
ness. Like Bunyan's pilgrim, it at least sees a little shin- 
ing light a great way off, and by keeping that little light in 
its eye, it at length reaches the straight and narrow way of 
Truth. When Newton saw the apple fall, he formed his 
hypothesis ; he thenceforward had a definite and great end 
before him. 

Thirdly. The Fallacy of making facts bend to favourite 
theories. — When Theories are once formed, men are ever 
ready to become intoxicated with them. An ingenious 
Theory is a proud effort of the Intellect, and, therefore, not 
easy to be relinquished by its author ; and the light and 
order which it gives to facts which before appeared compli- 
cated and inexplicable, soon brings it into general favour 
with enquiring minds. Hence there springs up a passion to 
apply it, and to make every thing accord with it. Men begin 
to forget that it is a mere hypothesis, which may or may 
not be true ; and that, if not confirmed by general observa- 
tion, it must yield to some more perfect conception. In this 



390 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

way they are often betrayed into great absurdities. We 
have an illustration of this, in the tenacity with which some 
chemists for a while adhered to the Phlogistic Theory. 

Now Truth and Philosophy alike demand that a Theory 
shall be adopted, always with the tacit understanding, that 
it is to be held in abeyance to farther discoveries. And 
here the great Philosopher shows his greatness, in that he 
becomes wedded to nothing but truth ; and holding theories 
only as a means of truth, he is ready to modify them ac- 
cording to the indications of new facts, or even to renounce 
them when they cannot be verified, or a better light is ob- 
tained. Thus Newton, for a time, laid aside the law of 
gravitation, while the calculations did not appear to sustain 
it. But in the end he had his rich reward. 

II. Fallacies in determining General Facts. 

First. The fallacy of affirming a uniform Sequence, from 
a mere observation of coincidences. — This Fallacy is very 
common. The superstition of dreams and omens, the em- 
piricisms of medicine, and a thousand empty popular max- 
ims, all belong here. 

Because two phenomena are found to be conjoined in 
time and place, therefore, by this Fallacy, one is assumed as 
the uniform antecedent of the other, and we are to expect 
the recurrence of the one wherever we find the other. Now, 
before we have a right to conclude that the two are in uni- 
form sequence, we must prove by experiment that the 
given Consequent never takes place except where the An- 
tecedent in question is present; i. e. We must prove by 
Negative instances as well as Positive. Upon further ex- 
amination, we may find the same Consequent to coincide in 
time and place with a thousand other phenomena ; but that 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 391 

alone can be its proper Antecedent, without which it does 
not take place. This indeed is the Fallacy condemned in 
the memorable language of Bacon :— " Inductio quae pro- 
cedit per enumerationem simplicem, res pu >rilis est, et 
precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia 
contradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam 
par est, et ex his tantum modo quae praesto sunt pro- 
nunciat. At Inductio quae ad inventionem et demonstra- 
rionem Scientarum et Artium erit utilis, Naturam separare 
debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas ; ac deinde post 
negativas tot quot sufficiunt, super afBrmativas con- 
cludere."* 

Secondly. The Fallacy of denying whatever has not been 
found hitherto in the common observation of men, or does not 
exist in generally received maxims. 

Th ; s Fallacy is of the same nature with the preceding, and 
equally condemned by the language of Bacon. The former 
affirms that those are proper Antecedents and Consequents 
which have been found together ; the latter, that none can 
exist beyond those which have hitherto been found together. 
The one gives authority to untested empiricism ; the other 
denies any truth to exist beyond it. The one consigns us 



* " That induction which proceeds by a mere enumeration of in- 
stances, is a puerile affair, and concludes precariously, and is exposed 
to danger from contradictory instances, and for the most part it gives its 
decisions according to fewer instances than is proper, and from those only 
which are then present. But an induction that would be useful to the 
discovery and demonstration of the sciences and arts, ought to distin- 
guish nature through proper rejections and exclusions, and then, after 
a sufficient number of negative instances have been adduced, to draw 
the conclusion upon the positive ones." 



892 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

to the despotism of bigotry and ignorance ; the other cuts 
us off from all hope in the future. The one affirms the 
majesty of ancient authorities ; the other denies all farther 
improvement. 

In opposition to both, Philosophy affirms that she will re- 
ceive nothing which she has not tested by the principles of 
human Reason ; and that she will dare to receive every 
thing which she has thus tested. 

The above are the chief Fallacies, given in brief, which 
belong to this division. They will be found upon reflection 
to comprise a violation of the Principles of Elimination laid 
down under Inductive Logic ; for, the aim of those princi- 
ples is to provide a test for sequences in general, so that 
we may determine amid the mass of phenomena, which are 
properly related as Antecedents and Consequents. 

III. Fallacies in iNnucTiNG- Laws. 

We have seen that the tests of a Law are its sufficiency 
to account for the phenomena, its characteristics of univer- 
sality and necessity, and its correspondence to an Idea. 
Now we note as a Fallacy under this head : 

First, The confounding of a general fact with a law, 
— To establish a general Fact, is to establish a uniform 
order of sequence in relation to certain phenomena ; e. g, 
the influence of the sun and moon upon the tides. The 
law under which this particular sequence is comprehended 
is the law of gravitation taken in connection with the pecu- 
liar interior constitution of fluids, which causes them to 
yield to an influence which does not affect the solid parts of 
the earth in the same manner. It is common to call the 
general facts laws ; and thus the two lines of investigation 
are not clearly distinguished. This, perhaps, is not so strictly 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 393 

a Fallacy in Induction, as a confusion in the end aimed at, 
and which may lead to fallacious inductions. A general 
fact viewed in itself is contingent ; it receives higher char- 
acteristics only when viewed as an exponent of Law, and 
then of course is distinguished from it. But a perfect 
method of philosophising demands that it keep its true place 
in every stage of the induction, and thus, instead of shut- 
ting up investigation, it becomes a means of leading it on 
to its last results. 

Secondly. The great Fallacy, and one which has been al- 
luded to more than once in this work, is, the separation of 
Observation and Ideas. This Fallacy has two modes, ac- 
cordingly as it reposes upon Ideas independently of ob- 
servation, or as it employs observation independently of 
Ideas. 

The true logical developement of Ideas takes place in con- 
nection with the reality of Nature ; and the laws of Nature 
are discovered and expounded only in the light of Ideas. 
The first mode of the Fallacy, therefore, shows itself in 
splendid but obscure conceptions of the order of Nature ; 
while the other presents us collections of sequences without 
system. 

Fallacies in respect to Intuition. 

I have already remarked,* that in the sphere of Intuitive 
Truths falsehood cannot well find place, because the charac- 
teristics of these truths are so clear and decided ; and be- 
cause if there be falsehood here, there can be no absolute test 
of Truth. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that 

* Primordial Logic. Idea of Truth, pp. 198, 199. 

B B* 



394 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

affirmations have been made, apparently with an intuitive 
positiveness, which afterwards have been totally set aside ; 
e. g. The celebrated philosophical maxim, that, " A thing 
cannot act where it is not." Even Newton, in order to 
escape the force of this maxim in its bearing upon the law 
of gravitation, imagines a subtle ether diffused through the 
space between the sun and the planets, as a mediate cause ; 
affirming that, " It is inconceivable that inanimate brute 
matter should, without the mediation of something else, 
which is not material, operate upon and affect other mat- 
ter without mutual contact" He even pronounces it " so 
great an absurdity," that he cannot believe that any man, 
u who in philosophical matters has a competent faculty of 
thinking, can ever fall into it."* And yet in our day the 
most philosophical minds do not perceive it to be at all in- 
credible that the sun and planets can act upon each other 
through the intervening space without an)'- medium what- 
ever. 

It would appear from this and similar instances that might 
be adduced, that there are Fallacies in respect to Intuition. 
I say Fallacies in respect to Intuition, for fallacious intuitions 
there cannot be. An Intuition carries with it its own 
truth, it is necessary and absolute ; to deny it is to belie 
Reason itself, and to destroy the possibility of certainty. 
What was said, therefore, under the " Idea of Truth," as 
above referred to, I conceive to be impregnable. 

But the question still remains, How are we to account 
for Fallacies in respect to Intuition ? If it be granted that 



* See Playfair's Dissertation on the Progress of Mathematical and 
Physical Science. 



njauuciTvE logic. 395 

an intuitive truth cannot be disputed, how can a false 
maxim put on, to appearance, the characteristics of such a 
truth? 

In the first place, there is to be remarked an ambiguity 
in the word " inconceivable ;" it may be taken either abso- 
lutely or relatively ; the absolutely inconceivable is the con- 
tradictory of all rational conception, and therefore equiva- 
lent to the impossible ; the relatively inconceivable, on the 
other hand, is only the opposite of the particular con- 
ceptions of an individual, of a class, or of an age. Now 
nothing is more common than men adhering to even wild 
and puerile maxims, and denying whatever lies beyond the 
range of their immediate experience with the utmost posi- 
tiveness and pertinacity ; this undoubtedly is owing to the 
undeveloped state of their minds, and the tyranny of pre- 
judice. 

This fallacy is one which we have already noticed under a 
preceding head.* Philosophers, it must be confessed, have 
given us similar examples : having embraced certain dog- 
mas, and committed themselves to maintain them, they 
manifest the utmost certainty of conviction, and that too 
with great sincerity. It follows, therefore, that in maintain- 
ing false maxims, men may assert with great earnestness, 
and apparent strength of belief, and may use the epithets 
" absurd" and " inconceivable," only because of their edu- 
cation, prejudices, and point of view. Now suppose these 
same men to be relieved from all these hindrances, and to 
occupy the same relative ground that we do, with whom 
their fondly cherished maxims are exploded, would it not be 

* p. 391. 



S96 DEtouctivE Logic. 

possible for them to believe as we do ? And would they not 
see that they had before occupied a fallacious position, but 
that, now, they had attained to the right one ? While in 
error, we are often very confident, and may be even so much 
so, as to think that our judgments are intuitive ; but when 
we really attain the truth, then we see plainly enough that 
those confident errors had not the strength and clearness of 
intuition. We are now in a condition to make a compari- 
son ; before, we were not. Notwithstanding all the mis- 
takes we may make, there is such a thing as perceiving 
absolute truth, and knowing that we are right. 

In the second place, we can account for these pretended 
intuitions by a want of developement in the Ideas which 
govern the sphere in which they appear. The maxim 
above mentioned was founded upon an erroneous conception 
of Causes ; showing that the Idea of Cause was not clearly 
developed in the minds of those who advocated it. Now it 
is the clearer developement of this Idea which enables us to 
conceive of the mutual attractions of the sun and the planets 
without any medium in the intervening space ; nor can we 
ever again conceive such a medium to be necessary.* 

All the Fallacies which arise in respect to intuition have 
their origin unquestionably in a want of philosophical de- 
velopement ; for Philosophy is not merely a system of truths 
and a law of method, but a state of the Reason in man. Just 
as this developement advances, does the vision of Truth be- 
come brighter and brighter unto the perfect day. But that 
perfect day is still to us an object of hope, and ever shall 
be, until we reach that Uncreated Light, in which we shall 
see Light itself. 

* Primordial Logic, Sec. VII., and particularly p. 230. 



BOOK IV. 

THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION I. 

NATURE OF PROOF. 



When we have arrived at judgments, we may state them 
in the form of Propositions or Theorems, and then subjoin to 
them the Logical Process by which they have been deter- 
mined. This is called the order of Proof. 

Opposed to the order of Proof is the order of Investigation, 
When we are searching after Truth we pursue the order of 
Investigation ; we employ our Intuitions, or the knowledge 
we may have already gained ; we make observations and ex- 
periments ; we compare ; we generalize ; we meditate ; we 
employ Induction and Deduction ; and when Truth appears, 
it appears as a Conclusion. The truths at which we thus 
arrive are entirely new, or were before but dimly seen as 
conjectures or theories. 

When we undertake to prove a proposition, we either 
know it to be true or false, or we are uncertain of its char- 
acter. 

1. If we know it to be true, then we must be acquainted 
with the investigation upon which it rests ; and to prove it, 



398 THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE. 

will be only to subjoin that process of investigation, accord, 
ding to Logical formulae, or, at least, in strict accordance 
with logical principles. 

2. If we know it to be false, then we must see that it is 
either deduced from false premises or is a false deduction. 
To prove it false, therefore, will require either an exposi- 
tion of its premises, or a statement of the fallacious syllo- 
gism. 

3. If we are uncertain of its character, we proceed to 
test it. The method of testing it will depend upon the na- 
ture of the proposition. 

1. If the proposition affirm an Antecedent, we test it by 
searching whether it stands as a necessary or probable con- 
dition to the existence of any known Consequents. 2. If the 
proposition affirm a consequent, we test it by searching 
whether any known antecedents involve it. In doing this 
we have to apply the principles of elimination laid down in 
Inductive Logic. 

We have here, then, two kinds of proof developed which 
are defined according to the nature of the connection which 
they hold to propositions to be proved. 

1. When the proof holds to the proposition to be proved, 
the relation of Antecedent to Consequent, or of Principle or 
Law to phenomena, as in its nature enveloping them, — it 
is called a priori ; i. e. I prove that such consequents, or 
such phenomena as the proposition affirms to exist, must 
exist, because an antecedent or principle exists which in- 
volves them. 

In this case, when the argument is reduced to the form of 
a syllogism, the antecedents or principles from which we 
prove the phenomena or consequents, form the premises : 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 399 

and the physical and logical sequences are said to corfes* 
pond. 

2. When the proof holds to the proposition to be proved, 
the relation of phenomena to law, or to necessary condition ; 
in other words, the relation of consequent to a necessary 
principle or antecedent, it is called a posteriori ; i. e. I 
prove that the antecedent or principle which the proposition 
affirms to exist, must exist, because phenomena exist, 
which demand the former as the necessary condition 
of their existence ; in some cases as explaining the very 
fact of their existence, — in others, the mode of their exis- 
tence. 

When the a 'posteriori argument is reduced to the form 
of a syllogism, the phenomena or consequents constitute the 
premises, and the physical and logical sequences are op- 
posed. 

These two methods of proving, although introduced 
above in immediate connection with uncertain propositions, 
or those whose character remains to be tested, embrace 
likewise the preceding cases. When I am myself certain 
of the character of a proposition, in representing that char- 
acter to another, that is, in proving it to him, I must neces- 
sarily adopt one or the other of these methods, according to 
the nature of the proposition, as above stated. 

This is manifest from a comparison of these methods 
with the two great forms of reasoning, the Deductive and 
Inductive. 

To prove a priori is to prove a consequent from an ante- 
cedent, a phenomenon from a law, by showing that the ante- 
cedent and law involve the consequent and the phenome- 
non. This corresponds to Deduction in its principle, for 



400 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

it is the containing whole determining the particular or par- 
ticulars contained. 

Again : To prove a posteriori is to prove an antecedent 
from a consequent, a law from phenomena, by showing that 
the existence of the consequent or of the phenomena can 
be accounted for only by the admission of the antecedent, 
or the law which the proposition affirms. This corresponds 
to Induction in its principle ; for it is the particular or par- 
ticulars determining the whole, as that which comprehends 
them and contains the cause and law of their being. 

To prove, therefore, is to reverse the order of Investiga- 
tion. 

In the latter, we are searching after unknown truths ; in 
the former, we are seeking to establish known truths. Both 
processes comprehend the same principles, and essentially 
the same materials ; only, that in the order of investigation, 
many steps are merely tentative, and give no positive re- 
sults ; while in the order of proof, where the whole of the pre- 
ceding investigation is before the mind, nothing but what is 
essentially constitutive of the argument is selected and ap- 
propriated. Where we test an uncertain proposition, there 
are tentative steps, and investigation and proof are in some 
degree commingled. 

The a priori method of proving must not be confounded 
with a priori principles. The former assumes antecedents, 
which involve the consequents to be proved by them, with- 
out any reference to the logical property of the antece- 
dents. But when principles are designated as a priori, we 
have direct reference to their logical property. By an a 
priori principle, we mean a principle which has not its ori- 
gin in the sense y but in the pure Reason. Sense or experi- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 401 

ence is a necessary condition of its developement, i, e. the 
reason would would not go into action to develope the prin- 
ciple, were not an experience given as a datum ; but when 
the principle is developed, we then clearly see that the ex- 
perience itself would not have been possible had not the 
principle had a prior existence ; e. g. body and space, phe- 
nomena and cause — space and cause being a priori revealed, 
upon condition of body and phenomena ; but when revealed, 
we see there could have been no experience of body and 
phenomena, had not space and cause had a prior existence. 
Ideas, and all first truths and axioms, are, therefore, a, priori 
principles. 



402 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE* 



SECTION II. 

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI PROOF. 

All the other forms of Evidence or Proof may be reduced 
to the a priori and the a posteriori. 

I. Testimony. — This belongs to the a posteriori. The 
testimony given is a fact which demands as the condition 
of its existence the truth of what it affirms, unless other 
conditions can be shown satisfactorily to account for it. 

II. Concurrent Testimony. — The concurrence is a fact 
which can be accounted for, only by admitting the truth of 
the testimony. 

III. Argument from progressive approach, e. g, the law 
of vis inerlice may be proved in this way. This is like- 
wise a posteriori proof. The facts of the progressive ap- 
proach are supposed to be accounted for, only by admitting 
the existence of the law. 

IV. Proving by example or fact is a posteriori, because 
it is establishing some point as the condition or necessary 
antecedent of the example or fact. Sometimes the a priori 
is united with the a posteriori ; when, from inducted ex- 
amples, we establish a principle, and then again apply this 
principle to a particular instance. 

The whole process is not usually put down, but we go 
elliptically from the inducted examples to the particular 
conclusion, suppressing the formal statement of the general 
principle which intervenes in the mental process. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 403 

Simple reasoning from example is nothing more than 
inductive reasoning. 

V. Reasoning from experience,— -This is reasoning either 
from the past and present to the future, or from the pre- 
sent to the past. When we reason from the past and present 
to the future, we show d priori what the future must be from 
the causes which have been, and now are, at work. When 
we reason from the present to the past, we show a posteriori 
what the past must have been from the facts now existing. 

VI. Reasoning from resemblance and analogy, 

1. Resemblance. — Resemblance is distinguished from 
identity by admitted differences ; identity excludes differ- 
ences. Now, reasoning from resemblance is reasoning either 
from the differences or the agreements of the two parallel 
cases ; i. e. the actually existing agreements are shown to in- 
volve other points of agreement, or the actually existing dif- 
ferences are shown to involve other points of difference. 
This is done d priori, or d posteriori, according to the nature 
of the case ; d priori, when the existing facts of resemblance 
or difference are antecedents to those which are to be proved 
from them ; and d posteriori, when the existing facts of re- 
semblance or difference are sequences of those to be proved 
from them. 

2. Analogy. — This is not direct or simple resemblance, 
but a resemblance of relations, or a resemblance of circum- 
stances in a common relation. In simple resemblance there 
are only two terms ; in analogy, there are three and four. 

1. Where there are three terms, there is a relation of two 
to a common third. This is a resemblance of circumstan- 
ces in a common relation. In this case, our object is 
either — the analogy being granted — to prove circum- 



404 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

stances in one relation by resembling circumstances in the 
other relation, or to prove the common relation or analogy 
itself, by the resembling circumstances. Where we wish 
to prove circumstances in one relation by resembling cir- 
cumstances in the others, the reasoning is d priori or a pos- 
teriori, according to the nature of the relation between the 
existing particulars and those to be proved ; — e. g, an analogy 
is granted to exist between mind and body, as respects edu- 
cation ;— their developement has a common relation to exer- 
cise. Now, there are many resembling circumstances in 
this common relation, and these circumstances may be 
made a basis of reasoning to the existence of other circum- 
stances of resemblance after the a priori or a posteriori me- 
thod, as the nature of the connection shall determine. 

Where we wish to prove the common relation, or the 
analogy itself, from the resembling circumstances, we pro- 
ceed according to the a posteriori method. The resembling 
circumstances are shown to require the analogy as the con- 
dition of their existence ; — e. g. Butler's Analogy : here the 
common relation of Revelation and the Universe to God is 
shown, from the resembling circumstances ; and objections 
to the first answered, by showing that similar objections 
must lie against the second. 

2. Where there are four terms, there is a resemblance of 
relations. If this resemblance is granted, then we proceed 
d priori to prove results; — e. g. it being granted that an ana- 
logy exists between the relation of a king to his subjects, 
and of a father to his children, we may prove d priori that 
a king must guard and guide his people, and yield his per- 
sonal interests to their wants. 

If we wish to prove an analogy of relations from facts, 



THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE. 405 

we proceed a posteriori. The establishment of such an 
analogy is like the establishment of a general principle by 
induction ; and the analogy thus established is employed 
like a principle in reaching new conclusions. 

Indeed, the analogy always contains a principle. In the 
first case, that of a common relation of two terms to a 
third, this third, on the & priori method, is the principle 
enveloping the circumstances of the other two ; and, on 
the a posteriori method, is the principle evolved from the 
circumstances of the other two. In the second case, that 
of the resembling relations of four terms, when we pro. 
ceed a priori, we assume a principle which envelopes and 
accounts for these relations ; and when we proceed a pos* 
teriori, although we stop short, usually, when we have estab- 
lished so many circumstances of resemblance as, to com- 
mon and general apprehension, demand an analogy to ac- 
count for them, still the analogy itself is but the exponent of 
a principle. The same holds true with respect to all rea- 
soning from resemblance : the resemblance is taken as the 
exponent of a law. In order to make this plain, let it be re- 
marked that in reasoning from simple resemblance, — L e. of 
two terms, or from analogy of three or four terms — there is 
always a comparison of certain circumstances in one term 
or relation to resembling circumstances in the other term 
or relation. Now, in the first term, or relation, — that is, the 
one from which we reason, — we find these certain circum- 
stances to be connected a priori or a posteriori with other 
circumstances ; and then passing over to the second term 
or relation to the resembling circumstances there found, 
we infer that these must likewise be a priori or a posteriori, 
as the case may be, connected with other circumstances, 



406 THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE. 

like those other circumstances referred to in the first. 
But why do we infer this 1 The answer is obvious. Na- 
ture is uniform in her operations, and therefore the re- 
sembling circumstances in the second term or relation 
form an exponent of the same law operating here, which 
is known to have produced those other circumstances in the 
first term or relation : — i. e. on the a priori principle of the 
uniformity of nature, as the ultimate basis of the reasoning, 
we assume the same law to envelope both terms, or both 
relations. 

The same is true, when, from resembling circumstances, 
we aim to establish an analogy, or a strict resemblance. 
We then say, inasmuch as nature is uniform in her opera- 
tions, these resembling circumstances can be accounted for 
only by referring them to the same law as governing the 
two terms, or relations. 

VII. Reasoning from axioms and definitions. — This is 
usually called Demonstrative Reasoning, or simply Demon- 
stration. This reasoning is, plainly a priori ; for all the 
conclusions are wrapped up in the axioms and definitions, 
and are, therefore, determined by them in a necessary and j 
absolute relation of consequents to antecedents. The prin- 
ciples here, are necessary and a priori principles, and all 
the conclusions exhibit but their manifold unfoldings. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 40* 



SECTION III. 

OF THE NATURE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN ANTECEDENTS AND 
CONSEQUENTS. 

We have seen that all the different modes of proof are 
comprehended under those two, — the it priori and the iipos. 
teriori. The a priori is the proof of a consequent by an 
antecedent, which involves it. The a posteriori is the proof 
of an antecedent by a consequent, which demands it as the 
condition of its own existence. But the question must here 
arise, What is the nature of that connection which exists 
between the two terms of antecedent and consequent? It 
cannot be a mere juxtaposition in time or space, because 
this juxtaposition may be arbitrary or accidental, and there- 
fore form no basis of certainty, or even of probability. It 
is obvious that the connection must be of a nature to de- 
mand the existence of the one when the existence of the 
other is granted. Hence, let it be observed, that in our 
explication of the a priori and the a posteriori, we were 
careful to point out this connection as a connection of an- 
tecedent and consequent, or of a principle in necessary re- 
lation to comprehended particulars, or of a condition with- 
out which the consequent could not have existed. But all 
these different forms of expression do really refer to rela- 
tions of the same nature, viz. either the relation of cause 
and effect, or of law and phenomena, or of first truths 
and their necessary consequences. When we attain to 
merely uniform sequences, as general facts, the uniformity 
we assume to be comprehended by some law and necessi- 



408 THE DOCTKINE OP EVIDENCE • 

tated by it. Cause of course is all-pervading, and therefore 
always implied ; but is not the great object of investigation, 
as has been before shown.* The consequent, then, whether 
regarded as an effect, or a particular comprehended under 
law, or an inference arising from an axiom, is really con- 
tained in its antecedent ; so that the affirmation of the lat- 
ter comprehends the affirmation of the former ; and the ex- 
istence of the former proves the latter, when, by applying 
the principles of elimination,^ or by tracing upwards the 
necessary sequence, it is shown that the former depends 
upon the latter. 

A condition, without which a consequent could not have 
existed, is not always an immediate antecedent ; as when we 
say of a tender plant, that it was destroyed, because the 
servant carelessly left it out of doors during a frosty night. 
Here we do not assign the carelessness of the servant as 
the immediate antecedent of the destruction of the plant ; 
but still, it was the immediate antecedent of the exposure 
of the plant ; and, had it not been left out of doors, it would 
not have been destroyed. In this case, there is a series of 
antecedents and consequents, all of which are necessary to 
account for the effect; but, instead of stating the whole series, 
we put down a remote antecedent as the condition of the 
last effect, and form thus an abbreviated form of expression 
for the whole. But the reasoning depends upon the rela- 
tions we have given above. 

The cardinal principles involved in the foregoing, axiom- 
atically expressed, are, 

1. " Every phenomenon must have its cause and its law." 

* Supra, p. 246. t p. 381, 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 409 

2. " Nature is uniform in her operations." 

This uniformity is the uniformity of the action of causes, 
as regulated by wise laws: and the uniformity of nature, 
therefore, may be expressed as follows : 

" Like antecedents involve like consequents ;" and 

" Like consequents imply like antecedents ;"* 

Or, to give it a more general expression, 

" Cause is immutably regulated in time and space ;" e. g. 
fire — gravitation — magnetism. 

3. " Whatever is predicated of the Whole is predicated 
of all the parts contained under it." 

Upon these three principles all the different kinds of proof 
above explained are based. 

In all the different forms of the a posteriori, we prove an- 
tecedents from consequents or phenomena. But, obviously, 
we cannot proceed in this proof, unless we assume that 
" Every phenomenon must have its cause and its law ;" and 
"That law governs uniformly." 

In the a priori, likewise, where we prove consequents or 
phenomena by antecedents, we cannot proceed without as- 
suming that " Every cause is governed by law uniformly." 



* p. 294. 
cc 



410 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION IV. # 



OF DEGREES OF EVIDENCE. 

The terms necessary, possible, contingent, and impossible, 
refer to the nature of the connection between a given an- 
tecedent and consequent. The terms certain, probable, and 
presumptive, refer to our knowledge of this connection. 

A necessary connection between the two is one determined 
by absolute law ; e. g. the connection between an Idea and 
an Axiom, as the Idea of space and the axiom of the three 
dimensions in space ; the connection between an axiom and 
consequences deduced from it ; the connection between the 
law of gravitation and the phenomena of nature ; the con- 
nection between the premises and conclusion of a syllogism ; 
and so on. 

A possible connection is one which no law absolutely pre- 
vents ; and which might take place by an adequate power 
which we know to exist, but which, at the same time, may 
not appear probable* It is therefore a contingent connec- 
tion. 

A contingent connection implies a law in relation to a 
cause which may or may not be governed by it. It is the 
opposite of a necessary connection. There is no contin- 
gency in the connection between natural causes and laws, and 
their phenomena. Contingency is found only in the con- 
nection between a Free Will, and motives consisting of 
Moral Laws, Reasons, and Inducements.* 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. t>2. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 411 

An impossible connection, is one prevented by law ; — e.g. 
that a stone thrown into the air should remain suspended 
there, or that a mass of solid iron should float in water, or 
that a part should be greater than a whole, or that 2 + 2 = 5. 

Impossibility is of two kinds, logical and physical. The 
first is a connection which would contravene Ideas and Axi- 
oms, and laws founded in them. Such a connection is an 
impossibility in itself, — e. g. that a part is greater than a 
whole, that there are four dimensions in space, or that 
2+2 = 5. A physical impossibility is the impossibility of 
any phenomena in contravention of physical laws. While 
these laws exist, or remain unsuspended, their proper phe- 
nomena must take place. But Omnipotence may suspend 
or modify these laws. This of course is a miracle or wonder. 

The other set of terms, we have said, refers to our know- 
ledge of any supposed connection between an antecedent 
and consequent. 

To an Omniscient Being there are no degrees of know- 
ledge. Such a Being sees, with the utmost clearness, the 
necessary and the contingent, the actual and the possible. 
To such a Being, all knowledge is certain. It is only to 
the knowledges which belong to beings like ourselves that 
the terms presumptive and probable can be applied ; it is 
only of such knowledges that degrees of certainty can be 
affirmed. 

There are then to us three kinds of certainty, according 
to the nature of the connection between the terms which 
are the object of proof. 

First. Absolute certainty. This is based upon the neces- 
sary connection between the two terms. Our knowledge 
of Ideas and Axioms is absolutely certain, — e. g. time and 



412 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

space ; that every body is in space. So also our knowledge 
of deductions from axioms is absolutely certain, as in ge- 
ometry, for example. Our knowledge of the connection 
between the premises and conclusion of a syllogism is of 
the same nature : this is sometimes called logical certainty. 

Secondly. Physical certainty. This is the certainty 
which lies in the connection between established physical 
antecedents and sequents, as exhibited in the phenomena of 
gravitation, heat, chemical affinities, mechanical forces, and 
so on. 

Now, the Reason does not conceive of this connection as 
necessarily fixed with an absolute necessity, because it ulti- 
mately depends upon the Will of God ; and the same Will 
which ordained it, can change, suspend, or even annihi- 
late it. 

When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be physically 
certain, we mean that our knowledge of it is based upon 
physical, and not upon necessary relations. 

Thirdly. Moral certainty. This is the certainty which 
lies between the connection of Motive and Will. By Will, 
we mean a self-conscious, intelligent and sensitive cause, 
or a cause in a triunity with Reason and Sensitivity. It is 
in the fullest sense a cause per se ; that is, it contains with- 
in itself proper efficiency, and determines its own direction. 
By Motives, we mean the reasons and inducements, in view 
of which the Will acts.* In general, all activity proceeds 
according to rules, or laws, or reasons, for they have essen- 
tially the same meaning : but in mere material masses, the 
law is not contemplated by the acting force ; it is contempla- 
ted only by the Intelligence which ordained and conditioned 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. 138. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE, 413 

the force. In spirit, on the contrary, the activity which 
we call Will, is self-conscious, and is connected with a per- 
ception and sense of the reasons and inducements, or ends, 
or motives of actions. These motives are of two kinds : 

First. Those found in the ideas of the practical reason, 
which decides what is fit and right. These are reasons of 
supreme authority. 

Secondly. Those found in the understanding and sensi- 
tivity ; i. e. the immediately useful and expedient, and the 
gratification of the passions. These are right only when 
subordinate to the first. 

Now, these reasons and inducements are a light to the 
Will, and serve to guide its activities* The human con- 
science, which is but the Reason, under its practical func- 
tion, in relation to the moral, has drawn up for the Will 
explicit rules, suited to all circumstances and relations, 
which are called ethics, or the rules. And so, on the other 
hand, the understanding, by which we mean the Reason, 
under its practical function, in relation to mere utility, has 
formed rules of prudence or expediency. The law of the 
sensitivity, taken in itself, is unique ; it is simply " To do 
whatever is most agreeable or pleasing to itself " 

These various rules the Will is not compelled or necessi- 
tated to obey. In every volition it is conscious of a power 
to do, or not to do. 

In the moral harmony and purity of the soul, the three 
kinds above named do not conflict with each other. The 
right has utility as an ultimate and certain result. The 
soul loves the right, in this state, because it is right, and 
reposes quietly in hope of the consequences. And all the 
passions find their highest gratification in obeying the law 



414 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

of the right. Hence moral certainty, as to the actions of 
moral beings, can exist only where the harmony of the 
spiritual being is preserved in a perfect, or at least paramount 
degree : e. g. God, and good angels, and good men. In 
God, moral certainty is perfect. His dispositions are infi- 
nitely pure, and His Will freely determines to do right ; it 
is not compelled or necessitated, for then His infinite meri- 
toriousness would cease. Moral certainty is not absolute, 
because Will being a power to do, or not to do, there is al- 
ways a possibility, although it may be an infinite improba- 
bility, that the Will may disobey the laws of the Reason. 

In the case of good angels, and good men, the moral cer- 
tainty is such, as to be attended with no apprehension of a 
dereliction. 

With respect to such men as Joseph, Daniel, Paul, How- 
ard, and Washington, we can calculate, with a very high 
and satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in which 
they will act in any given circumstances involving the in- 
fluence of motives. We know they will obey truth, justice, 
and mercy, that is, the first class of motives ; and the second, 
only so far as they are authorised by the first. 

If the first class of motives is forsaken, then human con- 
duct must be calculated according to the influence of the 
second class. 

Human character, however, is mixed and variously com- 
pounded. We might make a scale of an indefinite num- 
ber of degrees, from the highest point of moral excellence 
to the lowest point of moral degradation, and then our pre- 
dictions of human conduct would vary with every degree. 

In any particular case, where we are called upon to reason 
from the connection of motives with the will, it is evident 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 415 

we must determine the character of the individual as accu- 
rately as possible, in order to know the probable resultant 
of the opposite moral forces which we are likely to find. 

We have remarked that moral certainty exists only where 
the harmony of the moral constitution is preserved. Here 
we know the Right will be obeyed. It may, however, be 
remarked in addition to this, that moral certainty may be 
said to exist in the case of the lowest moral degradation, 
where the Right is forsaken. Here the rule is, " To do 
whatever is most agreeable," and " Whatever is useful in 
the immediate or temporal consequences." The volition, 
indeed, in such instances seems merged into a mere sense 
of present gratification. But, in the intermediate state, 
lies the wide field of probability. What is commonly called 
the knowledge of human nature, and esteemed of most im- 
portance in the affairs of human life, is not the knowledge 
of human nature as it ought to be, but as it is, in its vast 
variety of good and evil. We gain this knowledge from 
consciousness, from observation, and from history. What 
human nature ought to be, we learn from Reason and Re- 
velation. 

Will has already been represented as forming a triunity 
with the Reason and the Sensitivity, and in the constitu- 
tion of our being; is designed to derive its rules and induce- 
to o 

ments of action from these. Acts, which are in the direc- 
tion of neither reason nor sensitivity, must be very trifling 
acts ; and therefore, although possible, we may conclude 
they are very rare. In calculating, then, future acts of 
will, we may, like the Mathematicians, drop infinitesimal 
differences, and assume that all acts of the will are in the 
direction of the reason, or of the sensitivity, or of both in 



416 THE DOCTRINE OE EVIDENCE. 

their harmony. Although the will is conscious of power to 
do, out of the direction of both the reason and the sensitivity, 
still in the triunity in which it exists, it submits itself to the 
general interests of the being, and consults the authority of 
conscience, or the enjoyments of passion. Now every in- 
dividual has formed for himself habits and a character, more 
or less fixed. He is known to have submitted himself from 
day to day, and in a great variety of transactions, to the 
law3 of conscience ; and hence we conclude, that he has 
formed a fixed purpose of doing right. He has exhibited, 
too, on many occasions, noble, generous, and pure feelings 5 
and hence we conclude that his sensitivity, in a predomi- 
nant degree, harmonises with conscience. Or, he is known 
to have violated the laws of the conscience from day to 
day, and in a great variety of transactions ; and hence we 
conclude that he has formed a fixed purpose of doing 
wrong ; and that his sensitivity is in conflict with the 
reason. 

In both cases supposed, and, in like manner, in all sup- 
posable cases, there is plainly a basis, on which, in any given 
circumstances, we may foresee and predict the volitions, and 
consequently the actions of men. 

There is something " that is evident, and now existent, 
with which the future existence of the contingent event is 
connected." On the one hand, these predictions exert no 
necessitating influence over the events, for they are entirely 
disconnected with the causation of the events ; and, on 
the other hand, the events need not be assumed as necessary, 
in order to become the objects of probable calculations. If 
they were necessary, in any sense, the calculations could 
no longer be merely probable ; they would, on the contrary, 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 417 

take the precision and certainty of the calculation of 
eclipses and other phenomena based upon necessary laws. 

But these calculations can aim only at moral certainty, 
because they are made according to the generally known 
and received determinations of will in a triunity with the 
reason and the sensitivity ; but still, a will which is known, 
also, to have the power to depart at any moment from the 
line of determination which it has established for itself. 
Thus the calculations which we make respecting the con- 
duct of one man in given circumstances, based upon his 
known integrity, and the calculations which we make re- 
specting another, based upon his known dishonesty, 
may alike disappoint us, through the unexpected, though 
possible dereliction of the first, and the unexpected, 
though possible reformation of the latter. 

When we reason from moral effects to moral causes, or 
from moral causes to moral effects ; as, for example, in testi- 
mony, where we reason from the fact of the testimony to the 
motive which led to the testimony, — we cannot regard the 
operation of causes as positive and uniform under the 
same law of necessity which appertains to physical 
causes ; because, in moral causality, the free will is the 
efficient and last determiner. It is indeed true, that 
we reason here with a high degree of probability, 
— with a probability sufficient to regulate wisely and 
harmoniously the affairs of society ; but we cannot reason 
respecting human conduct as we reason respecting the phe- 
nomena of the physical world, since it is possible for the 
human will to disappoint calculations based upon the ordi- 
nary influence of motives ; e* g. The motive does not hold 
the same relation to will which fire holds to a combustible 
c c* 



418 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

substance. The fire must burn; the will may or may not 
determine in view of the motive. 

Hence, the reason why in common parlance probable 
evidence has received the name of moral evidence ; moral 
evidence being always probable — all probable evidence is 
called moral.* 

Next after certainty, we must consider probability. 

By the probable, we mean that which nas not attained to 
certainty, but which, nevertheless, has grounds on which it 
claims to be believed. We call it probable or proveable, 
because it both has proof, and is still under conditions of 
proof, that is, admits of still farther proof. 

That which is certain, has all the proof of which the case 
admits. A mathematical proposition is certain on the 
ground of necessity, and admits of no higher proof than that 
which really demonstrates its truth. The Divine volitions 
are certain on the ground of the Divine perfections, and ad- 
mit of no higher proof than what is found in these perfec- 
tions. The volitions of a good created being are certain 
on the ground of the purity of such a being, and admit of 
no higher proof than what is found in this purity. 

But when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being of 
Reason, and of a Sensitivity corrupted totally, or in differ- 
ent degrees, then we have place not for certainty, but for 
probability. As our knowledge of the future or the past vo- 
litions of such a being can only be gathered from something 
now existent, this knowledge will depend upon our know- 
ledge of the present relative state of his reason and sensi- 
tivity. But a perfect knowledge of this state is in no case 

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 261—369. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 419 

supposable, so that, although our actual knowledge of this 
being may be such as to afford us proof of what his volitions 
may be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may be 
increased indefinitely by close observation and study, so 
likewise will the proof be increased. According to the de- 
finition of probability above given, therefore, our knowledge 
of the future or past volitions of an imperfect being can 
only amount to probable knowledge. 

The direction of the probabilities will be determined by 
the preponderance of the good or the bad in the mixed being 
supposed. But the state of the Reason itself must be con- 
sidered. If the Reason or Conscience be in a highly de- 
veloped state, and the convictions of the right consequently 
clear and strong, there may be probabilities of volitions in 
opposition to passion, which cannot exist where the Reason 
is undeveloped, and subject to the errors and prejudices of 
custom and superstition. The difference is that which is 
commonly known under the terms " Enlightened and un- 
enlightened conscience." 

With a given state of the Reason and the Sensitivity, 
the direction of the probabilities will depend also very much 
upon the correlated, or upon the opposing objects and cir- 
cumstances.* 

We have spoken of Probability thus far only in reference 
to human volition and actions, since here is the great field 
of probability. It evidently applies to other subjects also : 
it applies wherever the connection between an antecedent 
and consequent is contingent, or appears to us to be so. 

We have pointed out several terms which refer to the 

* Review ut supra, pp. 291 — 3. 



420 THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE. 

nature of the connection between antecedents and conse- 
quents, viz., necessary, consequent, 'possible, and impossible ; 
and several others which refer to our knowledge of that con- 
nection, viz., certain, probable, and presumptive. 

Now these terms answer to each other. A necessary con- 
nection of antecedents and consequents, or of any two 
terms, is the ground of absolute certainty of knowledge. In 
the connection of physical antecedents and consequents 
there is a relative necessity, i. e. this connection is neces- 
sary while the system of nature remains unchanged ; but 
as such a change is possible by the Divine Will, the certainty 
of knowledge here is called physical, and not absolute. 

An impossible connection involves the Idea of necessity. 
Hence, when a connection is seen to be impossible, our 
knowledge that it will not take place is absolutely or physi- 
cally certain, according to the nature of the antecedents 
and consequents connected. 

Answering to a contingent connection between antecedent 
and consequent, we have a probable knowledge. We have 
indeed spoken of a moral certainty in respect to the voli- 
tions of pure beings. But the nature of the evidence in 
these cases is not changed. Moral certainty still admits a 
possibility in the opposing scale ; but the grounds of belief 
are so stable and conclusive as to leave no room for doubt. 
Generically considered, moral certainty is probable know- 
ledge. 

Again, answering to a possible connection between ante- 
cedents and consequents, our knowledge is presumptive. A 
possible connection is a contingent one, also ; it may or it 
may not be. The difference between this case and the pre- 
ceding, i. e. where a contingent connection of antecedents 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 421 

and consequents has a probable knowledge answering to it, is 
as follows : In the preceding there is always a certain 
amount of proof for or against the connection, with at least 
a possibility in the opposing scale. Frequently the proba- 
bilities on either side are so rife, that a nice judgment is re- 
quired in determining the preponderance. 

But where the connection is said to be merely possible, 
there is no proof for or against, as yet, adduced ; and then, 
according to the point of view at which we stand in rela- 
tion to it, we are said to have a presumptive knowledge 
that the connection does or does not exist. As soon as 
proof is adduced, a probability arises on one side or the 
other. 

But, while there is no probability, to which side does the 
presumption belong ? This, I have said, depends upon the 
point of view at which we stand. And this point of view 
must itself be determined on some fit principle ; for it is, by 
no means, a matter of indifference. Where a question 
arises between two parties, it must necessarily be so put as 
to involve an affirmative and a negative ; and the presump- 
tion will then be said to lie in favour of the affirmative or 
the negative. Now the point of view is determined : 

1. By the previous state of the question. If it has by old 
opinions or established usage been settled in the affirmative 
or negative, then from this point must it be viewed. Inde- 
pendently of all argument, and of all inherent probability, 
there is a presumption in favour of the old opinion, and the 
established usage. He who attacks the question is said to 
assume the burden of proof ; and, unless he can bring proof 
to the contrary, the old decision must stand. 

2. The point of view is determined by any natural right 



422 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE* 

which may chance to be involved in the question, such as 
the right of life, liberty, property, character, and freedom 
of opinion ; e. g. A man arraigned as a criminal is pre- 
sumed to be innocent, until he is proved guilty. A man in 
possession of an estate is presumed to be the owner, until 
his title is invalidated by sufficient proof. Any ancient in- 
stitution is presumed to be well founded, until its principles 
can be shown to be false and mischievous ; or it can be 
shown, by fraud or violence, to have supplanted a more an- 
cient institution. In the latter case the burden of proof 
falls upon the more modern, and the presumption lies in 
favour of the more ancient institution. It happens, some- 
times, that those are called innovators, who are, in reality, 
the advocates of what is truly ancient and venerable. If 
they prove this to be the fact, they, of course, transfer the 
burden of proof to where it justly belongs. 

Presumptive evidence must be distinguished from a priori 
or antecedent probability. This last is strictly inherent pro- 
bability, arising from a, priori or established principle. 
Any fact or proposition possesses this kind of probability, 
when it is a probable consequence of such a princi- 
ple ; e. g. From the known character of an individual, there 
is an antecedent probability how he will act under certain 
circumstances. There may be a moral certainty that he will 
do right; but the circumstances may be such as not simply 
to involve a question of rectitude. From the knowledge 
which we have of the circumstances, in connection with the 
character of the individual, we judge that an antecedent 
probability exists as to the manner in which he will act. 

There is antecedent probability in favor of a Divine reve- 
lation, arising from the character of the Deity and the moral 
condition of man. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 423 

In making experiments in Natural Science, there is often 
an antecedent probability of the results arising from known 
antecedents. 

In conclusion, we remark, that the evidence by which we 
gain certain knowledge of the connection of antecedents and 
consequents, or of any fact or proposition, is in general 
called demonstrative evidence. The terms demonstrative and 
demonstration are technically and particularly applied to 
mathematical reasoning. Moral reasoning may be demon- 
strative in respect to moral truth ; but not in respect to moral 
action. The evidence by which we gain 'probable knowledge 
is called probable evidence ; the highest degree of proba 1 ility 
is called moral certainty. And the evidence by which 
we gain presumptive knowledge is called presumptive evi- 
dence. 

We shall next proceed to apply the foregoing principles 
to the different kinds of evidence contained under the two 
general divisions of the a priori and the a posteriori. 



424 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION V. 

TESTIMONY. 

This is moral evidence, because it depends upon the 
human will. The highest certainty, therefore, to which 
testimony can attain is moral certainty. 

Testimony, as a species of evidence, must embrace very 
extensive considerations of human nature, and of the in- 
fluence of motives. Testimony, in any given case, is a fact 
which must a 'posteriori be accounted for. It is accounted 
for by referring it to the motives which led to it. If it can 
be shown that the truth of the fact testified to, is the mo- 
rally certain ground of the testimony, then the testimony 
proves the truth of that fact with a moral certainty. If 
the truth is the only probable ground, then the testimony 
proves the probability of the fact to a degree determined 
by the character of the witness and the circumstances in 
which he is placed. 

But to proceed to a more particular exposition of this 
subject — 

I. What circumstances determine the truth of testimony 
with a moral certainly ? 

1. The character of the witness : if he have all the quali- 
ties of a perfect moral being, then his veracity, under any 
circumstances, may be deemed morally certain. 

Only one degree, at least, below moral certainty is the ve- 
racity of such men as we have already referred to, viz., 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 425 

Paul, Joseph, Daniel, Washington, &c. We can hardly 
conceive of a trial so severe as to lead such men to sacrifice 
their integrity. 

2. Sufficient opportunities for observing the fact testified 
to, i. e. The fact must have been the direct and unquestion- 
able object of sense or experience : " That which we have 
heard — which we have seen with our eyes — which we have 
looked upon (i. e. have steadily contemplated) and our hands 
have handled — declare we unto you." 

3. The witness must be a man of sane mind. 

The first, however, may be regarded as including the two 
last. A man of high and perfect moral character will not 
testify to facts which he has not carefully and fully observed : 
nor will he testify, if he is not conscious of having been in 
a proper state of mind at the time they were presented. 

II. What circumstances determine the truth of testimony 
on grounds of mere probability ? 

1. The last particular mentioned under the preceding 
head is essential to all testimony ; and the probability will 
always be directly in proportion to the first two. 

2. The probability established by testimony will vary 
with the number and character of the motives under which 
the witness testifies. 

First. If the witness has an interest in the facts to 
which he testifies, arising from pride, ambition, or the grati- 
fication of any desire, or the fulfilment of any selfish pur- 
pose which he is known to entertain, then will his testimony 
in proportion be invalidated. Still, however, the known 
character of the witness must be taken into the account. The 
same motives relatively to one man will invalidate testimony 
to a greater degree than relatively to another ; i, e. the 



426 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

motive and the character must be taken together, and the 
probability be accordingly deduced. 

Secondly. If the motives be such as on principles of 
self-gratification would lead the witness J;o testify contrary 
to his actual testimony, then is the testimony strong in pro* 
portion to the motives ; e. g. A man testifying to facts at 
the expense of reputation— or worldly possessions and 
honours — or of life. 

III. Testimony in relation to opinion and in relation to 
fact. 

By opinion we mean a judgment of the mind, respecting 
a proposition as true or false. Opinion is to be distinguished 
from absolute knowledge, as implying that the proposition 
which is its object, is still debateable. 

Testimony cannot establish the truth of opinions or judg- 
ments. Their truth can be established only on some ne- 
cessary principle of the Intelligence. 

Testimony, as evidence, relates merely to matters of fact. 
All, therefore, that a witness can testify to, in relation to 
opinions, is the fact that he or some otner person entertains 
such and such opinions. But the truth or falsity of the 
opinions must be determined on other grounds, and wholly 
independently of testimony. 

A man may be of the highest integrity, and of sane 
mind, and may sacrifice reputation and possessions, and life 
itself, in maintaining his opinions, without affording any 
evidence of their truth. His testimony only goes to es- 
tablish the fact that he believes the proposition in question, 
and that he believes it ardently and firmly. 

Divine testimony is adequate to establish a truth as well 
as a fact, because God is Infinite Reason, and the very sub- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 42? 

stance of truth. We believe, therefore, what God affirms, 
although we may be incapable of determining the truth, in- 
dependently, on the principles of our reason. 

The testimony of good and wise men is entitled to high 
consideration. But we do not ultimately and securely set- 
tle a point which they profess to believe, until we have as- 
certained the grounds on which they believe. The same 
principles of evidence are common to them and to ourselves ; 
if, therefore, they have believed on just principles, we must 
be capable of perceiving them. 

IV. Truth and FacL — By fact, we mean phenomena, — 
something which we know by observation merely. Facts 
are of two kinds: 1. Facts of the Senses, or external ob- 
servation. 2. Facts of the Consciousness, or internal ob- 
servation. 

By truth, we mean that which is arrived at by the pure 
Reason. We always assume observation as conditional to 
the exercise of Reason. But while observation supplies 
facts, Reason supplies the principles under which the facts 
are to be reduced. Now, whatever the Reason supplies, 
whether in intuition or in deduction, we call truth. From 
this comparison of truth and fact, it must still more clearly 
appear that testimony cannot prove truths or doctrines. 
Testimony is only an attestation of what has been observed. 
Truths or doctrines can be proved by reasoning alone. 

V. Historical Evidence. — The leading feature of this 
species of evidence, is testimony. 

1. Where the historian relates what he has himself seen. 
This is pure testimony, and must be judged of accord- 
ingly. 

2. Where the historian relates cotemporaneous events, 



428 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

upon the testimony of others. Here, in addition to what 
has been laid down under testimony, we must take into 
account : First. The prejudices and antipathies of country, 
party, and sect. Secondly. The philosophical ability of 
the historian to investigate, compare, and deduce. Thirdly. 
The time and attention bestowed on the work. 

3. Where the historian depends for his information upon 
the writings of others, and upon national monuments, re- 
cords, and antiquities. Here the most various and lofty 
qualifications are requisite. First. All the qualities of a 
true witness. Secondly. Varied and profound erudition ; 
viz. a knowledge of languages — of science— -of arts— of go- 
vernment ; — great skill in antiquarian researches ; and 
above all, original, all-comprehensive, and penetrative genius, 
as a philosopher. Thirdly. Adequate materials. A history 
is entitled to belief in proportion as these particulars appear 
in its compilation. 

VI. Concurrent Testimony. — This must be distinguished 
from accumulated testimony, which is a mere multiplica ion 
of witnesses. In concurrent testimony, on the contrary, al- 
though the evidence be stronger, according to the number 
of the witnesses, yet the evidence itself does not lie in the 
qualifications of the witnesses ; but only in their concur, 
rence. 

Their concurrence, on supposition, cannot be accounted 
for, without granting the fact testified to ; i. e. If the fact 
did occur, then the concurrence was possible ; if the fact 
did not occur, then the concurrence was not probable, or 
possible, as the case may be. 

In the first place. It is plain that this evidence will be 
strong, in proportion to the improbability of previous con- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 429 

cert. If previous concert can be shown to be impossible, 
then the evidence occupies one of its highest grounds. 

But, in the second place, although the probability, or even 
possibility, of previous concert may be disproved, it will 
still remain to be shown that the concurrence can be ac- 
counted for only by the admission of the fact in question. 

Now, if the concurrence can be accounted for in any 
other way, it must be by showing, in the case of each wit- 
ness, separately, that there were motives which were ade- 
quate to lead to the given testimony, without supposing the 
reality of the fact testified to. This would of course 
invalidate the concurrence. If the existence of such mo- 
tives in the case of each witness should be shown to 
have existed, there would of course be an utter anni- 
hilation of the evidence : or, if the above be shown in the 
cases of only a part of the witnesses, it must tend to 
destroy the evidence. In all these cases the concurrence 
turns out a singular fortuity. Now, if in any given con- 
currence no such invalidating or destructive circumstances 
can be detected, then it must remain as valid evidence. 

VII. Concurrent Testimony in relation to fact and opinion. 
— The principles above stated refer to concurrent testi- 
mony, as evidence of facts merely. 

Concurrent testimony, in relation to opinion, is mere con- 
currence of opinion. Where this concurrence exists without 
previous concert, it affords evidence of sincerity. Where 
an opinion is thus concurred in by men of high integrity 
and wisdom, it is entitled to great consideration ; but ulti- 
mately it must rest upon principles, as forming its only de- 
cisive evidence. This has been above shown in discussing 
opinion in its relation to simple testimony. 



430 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



- SECTION VI. 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 

By circumstances, we mean, as the etymology denotes, 
whatever stands around a principal. 

Thus the circumstances of an individual comprise all 
the particulars which make up his external condition. Thus 
the circumstances of an event comprise all the particulars 
of time, place, action, modes, degrees, causes, and effects ; 
i. e. every thing attending upon it — accessory to it — or 
every thing making up a description of it. 

Now, circumstantial evidence in general takes place 
where we adduce the circumstances which belong to a 
principal, to prove the existence of that principal. But 
what is the connection between circumstances and a prin- 
cipal which enables us to reason from the one to the other ? 
It must be something more than mere juxtaposition. An 
arbitrary and accidental connection cannot be the founda- 
tion of reasoning. The connection then must be that of 
necessary, or at least probable consequent to a stated ante- 
cedent, or the connection of phenomenon with cause and 
law : i. e. The principal being necessary to account for the 
existence of circumstances, its existence is a posteriori 
proved from the circumstances. 

In calling this circumstantial evidence, however, we only 
give another name to the ordinary a posteriori reasoning. 

Circumstantial evidence, as a really distinct kind of evi- 
dence, is constituted by a concurrence of circumstances. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 431 

The circumstantial evidence above described is a mere 
accumulation of a posteriori proof, — a bringing together of 
many effects, or consequents, to prove a common cause, or 
antecedent. But the concurrence of circumstances or facts 
is, in itself, a new and peculiar fact, independently of the 
nature of the facts taken separately. Concurrent tes- 
timony and concurrent circumstances are analogous. In 
both kinds, the proof lies in the necessity of accounting for 
the concurrence. It is a phenomenon, — it must have a 
cause. 

That which as condition or cause accounts for the con- 
currence is proved by it, either with certainty, or with more 
or less probability, as the case may be. 

Circumstantial evidence possesses the highest degree of 
certainty when there is absolutely no other way of account- 
ing for the circumstances, except by the admission of the 
principal in question. 

It possesses the highest degree of probability when al- 
though it be possible to conceive other ways of accounting 
for the concurrence than the one adopted, still every one of 
these is far-fetched, altogether hypothetical, and having no 
known connection with any existent fact. 

Where there are several ways of accounting for the con- 
currence, and all have claims to probability, we must of 
course weigh the opposite probabilities, and determine ac- 
cordingly. 

Any given concurrence of facts cannot be set aside, as of 
no weight, except by accounting for each fact separately, 
in its time, place, and relations, so as to make the concur- 
rence appear altogether fortuitous. 

Reasoning from facts, merely, and reasoning from a con- 



432 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

currence of facts, since they may both appear in the same j 
case, and in relation to the same facts, are apt to be con- j 
founded. It need hardly be remarked that it is of the ut- 
most importance t« discriminate between them, and to pre- 
sent them each on its own independent basis. 

The evidence admitted in a court of justice to prove the 
guilt of a prisoner, must be positive, or at least morally cer- 
tain. Circumstantial evidence, therefore, regarded either 
as a collection of facts, or as a concurrence of facts, can be 
admitted as decisive, only where the guilt of the prisoner 
can be taken as the only way of accounting for the facts, 
or the concurrence of facts : L e. It is not enough that it 
is the most probable way of accounting for them, — it must 
be the only probable way. 

Where the rights of two parties are opposed, so that a 
determination necessarily involves loss to one or the other, 
as in a question respecting the title of an estate, the de- 
termination must, of course, be made according to the re- 
sult of a comparison of probabilities, if no positive evidence 
can be obtained. 

In concurrent testimony, we have a number of witnesses 
coming together, without previous concert, and supporting 
each other's evidence. In concurrent circumstances, we 
have a number of circumstances coming together without 
any previous contrivance, and supporting each other in re- 
lation to a principal. 

If the testimony be true, then this concurrence is what 
we might have expected. If this principal exist, then the 
concurrence of circumstances is what we might have ex- 
pected. 

In addition to this, we have assumed that unless the con- 



THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE. 433 

currence of facts can be proved to be fortuitous, by show- 
ing how each fact came to happen in that precise time, 
place, and relation, without requiring any connection be- 
tween the several facts ; and that unless the concurrent 
testimony be accounted for in the motives of each 
witness separately, so as not to require the truth of their 
common statement ; and, we may add, unless it can be 
shown to be fortuitous, as in the case of concurrent circum- 
stances, we are compelled to admit that antecedent or 
cause which most clearly accounts for the concurrence. But 
there is an objection made to this which requires attention, 
and may compel us to prove our assumption. 

It is as follows : 

" Any given phenomena brought into juxtaposition must 
of necessity assume some order of arrangement. But 
against any particular order there are chances indefinitely 
great in number ; and as the phenomena must come into 
some order, it is plain they may come into one order as well 
as into another ; and hence they may as well come into 
that regular and connected order which we call concur- 
rence, as into one of utter confusion and want of connec- 
tion." Says the objector, therefore, " What right have you 
to assume this concurrence as proof of the principal to which 
the facts seem to relate '? I have an equal right to assume 
the fortuity of the concurrence. 

We have here, then, two assumptions directly opposed; but 
one or the other must fall ; both cannot be true. Which 
shall stand ? The objector may say, ** Please support your 
assumption." We may rejoin, Please to support yours. 
Now, we may both make the attempt, and may both fail in 
positively settling the question. After all our discussions, 

DD 



434 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

there may appear something plausible on both sides. In 
this case, he who can adduce the greatest number of proba- 
bilities for his assumption, must win the argument. In 
supporting our assumption, we urge the fact, that at least in 
the great majority of cases where there is concurrence, there 
is some cause directly and clearly producing it ; e. g. Of 
all the books ever made, we do not find that any were made 
by a fortuitous concurrence of the letters ; of all the in- 
struments and machines that have ever been constructed, 
we do not find any that were constructed by the 
fortuitous occurrence of the materials ; and as to the 
phenomena of nature, we find, as our knowledge of natural 
philosophy and chemistry is extended, that laws are brought 
to light which explain them in all their multifariousness, 
and leave us little or no place of appealing to fortuitous 
combination ? As, then, we produce the greater number of 
instances of this kind, we claim the greater number of pro- 
babilities for our assumption. Indeed, the candid objector 
must be constrained to admit that he finds it very difficult 
to bring a single instance where fortuitous combination ex- 
plains concurrence and regularity. 

This reasoning goes to show that a concurrence must 
always have the balance of probabilities in its favour, as con- 
nected with some principal which unites the facts in the con- 
currence in opposition to the assumption of a fortuitous con- 
currence. 

But here another question may arise : Whether reason- 
ing from concurrence can ever possess the highest degree of 
certainty of any kind, as we have appeared in the preceding 
pages to take for granted, where we say, "this evidence 
possesses the highest degree of certainty when there is abso- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 435 

lutely no other way of accounting for the concurrence except 
by the admission of the principal in question," inasmuch as 
in every case there is a possibility of fortuitous concurrence ? 
This is a serious question, and involves the possibility, al- 
though not the probability, of every concurrence whatever, 
— even the creation of the world being fortuitous. We may 
indeed comfort ourselves with the overwhelming probabil- 
ity that the world is the work of design ; but still are we 
prepared to grant the possibility, however remote, of a for- 
tuitous creation 1 

We are not prepared to grant this. We think we can 
prove the impossibility of fortuitous concurrence, as well as 
explain those cases which appear to be such. 

In the first place, the axioms " Every phenomenon must 
have a cause," and " Every phenomenon must have a law," 
cannot be set aside. These are necessary principles of the 
reason. But concurrence is a phenomenon, and, therefore, 
must have a cause and a law. Now if by fortuity we mean 
to negate cause and law, then fortuity is impossible in con- 
currence : and thus the question is settled at once. In the 
second place, those concurrences which appear fortuitous are 
not really so ; e. g. a cast of dice : The dice have a certain 
position before they are cast ; a certain degree of projectile; 
force is given them, and the result is a certain concurrence of 
sides. Now in this case there are causes definite and regular ; 
but because we are unable to determine them with precision, 
we call the result fortuitous. All cases of apparent fortuity 
may be resolved in the same way. There are causes, and 
they work regularly according to their nature, but we can- 
not penetrate their action. In any case of concurrence, 
therefore, the question is not, as we have above allowed, out 



436 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

of courtesy, to the objector, between the assumption of cause 
and no cause ; but whether a certain antecedent accounts 
for the concurrence, or whether it is to be accounted for by 
some other. 

Now, from our knowledge of antecedents and concur- 
rences, there are some concurrences which we do generally 
attribute to certain antecedents, because generally connected 
with them ; e. g. The print of a man's foot in the sand. 
This we should naturally attribute to the pressure of an 
actual foot ; but still, it is possible that it might have been 
produced by the action of the waves. If produced by the 
action of the waves, it has its definite cause, and is not for- 
tuitous ; but it has in this case an unusual antecedent. On 
an inhabited coast, we should affirm at once that the proba- 
bilities greatly preponderate in favour of a man's foot as the 
cause ; but a man in the situation of Robinson Crusoe, 
finding such a print upon the sea-shore, might be in 
doubt. 

Now the only case where concurrence would afford the 
highest certainty, is, as we have above affirmed, one in 
which there is but one way of accounting for the fact — 
not in opposition to fortuity, but in negation of the possi- 
bility of other causes. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 437 



A 



SECTION VIL 

ARGUMENT FROM PROGRESSIVE APPROACH. 

This belongs to the a 'posteriori form of proof, because we 
ascend from facts to a law. If, however, the facts of the 
progressive approach, introduced on the principle of causality, 
are the only elements of the proof, then we have an ordinary 
case of induction ; e. g. We ptit a ball in motion on a rough 
surface, and its motion soon ceases ; we put it in motion 
on a smoother surface, and the motion is proportionally pro- 
longed ; and we find generally, that the time of the 
motion is inversely as the resistance. Hence we infer that 
if all resistance were removed, there would be no change 
in the motion ; i. e. From the uniformity of a given num- 
ber of facts, we infer an universal uniformity of facts* 

But arc we certain, on the mere induction, that we may 
not in actual experiment arrive at a point where the pheno- 
mena shall be reversed 1 Where the resistance, after having 
been reduced to a degree lower than has ever yet been at- 
tained, shall suddenly be greatly augmented 1 Recollect we 
are merely deducing from known facts ; and the uniformity 
of nature on which we base our conclusion respecting the 
unknown, is a uniformity which relates to law in general, 
and not merely to the particular law which we assume. 
There may, therefore, be a change in the facts in the ex- 
tended experiment, which shall require them all to be re- 
duced under another law m view of higner points of uni- 
formity. The suns which we before deemed uniform, as 



438 THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE, 

fixed centres, may be found uniform as revolving about 
some higher and common centre. 

The argument from progressive approach, therefore, would 
not in itself absolutely establish the vis inertia of bodies ; 
although it might afford a high degree of probability.* 

An argument has been drawn in favour of Christianity, 
from the fact that in proportion as nations are enlightened, 
their religious views approximate towards Christianity. The 
argument in this case differs widely from the preceding, in 
respect to its subject, and is conclusive. The cause or princi- 
ple here is the human Reason. Now, we conceive of this as 
uniform and continuous in its action ; i. e. as having fixed 
laws of action, and as inherently active. Let it go into 
action, therefore, and it will act in the direction of these 
laws, and continue to act, unless counteracting and modi- 
fying causes are brought in. Hence, as the Reason is 
the faculty of perceiving truth, if we remove all obstruc- 
tions, and give it its full play and developement, its per- 
ceptions must be taken as truth. That religion, there- 
fore, which the Reason adopts, when thus developed and 
unobstructed, must be the true religion. And so also we 
must conclude that those perceptions which follow the pro- 
gressive developement of Reason, must be perceptions ap- 
proximating, proportionally towards truth. Now, if it can 
be shown .from the history of human opinions — the his- 
tory of philosophy, that these opinions have approximated 
regularly towards Christianity with the progressive de- 
velopement of the Reason, then we have in this progres- 
sive approach the highest internal evidence of the truth 

* Supra, p. 222. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 439 

of Christianity. And the evidence in this case is not a 
mere induction of facts, whose uniformity enables us, on 
probable grounds, to proclaim a general fact; but that 
of a principle regularly developing itself, and hastening 
on to its certain issue. In this argument for Christi- 
anity, we first lay down the necessary criterion of a 
true religion, viz. its correspondence with the Reason' 
truly and fully developed ; and, as resulting from this, 
the progressive concentration of the human mind upon 
certain opinions, in proportion to its developement. This 
forms our major premiss. Then, by historical evidence, 
and the evidence derived from philosophical criticism, we 
establish the fact that Christianity is the point upon which 
the human mind, in its progressive developement, thus con- 
centrates. This forms our minor premiss. The conclusion 
is then inevitable. 



440 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE* 



SECTION vnr. 



PROVING BY EXAMPLE. 



The point to be proved is either a principle of a particu-* 
lar fact. If a principle, then the faets which go to estab- 
iish it, are inducted, and this is nothing more than induction,, 
employed in the order of proof. 

If a particular fact, then the establishment of a principle,, 
although not appearing in the statement, really intervenes 
in the mental process, and forms the ground of the conclu- 
sion, in reference to the particular fact. In both rases, the 
establishment of the genera! principle is the cardinal part of 
the proof. It may therefore be termed more appropriately, 
— proving by Induction. This differs from Inductive Inves- 
tigation only in the order. In Inductive Investigation, we 
begin with the facts, and advance to the principle. In Proof 
by Induction, we first lay down the principle, or a fact 
which reposes upon and presumes the principle, and then 
we induct- the facts, or examples, to prove it. 

It is necessary, however, to recall in this connection 
an important distinction, which applies both to inductive in- 
vestigation and to inductive proof. In Induction, we do not 
bring together facts promiscuously. We make a selection 
— we bring together only such facts as have some connec- 
tion with each other. They are alike either in form, time, 
a ' place, or in theii relal . But, why do we bring only 
such facts together as -are alike ? I will answer, by ask- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 441 

ing another question. Why do we bring facts together at 
all 1 Obviously, to understand or to comprehend them. 

But, if we wish merely to understand them by generaliz- 
ing them under a common name, then we must, of neces- 
sity, observe likeness, and, of course, difference. And, if we 
wish to comprehend them by reducing them under a law, then 
also must we observe likeness and difference, because our 
idea of a law, or cause, comprehends uniformity, — and the 
uniformity of the effects must be regarded as an exponent 
of the law. 

When, therefore, we are seeking for a law by Induction, 
in the order of investigation, or when we are proving by 
induction a law already laid down, we follow those connec- 
tions of the facts which presume a law. 

Now, in inductive investigation, we do not always suc- 
ceed in finding the law. We are often compelled, at least 
for a time, to stop short with a mere generalization under 
a common name, and the announcement of a theory. The 
generalization and the theory aid our farther investigations, 
and may enable us, eventually, to find the law ; but in 
them we have not arrived at certainty. 

So also in the order of proof. The point to be proved 
may not be a law, at the conception of which we may not 
yet have arrived, but merely a general uniformity, or a 
theory. The facts which we bring together are of course 
limited, since induction, from its very nature, is never 
complete. We are compelled, therefore, to infer the uni- 
versal from the limited. This is illogical. The inference 
must therefore be contingent. It may or may not be. We 
apply, next, to the inference, the laws of probability. 

What reason have we, in any given case, to infer aaun> 

DP* 



442 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

versa] uniformity from a limited observation, — e, g. from the 
fact that the sun has risen, at regular intervals, for five thou- 
sand years, what reason have we to infer that he will al- 
ways rise at the same intervals, supposing, of course, that 
we have as yet ascertained no law of the planetary move- 
ments ? It is because we feel assured that the uniformity of 
the facts is the exponent of some law, although the law 
be concealed ; and upon the authority of law, uniform and 
continuous, do we infer the universal from the limited. The 
particular and limited facts are a condition on which a 
law is conceived of, and then the inference is imbued with 
the whole energy, and stretched to the whole compass of 
law. But, if the inference thus rests upon the conception 
of some law, why is it not always characterised by cer- 
tainty? 

When the conception is not merely of some law, but ar- 
rives at a particular and certain law, then the inference 
is certain, — e. g. when the law of the planetary movements 
is ascertained, then we are physically certain that the sun 
will continue to rise at the same intervals. But, until we 
have ascertained the particular law, although we know from 
the uniformity there must be a law, and although we may 
form a shrewd theory, we cannot be certain but that the uni- 
formity observed is only a part of some other and higher 
uniformity, where the law really resides, and that this 
higher uniformity, in its wider cycle, presents the particu- 
lar uniformity which we have observed as only one of a 
long succession where the facts are uniform under one cha- 
racteristic for a certain period ; and then change and be- 
come uniform under another characteristic, and so on, 
throughout the whole succession; all the different uniformi- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

ties being held together by the law which penetrates and 
concentrates all. — e. g. Let an Intelligence, whose ex- 
istence numbers only a few days, like the butterfly of the 
opening summer, have the term of his being in those 
beautiful months : from the regular succession of sun- 
shine and soft showers which he observes, he con- 
cludes there must be some law ; and taking the observed 
uniformity as the exponent of that law, he concludes that 
the whole succession of climate is made up of sunshine and 
soft showers. While as yet he knows no particular and 
certain law of the planetary movements, he knows not that 
the uniformity which he observes is only one of a series of 
uniformities, under different characteristics, making up the 
cycle of the seasons : but let him ascertain^ the law, and 
then he at once passes beyond the narrow sphere of his in- 
ductions, and comprehends the whole succession. 

So also, had we not ascertained the law of the planetary 
movements, our own observation, as well as the observation 
of five thousand years, could not enable us certainly to con- 
clude respecting the future movements, inasmuch as the 
whole five thousand years might be only one of a succes- 
sion of uniformities, under different characteristics, and at- 
tachedto a higher system. 

You now clearly perceive the distinction at which we 
aim. The distinction between reasoning upon the basis of 
a law, or upon the basis of a mere uniformity. 

In the first, we infer, or we prove, with certainty. In the 
second, our basis is also some law, but a law unknown, and 
only theorised, and therefore our conclusions are only pro- 
bable. 

This is a general statement. There are apparent excep- 



444 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

tions ; where a limited observation of uniformity seems to 
enable us to conclude with certainty to the future and uni- 
versal uniformity. Indeed, there are cases where, upon a 
single observation, we thus conclude : e. g* the fusibility 
of a substance ; the combination of substances by elec- 
tive affinity. 

Upon such cases we remark : 

1. The observation, although limited in the particular 
case, is supported by more extended observations in similar 
or analogous cases. 

2. The cases are of such a character that all the possi- 
ble circumstances and relations that can be of any weight, 
are embraced in the observation, though limited both as to 
time and space. 

3. The cases in which a succession of uniformities is con- 
ceivable, and in which therefore certainty is attainable only 
by the discovery of a law, are cases where we take into 
consideration not the specific natures or powers, and sus- 
ceptibilities of substances, but general and extended rela- 
tions in time and space ; whereas, in these other cases, the 
specific natures or powers, and susceptibilities of substances, 
are what we particularly take into consideration. Take 
the elective affinity of two substances, and apply to it these 
principles as an illustration. 1. This is supported by ob- 
servations in numerous analogous cases. 2. All the cir- 
cumstances of the case, of any weight, are embraced in our 
observation. No change of time or place can add to or 
take from the completeness. 3. We are considering only 
the specific natures of these substances, in no general rela- 
tion, but simply in relation to each other. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 445 



SECTION IX. 

REASONING FROM EXPERIENCE. 

I. From the present to the past. — This, in the general 
statement, is called a posteriori. We wish to ascertain 
the past. We take the facts of the present, and, in ac- 
counting for them, call up the past. This presumes that 
the past is the cause of the present. Regarded, how- 
ever, more closely, this form of proof presents itself as 
follows : 

1. The facts of the present are accounted for by referring 
them to causes — causes which are also present, and now 
acting. But, causes are inherently energetic, and are uni- 
form ; hence, since they existed in the past, they must have 
produced effects like those which we now witness. We thus 
draw the facts of the past from the facts of the present, not 
by assigning the former as the causes of the latter, but by 
referring both to common causes, and then analogically 
concluding the past from the present. 

Thus we may prove the physical condition of the ancient 
world ; and, taking human nature as a cause, we may prove 
its moral condition. 

2. The distinction between moral and physical causes, 
and between moral and physical certainty, must be borne 
in mind. The former brings in the consideration of free 
will, in connection with a vast variety of moral character, 
and therefore gives birth to a vast variety of results, while 
the latter is fixed and precise. 



446 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

The physical condition of the ancient world, it "is not 
difficult to determine on well known and uniform general 
principles. But, in order to determine the moral condition 
with any precision, we need data from history. There is 
indeed a reciprocal action between history and general moral 
principles, in reasoning : the latter often serving to deter- 
mine points of history otherwise doubtful ; the former sup- 
plying, leading, and determining facts to the latter. 

3. Laws have often a gradual, instead of an immediate 
developement. Thus a law, in order to complete its cycle, 
may require ages. This appears in Geology and Astronomy, 
and in Politics and Philosophy. 

Now, if we can ascertain that given and present facts 
are a part of such a developement, gradual and progressive, 
then we have at once a chain by which we can a posteriori 
ascend to the past as well as a priori descend to the future. 

II. From the present to the future. — Our present experi- 
ence is connected with causes. If these causes are known, 
on the uniformity of law, we predict the future. 

The distinction between moral and physical causes, and 
between moral and physical certainty above referred to, is 
of equal importance here. On laws gradually developing, 
no additional remarks are necessary. 

The above proceeds on the supposition that we have as- 
certained Laws. In many instances, however, we may 
proceed merely on an uniformity more or less extensive. 
The distinction given under Reasoning from Example will 
apply here also, viz. That when we reason upon the basis 
of mere uniformity, generally, our conclusions are only pro- 
bable : but when we reason upon the basis of a law clearly 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 447 

ascertained, our conclusions are certain, morally or physi- 
cally, as the case may be. 

Those instances where we reason to a past and a future, 
uniformity upon a single experiment, or a very limited ex- 
perience, — e. g. the fusibility of a substance — have already 
been considered. 



448 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION X. 

REASONING FROM RESEMBLANCE AND ANALOGY. 

Resemblance is defined as agreement in certain points, 
and is thus distinguished from identity, which is universal 
agreement, and excludes difference. Other things being 
equal, the more numerous the points of agreement, the 
closer the resemblance. Some points, however, are more 
important than others. Agreement in a few important 
points constitutes a closer likeness than agreement in a mul- 
titude of unimportant or trifling points. 

Resemblance is of two general kinds : First, Resem- 
blance in properties. Secondly, Resemblance in relations. 

Now, in reasoning from resemblance, we must of course 
reason either from the resemblance of properties or of rela- 
tions. The first is called reasoning from direct or simple re- 
semblance. The second, reasoning from analogy. 

In reasoning from resemblance, there are two terms. In 
reasoning from analogy, there are three or four terms, and 
two relations. 

I. Direct Resemblance. — The object in this case is to de- 
termine particulars of resemblance unknown to exist, from 
known particulars ; i. e. From known corresponding proper- 
ties, to reason toothers which are unknown. One property 
in a subject is seen to involve another, either on the ground 
of uniform sequence or of law. Hence we infer the agree- 
ment of two terms in properties, which are involved in those 
which are known to exist. The reasoning is a priori, when 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 449 

the unknown property holds to the known, the relation of 
consequent to antecedent ; and, vice versa, the reasoning is 
a posteriori. 

The probability of the reasoning obviously must be de- 
termined by the nature of the connection between the 
known and unknown ; if it be a connection of mere stated 
uniformity, the reasoning is generally only probable ; if it be 
a connection of law, the reasoning is certain. Caesar 
and Buonaparte resemble each other in certain properties — 
ambition, &c. But ambition can be shown to involve the 
love of supreme power, and the love of supreme power in- 
volves attempts to gain the supremacy, if the time and oppor- 
tunity be auspicious : hence, Csesar and Buonaparte may 
have the consequential points of resemblance, inasmuch as 
they have the quality which involves them. This is a 
priori ; and the conclusion morally certain. 

In arguing that ihe planets are inhabited, from their re- 
semblance to this world, we proceed a posteriori. From like 
provisions for social existence, we infer social existence. 
We argue here to the motive or design. This likewise is 
morally certain. 

II. Indirect Resemblance or Analogy. 

1. Where there are two terms related to a common third, 
we may call the two relations a common relation, inasmuch 
as the common third is a cause of both, or at least a uniform 
antecedent of both. In this case, when the analogy is 
granted, and we reason from particulars of one relation, or 
of one member of the common relation to particulars of the 
other, our reasoning is probable or certain ; In the first 
place, according to the nature of the connection between the 
common third and the two related terms : if it be only a 



450 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

! 

connection of uniform sequents, the reasoning is generally 
only probable ; if of Law, the reasoning is certain. 

The reasoning is probable or certain in the second place, 
according to the nature of the particulars from which we i 
reason : if they are particulars necessarily comprehended i 
in the third term, the reasoning is certain : if they be j 
merely circumstantial, the reasoning will be probable, ac- \ 
cording to the degree of uniformity. When the third term ) 
is merely a uniform antecedent, and the particulars of the n 
relation likewise only circumstantial, with more or less of J 
uniformity, we shall have the case of a probability of a pro- J 
bability. 

When the analogy is to be proved from the resembling : 
particulars, we have substantially a case of simple a posteri- j 
ori reasoning. Each set of particulars is shown to de* A 
mand the common third as an antecedent. The princi- 
ples, therefore, which apply to a posteriori reasoning in i 
general will apply to this case. ! 

2. Where there are four terms and two distinct, but re- 
sembling relations. | 

What constitutes the analogy? The resembling rela- i. 
tions ? But this resemblance may be accidental. It must 
be at least a uniform resemblance, therefore, that consti- 
tutes the analogy. The particulars in one relation must 
uniformly resemble the particulars in the other relation. 
But this uniformity is an exponent of some law. What- 
ever conclusion is drawn, therefore, must rest upon this law 
as certainly ascertained, or as existing only in theory, and 
accordingly will be a conclusion certain or probable. 

Now, this law must comprehend both relations, because it 
explains the uniformity of the resemblance between the two 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 451 

relations. But are not these relations themselves relations of 
antecedent and consequent, as respects the two terms respec* 
tively, comprehended by some higher and common term? It 
is even so. The two terms on either side of the analogy are 
related as antecedent and consequent ; and then their rela- 
tions exhibit resemblances which must be referred to a high- 
er law comprehending and penetrating both ; e. g. The seed 
of a plant, and the egg of a fowl. The plant is in some sense 
the cause of the seed — and the fowl in some sense the cause 
of the egg. The two terms on either side have very slight 
direct resemblances. And the two relations do not resemble 
each other merely in being relations of cause and effect, 
for they resemble a multitude of relations in the same way. 
But the point to be nicely and strictly observed is, that 
these two relations have particulars of resemblance beyond 
their general agreement with each other, and with all other 
relations of cause and effect. What is this agreement] 
It is this. The egg and the seed , besides being effects the 
one of the fowl, the other of the plant, contain alike the 
principle of generative life. Now, when we reason from one 
to the other, we reason on the basis of this common principle. 
"Whatever particulars are necessarily comprehended in the 
action of this principle, and developed as such on one side 
of the analogy, may be concluded as likewise existing on 
the other side. 

If the principle be only in theory, then the reasoning 
cannot advance beyond probability. If the particu- 
lars have only a uniform, and not a necessary connection, 
to our perception, with the principle, the reasoning here 
likewise is only probable. If both the preceding concur in 
a given case, we have only a probability of a probability. 



452 THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE. 

Not unfrequently in this kind of analogy the great ob- I] 
ject of the reasoning is to establish the analogy itself; i. e. \ 
Four terms being given, and two terms respectively being J 
related each to each, constituting two relations, the object 
of the reasoning is to bring these relations under a common i 
principle. This may be done a priori, by showing that a J 
principle exists which necessarily or probably comprehends J 
these relations ; or, a posteriori, by showing that there are J 
particulars of resemblance in these relations which pro- J 
bably or certainly require the principle to account for 
them. , 

This analogy thus established, as we have before shown, 
becomes a general principle to these relations and forms the 
basis of deductions. We have an illustration of this in an 
argument adduced by phrenologists. 

There is an obvious connection between the governing 
and specific propensities of animals and their physical struc- 
ture : thus carnivorous animals may be distinguished from 
graminivorous — the lion from the ox. 

There is a connection likewise between the intellect of 
man and his physical structure. His senses and his brain 
are unquestionably connected with the developement of his 
intellect. 

Now the object of the reasoning is to establish an ana- 
logy; i. e. That the relations on either side are compre- I 
bended by the same principle or law. This, if established j 
at all, must be established either a priori or a posteriori. I 
If a priori, then we must find some principle or law ac- 
tually existing which comprehends these relations neces- j 
sarily, or at least probably. Is there any such principle ? 
They are bound to show it. I cannot perceive any. If 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 453 

a 'posteriori^ then we must find such particulars of resem- 
blance in the two relations as demand necessarily, or at 
least probably, a common principle to account for them. 
Are there such particulars of resemblance ? Let us see. 
In the first relation ; L e. between the animal propensities 
and physical structure, we perceive that the propensities 
have reference to ends which can be accomplished only by 
a physical structure directly adapted to them. The thirst 
for blood demands the teeth and paws of the lion and tiger ; 
palpably the nature cannot be complete without these in- 
struments. But are there any like particulars in the rela- 
tion between the intellect of man and his senses, brain and 
scull, &c. ? The senses and brain are indeed conditional 
to the exercise of thought ; but are they the instruments of 
thought ? Can it be shown that the senses and brain are to 
the intellect, what the teeth and paws are to the propensity 
for prey ? Can it be shown from any particulars in this 
relation, that any power of the mind requires a portion of 
the brain as its instrument for accomplishing its end, just as 
the beast palpably requires the strong jaws with all their 
furniture, and the muscular legs and paws ! 

The relation between the intellect and the brain and 
senses, contains no such particulars as the relation between 
the animal propensities and the instruments which are ne- 
cessary to accomplish their ends. Hence we cannot infer 
that they come under the same law — hence we cannot 
reason from one to the other. 

A beautiful and familiar analogy, and one which aptly 
illustrates analogy consisting of four terms, is that between 
the human being at death and insect metamorphoses. Here 
are the two relations, of the human being to death, and of 



454 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

the caterpillar to its chrysalis. In the latter case we see 
the whole process, a dissolution of the caterpillar, and the 
infolded germ of a higher being reposing for a time within 
the chrysalis and there preparing for its new form of life, 
and, when the hour arrives, bursting from its shell a winged 
and gorgeous psyche, dwelling in the sun-beams and feeding 
upon the aroma of flowers. In like manner the human 
being lies down to die ; but in this last case we do not see the 
whole process, — we cannot by the microscope discover here 
the wings of the immortal form infolded in the " mortal 
coil ;" nor do we see the struggling psyche after it has burst 
its shell. The analogy, therefore, does not present us many 
resembling circumstances in the two relations compared. 
But, nevertheless, there are some points very striking. The 
death of the caterpillar is not the extinction of the organific 
Life within — that survives. And yet he who first witnessed 
this metamorphosis, when he saw the worm die, and the 
chrysalis formed, must have concluded that Nature in her, 
sportive and beautiful fancy had only given the frail and in- 
significant creature a golden tomb. But when he looked 
again, he saw a bright and spirit-like creature struggling into 
a nobler life. We see thus, in Nature, an apparent death only 
the precursor of another and a higher form of life. Now 
take the human being, with all his sublime capacities — 
capacities admitting of indefinite improvement — and with 
his actual conceptions of, and longings after immortality 
and does it not seem a priori, a fit and reasonable thing that 
he should live again when he appears to die ? And if any 
should object to the conclusion, that all the circumstances 
of dissolution ought to lead to a contrary induction, then 
we may reason from the analogy of the butterfly, that in 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 455 

Nature an apparent death is but the process through which 
a new and more perfect form of life is produced. 

The use of the analogy here is not to prove the doctrine 
of immortality, but to answer an objection to it. The 
principle which comprehends both relations is that of Life, 
not as the product of organization, but as itself the organific 
power. To this we may add the fitness and harmony of the 
Divine design. 

The above exposition of reasoning from Resemblance and 
Analogy, suggests the following rules for conducting this 
reasoning : 

First, Be careful to distinguish between direct resem- 
blance and the resemblance of relations, and between the 
analogy of three and that of four terms. 

Secondly. Distinguish between important and unimport- 
ant resemblances. Those are unimportant which are 
merely accidental. Every degree of uniformity claims 
a corresponding degree of attention, because uniformity 
is an exponent of law. Those resemblances which stand 
directly and unquestionably connected with law, are the 
most important. 

Thirdly. Another rule commonly given is, not to carry 
out our comparison of the terms or relations to too many 
resemblances. 

The resemblances evidently cannot be too numerous if 
they all be important. This rule contemplates substantially 
the same point as the preceding. A comparison is always 
carried out too far when it is carried out to unimportant 
points of resemblance. 



456 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION XL 

DEMONSTRATIVE PROOF. 

In noticing the application of the Deductive Formula*, I 
drew illustrations from Geometry. Geometry then is De- 
duction. But it is Demonstrative Proof also. The princi- 
ples are the same — the process of reasoning the same. 
The only distinction lies in the order of proof and the order 
of investigation already noticed. f He who first constructed 
Geometry proceeded of necessity according to the latter 
order. Now, that it is constructed, the learner proceeds ac- 
cording to the former. 

Indeed, where we lay down a proposition, and then give 
the demonstration, we evidently only announce before hand 
the conclusion at which we are to arrive ; and this we are 
enabled to do, because in a previous investigation, this propo- 
sition was found to be the conclusion of the very chain of 
•premises, or the sorites, which we now call the demons! rat ion. 

Demonstrative proof applies to all subjects where our de- 
ductions can be made from absolute principles. 



* Supra, p. 363. t Supra, p. 39'- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 457 



SECTION XII. 

CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES AND CHANCES. 

The calculation of probabilities, is generally called the 
calculation of chances, but improperly. Let us try to dis- 
tinguish them. I have already defined^Ae probable as im- 
plying, both, that a certain amount of proof has already 
been obtained for a given proposition, and that still more is 
required for complete certainty. The 'possible, in distinct- 
ion from this, exists where no proof has actually been ob- 
tained, but where the proposition is of such a nature as to 
admit of proof.* 

Now, a proposition, while in the state of progressive 
proof, shows probabilities on either hand. It is here that 
a calculation is required, viz. : a calculation of the oppos- 
ing probabilities, so as to determine the ratio of probability 
for the proposition in question. 

Now, on the other hand, the calculation of chances 
would be the calculation of possibilities, or rather of pre- 
sumptions founded upon possibility. We have shown above, f 
that where a presumption is said to lie in favour of any pro- 
position, there is always some principle which, in reality, 
determines it. Some natural right claims to be respected 
until positive reasons be given why it should be set aside ; 
or the sanctions of time and usage surround the disputed 
point, and claim to hold it, until a higher authority be ad- 

* Supra, Section IV. t Ibid. 

EE 



458 THE DOCTRINE OP EVIDENCE. 

duced. Now, here is something of the nature of proba- 
bility. The fact that I am in possession of an estate, is 
proof that I am the owner, until my right is invalidated : and 
the fact of the existence of any institution, is proof in its 
favour, until it be proved to have had its origin in fraud or 
violence. Presumption may therefore be called the lowest 
degree of probability, as moral certainty is sometimes called 
the highest degree. 

A calculation of .pure possibilities, or chances, is imprac- 
ticable, because there are no data. In pure possibilities, all 
the terms are equally improbable, or without proof, and 
hence there is no calculation by which one result may be 
shown to be more likely than another. For example, in the 
cast of a die there are six possibilities, and yet any one side 
is improbable, for no reason can be assigned why it, in par- 
ticular, should come up : there indeed is a reason lying in 
the position of the die, — the manner in which it is thrown — 
giving it just such a direction, and such a degree of force ; 
but it is unascertainable. It may indeed be said that the 
probability in favour of a particular side is one-sixth, because 
there are six sides to the die ; but this is not true, since it 
is possible that the same side might come up successively 
many times. 

What is called the calculation of chances, therefore, is 
really the calculation of probabilities, either as probabilities 
simply, or under that form which we have termed presump- 
tions. There are always data — something given upon which 
we may base our calculations. This is amply illustrated 
in insurance upon life and property. The term of human 
life, under different climates, in different employments, and, 
taking as a point of departure, different ages, has been 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 459 

made the subject of very extensive observations, by which 
data have been accumulated sufficient to enable us to calcu- 
late the probable number of years still remaining to any in- 
dividual, so as to affix to it a definite commercial value. 
The rates of insurance on houses and ships are determined 
upon data acquired in the same way. Here there is no 
chance or mere possibility, but tangible proof. It is true, 
indeed, that the results calculated, may, in particular instan- 
ces, fail of being attained ; but this obviously arises from 
the fact, that our data are necessarily limited, embracing 
only the more general and striking circumstances of the 
risks of human life, by disease and accident, and of houses 
and ships, by fire and tempests. We have not, in respect to 
these, determined any absolute law, nor even any stated and 
fixed sequences, for then we should have certainty ; we 
have only arrived at certain aggregate sequences and a com- 
plexity of influences and laws, where we are liable to the 
introduction of some new influence or law which may 
change the whole state of things. And this is the reason 
why the process is called a calculation of chances, since 
men are accustomed, in common parlance, to call that 
chance which happens unexpectedly ; and we are here cal- 
culating particular results in opposition to possible fortuities. 
Or, perhaps, a juster representation is, that presuming an 
end, we calculate the risks — in other words, the probabil- 
ities, that it will not take place. 

Indeed, there are just two orders in which the proof may 
proceed : First. We may consider what antecedents may ex- 
ist in relation to a particular consequent, and which of them 
is most likely to produce it. Secondly. The consequent 
may be one in whose favour the presumption lies, so that 



460 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

the burden of proof rests with him who would dispute it. In 
this case, probabilities are to be arrayed against the conse- 
quent. 

Under the first order there are obviously three possible 
cases : 

1. The several possible antecedents may not differ as to 
the probability of their existence, but they may differ as to 
the probability with which each one claims to be the actual 
antecedent. In this case, the ratio to be determined re- 
spects the immediate connection of antecedent and conse* 
quent. 

2. The antecedents may not differ as to the probability 
of their actual antecedence, but, as to the probability 
of their existence. Here the ratio to be determined re- 
spects the antecedents themselves, and not their connection 
with the consequent. 

3. The antecedents may differ in both respects. In this 
ease, the ratio of the probabilities will be as the product of 
the probabilities of the existence, and of the actual antece- 
dence of the one, to the products of the same probabilities 
of the other ; i. e. the ratio of a probability of a proba- 
bility to a probability of a probability : e. g. suppose the 
probabilities of existence be as 5 : 6, and the probabili- 
ties of actual antecedence as 3 : 4, then the resultant 
probability will be as 5 : 8. 

Under the second order, the same cases must occur. This 
is the order of proof in insurances. The presumption is 
always in favour of life and property ; for the propaga- 
tion and sustentation of human beings, and the accumula- 
tion and preservation of property, is the fixed and predomi* 
nant order of things. He who insures them, can lose only 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 461 

by their being lost. He therefore, under the given circum- 
stances, must calculate the probabilities, that antecedents 
exist which may occasion this loss ; and if this be granted, 
or rendered probable, then he must calculate the ratio of the 
probabilities of the several antecedents. 

There are cases which appear at first entirely fortuitous, 
but which afterwards are invested with probability, through 
data acquired by sheer empiricism : e. g. nothing appears 
more fortuitous than the casting of a particular side of a 
die ; and yet, by casting the die a great many times, it has 
been found that a particular side returns with a consider- 
able degree of exactness, according to a certain ratio. 

We have not attempted, in this place, any thing like a 
* full explanation of the calculation of probabilities ; for this 
would lead us into the domain of Mathematics. We have 
only aimed to state the leading principles as they stand con- 
nected with the Doctrine of Evidence. 



THE END. 



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